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3 The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation

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7 **Abstract** One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is
8 that our conception of the relation between moral language and motivation provides
9 strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue
10 that this supposition is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments
11 that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view to the extent they are
12 assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view
13 according to which there is a pragmatic and standardized connection between moral
14 utterances and motivation. The pragmatic account I propose states that a person's
15 utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to ϕ conveys two things: the
16 sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that she ought
17 to ϕ , and her utterance carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect
18 that she is motivated to ϕ . This view also makes it possible to defend cognitivism
19 against a well-known internalist argument.

20
21 **Keywords** Cognitivism · Externalism · Generalized conversational implicature ·
22 Paul Grice · Metaethics · Moral motivation · Non-cognitivism
23

24 1 Introduction

25 In metaethics, we are frequently asked to imagine people who employ moral
26 language but lack the corresponding moral motivation. It is generally presumed that
27 our responses to such thought experiments provide strong support for internalism,
28 the view that there is a necessary and nontrivial connection between moral
29 judgments and motivation. Correspondingly, it is generally presumed that they

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30 constitute a problem for externalism, the view that no such connection holds. It is
 31 consequently taken for granted that internalism has an important advantage over
 32 externalism on the ground that it offers a compelling explanation of our conception
 33 of the relation between moral language and motivation, whereas externalism merely
 34 can appeal to the impression that amorality appears conceivable. In the present
 35 paper, I argue that this presumption is unfounded. On closer inspection, our
 36 conception of the relation between moral language and motivation does not supply
 37 the foundation to internalism it is usually thought to do. In particular, I argue that it
 38 provides at least as strong support to an externalist account in terms of a pragmatic
 39 and standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation.

40 In the next section, I examine five dimensions of internalist claims that yield
 41 different versions of internalism. An important upshot of this survey is that it allows
 42 us to demarcate the version of internalism needed to function as a premise in an
 43 influential internalist argument against cognitivism. In Sect. 3, I examine the various
 44 types of thought experiments that internalists adduce in support of their view. Most
 45 importantly, I argue that none of our assumed responses to these cases provide
 46 convincing evidence for any of the various versions of internalism, and that all of
 47 these responses are equally explainable by an externalist and pragmatic view. The
 48 rest of the paper is devoted to defending such a view. In Sects. 4 through 5, I lay out
 49 the Dual Aspect Account with regard to moral motivation: A person's utterance of a
 50 sentence according to which she ought to ϕ conveys both the belief that she ought to
 51 ϕ and that she is motivated to ϕ . Whereas the first is conveyed by means of the
 52 conventional meaning of the sentence, the latter is conveyed by the fact that an
 53 utterance of such a sentence carries a generalized conversational implicature to this effect.¹ In
 54 Sect. 6, I argue that this pragmatic account can explain our responses to the various
 55 thought experiments we considered earlier. Therefore, I recommend that externalists
 56 adopt this account so as to explain our conception of the relation between moral
 57 language and motivation. The resulting view bestows cognitivists with an effective
 58 tool to uphold their claim against the internalist argument, since it makes it possible
 59 for them to adopt externalism at the same time as they can explain our conception of
 60 the relation between moral language and motivation. The general line of argument
 61 in the paper suggests that, in consideration of the fact that it has been quite hard to
 62 formulate a viable version of internalism and that this kind of claim has a number of
 63 difficulties, there is reason to think that the proposed externalist and pragmatist view
 64 is preferable to internalism.

65 2 Dimensions of Internalism

66 The following type of claim can be considered as a generic formulation of Moral
 67 Judgment Internalism (MJI):

68 Necessarily, if a person judges that she morally ought to ϕ , then she is, at least
 69 to some extent, motivated to ϕ .

¹ I defend this view in more detail in Strandberg (forthcoming a), where I consider moral language more generally.

70 We shall first see that this generic formulation can be specified and modified
 71 along five dimensions with the consequence that there are different versions of
 72 MJI.² We shall then see that the most metaethically significant version of MJI needs
 73 to be understood so as to fulfill five conditions, answering to the first claim in each
 74 dimension.³

75 (i) *Conceptual Necessity vs. Non-Conceptual Necessity* This dimension concerns
 76 how “necessary” in MJI should be understood. According to a *conceptual* version
 77 of MJI, “necessary” is understood as “conceptually necessary,” and, hence, as
 78 being a matter of the meaning of moral terms and sentences. According to a
 79 *non-conceptual* version of this view, it is understood as some other type of
 80 necessity, e.g., metaphysical necessity. In metaethics, claims about meaning are
 81 commonly understood in terms of what mental states sentences express in virtue of
 82 their conventional meaning. Think of a sentence of the type “I ought to ϕ .” Assume
 83 that a person who fully understands the meaning of the sentence asserts or accepts it.
 84 It is then plausible to assume that she has to be in a certain mental state. More
 85 exactly, it is reasonable to assume there is a minimal mental state that she needs to
 86 be in, order to it to be consistent with the meaning of the sentence for her to accept
 87 or assert it. This might be put by saying that the sentence expresses such a mental
 88 state: a “moral judgment.”⁴ Accordingly, a conceptual version of MJI would
 89 maintain that the sentence, in virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a moral
 90 judgment such that if a person holds it, she is motivated to ϕ .⁵

91 (ii) *Generalizable vs. Non-Generalizable* This dimension concerns whether MJI
 92 can be generalizable to other types of moral judgments that involve a certain moral
 93 concept (e.g., ought) than those referred to in a generic formulation of this claim. As
 94 is clear from this formulation, MJI is typically characterized in terms of a particular
 95 type of moral judgment. First, it concerns judgments to the effect that ϕ ing has
 96 a certain moral characteristic, e.g., that ϕ ing ought to be performed. Second, of these
 97 judgments it concerns self-addressed moral judgments, e.g., a person’s judgment
 98 that *she* ought to ϕ . Third, of these judgments it concerns those that relate to a
 99 person’s present or future actions. According to a *generalizable* version of MJI, this
 100 claim is generalizable to other kinds of moral judgments than those referred to in a

2FL01 ² In this paper, I consider dimensions of MJI that are directly relevant to the various thought experiments
 2FL02 to which internalists appeal. However, there are other important dimensions of this view. One concerns in
 2FL03 what kind of moral judgement consist (beliefs, desires, or something else). Another concerns what it is
 2FL04 about moral judgments that explains motivation (their being mental states of a certain type or their having
 2FL05 certain propositional objects). It should further be noticed that both moral judgments and motivational
 2FL06 states might be understood either as dispositional or as occurrent mental states. I will, in accordance with
 2FL07 the literature, understand both in the latter way (but see below). Internalist claims also bring up intriguing
 2FL08 issues as regards concept ascription that I cannot discuss here; see Greenberg (2009, pp. 137–164).

3FL01 ³ For clarifying comments on MJI, see Audi (1997, pp. 134–138); Cuneo (1999, pp. 361–363);
 3FL02 Svavarsdóttir (1999, pp. 163–165); Lippert-Rasmussen (2002, pp. 8–15); Roskies (2003, pp. 52–53);
 3FL03 Tresan (2009a, pp. 51–72); Zangwill (2007, pp. 91–96); Miller (2008, pp. 1–23); and Francén (2010,
 3FL04 pp. 117–148).

