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\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}\pard\plain \ltrpar\s17\qc \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Spinoza on Inherence, Causation, and Conception}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\ul\super\insrsid7669494\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7669494 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid11411133 Unless otherwise marked, all references to the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid11411133 Ethics,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid11411133 
 the early works of Spinoza, and Letters 1-29 are to Edwin Curley's translation: }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid11411133 The Collected Works of Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid11411133 , Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). In references to the other letters of Spinoza I have used Samuel Shirley's translation: }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid11411133 Spinoza: Complete Works}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid11411133  (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002). }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
I use the following standard abbreviations for Spinoza\rquote s works:}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  TdIE}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  - }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ], }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 TTP}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \endash  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Theological Political Tretises}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Tractatus Theologico Politicus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ], }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 KV}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \endash  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Korte Verhandeling van God de Mesch en deszelfs Welstand}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ], }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \ab\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 DPP}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \endash  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \ai\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Descartes
\rquote  Principles of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \ai\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I & II}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ], and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ep.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \endash  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Letters}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 . Passages in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  will be referred to by means of the following abbreviations: a(-xiom), c(-orollary), p(-roposition), s(-cholium) and app(-endix); }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
\lquote d\rquote  stands for either \lquote definition\rquote  (when it appears immediately to the right of the part of the book), or \lquote demonstration\rquote 
 (in all other cases). Hence, E1d3 is the third definition of part 1 and E1p16d is the demonstrati}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944 on of proposition 16 of part 1.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 

\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid7669494 Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qc \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7678685 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid7678685 (Forthcoming in }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid7678685\charrsid7678685 
Journal of the History of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid7678685 )}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab Spinoza\rquote s philosophy is bold and rich in challenges to our \u8220
\'d2common-sense intuitions\u8221\'d3, and insofar as it provides powerful arguments to motivate these challenges, I believe that we cannot ask for more. Bold}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  well-argued philosophy has the indispensable virtue of being able to unsettle and try us, to move us to reconsider what seems natu
ral and obvious, and possibly even to change our most basic beliefs. Indeed, for those who seek to test \endash  rather than confirm - their old and well-fortified intuitions, Spinoza is nothing short of a living spring.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab My deep support for }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 rigorous}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , counter-int
uitive philosophy notwithstanding, a considerable part of the current paper will be dedicated to an examination and critique of one of the boldest and most fascinating readings of Spinoza of the past few years. In his recent piece, \u8220\'d2
Rationalism Run Amok: Representation and the Reality of Emotions in Spinoza,\u8221\'d3
 and in his outstanding new book, Michael Della Rocca suggests a strict identification of the relations of inherence, causation, and conception in Spinoza (Della Rocca develops this view partly in respo
nse to a position recently articulated by Don Garret). In order to see the striking implications of this claim, one need only realize that, according to Della Rocca, Spinoza holds that insofar as the sun is the (partial) cause of some states of the sunflo
wer, the sunflower (partly) inheres in the sun. Furthermore, insofar as my great-great-grandparents caused me, I inhere in them (though we never co-existed at the same time). The mere oddity of Della Rocca\rquote 
s claim will play only a limited role, if any, in my discussion below. Della Rocca provides important and interesting arguments to the effect that if we are to accept Spinoza\rquote 
s radical version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (henceforth, PSR),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See E1p11d for Spinoza\rquote s strong formulation of the PSR, \uc1\u8220\'d2For each things there must be assigned a cause }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 or}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  reason, both for its existence and for its nonexistence\uc1\u8221\'d3. Cf. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 DPP 1a11 (I/158/3: \uc1\u8220\'d2Nothing exists of which it cannot be asked, what is the cause, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 or}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  reason, why it exists\uc1\u8221\'d3) and E1p8s2 (II/50/28: \u8220\'d2there must be, for each existing thing, a certain cause on account of which it exists\u8221\'d3
). E1a2, which states that all things are conceived (and hence, explained), should also be read as a statement of the PSR.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  we should bite the bullet and accept the odd implicatio
ns of Spinoza\rquote s alleged view. While I have nothing but admiration for this willingness to read Spinoza in an allegedly consistent and uncompromising manner, I do think that Della Rocca\rquote 
s argument that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception is wrong. I will argue that (1) Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and (2) that Della Rocca\rquote 
s suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or friendly amendment to Spinoza\rquote s system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system, and for }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 that}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  reason (and not because the threefold identity contravenes common sense) it should be rejected. In the rest of the paper I rely on my analysis of 
the relations of inherence, causation, and conception, and suggest a new interpretation of core issues in Spinoza\rquote s metaphysics, and particularly of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 conceived through}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in another}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 relations and the nature of the substance/modes opposition. Against Della Rocca\rquote 
s claim that the bifurcation of efficient causation (into causation which is, and is not, accompanied by inherence) constitutes an illegitimate brute fact, I will argue that the bifurcation of causation in Spinoza is paralleled by a bifurcation o
f conception and that the two relations are grounded in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 foundational bifurcation of existence into substance and modes}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
. If we are to recognize the reality of modes in Spinoza, we must also acknowledge the bifurcations that result from the bifurcation of existence into substance and modes.
\par \tab In the first part of the paper, I present the considerations and arguments that motivated Don Garrett\rquote s and Della Rocca\rquote s interpretations.  In the second part, I present and examine several problems that result from Della Rocca\rquote 
s reading.  In the third and final part, I (1) present my own view on the relation among inherence, causation, and conception; (2) offer a new interpretation of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 conceived through}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  relation in Spinoza; and finally, (3) defend and justify the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very center of Spinoza\rquote s system.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid7669494 1.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Inherence, Causality, and Rationalism}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab E1a4, one of the most important yet enigmatic axioms of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Ethics,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  reads:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 E1a4: Cognition}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Unlike Curley, I prefer \lquote cognition
\rquote  over \lquote knowledge\rquote  as translation of \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 cognitio}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ,\rquote 
 since the former does not give the false impression that E1a4 pertains only to true ideas. Cf. next note.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  of an effect depends on, and involves, the cognition of its cause [}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet, et eandem involvit}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .].
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 While the precise meaning of this claim may be disputed,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7697064 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064 For a helpful discussion of E1a4 see Margaret D. Wilson, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s Causal Axiom\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064 
in Margaret D}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944 .}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064  Wilson, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064 Ideas and Mechanisms}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 141-65,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064  and particularly her critique of Gueroult\rquote 
s claim that E1a4 pertains only to true ideas (}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064 Martial Gueroult}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944 ,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064  Spinoza I}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064  (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7697064 96-7).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  a consideration of Spinoza\rquote s use of this axiom makes it clear that at least part of what it means is that
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (1)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  If x causes y, then y is conceived through x.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 In E1p6, Spinoza argues that \u8220\'d2
One substance cannot be produced by another substance.\u8221\'d3 The second of Spinoza\rquote s two proofs of this proposition reads: 
\par }\pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 If a substance could be produced by something else, the cognition of it would have to depend on the cognition of its cause (by A4). And so (by D3) it would not be a substance (E1p6d2).