4FL01 ⁴ I use “judgment” in a way that is neutral between cognitivism and expressivism. For useful discussions
 4FL02 of “express,” see Kalderon (2005, Chap. 2); and Schroeder (2008, pp. 86–116).

5FL01 ⁵ At least granted that certain requirements are fulfilled (see below). Conceptual MJI is most common,
 5FL02 but for a non-conceptual variant, see Bedke (2009, pp. 189–190). Cf. Mele (1996, pp. 727–753); Sinclair
 5FL03 (2007, pp. 201–220); and van Roojen (2010, pp. 495–525).



101 generic formulation of this view.⁶ According to a *non-generalizable* version of MJI,
102 it is only applicable to the kind of moral judgments referred to in this formulation.

103 (iii) *Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic* This dimension concerns whether motivation is
104 constitutive of the nature of moral judgments. According to an *intrinsic* version of
105 MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges that she ought to ϕ , then she is motivated
106 to ϕ , and this judgment is by itself sufficient for her to be motivated to ϕ .⁷
107 According to an *extrinsic* version of MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges that
108 she ought to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ ,⁸ but the judgment is not by itself
109 sufficient for her to be thus motivated.

110 We can furthermore distinguish between different types of extrinsic MJI by
111 considering to what extent motivation is extrinsic to moral judgments. According to
112 a *weak extrinsic* version of MJI, it is the nature of a person's moral judgment in
113 conjunction with some further fact that explains her motivation to ϕ . According to a
114 *strong extrinsic* version of MJI, the nature of a person's moral judgment does not
115 play any part at all in an explanation as to why she is motivated to ϕ . For instance, it
116 might be suggested that we classify a person's judgment as a *moral* judgment only if
117 she is motivated to ϕ , but that the nature of the judgment does not play any part in
118 the explanation of her motivation.⁹

119 We will next consider two further dimensions of MJI. In each of these
120 dimensions, the first version of MJI exists in both intrinsic and extrinsic variants,
121 whereas the second version of MJI only exists in extrinsic variants.

122 (iv) *Unconditional vs. Conditional* This dimension concerns whether the
123 necessary connection between moral judgments holds for all persons or only for
124 those who satisfy some condition relating to their psychological state. According to
125 an *unconditional* version of MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges that she ought
126 to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ , and this holds for any person irrespective of her
127 psychological state.¹⁰ According to a *conditional* version of MJI, it is necessary that
128 if a person judges that she ought to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ if she fulfills a

6FL01 ⁶ This should not be understood to entail that other kinds of moral judgments are necessarily connected
6FL02 specifically to motivation to *perform* actions (or not to perform actions). It means rather that what
6FL03 explains that moral judgments of the kind referred to in a generic formulation of MJI are necessarily
6FL04 connected to motivation to perform actions also explains the connection between other kinds of moral
6FL05 judgments and motivational states, such as motivation to assist others to perform actions. So on the
6FL06 assumption that it is the meaning of a certain moral term (e.g., "ought") that ultimately explains the
6FL07 connection between the kind of moral judgments and motivation referred to in a generic formulation of
6FL08 MJI, the meaning of this term should also explain the connection between other kinds of ought judgments
6FL09 and motivational states.

7FL01 ⁷ This means that a moral judgment either consists in or entails (without consisting in) a motivational
7FL02 state. If the latter is the case, a moral judgment either consists in a complex of mental states of which a
7FL03 motivational state is part, or it somehow gives rise to a motivational state without this state being part of
7FL04 it. On a related alternative, a moral judgment by itself causes a motivational state. Cf. Tresan (2009a,
7FL05 pp. 54–57).

8FL01 ⁸ At least granted that certain requirements are fulfilled (see (iv) and (v) below).

9FL01 ⁹ See Tresan (2009a, pp. 57–58). Cf. Sneddon (2009, pp. 41–53).

10FL01 ¹⁰ In order to distinguish this view from an individual version of MJI (see (v)), we can add that this at
10FL02 least holds for a person who is member of a community in which a significant number of persons are
10FL03 motivated in accordance with their moral judgments. A few internalists can be understood to defend an
10FL04 unconditional version of MJI; see, e.g., Lenman (1999, pp. 441–457); and Joyce (2001, pp. 17–29). It is



129 certain condition C with regard to her psychological state, for example, that she is
 130 rational or “normal.”^{11,12} Advocates of conditional MJI think that the connection
 131 between moral judgments and motivation might collapse if a person who holds a
 132 moral judgment suffers from a mental condition such as depression, apathy or
 133 emotional disturbances. They therefore advocate conditional MJI where the fact that
 134 a person does not satisfy C can explain such cases.¹³

135 (v) *Individual vs. Communal* This dimension concerns whether the necessary
 136 connection between moral judgments and motivation holds on an individual or a
 137 communal level. According to an *individual* version of MJI, it is necessary that if
 138 a person judges that she ought to ϕ , then *she* is motivated to ϕ .¹⁴ According to a
 139 *communal* version of MJI, it necessary that if a person judges that she ought to ϕ ,
 140 then she is part of, or suitable connected to, a community in which a significant
 141 number of people are motivated in accordance with their moral judgments.¹⁵
 142 Advocates of the latter view maintain that a person cannot hold a moral judgment
 143 unless she is part of a moral community containing moral institutions and practices
 144 that sustain the connection between people’s moral judgments and motivation in
 145 general. This can, in turn, be accounted for by maintaining that morality is an

10FL05
 10FL06 Footnote 10 continued

10FL07 normally presumed that an unconditional version of MJI needs to be intrinsic, but for the possibility of an
 10FL08 unconditional and extrinsic version, see Tresan (2009a, pp. 57–58).

11FL01 ¹¹ On a *weak extrinsic* version of conditional MJI, it is the nature of a person’s moral judgment in
 11FL02 conjunction with the fact that she fulfills C that explains her motivation to ϕ (see Smith 1994, Chap. 3).
 11FL03 On a *strong extrinsic* version of conditional MJI, the nature of moral judgments does not play any part in
 11FL04 such an explanation.

12FL01 ¹² There is a complication that needs to be mentioned in this context. It is possible to combine a certain
 12FL02 conditional version of MJI with a certain unconditional version of this view. The reason is that both
 12FL03 “moral judgments” and “motivation” can be understood either as dispositional or occurrent mental
 12FL04 states. Some expressivists accept the following version of conditional MJI: Necessarily, if a person judges
 12FL05 that she ought to ϕ , in the sense of having a certain *dispositional desire* in relation to ϕ ing, then she is
 12FL06 motivated to ϕ , in the sense of having a certain *occurrent desire* to ϕ , if she fulfills C. This view is
 12FL07 possible to combine with a certain unconditional version of MJI: Necessarily, if a person judges that she
 12FL08 ought to ϕ , in the sense of having a certain *occurrent desire* in relation to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ ,
 12FL09 in the sense of having a certain *occurrent desire* to ϕ . The basic idea is that a moral judgment, in the form of
 12FL10 a dispositional desire, issues in an occurrent desire only if the person in question fulfills C. See Blackburn
 12FL11 (1998, pp. 59–68), Björnsson (2003, pp. 327–344); and Gibbard (2003, pp. 152–154). I criticize this view
 12FL12 in Strandberg (forthcoming b).

13FL01 ¹³ For examples of conditional MJI that specify C in terms of rationality, see Smith (1994, p. 61);
 13FL02 Korsgaard (1996, pp. 315–317), and van Roojen (2010, pp. 495–525). For other readings of C, see, e.g.,
 13FL03 Dreier (1990, p. 11); and Gibbard (2003, pp. 154). I criticize conditional versions of MJI in Strandberg
 13FL04 (forthcoming c). It has been shown difficult to spell out C in a way which does not trivialize MJI; see
 13FL05 Lenman (1996, pp. 298–299); Sayre-McCord (1997, pp. 64–65); Svavarsdóttir (1999, pp. 164–165);
 13FL06 Roskies (2003, p. 53); and Schroeter (2005, p. 4).

14FL01 ¹⁴ In order to distinguish this view from an unconditional version of MJI, we can add that that this at least
 14FL02 holds for a person who satisfies C.

15FL01 ¹⁵ On a *weak extrinsic* version of communal MJI, it is the nature of a person’s moral judgment in
 15FL02 conjunction with the fact that she is a member of a certain moral community which explains that she is
 15FL03 motivated to ϕ ; cf. Greenspan (1998, p. 111); and Tresan (2009b, p. 185). This might for example be the
 15FL04 case if moral judgments are about moral communities. On a *strong extrinsic* version of communal MJI,
 15FL05 this is not the case. For example, it might be that we classify a person’s judgment as a *moral judgment*
 15FL06 only if she is part of such a community, cf. Tresan (2009a, p. 60).



146 essentially social phenomenon that requires the existence of such institutions and
147 practices for its existence.¹⁶

148 Moral Judgment Externalism (MJE), as will understand this view, rejects MJI
149 irrespective of how it is interpreted along the various dimensions delineated above.
150 Thus, MJE denies that there is any nontrivial and necessary connection between
151 moral judgments and motivation.

152 It is generally assumed that MJI is of utmost significance on the ground that this
153 view in conjunction with the Humean theory of motivation entails that cognitivism
154 is false and lends support to expressivism. Cognitivism is standardly understood as
155 the semantic claim that moral sentences express moral judgments that consist in
156 beliefs, and expressivism as the semantic claim that moral sentences express moral
157 judgments that consist in desire-like states. The internalist argument can be
158 construed as follows. According to a generic formulation of MJI, it is necessary that
159 if a person judges that she ought to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ . However,
160 according to the Humean theory of motivation, a belief is not by itself sufficient for
161 motivation; to be motivated, it is necessary to have a distinct mental state in the
162 form of a desire.¹⁷ It is concluded that moral judgments do not consist in beliefs,
163 which means that cognitivism is false, and that they involve desires, which is an
164 argument for expressivism.

165 We can now see that MJI needs to be understood according to the first version of
166 this claim in each of the various dimensions (i)–(v) in order to function as a premise
167 in this argument. (i) Assume a non-conceptual version of MJI: such a claim is not a
168 semantic claim about what kind of moral judgments that moral sentences express. In
169 that case MJI in conjunction with the Humean theory of motivation does not provide
170 any support to expressivism as standardly understood, since moral sentences would
171 not express moral judgments with the relevant connection to motivation or desire.¹⁸
172 (ii) Assume a non-generalizable version of MJI: such a claim does not generalize to
173 other moral judgments than those mentioned in a generic formulation of such a
174 view. In that case there is reason to doubt the plausibility of the general conclusions
175 of the argument: that cognitivism is false and that there is reason to adopt
176 expressivism. (iii) Assume an extrinsic version of MJI: a moral judgment is not by
177 itself sufficient for motivation. Assume further the Humean theory of motivation.
178 The conjunction of these views is compatible with moral judgments consisting in
179 beliefs. For example, it might be a person's moral belief in conjunction with a
180 certain further fact that explains why she is motivated to ϕ , where her motivation is

16FL01 ¹⁶ See Foot (1978, pp. 189–207); Blackburn (1998, Chap. 3); Greenspan (1998, p. 105–109); Tresan
16FL02 (2006, pp. 150–151); and Tresan (2009b, pp. 179–199). Cf. Dreier (1990, pp. 9–14).

17FL01 ¹⁷ That is, a belief does not consist in, entail, or by itself cause a motivational state.

18FL01 ¹⁸ However, if expressivism is not understood as a conceptual claim, this consideration does not apply. In
18FL02 any case, the internalist argument gives limited support to expressivism since it merely entails, as I have
18FL03 vaguely formulated it, that moral judgments “involve” desire-like states, not that they consist in such
18FL04 states. It is thus compatible with the view that moral judgments consist *both* in beliefs and desire-like
18FL05 states; see Ridge (2006a, pp. 302–336); Boisvert (2008, pp 169–203); and Eriksson (2009, pp. 8–35).

181 constituted by a desire.¹⁹ (iv), (v) Assume a conditional or a communal version of
 182 MJI. As these are instances of extrinsic MJI, similar considerations hold for these
 183 views.²⁰

184 Corresponding to the various versions of MJI, there are several distinct ways for
 185 cognitivists to counter the internalist argument. However, I will argue that
 186 cognitivists should respond to this argument by denying MJI altogether and adopt
 187 MJE. However, they need to complement MJE with a pragmatic account so as to
 188 explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation.

189 3 The Alleged Support of Internalism

190 It is generally presumed that MJI has a significant advantage over MJE on the
 191 ground that it is able to explain our conception of moral language and motivation. In
 192 the present section, I will examine this supposition by considering the various types
 193 of thought experiments that are assumed to show that MJI is explanatorily superior
 194 to MJE in this regard. The discussion follows my description above of the different
 195 dimensions of MJI, (i)–(v).

196 3.1 Individual Cases

197 The overwhelmingly most frequent argument for MJI invokes cases that concern the
 198 connection between a person’s moral utterance and her motivation.²¹ The following
 199 scenario is representative:

200 *C1.* Anne and Bill are watching a TV programme about people suffering from
 201 famine. They start to talk about charity. Anne says to Bill “Actually, I ought to
 202 give some money to those who are starving.” There is no indication that her
 203 utterance is insincere, e.g., that she is lying or is ironic. At the same time,
 204 Anne has no motivation whatsoever to donate any money to the people who
 205 are starving.²²

19FL01 ¹⁹ According to an influential version of conditional MJI, this further fact consists in the person being
 19FL02 rational; see Smith (1994, Chap. 6).

20FL01 ²⁰ However, it is possible to combine a conditional version of MJI with an unconditional version of this
 20FL02 view, since moral judgments and motivation can be understood either as dispositional or occurrent mental
 20FL03 states (see above). It might then be argued that the resulting version of MJI can function as a premise in
 20FL04 the internalist argument. Some expressivists can be interpreted to embrace this view.

21FL01 ²¹ For some examples, see Stevenson (1944, pp. 16–17); Frankena (1976, p. 60); Dancy (1993, p. 4);
 21FL02 Smith (1994, p. 60); Lockie (1998, p. 16); Finlay (2004, pp. 206, 212); Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 156);
 21FL03 Railton (2006, p. 206); Ridge (2007, p. 51); Boisvert (2008, p. 169); Bedke (2009, pp. 189–190); and
 21FL04 Francén (2010, pp. 119, 125). (Although these authors believe that our response to such cases supports
 21FL05 MJI, not all of them ultimately embrace this view.) Many authors who write about MJI seem to presume
 21FL06 that this view is so plausible that they need not provide any argument for it. It is reasonable to think that
 21FL07 our assumed responses to cases such as C1 explain this presumption.