\par }\pard\plain \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 The first sentence of this passage relies on E1a4 to conclude from \u8220\'d2x is the cause of y (or x produces y}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar 
\pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \uc1\u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 potest produci}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8221\'d3 (\u8220\'d2could be produced\u8221\'d3) must refer to a causal relation, for otherwise one cannot explain the appeal to E1a4 which is dealing with causation.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 )\u8221\'d3 that \u8220\'d2the cognition of y involves the cognition of x.\u8221\'d3
 In the second sentence Spinoza argues that had the cognition of a substance involved the cognition of something else as its cause, this would violate the definition of substance (E1d3) as what is \u8220\'d2
conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing.\u8221\'d3 Thus, in E1p6d2, Spinoza clearly reads E1a4 as stating that effects are conceived through their causes, i.e., }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (1)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Cf. Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 11.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Following Don Garrett, I will call this doctrine the \u8220\'d2Causality Implying Conception Doctrine.\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar 
\pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7288210 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Don Garrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote 
s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Conatus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210  Argument\uc1\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 
 in Biro and Koistinen (eds.), }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 136-7.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab In his 1996 book, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
, Della Rocca followed Jarrett, Bennett, and Wilson in pointing out that Spinoza\rquote s use of E1a4 in E1p25d shows that he understands E1a4 to claim also the opposite direction implication,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10946058 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 
, 11. Cf. Bennett, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 A Study of Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\ul\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 , 128 n.1, Jarrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2The Logical Structure of Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 , Part 1\uc1\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058 Synthese}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid10946058  37 (1978) 29, and Wilson, \uc1\u8220\'d2
Spinoza\rquote s Causal Axiom\u8221\'d3 163 n. 27.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  i.e., that 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (2)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 If y is conceived through x, then y is caused by x.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 E1p25d reads:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
E1p25: God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
\par Dem.: If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by A4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But (by P15) this is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the essence of things, q.e.d.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 The demonstration takes E1a4 to state, \u8220\'d2if 
x is not the cause of y, y can be conceived without x.\u8221\'d3 The contrapositive of the last claim is that \u8220\'d2if y must be conceived through x, x is the cause of y,\u8221\'d3 which is roughly }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (2)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . Following Garrett, we will call this doctrine the \u8220\'d2Conception Implies Causality Doctrine.\u8221\'d3 The conjunction of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (1)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (2)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 gives us the biconditional:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 x}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  causes }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 y}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , iff }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 y}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  is conceived through }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 x}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab 
In 2003, Garrett published an important article offering a new interpretation of the doctrine of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 conatus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 in Spinoza. According to Garrett, the phrase \u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 quantum in se est}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \u8221\'d3 in E3p6 (\u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \u8221\'d3
) should be read literally, as implying that finite things can be in themselves to a certain degree (while God is unrestrictedly \u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in se}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \u8221\'d3). In a note in this article Garrett claims:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
It is clear that, in this context, Spinoza also accepts the converse claim that \u8220\'d2if y is conceived through x, then y is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  x.\u8221\'d3 This applies, however, only in cases where y is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 completely}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 conceived through x.  For although a finite mode may be partly conceived through the other finite modes that are partial causes of it, it does not follow that it is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  those finite modes.  Rather, it is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the substance through which it \endash 
 as well as the finite modes that help to cause it \endash  may be }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 completely}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  conceived.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Garrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza
\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Conatus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Argument,\uc1\u8221\'d3 156, n. 21.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Garrett also adds:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 One might reasonably ask whether, if an accident is not entirely }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the singular thing of which it is predicated, it must then be partly }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the other singular things that contribute to its causation. Spinoza\rquote 
s view seems to be that whatever is completely caused by x must be completely }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 x, but that we need not accept as a general principle that whatever is only }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 partly}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  caused by x is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 partly}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  in x. That is, what Spinoza calls \u8220\'d2immanent causation\u8221\'d3 implies inherence, but what he called \u8220\'d2
transient causation\u8221\'d3 does not.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Garrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Conatus}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Argument,\uc1\u8221\'d3 157, n. 31. For an analysis of the distinction between immanent and transient cause which reaches the same conclusion, see my article, \u8220\'d2
Inherence and the Immanent Cause in Spinoza,\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Leibniz Review}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  16 (2006), 43-52.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Della Rocca is highly supportive of Garrett\rquote 
s view that finite things can be in themselves to a certain degree. He also expresses sympathy for Garrett\rquote 
s decision to propose a rather unstable position (i.e., by suggesting that finite things can be partly in themselves, but not partly in another) in order to avoid some bizarre implications, yet he thinks that Spinoz
a should bite the bullet and embrace the bizarre implications.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 So on Garrett\rquote 
s view, although conception and causation may be only partial, and although a thing can be only partly in itself, being in another is all or nothing.  This seems to be a reasonabl
e move because it avoids having to bite the apparent bullet of saying that the table is in any way }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 or inheres in the carpenter. But }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 is not one to avoid biting bullets or, more accurately, what one might see as bullets the biting of which is to b
e avoided, Spinoza often sees as logical or rational conclusions to be embraced because of their rationality, because of their logical unavoidability. And, indeed, I think that there are good reasons to see Spinoza as embracing this conclusion.}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Della Rocca, \uc1\u8220\'d2Rationalism Run Amok}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 
: Representation and the Reality of Emotions in Spinoza\uc1\u8221\'d3, in Charlie Heunemann (ed.), }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210  44.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Hence, Della Rocca suggests that we should unrestrictedly accept the Inherence
}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 Apart from one rare occasion in Letter 12 (IV/61/2), Spinoza hardly uses the term \lquote inherence.\rquote  Still, I will keep on using it to denote the}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  in se/in alio }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 relations in accordance with current convention.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 -Causation Biconditional:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 x}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 y}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , iff }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 x}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  is caused by }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 y}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab 
In order to support (4), Della Rocca provides both textual evidence and a highly interesting argument relying on (Spinoza\rquote s version of) the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Della Rocca reads Spinoza\rquote s definition of mode \endash  \u8220\'d2
E1d5: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Per modum intelligo substantiae af
fectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ]\u8221\'d3 \endash  as stating the biconditional
\par \tab }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (5)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  x is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  y, iff x is conceived through y.
\par We will call }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (5)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the \u8220\'d2Inherence-Conception Biconditional.\u8221\'d3 Obviously, from }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (5)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 one can deduce }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  by transitivity.
\par \tab Della Rocca brings some further textual support for }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  by pointing to an interesting parenthetical passage from the }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Theological Political Treatise}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  that seems to imply that an effect is a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 property}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  of its cause:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 The more we know natural things, t
he greater and more perfect is the knowledge of God we acquire, or (since }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing but knowing some property of the cause}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ) the more we know natural things, the more perfectly do we know God\rquote s essence, which is the cause of all things.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn 
{\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  TTP, Chap. 4 \uc1\u167\'a4
 11, G III 60 (emphasis mine). Cf. TIE 92 (II/34/14).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 According to Della Rocca, the claim that knowledge of an }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 effect}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  through its cause is knowledge of a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 property}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  of the cause can be read as implying that to be a property and to be an effect of x are one and the same thing.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote 
\ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7288210 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See Della Rocca, \uc1\u8220\'d2Rationalism Run Amok,\u8221\'d3 44, and Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Spinoza }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 (New York: Routledge 2008)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 69. A major advantage of Della Rocca
\rquote s reading of the TTP parenthetical remark is that it explains Spinoza\rquote s insistence that knowing a property through its cause is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 nothing but}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  knowing a property of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 cause}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
, rather than knowing a property of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 effect. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 If the effect }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 is}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  a property of the cause, then knowing the effect is eo ipso knowing a property of
 the cause. Two further texts (not mentioned by Della Rocca) which seem to support the identification of effect and property appear in the Definitions of the Affects at the end of Part III of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 : \uc1\u8220\'d2Overestimation\u8230\'c9 is an effect }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 or}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 sive}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ] property of Love\uc1\u8221\'d3
 (E3DefAff22e), and \u8220\'d2Pride is an effect or [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 sive}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ] property of Self-love\uc1\u8221\'d3
 (E3DefAff28e). One further consideration which supports the identification of property and effect is that Spinoza (like most early modern philosophers) uses \lquote property\rquote  in the rather narrow sense of the scholastic \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 proprium\rquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , a quality that follows necessary from (or is necessarily caused by) the essence of a thing. See Garrett, \uc1\u8220
\'d2Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Conatus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Argument\uc1\u8221\'d3, 156-7 n. 24, and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944 Yitzhak Y. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Melamed, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s Metaphysics of Substance}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
: The Substance-Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Predication\uc1\u8221\'d3, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944  (78:1) 2009,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  69.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Della Rocca also cites another passage from the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Short Treatise}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  which suggests that the internality/externality of effects is a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 matter of degree}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  (and hence that an effect can be partly in its cause and partly in an entity external to the cause):
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
All the effects which we produce outside ourselves are the more perfect the more they are capable of being united with us to make one and the same nature, for }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
in this way they are nearest to internal effects}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  KV II, Chap. 26 (G I 11) (Emphasis mine). See Della Rocca, \uc1\u8220\'d2Rationalism Run Amok\u8221\'d3
, p. 44, n. 31.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab Yet, Della Rocca\rquote 
s main motivation for accepting the Inherence-Causati
on Biconditional comes from the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It is commonly agreed that, for Spinoza, inherence implies causality; the point of contention is whether causality implies inherence. If causality does not imply inherence, it would seem that
 within causation there is a sharp division between causation which is accompanied by inherence and causation which is not. This bifurcation, like any other fact, demands an explanation, but according to Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 there is no explanation }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 for this bifurcation: it is just a brute fact.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
[A]s far as I can see, there is no good answer to the question in virtue of what does what might be called inherence-dependence differ from other forms of causal dependence. And, thus, this difference would seem to be a brute
 fact, in violation of the PSR. Given Spinoza\rquote s deep aversion to brute facts, it behooves us to see Spinoza as not drawing this ultimately arbitrary distinction.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn 
{\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Della Rocca, \uc1\u8220\'d2
Rationalism Run Amok,\u8221\'d3 45. Cf. Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 265.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734   
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Similarly, Della Rocca argues, insofar as }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 is true, the relations of causality and conception always go together. Now there is only one kind of conception, and it appears to be just a brute fact that conception (being always the same) is sometimes accompanied, sometimes not, by inherence.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
But now on the conceptual level, what kind of dependence relations are there?  It seems that there is just one: the table is conceived through God and the table is conceived through the carpenter. In the former case, the conceptual depe
ndence is complete; in the latter case, the conceptual dependence is not complete.  But in both cases, on the conceptual level, the kind of dependence seems to be the same.  There is no radical shift in kinds of dependence relations on the conceptual leve
l as there is on the ontological level between dependence relations that are relations of inherence and those that are not.  Thus, on the view I am opposing, the homogeneity of the conceptual dependence relations is not matched \endash 
 not, if you will, paralleled \endash  by any homogeneity of the ontological dependence relations.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Della Rocca, \uc1\u8220\'d2Rationalism Run Amok,\u8221\'d3 46.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 

\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
For Spinoza, brute facts are anathema, and if the only way to avoid the acceptance of brute facts is by endorsing the Inherence-Causation Biconditional }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , Spinoza, Della Rocca says, must bite this bullet.
\par \tab Let me state from the outset that I do not believe Spinoza himself actually accepted the Inherence-Causation Biconditional. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
The notions of inherence, causation, and conception are far too central 
to his system for him to have neglected stating their equivalence (or identity) had he believed in it. Spinoza makes abundant use of the notion of partial (or inadequate) cause, but as far as I can see, in none of these places does he indicate that a part
ial effect inheres (partly) in its (partial) cause}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 The two most natural loci where Spinoza could have asserted the equivalence of inherence and causation had he believed in it are E2p13a1\rquote \rquote  and E2p16. In correspondence Della Rocca responds that my positi
on is susceptible to the same objection, since I accept the Causality-Conception Biconditional }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 (3) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
and the Inherence Implying Causality doctrine }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 (6)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
, though they are, allegedly, not stated explicitly in the text. I do not think the cases are at all similar. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 (6)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }
{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 is}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 stated explicitly (and precisely where it should be) in E1p18d (as well as KV I, iii|I/35/19). The textual source of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 (3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  is also obvious, and is stated in a very central place in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
: it is E1a4. We might have questions about the precise meaning and use of E1a4, but if we accept that E1a4 states a biconditional (as both Della Rocca and I eventually think), then }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
(3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 is}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  stated at the very surface of the text.
}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Furthermore, Spinoza\rquote s talk in Letter 12 of \uc1\u8220\'d2things which are infinite by the force }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 of the cause in which they inhere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8221\'d3 (IV/61/2. My emphasis) seems to be out of place, since according to Della Rocca, }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 all}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  things are caused by the subjects in which they inhere. Were Della Rocca ri
ght, Spinoza should have simply stated \uc1\u8220\'d2things which are infinite by the force of their cause.\u8221\'d3}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  I consider this simple point to be conclusive as to Spinoza\rquote 
s actual views, though it still leaves open the possibility of a friendly amendment to, or even improvement of, his system. But let me add two more brief points about Spinoza\rquote s actual views. When we look carefully at Spinoza\rquote 
s use of Ed5, we find that he relies on this definition quite frequently but }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 never}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 uses it to derive inherence from conception.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734   E1p31d and E2p1d could be read as deriving conception from inherence.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Finally, the first axiom of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  could be read as excluding the possibility of 
one thing\rquote s being partly in itself, partly in another.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 E1a1: Whatever is, is either in itself or in another [}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Omnia, quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ].
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 If Spinoza\rquote s use of \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 vel\rquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  indicates mutually exclusive disjunctions, then E1a1 seems to reject the possibility of one thing being both in itself and in another.}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Cf. Garrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2Ethics IP5: Shared Attributes and the Basis of Spinoza\rquote s Monism\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 in Cover and Kulstad (eds.), }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210  (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 96-7. Yet, perhaps if one allows for partial inherence, an exclusive reading of \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 vel\rquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210  would imply that (according to E1a1) to the extent that something is not in itself, it is in another.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
\par \tab Be that as it may, even if Spinoza himself never accepted the Inherence-Causality Biconditional, it appears to me perfectly legitimate to suggest an improvement of Spinoza\rquote 
s system. Obviously, such an improvement should remain loyal to the principles and main contours of the system. In the following part of this paper, I consider t
he viability of the Inherence-Causality Biconditional as a Spinozistic doctrine and its consistency with the rest of Spinoza\rquote s system, without regard to the question of whether Spinoza did or did not explicitly accept the doctrine.
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid7669494 2.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid4800734 Bifurcations and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab I see several problems with the Inherence-Causality Biconditional, and I will present them in escalating order (i.e., from least problematic issues to most).
\par \tab (i) In E1p18, Spinoza presents a distinction between immanent and transitive (or transient) causation.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 E1p18: God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.
\par Dem.: Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God (by E1p15), and so (by E1p16c1) God is the cause of [NS:
 all] things, which are in him. That is the first [thing to be proven]. And then outside God there can be no substance (by E1p14), i.e. (by E1d3), thing which is in itself outside God. That was the second. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transiti
ve cause of all things q.e.d.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
From the demonstration of E1p18, we can learn that an immanent cause is an efficient cause (hence the appeal to E1p16c1) whose effect is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the cause (hence the invocation of E1p15).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  The distinction between immanent and transitive cause is presented clearly in Spinoza\rquote s discussion in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
Short Treatise}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  of the four internal divisions of the efficient cause. The second division reads, \uc1\u8220\'d2
[God] is the immanent and not a transitive cause, since he does everything in itself, and not outside himself (because outside him there is nothing)\u8221\'d3 (KV I, iii| I/35/19). See also Spinoza\rquote 
s claim in Letter 60 that an efficient cause can be internal as well as external. For further discussion of the nature of the immanent cause, see }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af4 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs29\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Garrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza
\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \ai\af4 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs29\i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Conatus }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af4 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs29\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 argument,\uc1\u8221\'d3 157 n. 31.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  A transitive cause is an efficient cause whose effect is not }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 the cause. Now, according to Della Rocca, every effect is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 its cause, and this seems to make the transitive cause into an empty category that is strictly impossible.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  That at least }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 some}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  causes are transitive one can see from Spinoza\rquote s identification of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 internal}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 immanent}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  cause (I/110/23), and his claim that \uc1\u8220\'d2[God] }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 alone}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  is an internal cause\uc1\u8221\'d3 (KV II, xxvi| I/111/17). Spinoza illustrates this non-immanent
 causation in the following passage: \u8220\'d2All the effects which we produce }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 outside ourselves}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 are the more perfect the more they are capable of being united with us to make one and the same nature, for in this way }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 they are nearest to internal effects}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8221\'d3 (I/111/27. Italics mine.) In the Physical Digression following E2p13 Spinoza glosses that an external cause is a cause whose effect is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 not in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  the cause (II/99/6), i.e., it is not an Immanent Cause. There are numerous other passages where Spinoza discusses external 
(i.e., non-immanent) causes. See, for example, E3p4, E3p30d, and E4p19d.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 While this objection puts some pressure on the threefold identity thesis, it may not be fatal. A proponent of the Inherence-Causation-Conception identity thesis could respond by suggesting that any case in which the effect is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 not}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 fully}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 the cause should count as transitive causation (while immanent causation will be defined as the case in which the effect is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 fully}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the cause).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\ql \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 This response was suggested to me in conversation with Michael Della Rocca.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  In such a case, the carpenter would only be a transitive cause of the table, since the table is only partly }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the carpenter. We may press this objection a bit further. According to the threefold identity thesis, the table should b
e fully in its }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 complete}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  cause. Thus the table is perhaps not
 fully in the carpenter, but it should be fully in the singular thing constituted by the carpenter together with all the other entities which contributed to the production of the table (see E2d7). Hence, it would seem that the category of transitive causa
tion still remains empty, since each thing would be fully in the singular thing which caused it. Della Rocca could respond to this by saying that a transitive cause is only an incomplete }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
account}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  of a case of immanent causation. In other words, we consider t
he carpenter the transitive cause of the table (since the table is only partly caused by the carpenter), but the carpenter together with all the other entities that collaborated in the causation of the table are (all together) the immanent cause of the ta
ble. I do not think this response works, since it seems to me that Della Rocca should say that that part, or aspect, of the table that is completely }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 caused by}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the carpenter is also completely }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  the carpenter;}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 Della Rocca could also respond (and in correspondence he indeed responds) by saying that only that aspect of the table that is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 fully}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  caused by the carpenter is fully in the carpenter. I am not sure, however, whether he can resort to this position. Part of Della Rocca\rquote s critique of Garrett\rquote s position is that Garrett }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 arbitrarily}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  takes inherence in another as an \uc1\u8220\'d2all or nothing\u8221\'d3
 relation, providing no reason for his rejection of partial inherence in another. The same charge of arbitrariness or lack of motivation could be brought against Della Rocca\rquote s rej
ection of the claim that the aspect, or part, of the table that is caused by the carpenter is fully in the carpenter.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 and if this is the case, then, again, the category of transitive causation turns out to be empty.
\par \tab (ii) In E3d3, Spinoza defines an affect [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Affectu}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid15214524\charrsid4800734 s}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
] as the \u8220\'d2affections of the Body by which the Body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.\u8221\'d3 Now, consider the following scenario. Josephine whispers \u8220
\'d2bu\u8221\'d3 to Napoleon. Napoleon laughs. Insofar as Napoleon\rquote s laugh is caused by Josephine, the laugh also inheres in Josephine, i.e., is an affection of Josephine\rquote s body, as well as of Napoleon\rquote 
s body. Laughter or joy increases our power of acting, but the question is: }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Whose}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
power of acting is increased? Since both Josephine and Napoleon contributed to the causation of the laugh, we should, according to Della Rocca, ascribe the joy to both bodies. The tragic reality, however, is that in many a case Josephine-like people say b
u-like things to Napoleons, making the Napoleons laugh (i.e., increasing their power of acting), while the Josephine-like people remain at the same level of power of acting, or perhaps even get saddened.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 This is particularly likely to happen where Josephine and Napoleon are enemies or rivals who hate one another. I am indebted to Don Garrett for this note.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 In other words, causing an increase in the power of acting of someone else does not necessarily increase your own 
power of acting, but if we accept the identity of inherence and causation, it would seem that the increase of the power of acting must also belong to (i.e., be in) the cause of the increase as well. A world with such regularities would be quite interestin
g and, perhaps, just, but it is not ours, and we have no reason (or textual support) to believe that Spinoza thought that our world obeys such wonderful regularities.