22FL01 ²² In what follows, I will assume that there are no indications that the moral utterances we are asked to
 22FL02 contemplate are insincere. It is commonly presumed that the fact that a person sincerely utters a sentence
 22FL03 entails that she holds the corresponding belief. However, it can be argued that a person might sincerely
 22FL04 utter a sentence without entertaining the corresponding belief if she is mistaken about what she believes

206 We respond presumably to such cases by finding them puzzling and we might
 207 even want to question whether the person in question actually thinks (i.e., judges)
 208 that she ought to ϕ , even if we do not have any evidence that she is insincere.

209 (i) It should first be pointed out that our responses to the type of thought
 210 experiments that internalist make use of only can provide support to a conceptual
 211 version of MJI, since these cases clearly are assumed to invoke our linguistic
 212 intuitions. The internalist explanation of our responses is thus that we know, granted
 213 that we are competent language users, that a sentence of the type “I ought to ϕ ” in
 214 virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a moral judgment such that if a person
 215 holds it, then she is motivated to ϕ (at least granted that certain requirements are
 216 fulfilled).

217 However, contrary to what usually is assumed to be the case, our response to
 218 cases such as C1 provides very little support to a conceptual version of MJI. We are
 219 told in these cases that a person utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to ϕ
 220 without being motivated to ϕ . However, MJI is not a thesis about the connection
 221 between *utterances* of such a sentence and motivation, but about the connection
 222 between the *moral judgment* such a sentence, in virtue of its conventional meaning,
 223 expresses and motivation. Consequently, our response is compatible with another
 224 explanation than the one proposed by internalists: what explains that we find a case
 225 such as C1 puzzling is that a person’s *utterance* of a sentence to the effect that she
 226 ought to ϕ standardly conveys that she is motivated to ϕ , not that the sentence she
 227 utters expresses a moral *judgment* that is necessarily accompanied by motivation.
 228 Our response thus leaves open to the possibility that even if it is anomalous for a
 229 person to utter such a sentence without being accordingly motivated, it is possible
 230 for a person to hold such a judgment without being accordingly motivated. Later on
 231 we will see that this view also can explain why we might come to doubt that a
 232 person who makes such a moral utterance, without being motivated to ϕ , thinks that
 233 she ought to ϕ .²³

234 This argument is similar to a well-known objection against inferences from use to
 235 meaning. When internalists appeal to cases such as C1, they argue in effect that we
 236 feel that it is odd to *use* a certain type of moral sentence in the absence of
 237 motivation, and they take this to indicate that the sentence expresses a moral
 238 judgment that is necessarily accompanied by motivation. A number of philosophers
 239 have pointed out that from the fact that it would be odd to use a given expression in
 240 certain circumstances we cannot draw any definitive conclusion as regards its
 241 meaning.²⁴ In the same vein, I argue that the fact that it is odd to use a certain type
 242 of moral sentence unless one is accordingly motivated should not make us infer
 243 MJI. These philosophers often maintain that we instead should adopt a pragmatic
 244 explanation of why it is odd to use an expression in certain circumstances. Consider:

22FL05
 22FL06 Footnote 22 continued

22FL07 (Ridge 2006b, pp. 487–495). Whether this view is correct does not affect my arguments as they also apply
 22FL08 to cases where a person explicitly is said to hold the moral judgment in question.

23FL01 ²³ Cf. Frankena (1976, pp. 66–67).

24FL01 ²⁴ For classical formulations of this argument, see Searle (1962, pp. 423–432; 1969, Chap. 6), esp.
 24FL02 pp. 146–149; and Grice (1989a, pp. 220–240). For some recent formulations, see Neale (1992,
 24FL03 pp. 512–520); Soames (2003, pp. 146–147); and Kalderon (2005, Chap. 2).

245 C2. Anne and Bill are professors at the philosophy department. They are
 246 discussing which students that will be admitted to the master programme in
 247 ethics. Anne says to Bill “David or Saul will be admitted to the master
 248 programme.” There is no indication that her utterance is insincere, e.g., that
 249 she is lying or is ironic. At the same time, Anne thinks that both David and
 250 Saul will be admitted to the programme.

251 It is plausible to assume that we respond to C2 by finding it puzzling since a
 252 person’s utterance to the effect that David or Saul will be admitted to the master
 253 programme strongly indicates that she does not think that both of them will. We
 254 might even hesitate to ascribe to her the belief that David *or* Saul will be thus
 255 admitted in that case. However, according to the received view, the sentence “David
 256 or Saul will be admitted to the master programme” does not entail that not both of
 257 them will be admitted to the programme. To formulate the point in the vocabulary
 258 utilized above: The sentence does not, in virtue of its conventional meaning, express
 259 a belief entailing that not both David and Saul will be admitted to the programme.
 260 Rather, it is a person’s utterance of a sentence of the type “X or Y” which
 261 standardly conveys that not both X and Y are the case. Thus, our response to C2
 262 should not be explained by the meaning of the sentence in question. It should rather
 263 be explained by there being a standardized pragmatic connection between utterances
 264 of this type of sentence and the mentioned piece of information.²⁵ Importantly, this
 265 suggests that the explanation of why we find C1 puzzling might be of the same kind
 266 as the explanation of why we find C2 puzzling: there is a standardized pragmatic
 267 connection between utterances of a certain type of sentence and a certain piece of
 268 information.

269 In reply, internalists might object that there is another type of case that provides
 270 stronger support to their view.²⁶

271 C3. Anne is alone at home watching a TV programme about people suffering
 272 from famine. Anne starts to think about charity. She thinks to herself that she
 273 ought to give some money to those who are starving. At the same time, Anne
 274 has no motivation whatsoever to donate any money to the people who are
 275 starving.

276 Internalists might argue that we respond to cases such as C3 by finding them
 277 puzzling; indeed, they might even be inclined to declare that such cases are
 278 impossible. The idea is then that this response would give stronger support to MJJ
 279 than our response to C1, since C3 concerns moral judgments rather than moral
 280 utterances.

281 It is first worth noticing that internalists appeal to cases such as C3 much less
 282 frequently than they appeal to cases such as C1. This is in itself remarkable since,

25FL01 ²⁵ According to a prevalent view, a sentence of the type “X or Y” carries a generalized conversational
 25FL02 implicature which accounts for this fact; see, e.g., Grice (1989b, 44–47); Levinson (2000, pp. 75–111);
 25FL03 and Soames (2003, pp. 206–210). However, the generalized conversational implicature in question is
 25FL04 more complicated than I can do justice to here.

26FL01 ²⁶ For example, see Milo (1981, p. 375); Smith (1994, p. 60); and Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 156). It is not
 26FL02 evident that they have this type of cases in mind as it is not clear what they mean by “judgment.”



283 as just noticed, our response to them would provide stronger evidence for MJI.
 284 Indeed, it might even be suggested that the fact that internalists appeal to cases such
 285 as C1, rather than C3, suggests a pragmatic explanation on the lines indicated above.

286 More importantly, the fact that we find cases such as C3 puzzling does not help
 287 the sake of MJI. The reason is that we respond in the same manner to cases where
 288 our response cannot be explained in terms of meaning but needs to be explained
 289 pragmatically. Consider:

290 C4. Anne, who is a professor at the philosophy department, is alone working.
 291 She is thinking about which students that will be admitted to the master
 292 programme in ethics. Anne thinks to herself that David or Saul will be
 293 admitted to the master programme. At the same time, Anne thinks to herself
 294 that both David and Saul will be admitted to the programme.