\par }\pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab (iii) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Durational Inherence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  \endash 
 The next few arguments deal with the implications of Della Rocca\rquote s thesis for Spinoza\rquote 
s understanding of temporality. A radical reading of Spinoza, suggested primarily by the German and British Idealists, takes Spinoza to be a modern reviver of the ancient Eleatic philosophy. According to this reading, Spinoza deni
es the reality of finite things, time, and duration, and affirms the sole reality of the eternal substance in which all determinations are null and void.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar 
\pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \uc1\u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
Parmenides has to reckon with illusion and opinion, the opposites of being and truth; Spinoza likewise, with attributes, modes, extension, movement, understanding, will, and so on [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 So bekommt Parmenides mit dem Scheine und der Meinung, dem Gegenteil des Seins und der Wahrheit, zu tun; so Spinoza mit den Attributen, den Modis, der Ausdehnung, Bewegung, dem Verstande, Willen usf}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ]\uc1\u8221\'d3. Hegel,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \ai\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  The Science of Logic}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , trans. by A.V. Miller (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), 98. Cf. 84 and 94-5.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  For a discussion of this so-called \uc1\u8220\'d2acosmist\u8221
\'d3 reading of Spinoza, see my papers: }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8220\'d2Acosmism or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8221\'d3 Journal of the History of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  48 (2010), 77-92, and \uc1\u8220\'d2
Salomon Maimon and the Rise of Spinozism in German Idealism,\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Journal of the History of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\ul\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 42 (2004), 67-96.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  As I will later argue, I suspect that Della Rocca
\rquote s bold use of the PSR in order to obliterate any bifurcations in Spinoza\rquote s metaphysics leads him toward this stance, but so far Della Rocca does not seem to subscribe to this view.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , Ch. 7. Indeed, in correspondence Della Rocca writes: \uc1\u8220\'d2I don\rquote 
t think that duration is illusory. But I do think that duration and things that endure have less reality and exist to lesser degree than an eternal thing.\u8221\'d3 This is, in fact, quite a conservative position, since modes (\u8220\'d2things that endure
\u8221\'d3) are clearly less real than substance (\u8220\'d2an eternal thing\u8221\'d3), insofar as they completely depend on substance for their existence. }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 Assuming that Della Rocca does not ascribe to Spinoza the view that duration (\u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 duratio}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \u8221\'d3) is illusory,}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  The distinction between eternity [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 aeternitas}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ], duration [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 duratio}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ], and time [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 tempus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ] is at the very center of Spinoza\rquote s metaphysics, yet unfortunately it has not been adequately elucidated so far. In this paper, I will try to avoid d
elving too much into this thorny issue, which is complicated even more by the fact that it is not at all clear that Spinoza\rquote s early discussions of the issue (especially in Letter 12 and the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Cogitata metaphysica}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ) take the same stand as the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 . It is clear, however, that for Spinoza }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 tempus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 is a certain construction of temporality as measured and adopted for the human perspective that is both imaginary and inadequate. In the following, I will speak mostly about duration, but even when I use \lquote time,\rquote  I will 
do this in the colloquial sense and not in Spinoza\rquote s technical sense.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid7018103  For a detailed discussion of Spinoza\rquote s notion of eternity, see my forthcoming article }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid7018103\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s Deification of Existence,\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid7018103\charrsid4800734 Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid7018103\charrsid4800734 .}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  it seems that insofar as future things are caused by past things, future things must also inhere in the past (i.e., in past things).}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
  By using the tenses \lquote past,\rquote  \lquote present,\rquote  and \lquote future,\rquote 
 I do not assume that Spinoza had a McTaggart A-series conception of time. He did not. This is just a convenient way to refer to three consequent locations in time, and could be replaced by any t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\sub\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 1}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\sub\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , and t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\sub\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , so that t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\sub\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  is later than t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\sub\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , and that is later than t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\sub\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 1}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 .}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  But that is a very bizarre conception of inherence. Traditionally, inherence is understood as a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 simultaneous}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  relation between a substratum and its states or qualities (or at least as a relation that is not spread in time, in the case of a sub
stratum and states which are not in time at all). Of course, one may still bite the bullet by embracing this odd notion of inherence -- as I readily admit, Spinoza is always full of surprises -- but upon closer examination, it seems that Della Rocca
\rquote s understanding of inherence amounts to nothing over and above efficient causation. In 1969, Edwin Curley published a work that in many ways changed Anglo-American discourse on Spinoza.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14378367 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944 Edwin }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Curley, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Spinoza\rquote s Metaphys}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944 ics: An Essay in Interpretation}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid14378367  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid14378367 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
\par }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Curley argued that in Spinoza\rquote 
s work, the Substance-Mode relation cannot be understood according to its traditional sense but rather that, for Spinoza, to be a mode of God is just to be caused by God. Over the years, Curley\rquote s interpretation was criticized by several scholars,}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14378367 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid3233672 See John Carriero, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid3233672 \uc1\u8220\'d2On the Relationship between Mode and Substance in Spinoza\rquote s Metaphysics
\u8221\'d3, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid3233672 Journal of the History of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944  33 (1995), 245-73;}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid3233672  Charles Jarrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2The Concept of Substance and Mode in Spinoza\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid3233672 Philosophia}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid3233672  7 (1977),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944  83-105;}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid3233672  and Melamed, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote 
s Metaphysics of Substance.\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 and in his recent work Della Rocca himself provides two powerful arguments against Curley\rquote s position, claiming that \u8220\'d2for Spinoza, all modes\u8230\'c9 are modes in something like the Cartesian sense: they are features or states of God.
\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734   Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 63-4.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Della Rocca explicitly aligns himself with the traditional understanding of inherence: \u8220\'d2
The notion of in-ness as manifested in the substance-mode relations, I believe, a version of the traditional notion of inherence: modes are in substance in the sense that they inhere in that substance.\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \uc1\u8220\'d2
Rationalism Run Amok,\u8221\'d3 41.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Yet, I am not aware of any text of Descartes or his predecessors in which inherence is taken as a relation that is spread in time.
\par \tab As far as I can see, Della Rocca\rquote s view does not much differ from Curley\rquote 
s. An inherence relation in which the substratum and qualities have different temporal locations seems to have very little in common with the traditional understanding of inherence (and much more in comm
on with the traditional characteristics of efficient causation). }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  In \uc1\u8220\'d2Rationalism un Amok,\u8221\'d3 Della Rocca suggests that \u8220\'d2
inherence just is the relation whereby one thing depends on another\u8221\'d3 (47), but this characterization of inherence is far too thin, sinc
e Spinoza allows for dependence relations that are not inherence, e.g., the part whole relation (see E1p12d (55/12-13), CM I/258/16, and KV I/30/10).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 I have elsewhere provided several arguments against Curley\rquote s interpretation of the substance-mode relation,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Yitzhak Y. Melamed, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8220\'d2Spi}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944 noza\rquote s Metaphysics of Substance\uc1\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 .}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 and if Della Rocca\rquote s is just the same view in different garb, I believe that many (though not all) of the same arguments are applicable to his reading as well. 
\par }\pard\plain \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab (iv) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Inherence in non-existing things? }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \endash 
 An inherence relation that is spread in time has many bizarre implications. From the following passage from E1p17s we can conclude that (1) at least }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 some}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  things cease to exist and perish.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Notice that I do }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 not}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  assume here that }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 all}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 past things cease to exist. I believe McTaggart made a conclusive argument to the effect that duration relies on a genuine sense of the coming in, and out of, existence of things. Yet, I do not need this important general claim for my argument, since in 
E1p17s Spinoza openly claims that }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 some}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  past things cease to exist, and my argument addresses the effects of }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 these}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  things.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  If we add to that Spinoza\rquote 
s claim in E1p36 that (2) all things have effects, it would seem that according to Della Rocca an effect of a mode that ceased to exist may still inhere in the mode }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 after}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  it ceased to exist. Suppose mode M caused (i.e., was a partial cause of) mode N at t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \sub\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 0 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 and immediately afterwards at t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \sub\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 1}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 ceased to exist. For Spinoza mode N could perfectly exist without its cause after t}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \sub\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 1}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
A man is a cause of the existence of another man, but not of his essence, for the latter is an eternal truth. Hence, they can agree entirely according to their essence. But in existence they must differ. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 And for that reason, if the existence of the one perishes, the other\rquote s existence will not thereby perish}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\expnd0\expndtw-3\kerning2\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 si unius existentia pereat, non ideo alterius peribit}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
]. But if the essence of the one could be destroyed and become false, the other\rquote s essence would also be destroyed (E1p17s| II/63/18-23. Italics mine)
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
However, it would make no sense for N to exist after the perishing of M, were N to be }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 M (i.e., were N a mode or affection of M). The existence of a mode completely depends on its substratum}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  By \lquote substratum\rquote  I refer to that in which something inheres (or \uc1\u8220\'d2is in\u8221\'d3
). Spinoza does not use the term himself since he talks very little of the inherence of modes of modes in first order modes, and for all other purposes \lquote substance\rquote  denotes the substrate in which modes inhere.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  (E1d5),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See also E2a3 for the complete dependence of modes of modes (\uc1\u8220\'d2affects of the mind\u8221\'d3
) on their original modes.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and if the substratum perishes, the mode simply cannot exist without is substratum. In this sense, there is a sharp contrast between the relations of inherence 
and causation in Spinoza. An effect can exist after its cause perishes; a mode cannot exist after its substrate perishes. 
\par \tab (v) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Bifurcation of Inherence I: Degrees of Reality.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  \endash  One of the traditional features of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in alio }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 relation is that modes are less real than the substratum in which they inhere.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  The }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 in se }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 relation does not involve a difference in the degree of reality since the relata are identical.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Modes completely depend for their existence on their substance and are therefore less real than substance.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar 
\pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 On the degrees of reality in Descartes, see Meditation Three (AT VII 41), and Third Set of Replies (AT VII 185). On degrees of reality in Spinoza, see E1p9 and DPP 1a4 (154/27).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 Now, if we identify inherence and causation, it would seem that }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 past things are more real than present and future things}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
, and that the universe is winding down}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 If duration is not illusory, and the past causes the present and the future, then the past should also be the substratum in which the future and present inhere
. If the future and present inhere in the past, then the past must be more real than the present and the future. Notwithstanding the counter-intuitive nature of such a view (and we have no prejudices in favor of commonsense!), it seems that Spinoza embrac
es a view according to which all moments in time \u8220\'d2are equally dear to God\u8221\'d3 (to paraphrase the saying of the great German historicist, Leopold von Ranke}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn 
{\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14761817 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid14761817 "Die Idee von der Erscheinung des Menschengeschlechtes hat allerdings etwas Wahres an sich, aber vor Go
tt erscheinen alle Generationen der Menschheit als gleich berechtigt, and so muss auch der Historiker die Sache ansehen."\~Leopold von Ranke, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid14761817 Epochen der neueren Geschichte}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid14761817  in }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid14761817 Aus Werk und Nachlass}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid14761817 , }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid14761817 ed. Walther Peter Fuchs (Munich: Olenbourg, 1971), }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid14761817 vol. II, 63. I am indebted to Fred Beiser for providing the precise quote.
}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944  }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ). \u8220\'d2
Insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea is of a future or a past thing, or of a present one,\u8221\'d3 says Spinoza in E4p62. Now, when the mind conceives things \u8220\'d2
from the dictate of reason\u8221\'d3 it conceives them }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 adequately}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
, and as such it does not prefer one point in time over another (E4p62d&s). Here, again, there is a sharp contrast between the relations of inherence and ca
usation in Spinoza. A mode is always dependent upon and hence less real than its substratum, but Spinoza }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 never}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 claims that an effect is less real than the cause. One possible line of defense may suggest that in }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 some}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 cases inherence is accompanied by a diff
erence in the degree of reality between the quality and its substratum (as in the case of substance and modes), while in other cases inherence does not involve a gap between the reality of the substratum and its qualities. The problem with the last sugges
tion is that it seems to create a bifurcation }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 within inherence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
, a bifurcation which, as I will shortly argue, appears to be a brute fact.