295 It is plausible to assume that we respond to C4 by finding it puzzling because
 296 describing a person as thinking that David or Saul will be admitted to the master
 297 programme strongly indicates that she does not think that both of them will.
 298 However, as our discussion of C2 makes clear, this should not be explained by the
 299 conventional meaning of the sentence “David or Saul will be admitted to the master
 300 programme.” In view of our considerations in relation to C2, it is plausible to
 301 assume that it should be explained by there being a standardized pragmatic
 302 connection between utterances of a sentence of the type “X or Y” and the
 303 contention that not both X and Y are the case. More precisely, it is plausible to
 304 assume that we have, so to speak, internalized this connection in such a way that it
 305 has become part of our notion of the connection between “X or Y” and “not X and
 306 Y.” Importantly, this means that our response to C3 does not give any advantage to
 307 MJI over an externalist and pragmatic account. In other words, just as our response
 308 to C4 should be explained by means of pragmatic considerations, it might be that
 309 our response to C3 should be explained in this manner as well.

310 (ii) The type of cases that internalists appeal to in defence of their view, such as
 311 C1 and C3, concern a particular type of moral judgments, corresponding to the type
 312 of judgments referred to in a generic formulation of MJI. This means that our
 313 responses to such cases do not provide support to a generalized version of MJI
 314 according to which such a claim can be generalized to other kinds of moral
 315 judgments than those referred to in a generic formulation. It is plausible to doubt,
 316 however, that MJI can be thus generalizable in view of the numerous types of
 317 contexts a certain moral concept can be involved in. Importantly, if MJI is not
 318 generalizable it is reasonable to question whether it can constitute a conceptually
 319 necessary claim. The reason is that such a claim reasonably has to be generalizable
 320 to all judgments involving the same moral concept irrespective of how they diverge
 321 with regard to the various aspects of moral judgments mentioned earlier.
 322 Unfortunately, I cannot pursue this argument in the present paper as it brings up
 323 a number of complex topics.

324 (iii) It can next be observed that our response to cases such as C1 or C3 provides
 325 support neither to an intrinsic nor an extrinsic version of MJI.

326 According to intrinsic version of MJI, a person’s judgment that she ought to ϕ is
 327 by itself sufficient for her to be motivated to ϕ . Our responses to cases such as

328 C1 and C3 do not provide evidence to this version of MJJ. They merely show that
 329 we are told that a person utters a certain type of moral sentence, or holds a certain
 330 kind of moral judgment, without being accordingly motivated, we are puzzled and
 331 perhaps even inclined to protest that she cannot really be holding the moral
 332 judgment in question.²⁷ There is nothing in this response which shows that the
 333 judgment itself, or even a part of it, needs to be involved in an explanation of the
 334 motivation in question. It should particularly be observed that our responses to cases
 335 such as C1 or C3 do not provide support to an intrinsic version of MJJ over an
 336 extrinsic variant of this view. The explanation of our response might be that we are
 337 told that a person judges that she ought to ϕ without being motivated to ϕ , and that
 338 we tacitly presume some further relevant consideration. For instance, it might be
 339 that we classify a person's judgment as a *moral* judgment only if it is accompanied
 340 by motivation, although the judgment need not be involved in the explanation of the
 341 motivation.²⁸ As we presume that the person figuring in these cases holds a moral
 342 judgment, we are puzzled when we are told that she is not accordingly motivated.

343 According to an extrinsic version of MJJ, a person's judgment that she ought to ϕ
 344 is not sufficient by itself for her to be motivated to ϕ . Our responses to cases such as
 345 C1 and C3 do not lend support to this view for the simple reason that they do not
 346 make explicit reference to any additional consideration, such as the one just
 347 mentioned, which would explain why we respond to these cases by finding them
 348 puzzling. (But see the discussion on conditional MJJ below.)

349 (iv) We might next consider the dimension pertaining to unconditional and
 350 conditional MJJ.

351 According to an unconditional version of MJJ, it is necessary that if a person
 352 judges that she ought to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ , and this holds for all persons
 353 irrespective of their mental condition. First, this view has the same type of difficulty
 354 as an intrinsic version of MJJ. Plausibly, we generally presume that people do not
 355 suffer from, say, depression or apathy in the absence of information to this effect.
 356 As a consequence, the explanation of why we respond to cases as C1 or C3 as we do
 357 might be that we presume that the person in question does not suffer from any
 358 mental condition of the relevant kind. Second, consider:

27FL01 ²⁷ It might be objected that there are cases which provide support to an intrinsic version of MJJ. This
 27FL02 would be cases in which a person utters that she ought to ϕ , is motivated to ϕ , but her motivation is not
 27FL03 explained by her moral judgment. Consider the following case: Anne and Bill are watching a TV
 27FL04 programme about people suffering from famine. They start to talk about charity. Anne says to Bill
 27FL05 "Actually, I ought to give some money to those who are starving." There is no indication that her
 27FL06 utterance is not sincere, e.g., that she is lying or is ironic. Anne is motivated to give money to charity. She
 27FL07 is not motivated by what she regards as moral considerations but merely by what she regards as non-
 27FL08 moral considerations. More precisely, she is only motivated to give money to charity so as to be admired
 27FL09 by her friends (cf. Sneddon 2009, pp. 41–53). First, it is plausible to assume that we do not find these
 27FL10 cases as puzzling as C1. One indication is that internalists never appeal to them when arguing for their
 27FL11 view. Second, our response to these cases would merely indicate that a person's moral judgment
 27FL12 somehow is part of an explanation of her motivation to perform a certain action, not that the judgment by
 27FL13 itself is sufficient for this motivation. Hence, it is compatible both with a conditional and a communal
 27FL14 version of MJJ. Finally, our response is compatible with a pragmatic and externalist account according to
 27FL15 which we regularly are motivated in accordance with what we think we have moral reasons to do. I will
 27FL16 return to this explanation in Sect. 6.

28FL01 ²⁸ Cf. Tresan (2006, pp. 148–149); and Sneddon (2009, pp. 41–53).



359 C5. Identical to C1, except for the additional information: There are
360 indications that Anne is deeply depressed.

361 It seems plausible to assume that we do not find cases such as C5 particularly
362 puzzling, since it makes reference to a possible explanation of the person's lack of
363 motivation. Thus, there is reason to think that a person who judges that she ought to
364 ϕ need not be motivated to ϕ quite irrespective of her mental condition.

365 According to a conditional version of MJI, it is necessary that if a person judges
366 that she ought to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ if she fulfills condition C. What I said
367 above suggests that this view gets support from a comparison between C5 and
368 another type of case. Consider:

369 C6. Identical to C1, except for the additional information: There is no
370 indication that Anne suffers from a mental condition such as depression,
371 apathy, emotional disturbances, or the like.

372 It is plausible to assume that we find cases such as C6 puzzling. Moreover,
373 it might be argued that since we find C6 more puzzling than C5, a conditional
374 version of MJI is preferable to an unconditional version of this view.