\par \tab (vi) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Bifurcation of Inherence II: Temporality.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  \endash 
 Another bifurcation between two kinds of inherence in Della Rocca\rquote s interpretation of Spinoza arises for the following reasons. For Spinoza, causal relations can be both in duration, and not in duration. The causal relation between God\rquote 
s essence and the infinite modes is an example of non-durational causality (the effect does not come }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 after}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 the cause). The causal relation between the father of Napoleon and Napoleon himself is an example of the second kind of causality (the cause precedes the effect).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn 
{\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 Similarly, Descartes claims that efficient causation can be either temporal or non-temporal: \uc1\u8220\'d2the natural light does not establish that the concept of an efficient cause requires that it is prior in time to its effect\u8221\'d3
 (First Set of Replies, AT VII 108). For an example of non-temporal efficient causation, see Descartes\rquote  claim that the will of God is the efficient cause of the eternal truths (Letter to Mersenne, May 27 1630).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Now, according to Della Rocca, this bifurcation of causation should be accompanied by a bifurcation of inherence so that some inherence relations are in ti
me and others are not. But why is it the case that some inherence relations are in time, while others are not? Is this not a brute fact? Obviously, Della Rocca could resort to a strategy of claiming that if we are willing to accept the bifurcation of caus
ality into temporal and non-temporal, we should also be content with a bifurcation of inherence. But I do not think that this response works. I suspect that, in Spinoza, there}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  is}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  a genuine bifurcation of causality (not of inherence), and I will soon attempt to explain the reason for this bifurcation in order to show that it is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 not}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 a brute fact. On the other hand, Della Rocca, who is committed to the elimination of (unexplained) bifurcations, must explain the durational vs. non-durational bifurcation of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 both}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  inherence and causation. As far as I can see, he has not yet provided such an explanation.
\par \tab (vi) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \u8220\'d2in alio\u8221\'d3 without \u8220\'d2in se\u8221\'d3?}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  \endash  I have previously argued that Della Rocca
\rquote s identification of causation with inherence results in making the past, in which the pr
esent and future inhere, more real than the future and present. But the story gets worse once we realize that Spinoza does not believe in creation in time and takes duration to be infinite both backwards and forwards. This would mean that the order of dur
ational inherence (i.e., the inherence of effects in their past causes) goes backwards infinitely and is never grounded in an entity that is \u8220\'d2in itself.\u8221\'d3 But what is \u8220\'d2in another\u8221\'d3
 depends for its very existence on something else (that\rquote s what it is to be a mode!), and as long as we have an infinite chain of \u8220\'d2in another\u8221\'d3 entities that are not ultimately grounded in an \u8220\'d2in itself,\u8221\'d3
 the existence of the whole chain remains up in the air, without explanation and grounding for its existence.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  One important text which suggests that - unlike the infinite regression of causes - Spinoza would not accept an }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 inherence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  chain of \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 in alio}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \rquote  entities that is not ultimately grounded in an \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 in se}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \rquote  appears at the end of the celebrated \uc1\u8220\'d2Letter on the Infinite\u8221\'d3 (Letter 12). Here S
pinoza praises the medieval Jewish anti-Aristotelian Hisdai Crescas for rejecting the common Aristotelian proof for the existence of God through the impossibility of an infinite chain of causes. Spinoza, like Crescas, thinks that actual infinity is perfec
tly legitimate. Spinoza also endorses Crescas\rquote 
 correction of the proof which relies on the impossibility of a chain (finite or infinite) of things that are merely possible-of-existence which is not grounded in a thing which is necessary-of-existence (for Crescas\rquote s text see Wolfson, }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Crescas\rquote  Critique of Aristotle}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 220-8. \uc1\u8220\'d2
But in passing I should like to note here that the more recent Peripatetics have, as I think, misunderstood the demonstration by which the Ancients tried to prove God's existence. For as I f
ind it in a certain Jew, called Rab Chasdai, it runs as follows: if there is an infinite regress of causes, then all things that are will also have been caused; but it does not pertain to anything which has been caused, to exist necessarily by the force o
f
 its own nature; therefore, there is nothing in Nature to whose essence it pertains to exist necessarily; but the latter is absurd; therefore, the former is also. Hence the force of this argument does not lie in the impossibility of there being an actual 
infinite or an infinite regress of causes, but }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
only in the supposition that things which do not exist necessarily by their own nature are not determined to exist by a thing which does necessarily exist by its own nature}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8221\'d3
 (IV/61/15-62/10. Italics mine). Things which are \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 in alio\rquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 clearly do not exist by their own nature, and hence their existence depends on the existence of an entity which \uc1\u8220\'d2necessarily exist by its own nature,\u8221\'d3 i.e., a thing that is \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 in se.\rquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Spinoza would have no problem with an infinite }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 causal}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  chain of things that does not end with an \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 in se,\rquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  since the existence of the effect is far less strictly dependent on its cause in comparison with the total dependence of a mode on its substratum (an effect can, for example, exist after the cause peris
hed. See E1p17s (63/22).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab Della Rocca would probably respond that, though it is true that an infinite chain of modes depending one upon the other must be ultimately grounded in a substance (for otherwise, modes will exist without substance, which is a pla
in contradiction for Spinoza), the fact that the modes are grounded in the substance in an inherence that is non-durational (insofar as each finite mode is part of an infinite mode that inheres in a non-durational manner in God) should free us from the wo
rry that durational inherence is an infinite order that does not end by grounding in an \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in se}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .\rquote  }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 In correspondence Della Rocca writes: \uc1\u8220\'d2I think that the links in the chain are grounded in the whole which is prior to the parts. Perhaps also the chain is grounded in the attributes.\u8221\'d3
 I see two problems with this response. First, Spinoza\rquote s common stance on mereological issues is that parts are prior to their wholes both in nature and in knowledge (see }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
DPP 1p17d, CM (I/258/16), KV (I/30/10), Ep. 35 (Shirley 856), and E1p12d (55/12-3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ). Admittedly, it is not easy to reconcile this position with Spinoza\rquote 
s claim that finite modes are parts of infinite modes. It would be odd if finite modes were prior to the
 infinite modes of which they are parts. Second, assuming that the whole chain is grounded in the attributes, the problem is still not solved since, according to Della Rocca, we have two distinct chains of inherence relations (infinite modes in the substa
nce, and finite modes in their finite causes). If indeed the relation in both cases is a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 genuine}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 inherence relation, each relation should be independently grounded. Otherwise, the grounding of the one, but not the other, would seem to be a brute fact.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab I s
till do not think that we should accept this answer. According to Della Rocca, each finite mode takes part in two kinds of inherence relation. On the one hand, each mode inheres (in a non-durational manner, as a part of an infinite chain of finite modes, 
or as part an infinite mode}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7411518 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 
I take finite modes to be parts, not effects, of infinite modes. The nature of the infinite modes, the reason why Spinoza introduced this notion, and the relation between infinite and finite modes are crucial yet difficult ques
tions and cannot be adequately addressed here. I address these questions in Yitzhak Y. Melamed, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 Spinoza\rquote s Metaphysics of Substance and Thought}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518  (Oxford: Oxford U}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944 niversity Press: forthcoming), c}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 hapter 3.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518  Cf. Nadler\rquote s elegant discussion, Steven }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 Nadler, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 
Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\ul\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 : An Introduction}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7411518 , 87-96.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ) in God\rquote 
s nature or essence,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  \uc1\u8220\'d2[Modes] can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone\u8221\'d3 (E1p15d).}}}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  but on the other hand, it also inheres, in a durational manner, in the singular thing that caused it. The result is that the poor mode becomes a servant of two masters,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 One may object here that even on my reading a finite mode is a servant of two masters, since it is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 caused}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 both transitively by another finite mode (see E1p28), and immanently by God\rquote 
s essence. In response, let me point out that the ontological dependence involved in the relation of inherence is not the same the dependence of a cause on its effect. A mode cannot be without the subject in which it inheres, but Spinoza }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 never}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 claims that an effect cannot exist if the cause goes out of existence. On the contrary, in E1p17s (63/22) Spinoza explicitly stresses that an effect of an external cause may exist even after its cause perished. This is 
not the case with immanent causation (which involves inherence). See }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 KV II, xxvi I/110/25). Cf. KV I/33/9}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and the whole causal structure of Spinoza\rquote s system gets distorted.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Notice that these
 are alternative causal (or inherence) relations, the one durational, the other not. Furthermore, a body does not inhere in Extension }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 by}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  inhering in the body that caused it, since the cause of the essence of the body (which includes the fact that it is extended) cannot be another finite body (see E1p17S).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  If the durational inherence that Della Rocca accepts is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 genuine}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 inherence, it cannot appeal to the fact that the modes are grounded in a non-durational inherence in the substance in order to explain how we can have an order of inherence (i.e., durational inherence) without an \u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in se}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .\u8221\'d3 We have here two distinct chains 
of inherence relations and each should be grounded independently of the other, if each is to be reckoned as }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 bona fide}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 inherence. If we resort to the position that one chain of inherence (the non-durational inherence of modes in God\rquote s nature) is grounded in
dependently, while the other chain of inherence (the inherence of finite modes in their finite causes) relies on the first chain in order to have grounding, we are faced again with a charge of bifurcating the inherence relation into two kinds: inherence t
hat is grounded in an \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in se}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ,\rquote 
 and inherence that is not. The very fact that durational inherence is not grounded in an \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in se\rquote  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
should make us strongly suspect that it is not a genuine inherence relation at all (and, as we have previously seen, we have several independent reasons that point to the very same conclusion).