375 However, the fact that we respond differently to cases such as C5 and C6 give
376 limited support to a conditional version of MJI, since there is an alternative
377 pragmatic explanation of our reactions. These responses amount to the following:
378 we are more puzzled by cases (such as C6) in which a person utters a sentence to the
379 effect that she ought to ϕ , is not motivated to ϕ , and she is reported not to suffer
380 from a mental condition like depression, than cases (such as C5) in which she is
381 reported to suffer from such an inadequacy. According to the relevant conditional
382 version of MJI, the explanation of our responses is that the sentence the person
383 utters expresses a judgment such that if a person holds the judgment, she is
384 motivated to ϕ , provided that she fulfills a certain condition C with regard to her
385 mental condition. However, there is a pragmatic explanation of our responses:
386 A person's utterance of a sentence to the effect that she ought to ϕ standardly
387 conveys that she is motivated to ϕ , granted the assumption that she does not
388 suffer from a mental condition of the relevant kind. I will return to this explanation
389 in Sect. 6.

390 3.2 Communal Cases

391 A number of internalists have appealed to cases that concern the connection
392 between the moral language in an entire community and motivation.²⁹ Consider:

393 C7. There is an alien community which in many respects is like ours. People in
394 this community utter sentences to the effect that certain actions ought to be
395 performed. For example, when discussing charity, some of them might say
396 things like "Actually, I ought to give some money to those who are starving."

29FL01 ²⁹ See Dreier (1990, pp. 13–14); Blackburn (1995, pp. 48, 52–53); Lenman (1999, pp. 445–446,
29FL02 452–453); Joyce (2001, pp. 26–27); Bedke (2009, pp. 194–195); and Tresan (2009b, pp. 185–186).
29FL03 Cf. Hare (1952, pp. 148–149); and Blackburn (1998, pp. 61–65). These authors consider cases that vary in
29FL04 different respects, but I do not think these differences are relevant to my arguments.

397 There is no indication that their utterances are generally insincere; e.g., there
 398 are no indications that they generally are lying or are ironic. No one in this
 399 community who makes such utterances has, or has ever had, any motivation
 400 whatsoever to perform any of these actions.³⁰

401 We respond presumably to such cases by finding them puzzling and we might
 402 even come to question whether people in this community have a moral language.

403 Let us start with observing that our response to cases such as C7 does not give
 404 any support to an individual version of MJI. According to this view, it is necessary
 405 that if a person judges that she ought to ϕ , then *she* is motivated to ϕ .³¹ However,
 406 what we find puzzling in C7 is not that there is a *single person* who utters, or judges,
 407 that she ought to ϕ and that *she* fails to be motivated to ϕ , but that there is a *whole*
 408 *community* in which there are persons who utter that they ought to ϕ and that *each*
 409 of them fails to be motivated to ϕ . Our response leaves consequently open the
 410 possibility that a person might hold a moral judgment even if *she* is not accordingly
 411 motivated.³²

412 (v) Advocates of communal versions of MJI argue that although our response to
 413 cases such as C7 does not provide support to individual version of MJI, it provides
 414 support to communal MJI. In particular, they take our response to suggest that in
 415 order for a person to judge that she ought to ϕ , she must be part of a community in
 416 which a significant number of people are motivated in accordance with their moral
 417 judgments, even if she need not be motivated to ϕ herself.

418 However, our response to cases such as C7 provides little support even to
 419 communal MJI. The most important reason from the present perspective is that
 420 these cases concern the connection between *utterances* of moral sentences and
 421 motivation, not the connection between moral *judgments* and motivation. They
 422 leave consequently open the possibility that there is no necessary connection
 423 between moral judgments and motivation even at a communal level. In particular,
 424 they are compatible with a pragmatic account according to which there is a
 425 standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation. Consider:

426 C8. There is an alien community which in many respects is like ours. People in
 427 this community utter sentences of the type “X or Y.” For example, when
 428 discussing which students that will be admitted to the master programme in
 429 ethics, philosophy professors might say things like “David or Saul will be
 430 admitted to the master programme.” There is no indication that their
 431 utterances generally are insincere; e.g., there are no indications that they
 432 generally are lying or ironic. No one in this community who makes such
 433 utterances thinks, or has ever thought, that not both X and Y is the case. For
 434 example, none of the mentioned philosophy professors thinks, or has ever
 435 thought, that not both David and Saul will be admitted to the master
 436 programme.

30FL01 ³⁰ We might also add: “Moreover, there is no indication that the people in this society generally suffer
 30FL02 from mental conditions such as depression, apathy, emotional disturbances, or the like.”

31FL01 ³¹ That is, at least granted that she satisfies condition C.

32FL01 ³² Cf. Gert and Mele (2005, p. 281).



437 We are presumably liable to find such cases puzzling. According to the received
 438 view, the explanation of our response is not that a sentence of the type “X or Y,” in
 439 virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a belief which entails that not both X
 440 and Y are the case, even granted that the person in question is part of a community
 441 in which a significant number of people who holds the first belief hold the second.
 442 As before, the explanation is rather that there is a standardized pragmatic connection
 443 between utterances of a sentence of the type “X or Y” and the mentioned piece of
 444 information.³³

445 It might be objected that we find communal cases, such as C7, more puzzling
 446 than individual cases, such as C1. It is this difference proponents of communal MJI
 447 employ so as to make plausible the claim that even if it is possible for a person to
 448 judge that she ought to ϕ without being motivated to ϕ , it is not possible for a
 449 person to judge that she ought to ϕ unless she is part of a community in which there
 450 is a significant correlation between moral judgments and motivation.³⁴ It might then
 451 be maintained that a pragmatic account cannot explain this difference between the
 452 individual and communal level. But this difference is not surprising on the
 453 suggestion that there is a standardized pragmatic connection between moral
 454 utterances and motivation. In C7 no one who utters that she ought to ϕ is motivated
 455 to ϕ , whereas this is the case only as regards one person in C1. Similarly,
 456 corresponding to our responses to C1 and C7, we presumably find C8 more puzzling
 457 than C2. Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue that the pragmatic connection
 458 between moral utterances and motivation is a matter of the function moral language
 459 has in an entire community.

460 Let us summarize. First, we have seen that none of the responses that we are
 461 presumed that have in relation to the thought experiments internalists employ
 462 provides convincing support to any of the various versions of MJI. Importantly,
 463 it follows that these responses do not provide evidence to a version of MJI that can
 464 function as a premise in the internalist argument against cognitivism. It should also
 465 be stressed that in reaching this conclusion, I have presumed that internalists are
 466 correct about our responses. In other words, externalists need not contest that we
 467 have these responses in order to challenge MJI. Second, I have indicated that our
 468 responses to these cases can be explained by an externalist account that exploits a
 469 standardized pragmatic connection between moral utterances and motivation. Third,
 470 as the metaethical literature bears witness, internalist claims have a number of
 471 well-documented difficulties.³⁵ In view of these considerations, there is reason to
 472 further investigate the plausibility of an externalist and pragmatic alternative.
 473 However, in order to be plausible, this view needs to explain how utterances of
 474 moral sentences standardly convey motivation in a way which might be taken to

33FL01 ³³ It would not help advocates of communal MJI to employ communal cases that concern moral
 33FL02 judgments rather than moral utterances. The reason is that we can use the same manoeuvre as we used
 33FL03 above when we compared our responses to C3 and C4. That is, we can set up a case like C8 but which
 33FL04 concerns people’s beliefs that X or Y is the case rather than their utterances to this effect. We would
 33FL05 presumably find such cases just as puzzling as their moral counterparts.

34FL01 ³⁴ See Greenspan (1998, p. 106); and Tresan (2009b, pp. 185–186, 193).

35FL01 ³⁵ In fact, internalists seem to differ as regards their intuitions regarding certain central cases; see
 35FL02 Franc en (2010, pp. 117–148).

475 suggest that it should be explained in terms of the conventional meaning of these
 476 sentences. In what follows, I will argue that externalists can provide such an account
 477 in terms of Paul Grice's notion of general conversational implicature.³⁶

478 4 Two Purposes of Moral Discourse

479 A governing idea in Grice's theory of conversational implicatures is that we
 480 contribute to the conversations in which we are engaged in the ways that are
 481 required to fulfill the mutually accepted purposes of these conversations. He
 482 formulates a number of maxims which make it possible for us to fulfill this goal.
 483 The two I will make use is the maxim of relation, which states that one should make
 484 one's contributions so as to be relevant in consideration of the purposes of the
 485 conversation in question, and the second maxim of quantity, which states that one
 486 should not make one's contributions more informative than is required in
 487 consideration of these purposes.³⁷ In Grice's view, the fact that we are understood
 488 to conform to these maxims can make our utterances convey information that is not
 489 part of the conventional meaning of the sentences we employ. He refers to this
 490 information as "conversational implicatures."

491 To illustrate, assume that Anne and Bill work together with trying to assemble a
 492 bookcase and that Anne says to Bill "The screwdriver is over there." It is
 493 reasonable to assume that, given certain features of the context, Bill understands
 494 Anne's utterance to convey that she wants him to give her the screwdriver. This
 495 cannot be explained by the conventional meaning of the sentence she utters. Simply
 496 put, it should rather be explained by the fact that a mutually recognized purpose of
 497 their conversation is that they should put together the bookcase and that they are
 498 assumed to make utterances that are relevant given this purpose. On these
 499 assumptions, the most reasonable understanding of Anne's utterance is that she
 500 wants Bill to give her the screwdriver.³⁸

501 Grice distinguishes between two kinds of conversational implicatures. To see the
 502 difference, assume that an utterance of a sentence s with the conventional meaning
 503 p conversationally implicates q .

504 It is a *particularized conversational implicature (PCI)* in case an utterance of
 505 s does not standardly conversationally implicate q . The utterance carries the
 506 implicature in question only on the assumption that the context in which it is uttered
 507 has certain specific features justifying this understanding of it. (The case above is an
 508 example of PCI.)

509 It is a *generalized conversational implicature (GCI)* in case an utterance of
 510 s *standardly* conversationally implicates q . The utterance carries the implicature in

36FL01 ³⁶ For other pragmatic accounts, see Copp (2001, pp. 1–43; 2009, pp. 167–202); Finlay (2004,
 36FL02 pp. 205–223; 2005, pp. 1–20). In Strandberg (forthcoming a), I argue that the alternative proposed below
 36FL03 has a number of significant advantages to these views. For other pragmatic suggestions, see Searle (1969,
 36FL04 Chap. 6; 1979, pp. 32, 39–40); Ridge (2003, pp. 563–574); Railton (2006, pp. 212–215); and Cholbi
 36FL05 (2009, 495–510).

37FL01 ³⁷ Grice (1989a, pp. 26–27).

38FL01 ³⁸ Cf. Grice (1989a, p. 29).



511 question even if the contexts in which it is uttered do not have any specific features
 512 that justify this understanding of it. Hence, a GCI does not need contextual features
 513 of this kind to arise but arises unless there are any specific circumstances that defeat
 514 it.³⁹

515 An important idea in Grice's theory is that utterances carry conversational
 516 implicatures because there are certain mutually recognized purposes of the
 517 conversations in question. In what follows, I will maintain that externalists should
 518 maintain that there are two mutually accepted purposes that generally are present in
 519 moral conversations.

520 (1) The first general purpose of moral conversation is to communicate what the
 521 participants of the conversation believe about moral matters. For example, in moral
 522 conversations people communicate their beliefs that certain actions ought to be
 523 performed. This exemplifies the kind of purpose Grice describes as "giving and
 524 receiving information."⁴⁰

525 This purpose corresponds to what constitutes the conventional meaning of moral
 526 sentences according to cognitivism. A main objective of the present paper is, as
 527 pointed out in the introduction, to defend MJE in order to save cognitivism from the
 528 internalist argument. Consequently, in what follows I will investigate the prospects
 529 of combining cognitivism with an externalist and pragmatic view. It should be
 530 emphasized that the view I am defending does not entail a particular version of
 531 cognitivism but is compatible with any relevant version of this view. However, it
 532 presupposes one important but uncontroversial requirement: A sentence to the effect
 533 that a person morally ought to ϕ entails that she has a moral reason to ϕ .⁴¹ A reason
 534 to ϕ consists, according to a widely accepted view, in a fact which "counts in
 535 favour" of ϕ ing.⁴² In other words, a sentence to the effect that a person morally
 536 ought to ϕ entails that ϕ ing has some feature which, from the point of view of
 537 morality, counts in favour of that person ϕ ing. This requirement does not entail any
 538 particular conception of moral reasons. In particular, it does not entail that moral
 539 reasons constitute normative reasons where such reasons are understood in terms of
 540 rationality. According to such a notion, if a person thinks that she has a normative
 541 reason to ϕ , then she is motivated to ϕ if she is fully rational.⁴³ My account is thus
 542 not committed to this notion, even if it is compatible with it.

543 As the first purpose corresponds to the conventional meaning of moral sentences
 544 according to cognitivism, it should be uncontroversial to assume that moral

39FL01 ³⁹ For considerations in relation to GCI that are relevant for the pragmatic account I propose, see Bach
 39FL02 and Harnish (1998, pp. 682–711); Bach (1998, pp. 712–722); Morgan (1998, pp. 639–657); and Recanatì
 39FL03 (2003, pp. 299–332).

40FL01 ⁴⁰ Grice (1989a, p. 26).

41FL01 ⁴¹ Cf. Brink (1992, pp. 1, 8–9); Smith (1994, pp. 95–96); and Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 166). It might be
 41FL02 argued that there is a difference between "right" and "ought" as regards their relation to moral reasons.
 41FL03 On this view, a sentence to the effect that it is morally right that a person ϕ s entails that she has a moral
 41FL04 reason to ϕ (in that situation), whereas a sentence to the effect that a person morally ought to ϕ entails
 41FL05 that ϕ ing is what she has the *strongest* moral reason to do (in that situation). However, whether or not this
 41FL06 is correct does not affect my arguments.

42FL01 ⁴² See, e.g., Scanlon (1998, p. 17).

43FL01 ⁴³ See, e.g., Smith (1994, esp. Chap. 5); and Shafer-Landau (2003, Chap. 8).

545 conversations generally have that purpose on this view. In contrast, the second
 546 purpose is not in this way connected to what constitutes the conventional meaning
 547 of moral sentences on cognitivism. It is clear from Grice's discussion, however, that
 548 what purposes conversations have need not be directly connected to the meaning of
 549 the sentences uttered in them.