\par \tab (vii) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Modes as Tropes}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . \endash 
 According to Della Rocca, a mode can inhere in two distinct things. If both Geppetto and Pinocchio build a table T, T inheres in both G and P. But is not a mode supp
osed to be completely dependent on its substratum (i.e., its substance)? If so, how can it be a mode of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 two}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  substrata? }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Charles Jarrett and John Carriero argued convincingly (and independently) that Spinozistic modes are }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
particular qualities}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , or }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 tropes}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , of 
the substance.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \up6\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid14378367 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid5975463 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\up6\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 See Jarrett, \uc1\u8221\'d3Substance }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944 and Mode\uc1\u8221\'d3, p. 86, and Carriero,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463  \uc1\u8220\'d2Mode and Substance in Spinoza\u8221\'d3, 256-9. On the metaphysics of tropes, see John Bacon, \u8221\'d3Tropes,\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463  }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 The Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944 (2010)}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 , }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 and Keith Campbell, \uc1\u8220\'d2The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars,\u8221\'d3 }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 in }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 Properties}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 , ed. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944 D.H. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 Mellor and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944 Alex }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid5975463 
Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 123\endash 39.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
\par }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid14378367  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab A simple thought experiment might help us see why a mode cannot be shared by two substrata that are substances. Consider the alleged possibility of two substances A and B sharing a mode }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 m}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . Let\rquote s assume now that there\rquote s a change in mode }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 m}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . The cause of the change can come from either one of the two substances. However, if A is the cause of the change in }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 m
}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , it would seem that substance A caused a change in substance B (since }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 m}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  is also a mode of B), whereas Spinoza strictly rejects any causal interaction between substances (E1p6d).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\cf1\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar 
\pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
Moreover, the very fact that }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 m}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
, a mode of B, inheres in A, violates the causal independence of the two substances, since insofar as }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 m}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 is partly caused by each of the two substances, each substance has a mode caused by another substance.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
\par \tab This, I think, suffices to show that Spinozistic modes cannot be shared by two }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 substances}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
. Now comes the question whether two Spinozistic }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 modes}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  - such as }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Geppetto and Pinocchio \endash  can share a mode of a mode. On the face of it, it seems that if some inherenc
e relations allow for their modes to inhere in two substrata, and other inherence relations do not allow it, we would have a brute bifurcation of inherence, a bifurcation which Della Rocca must reject. But Della Rocca may argue that this bifurcation is no
t brute, since it is only in the case of substrata that are substances that the substrata cannot causally interact. Substrata that are not substances may interact causally, and therefore may, perhaps, share a mode (of a mode). 
\par \tab Still, I do not think Spinoza could allow for such a case. Were table T a genuine property (or mode) of both Geppetto and Pinocchio, it would have to be either a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 universal}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  or a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 particular}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  property. T is clearly not a }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 particular}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  property since it is allegedly a property shared by }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 two}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  things,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 Similarly, if in addition to G and P, two billion other things were the causes of T, then T would be a shared property of more than two billion things.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 but it also cannot be a universal since Spinoza clearly and strictly rejects the reality of universals }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (E2p40s1).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\up6\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid14497944 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\up6\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  For Spinoza\rquote 
s rejection of the reality of universals, see Ep. 2 (IV/9/12-15), Ep. 19 (IV/91-92), CM I, i (I/235/14-15), CM II, vii (I/263/8), TdIE 99 (I/36/18).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944  At this point }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid14497944 one may argue that perhaps Spinoza rejects universal that are conceived as existing independently of the particulars falling under them, but Spinoza \endash 
 so the objection goes - would perhaps accept universals if these are conceived as totally embed in the particulars. There are two reasons why I think it would be wrong to ascribe this view to Spinoza. First, there is no indication in Spinoza\rquote s te}
{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid12742826 xt that he supports such a view. S}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid14497944 econd, there are numerous theoretical problems with such a view (e.g., if a universal is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid14497944\charrsid12069610 fully}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid14497944  present in two particulars that are ten feet distant from each other, then we have }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid12742826 a case of an entity that is at }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid12742826\charrsid12742826 a}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid14497944\charrsid12742826  ten feet distance}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid14497944\charrsid9393333  from itself}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid14497944  \endash  a view that is not easy to defend).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cf1\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  The table might be the joint effect of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
Geppetto and Pinocchio, but it cannot be their shared property.
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid7669494 3.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Spinoza\rquote s Dualism}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab At this point, I would like to start outlining an alternative to Della Rocca\rquote 
s view. As I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, Della Rocca does have powerful arguments to support his position, and it is an essential condition of any attempt to present an alternative rea
ding to his that it should be able to rebut these arguments.
\par \tab One alternative that I believe is not likely to work is to reject the causation-conceivability biconditional }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . Let
\rquote s first consider the prima facie appeal of this venue. The major text that s
upports the causation-conception biconditional is E1a4, and in almost all cases Spinoza uses it in only one direction, i.e., from causality to conception (which leaves open the possibility of conception that is not accompanied by causality). The only exce
ption - where Spinoza does derive causality from conception - is E1p25d, and it is not impossible that this could have been just a slip of pen or simple error.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote 
\ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See Bennett, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Study of Spinoza
\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\ul\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 128, n. 1.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
\par \tab 
I tend to think that this alternative is not very viable for the following reason. The only case in which we find Spinoza suggesting a conception relation that is apparently unaccompanied by causality is that of inherence; he holds that what inheres in so
mething else must also be conceived through that thing.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  I read E1d5 as supporting the \uc1\u8220\'d2Inherence Implying Conception Doctrine,\u8221\'d3
 but not the Inherence-Conception Biconditional. As I have noted above, Spinoza never uses E1d5 to derive inherence from conception. One place where Spinoza does derive inherence from conception is the end of E5p22d. However, in this place he }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 does}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 not}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  assu}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944 me that conception universally implies }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
inherence, but rather appeals to the fact that all things are in God (E1p15, on which E2p3, and ultimately E5p22d rely) in order to derive the relevant inherence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944  relation. I am indebted to John Brandau}
{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  for drawing my attention to this passage.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  But since inherence itself is always accompanied by causation,}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
  We should distinguish between two cases: (I) things which inhere in God are also caused by God\rquote s nature, since God\rquote 
s nature is the cause of all things (E1p16), and (II) the modes of a finite thing x are caused both by the nature of x, and the external cause with which x interacts (see E2 Physical Digression A1\uc1\u8221\'d3
, and E2p16). Hence, inherence both in God and in finite things is always accompanied by causation (though I do not think the converse is true).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 it seems that, in one way or another, causation always accompanies conception. Hence, I believe, we should affirm the causation-conception biconditional.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar 
\pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Cf. Jarrett, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8220\'d2
Substance and Mode\u8221\'d3, 96, and Garrett, \u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Conatus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Argument\uc1\u8221\'d3
 136 and 156 n. 22.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab So what, then, is the alternative? Let us go back to three of the formulae we have examined before:
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  x is the cause of y, iff y is conceived through x (Causation-Conception Biconditional)
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  x is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  y, iff x is caused by y (Inherence-Causation Biconditional).
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (5)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  x is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  y, iff x is conceived through y (Inherence-Conception Biconditional).\tab 
\par \tab I suggest that Spinoza accepted }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (3)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , and only the left-to-right direction of both }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (5)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
. In other words, instead of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (5)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , he accepted
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (6)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  If x is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  y, y causes x (Inherence Implying Causation Doctrine), and
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \b\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 (7)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  If x is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 in}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  y, x is conceived through y (Inherence Implying Conception Doctrine). \tab Arguably, in Spinoza there is a genuine bifurcation between two kinds of causation }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 as well as}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  between two kinds of conception, but }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 neither}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  bifurcation is a brute fact, and it is to the reasons for these bifurcations that we now finally turn.
\par \tab Spinoza\rquote s important distinction between immanent and transitive causation has already been discussed above. Immanent causation involves inherence of the effect in the cause, while transitive causation does not.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af4 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs29\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Garrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \ai\af4 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs29\i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Conatus }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af4 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs29\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Argument,\uc1\u8221\'d3 157 n. 31.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 Since, as I believe, the relations of causation and conception perfectly reflect each other, the bifurcation of causation should be mirrored by a }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 bifurcation of conception}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . Indeed, I believe that we have strong textual support for that conclusion.
\par \tab Consider the following passage from Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Short Treatise}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
. The context of the discussion is a distinction Spinoza draws between two kinds of definition. The first kind includes definitions \u8220\'d2of attributes, which are of a self-existing being,\u8221\'d3 while to the second belong definitions
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
[o]f those things which do not exist through themselves, but only through the attributes of which they are modes, and through which, as [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 als}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ] their genus, they must be understood. (KV I, vii| I/47/4)}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Cf. TIE 101, where Spinoza describes the \uc1\u8220\'d2fixed things\u8221\'d3 as \u8220\'d2like genera\u8221\'d3
 of the singular, changeable things. I take the \u8220\'d2fixed things\u8221\'d3 to be the attributes, not the infinite modes, because according to TIE 100, in the case of the \u8220\'d2fixed things,\u8221\'d3
 essence and existence are not distinct, while the existence of modes (finite or infinite) is distinct from their essence.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Modes are conceived or understood through their attributes, which function }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 as their genus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
; but obviously my parents, or any of my other transitive causes, are not in any sense my genera, nor does it make sense to say that the carpenter is the genus under which the table falls. While the table is conceived both through the carpenter and throug
h
 the attribute of extension (both are in some sense the cause of the table), there is a significant difference between these two kinds of conception. Extension explains the table by being its genus, while the carpenter explains the table in a completely d
i
fferent manner. This issue deserves careful and detailed discussion that goes beyond the scope of this article, but to put things briefly, the distinction between the two kinds of conception seems to be a distinction between the explanation, or conception
, of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 essence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , as opposed to the explanation of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 existence}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . The carpenter (i.e., God qua the carpenter}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 God is the efficient cause of both of the essence and existence of all things (E1p25), yet as E1p28d points out it is God \uc1\u8220\'d2modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence\u8221\'d3
 (II/69/25) which is the cause of the existence (\u8220\'d2determines to exist\u8221\'d3) of another finite thing.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ) explains the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 existence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  of the table, while Extension (i.e., God qua Extension) explains the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 essence}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  of the table. Consider the following passage from E1p17s: 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
A man is a cause of the existence of another man, but not of his essence, for the latter is an eternal truth. Hence, they can agree entirely according to their essence. But in existence they must differ\u8221\'d3(II/63/18)
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Here Spinoza is saying that the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 causes}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 of the essence and existence of a finite thing are distinct. But if the causes are distinct, then, following E1a4, the conceptions or explanations, of the essence and existence of a finite thing should also be dis
tinct. Essences of finite things are conceived and explained through their attribute, while }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid13977435\charrsid4800734 the existence of a finite thing}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 is explained through another finite thing (E1p28d).
\par \tab One may, of course, say that the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Short Treatise }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 is an odd and early text and th
at therefore we cannot take as conclusive evidence this distinction between conception that does and does not involve falling under a genus; yet a very similar distinction appears in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  itself. Spinoza uses }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 concipire}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 (to conceive) very frequently in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . There are two important features of Spinoza\rquote 
s use of this term which I would like to point out here.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  The contemporary literature on Spinoza tends to take }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
concipere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  (to conceive), }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 explicare}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 (to explicate or explain), }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 cognoscere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  (to know) and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 intelligere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  (to understand) as interchangeable. I am not sure this is indeed the case. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Cognoscere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
, for example, can refer to inadequate cognitions (E2p30), while at least some of the other three verbs seem to be reserved to adequate cognitions. The elucidation of these notions goes beyond the scope of this paper.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  First, in many places in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 (and in other texts), Spinoza talks about modes being conceived }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 under}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 sub}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ] an attribute, but he }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 never}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  claims (nor does it make sense to claim) that an effect of a transitive cause is conceived }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 under}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  that cause. Consider, for example, E3p2s:
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
[T]he Mind and the Body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\expnd0\expndtw-3\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Mens, et Corpu
s una, eademque res sit, quae jam sub Cogitationis, jam sub Extensionis attributo concipitur}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ](II/141/25).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn 
{\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  For other texts where Spinoza uses 
\uc1\u8220\'d2conceived under an attribute,\u8221\'d3 see, for example, DPP I (I/145/12), CM II, x (I/269/33), E2p6d, E2p7s, and E2p45d.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 The table is conceived \lquote under\rquote 
 Extension, but it is definitely not conceived \lquote under\rquote  the carpenter. To be \lquote conceived under\rquote  is quite close to the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Short Treatise}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \rquote s view of the attributes as the genera of modes. 
\par \tab Second, if we look carefully at Spinoza\rquote s use of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 concipere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  in the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 Ethics,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  we will find that he never uses it to designate the conception of a mode through its transitive cause. A mode is said to be \lquote 
conceived through\rquote  God\rquote s essence or the mode\rquote s nature, but, as far as I can see, never through another mode.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  A }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 possible}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  exception to this observation appears in a text outside of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , in 
\uc1\u167\'a492 of the TdIE, where Spinoza claims that \u8220\'d2a thing [can] be conceived either through its essence alone or through its proximate cause.\u8221\'d3 In the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , the expression \lquote conceived through another\rquote 
 is reserved to the dependence of modes on the substance, and is never applied to the relation of one mode to another. Hence, in E1p28 (one of the main places where Spinoza discusses transient causation), Spinoza does no
t claim that a finite mode is conceived through another finite mode. A very partial list of places where Spinoza speaks of modes as \uc1\u8220\'d2conceived through\u8221\'d3 God\rquote 
s essence includes: E1p15d, E1p18d, E1p29s, E4P39d, E5p23s, and E5p30d. One place where Spinoza speaks of affections of modes as \u8220\'d2conceived through\u8221\'d3 the modes\rquote  essences is E4p61d. }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Given Spinoza\rquote s abundant use of the term, it is highly unlikely to be a coincidence. Based on this finding, one could argue that there is no conception relation between ideas
 of modes which are connected by transitive causation,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  For an impressive paper that argues for this conclusion, see John Morrison, \uc1\u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid11422190 Restricting Spinoza\rquote s Causal}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Axiom\uc1\u8221\'d3 (unpublished manuscript).}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 but I believe that this is not the case. At the beginning of this paper we called the relation designated by E1a4 (\u8220\'d2The cognition of an effect depends on and involves the cognition of its cause\u8221\'d3) a relation of \lquote conception\rquote 
. This was in agreement with the common use in contemporary Spinoza scholarship, though it might have been slightly misleading, since }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 concipere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  does not appear in E1a4. I do think that E1a4 indicates a certain relation }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 we}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 would call a conceptual relation, since it is a relation between ideas or concepts.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See the use of E1a4 in E2p7d.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Spinoza\rquote 
s use of E1a4 seems to show that this conceptual relation holds between ideas whose objects are connected by immanent causation,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See E2p6d, E1p25d and E2p45d.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 as well as transitive causation.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See E2p7d, E2p16d and possibly E1p3d.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Hence, whi
le both immanent and transitive causation are mirrored by conceptual relations, Spinoza seems to reserve the verb }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 concipere}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 to a particular kind of conception, the conception of things (or their properties) either through the essence of God or through their own essence. In both cases, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 concipere}{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  is tied with the explanation of essences and mirrors only }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 immanent}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 causation.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 Even further support for the claim that the relation between an attribute and a mode is utterly different from the relation between the carpenter and the chair comes from Spinoza\rquote s claim that modes }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 express}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  God\rquote s attributes (E1p25c: \uc1\u8220\'d2Particular things are nothing but affects of God\rquote s attributes, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 or}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  modes by which God\rquote s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way\uc1\u8221\'d3),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
but as far as I can see, Spinoza never claims that an effect of a transient cause expresses its cause. I am not aware of a satisfactory explanation of \lquote expression\rquote  and its derivatives in Spinoza. Yet, when we look at Spinoza\rquote 
s use of the term, it seems that \lquote expression\rquote  denotes a relation that holds either between God\rquote s essence and the attributes or between the attributes and their m
odes. There is only one text where Spinoza talks about a mode expressing another mode. The enigmatic E5p22 reads: \uc1\u8220\'d2in God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of this or that human Body, under a species of eternity\u8221
\'d3; but, presumably, there is no causal relation between the mind and the body insofar as they belong to different attributes.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
\par \tab We have thus two parallel bifurcations: a bifurcation of causation into }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid13977435\charrsid4800734 (A) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 immanent and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid13977435\charrsid4800734 (B) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 transitive causation, and a bifurcation of conception into }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid13977435\charrsid4800734 (A`) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 conceiving things through (or under) God\rquote s essence or their own essence (\lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 concipere\rquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ), and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid13977435\charrsid4800734 (B`) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
the conceptual relation between an idea and its external cause which explains the existence but not the essence of finite things. These two bifurcations 
also seem to map well onto other bifurcations we have already encountered: (1) between causation that is, and is not, in time, and (2) between causes which are }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 more real}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  than their effects, and causes which are }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 as real}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 as their effects. An effect of an immanent cause is not posterior in time to the cause and is less real than the cause, while an effect of a transitive cause is equally real, and is posterior in time to the cause.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 I take the causation among infinite modes to be immanent (i.e., not in time a
nd involving inherence). The issue cannot be discussed in detail here, but let me present briefly two points that support this conclusion. First, in E1app Spinoza elaborates on his discussion of infinite modes in E1pp21-23: \uc1\u8220\'d2
...as has been established in PP21-23, that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God, and the more something requires several intermediate causes to produce it, the more imperfect it is\u8221\'d3
 (II/80/16-19). In other words, the immediate infinite modes are more perfect than
 the mediate infinite modes. Since Spinoza identifies reality and perfection (E2d6) it seems that the immediate infinite modes are also more real than the mediate infinite modes. Secondly, Spinoza uses the term \u8220\'d2follow [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 sequuntur}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 ]\uc1\u8221\'d3 to describe the (causal)
 relation between the absolute nature of the attributes and the immediate infinite modes (E1p21), as well as the relation between the immediate infinite modes and the mediate infinite modes (E1p22). The former case seems to be one of immanent causation (s
ince modes both inhere in and are caused by God\rquote s nature). Were the latter relation (i.e., E1p22) one of transitive causation, Spinoza would be equivocating in his the use of \lquote }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 sequuntur}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 .\rquote  }}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab What we have done so far shows that we can explain the bifurcation
 of conception through the bifurcation of causality (or the other way around). Still, the question remains whether we can go even deeper and explain the bifurcation of causality. Yes, we can.
\par \tab When Spinoza discusses the adequate definitions of things, he splits the discussion and suggests that }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 things which exist through themselves }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 should be defined differently from }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 things which do not exist through themselves}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 .}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  KV I, vii (I/46-47). Cf. TdIE \uc1\u167\'a4\u167\'a4 96-97.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  This essential bifurcation between two kinds of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 things}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  is restated by Spinoza in numerous ways. Some things are }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 free}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 libera}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ], while others are }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 compelled}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  [}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 coacta}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
] (E1d7). Some things \u8220\'d2are called }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 necessary by reason of [their] nature}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ,\u8221\'d3 while others }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 are necessary by reason of their cause}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  (E1p33s1).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote 
\ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Cf. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 Garrett, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s Necessitarianism\u8221\'d3 in Y. Yovel (ed.) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 God and Nature: Spinoza\rquote 
s Metaphysics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 , (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 199: \uc1\u8220\'d2It must be emphasized\u8230\'c9 that Spinoza does not present the distinction [in E1p33s1] as one between two }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 degrees}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210  of necessity, but rather as one between two }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210 sources}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7288210  of necessity; a thing\rquote s own essence, and a cause other than the thing itself.\uc1\u8221\'d3}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Some things }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 exist}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  (or do not exist) }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 by reason of their essence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , while others \u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 by reason of the whole nature}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \u8221\'d3 (E1p11d). All these bifurcations amount to Spinoza\rquote 
s central division between substance and mode. Only the substance exists and is necessary by virtue of its essence, and only the substance is free. Modes are never (fully) free, and they exist and are necessitated by vi
rtue of causes that are not their essence. While modes can strive to be more free and independent, they will never be substances.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  For Spinoza there is no continuum between the substance and modes. See Letter 54: \uc1\u8220\'d2
This I do know, that between the finite and he infinite there is no relation, so that the difference between God and the greatest and most excellent created thing is no other than between God and the least created thing\u8221\'d3 (Shirley 899| G IV/253).}
}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par \tab The distinction between substance and modes is also related to another crucial distinction of Spinoza, that between Eternity and Duration.
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li720\ri720\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
The difference between Eternity and Duration arises from this. For it is only of
 Modes that we can explain the existence by Duration. But [we can explain the existence] of Substance by Eternity, i.e., the infinite enjoyment of existing, or (in bad Latin) of being (Letter 12| IV/54-55).
\par }\pard \ltrpar\s17\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\nowidctlpar\wrapdefault\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 I am not sure whether Spinoza later changed his m
ind or not, but at least in this letter, Spinoza seems to conceive of eternity as the existence of substance and duration as the existence of modes.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar 
\pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  I discuss this issue more fully in my forthcoming article, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8220\'d2Spi}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid7018103 noza\rquote s Deification of Existence}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8221\'d3.}}}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 Of course, modes, insofar as they are modes of the substance, can in some way participate in the eternity of substance, and I assume that this is what Spinoza means by saying that modes can be conceived }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 sub specie aeternitatis}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  (E5p29d).}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Cf. E2p45s.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  
\par \tab Let me here stress two points. First, the bifurcation of substance and mode is not one in which the two sides are completely alien to each other (as with Kantian intuitions and concepts}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3624563 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 The radical heterogeneity of intuitions and concepts in Kant generates the crucial problem of the schematism, i.e., what guarantees the necessary agreement between concepts and intuitions if indeed they come from utterly alien sources. Kant\rquote 
s response (\uc1\u8220\'d2[it] is a hidden art in the depth of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty\u8221\'d3, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid3624563 Critique of Pure Reason}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid3624563 , translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  A141/B180) is far from satisfactory, and was subject to sharp criticism by some of his contemporaries}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
). The modes are modes of the substance, yet they have essential characteristics which are strictly opposed to those of substance, and it is this opposition between substance and modes, or }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
natura naturans}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 natura naturata}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 (E1p29s), that ultimately grounds the bifurcations of causation and conception.
\par \tab Second, according to Della Rocca, the PSR does not allow for the existence of brute or illegitimate bifurcation, but at times it seems as if Della Rocca is arguing for an even stronger thesis, i.e., that for Spinoza }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 all bifurcations are illegitimate}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . Della Rocca claims that Spinoza\rquote s naturalism (which itself is motivated by, or even tantamount, to the PSR) \u8220
\'d2is the view that there are no illegitimate bifurcations in reality,\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734   Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 6.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  but the question is whether there are }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 legitimate}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  bifurcations in reality. To my mind, the passage just cited from Letter 12 shows clearly that at the center of Spinoza\rquote 
s metaphysics there is a sharp division between the existence of substance (eternity) and the existence of modes (duration). Della Rocca defines the naturalism he ascribes to Spinoza as the \u8220\'d2
thesis that everything in the world plays by the same rules,\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734   Della Rocca, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Spinoza}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 , 5.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  but playing according to the same rules does not mean that there is only one single player. In other words, cl
aiming that the nature of substance is different from the nature of modes is consistent with the strict commitment of both to the same set of rules.
\par \tab I have argued elsewhere that, for Spinoza, modes are nothing but the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 propria}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  of God which follow necessarily from God
\rquote s essence.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1
\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  See Melamed, \uc1\u8220\'d2Spinoza\rquote s Metaphysics of Substance,\u8221\'d3 67-9. Cf. Garrett, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 
\ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \lquote \lquote Spinoza\rquote s }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Conatus}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af299 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 
 Argument, 156-7, n. 24.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Spinoza understands the relation between an essence and its }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 propria}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  as one of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 immanent causation}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , in which case the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 propria}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  are simultaneous with their cause, and inhere in their cause.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn 
{\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  This explains Spinoza\rquote s claim that 
\uc1\u8220\'d2knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing but knowing some property of the cause\u8221\'d3 (TTP, Ch. 4|G III/60). The context of this discussion is the relation of God\rquote 
s essence to the modes, which is a relation of immanent causation, and it is only in this kind of causation that an effect is a proprium of the essence of its cause (a proprium must follow solely from the essence of the thing).  Indeed
, the two other texts (cited in note 1}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944 4}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  above) where Spinoza identifies \lquote an effect of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 x}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \rquote  with \lquote a property of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 x}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \rquote  also deal with immanent causation.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  The causation between finite modes is }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
transitive causation}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 . The picture we get is that }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 both}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 causation and conception are bifurcated, but }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 neither}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
 bifurcation is a brute fact. The bifurcation of conception is grounded in the bifurcation of causation (or the other way around), which is ultimately grounded in the bifurcation of existing things into }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 natura naturans}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  and }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 nartura naturata}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , eternity and duration.
\par \tab But how about this very last bifurcation? Is the substance-mode bifurcation brute? If so, one may invoke the PSR in order to obliterate it by denying the reality of duration and modes and embracing the acosmist 
interpretation of Spinoza, which affirms the sole reality of undifferentiated }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 natura naturans}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
. One can now see why Hegel claims that \u8220\'d2}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ex nihilo nihil fit}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ,\u8221\'d3 a variant of the PSR, leads to acosmism,}{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid6371232 \rtlch\fcs1 
\af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734   }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 See G.W.F. Hegel, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 Lectures on the History of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 , }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 translated by E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson (London: University of Nebraska Press 199),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232  vol. I 244; }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 Science of Logic}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 ,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232  translated by A.V. Miller (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969),}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232  84; and the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 
Encyclopedia Logic}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid6371232 , translated by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchtig and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), \uc1\u167\'a488.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  but in spite of the charm and boldness of this interpretation, I do not think that it is sustainable.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\super\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar
\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sb120\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4800734 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 
\ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  Briefly, the acosmist interpretation conflicts with some key doctrines of the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 Ethics}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734   (such as the paral
lelisms (E2p7 and E2p7s), and the third kind of knowledge) which seem to presuppose the reality of modes. For more detailed discussion, see my }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 \uc1\u8220\'d2
Acosmist or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid7669494 \uc1\u8221\'d3}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734  }{\rtlch\fcs1 
\af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\cf1\insrsid14497944\charrsid4800734 89-91.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  Assuming that the acosmist
 interpretation of Spinoza is wrong, we may, and indeed should, ask: Why is it the case, for Spinoza, that there is a universe of finite modes and not just one eternal and undifferentiated substance?  Why does }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 natura naturata}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  follow from }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 natura naturans}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 ? Why are plurality and duration real?
\par \tab 
\par \tab }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid7669494\charrsid7669494 4. }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \ul\insrsid11168585\charrsid7669494 Conclusion
\par }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \tab Della Rocca\rquote s bold and remarkable thesis led us to one of the deepest questions in Spinoza\rquote 
s metaphysics. I have argued in this paper that Spinoza never actually identified the relations of inherence and causation, and that any attempt to suggest such an identification as a friendly amendment to the system is inconsistent with some of Spinoza
\rquote s main theses. I have provided several arguments in support of the latter claim. In the last part of the paper, I have argued that in Spinoza there is sharp bifurcation between }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
two kinds of causality }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 as well as between }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 two kinds of conception}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 , and that both bifurcations are grounded in the bifurcation of existence into substance and modes. At this point we may legitimately ask as to the reason for this very last bifurcation: Why does God have modes?
\par \tab This last question seems to press Spinoza from different directions. On the one hand, Spinoza\rquote s strict commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason demands that this 
question be answerable. Spinoza cannot avail himself of the claim that God created the world by virtue of some arbitrary grace. On the other hand, it seems that one cannot say that }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
natura naturans}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  needs or demands the existence of }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 natura naturata,}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734  since this would presumably invert the dependence relation of modes on the substance.
\par \tab This deep and foundational question requires a thorough investigation and hence must wait for another occasion, but let me here just hint at an answer. The very definition and essence of God \endash  \u8220\'d2By God I understand a being }{
\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 absolutely infinite}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 \u8221\'d3 - asserts the reality of an infinitely infinite multitude.}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\cs21\super\insrsid7669494 \chftn {\footnote \ltrpar \pard\plain \ltrpar\s19\qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\wrapdefault\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid7669494 \rtlch\fcs1 \af0\afs24\alang1033 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \cs21\fs22\super\insrsid14497944\charrsid7669494 \chftn }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7669494 
 I am indebted to Steve Barbone, John Brandau, John Carriero, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944 Dan Garber, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7669494 
Don Garrett, Zach Gartenberg, John Heil, Mogens Laerke, John Morrison, Lukas Muehlethaler, Sam Newlands, Alan Nelson, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944 Don Rutherford, }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7669494 two referees for the }{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \i\fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7669494 Journal of the History of Philosophy}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 \fs22\insrsid14497944\charrsid7669494 
, and especially, Michael Della Rocca, for insightful comments on
 an earlier draft of this paper. I presented earlier versions of this paper at the Leiden-Duke Early Modern Philosophy workshop at Leiden University (September 2008), the Southwest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy in Caltech, Pasadena (March 2009). The 
p
aper also was also the subject of a symposium at the Pacific APA (March 2010). I would like to thank the participants in the discussions in these seminars for their very helpful comments. I owe much of my knowledge of Spinoza to Michael Della Rocca, and I
 very much doubt whether I would have become a Spinoza scholar if not for him. But it is because, and not in spite, of this debt that I would like to engage with this central line of his recent work.}}}{\rtlch\fcs1 \af0 \ltrch\fcs0 
\insrsid11168585\charrsid4800734 
\par 
\par 
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