550 (2) The second general purpose of moral conversations is to influence action and,
 551 in particular, to make people perform, or avoid to perform, certain actions.⁴⁴ This
 552 exemplifies the purpose Grice describes as "influencing or directing the actions of
 553 others."⁴⁵

554 It is widely agreed in metaethics that moral language is essentially practical.
 555 Generally, if a person employs a sentence to the effect that ϕ ing has a certain moral
 556 characteristic, then we presume that she has a certain action-guiding attitude
 557 towards ϕ ing. Indeed, our responses to the cases we considered above confirm this
 558 view. A natural explanation of why moral language is practical in this way is, briefly
 559 put, that moral language thereby fulfills an important function: it makes it possible
 560 for us to regulate one another's behaviour in directions that we find desirable. For
 561 instance, assume that, generally, if a person utters a sentence to the effect that ϕ ing
 562 ought to be performed, then we presume that she wants that ϕ ing is performed. It is
 563 plausible to suppose that this, all things equal, will make us more inclined to ϕ than
 564 if she had not made the utterance. Similarly, it is likely to make us more inclined to
 565 assist other people in ϕ ing. Further, assume that, generally, if a person's utters a
 566 sentence to the effect that she ought to ϕ , then we presume that she is motivated to
 567 ϕ . This is also, all things equal, likely to make us more inclined to ϕ than if she had
 568 not made the utterance, since it indicates that she wants that ϕ ing is carried out.
 569 Likewise, it is likely to make us more inclined to assist her and others in ϕ ing. The
 570 explanation of this feature of moral language is presumably very fundamental: in
 571 order to live together in a way which promotes our own welfare and the welfare of
 572 our family and mates, we need to avoid conflicts and to cooperate with one another.
 573 As a result, what actions we carry out will depend on what attitudes we think people
 574 have towards them.

575 Granted the assumption that moral language generally *functions* so as to regulate
 576 behaviour, it is plausible to assume that moral conversations generally have as a
 577 *purpose* to influence action. If the purpose of moral conversations to influence
 578 action is successfully achieved, this will have as an overall result that we regulate
 579 one another's behaviour by means of moral language, and, hence, that moral
 580 language fulfills this function. As it is plausible to think that moral language has this
 581 function, it is plausible to think that our moral conversations generally have the
 582 purpose to influence action. On the other hand, if it were not a general purpose of
 583 moral conversations to influence action, it is difficult to see how moral language
 584 would be able to fulfill this function, since moral language in that case would need
 585 to work in a way that does not match the purpose we have in employing it. It is also
 586 important to observe that, in Grice's view, we do not need to be consciously aware
 587 what the purposes are of the conversations we are engaged in. Grice's contention is

44FL01 ⁴⁴ Cf. Copp (2001, p. 32).

45FL01 ⁴⁵ Grice (1989a, p. 28).

588 particularly plausible on the view that the purpose to influence action is a general
 589 purpose of moral conversations, since this view helps to explain that the purpose has
 590 become habitual and, hence, stays in the background of our moral considerations.
 591 We should rather think of it as a tacit assumption that guides our understanding of
 592 moral utterances without us necessarily being consciously aware of it.

593 Metaethicists who reject cognitivism and accept expressivism should agree that
 594 moral conversations have the general purpose of influencing action. To see this,
 595 suppose that it were not a purpose of moral conversations to influence action. In that
 596 case, a person's utterance of a sentence to the effect that ϕ ing ought to be performed
 597 would not be able to influence action, even if the sentence expresses a certain desire-
 598 like state. This is so since we would not identify the utterance as saying anything
 599 that is relevant in the conversation in question. Accordingly, expressivists
 600 repeatedly stress that the purpose of moral language is to influence action.⁴⁶

601 5 The Dual Aspect Account

602 In what follows, I will argue that advocates of MJE should adopt the Dual Aspect
 603 Account (DAA) as regards moral motivation. This account states that a person's
 604 utterance of a sentence to the effect that she ought to ϕ conveys two things,
 605 corresponding to the two purposes of moral discourse identified above. First, such a
 606 sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that the person
 607 in question ought to ϕ . Second, an utterance of this type of sentence carries a GCI,
 608 a standardized conversational implicature, to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ .
 609 As the first aspect merely is a statement of cognitivism, I will focus on the second
 610 aspect.

611 Let us start with considering an utterance of a sentence to the effect that a certain
 612 person ought to ϕ , but where the person in question need not be the speaker herself.
 613 We observed in particular three things above. First, a sentence to the effect that a
 614 person ought to ϕ entails that she has a moral reason to ϕ , which in turn entails that
 615 ϕ ing has some feature which, from the point of view of morality, counts in favour of
 616 her ϕ ing. Second, given the objectives of the present paper, it is reasonable to
 617 assume that moral conversations have two general purposes: to communicate beliefs
 618 about moral issues and to influence action. It was also observed that we need not be
 619 consciously aware of the purposes of the conversations we are engaged in. Third, a
 620 very basic way to influence other people's actions is to inform them about our
 621 attitudes. We observed in particular that if our moral utterances convey that we want
 622 that certain actions are performed, or that we are motivated to perform certain
 623 actions, this will have the function to influence other people's actions in ways that
 624 we find desirable.

625 Now, in view of these considerations, it is reasonable to understand someone who
 626 utters a sentence to the effect that a person ought to ϕ as wanting that the person in
 627 question ϕ s. That is, if someone utters a sentence which entails that, from the point
 628 of view of morality, there is a reason for a person to ϕ , and moral conversations

46FL01 ⁴⁶ See, e.g., Blackburn (1998, pp. 1–4).

629 have as a general purpose to influence action, and a basic way of doing so is to
 630 inform one another about our attitudes towards these actions, we understand the
 631 speaker as wanting that the person in question ϕ s. The reason is that, in
 632 consideration of the purpose of moral conversations to influence action, her
 633 utterance would lack in relevance unless she wants that the person ϕ s. Put
 634 differently, it is difficult to see what the point would be for someone to utter a
 635 sentence which entails that there is a moral reason for a person to ϕ , in a
 636 conversation that has as a purpose to influence action, unless she wants that the
 637 person in question ϕ s.

638 Let us next consider a person's utterance of sentence to the effect that she ought
 639 to ϕ . We have seen that an utterance of a sentence to the effect that a person ought
 640 to ϕ conveys that the speaker wants that the person in question ϕ s. In case a person
 641 utters a sentence according to which she ought to ϕ , this means that her utterance
 642 conveys that she wants herself to ϕ ; in other words, that she is motivated to ϕ .

643 This can be accounted for in terms of Grice's notion of the maxim of relation,
 644 which declares "Be relevant."⁴⁷ In Grice's view, we are justified to assume that a
 645 person who is engaged in a conversation contributes to it in the ways that are
 646 required to fulfill its mutually accepted purposes. An essential means of doing so is
 647 to follow the maxim of relation and, hence, only make utterances that are relevant in
 648 view of the purposes of the conversation in question. As we have seen, in order to
 649 explain that a person who utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to ϕ
 650 contributes to a moral conversation in a way which is relevant given the purpose of
 651 such conversations to regulate behaviour, we should understand her to be motivated
 652 to ϕ . Consequently, the person's utterance conversationally implicates that she is
 653 motivated to ϕ .^{48,49}

654 Moreover, this is a GCI rather than PCI. We noted above that, in order to regulate
 655 people's behaviour, moral conversations generally have as a purpose to influence
 656 action. This means that moral conversations have this purpose throughout the
 657 various contexts in which people are involved in such conversations. In turn, this
 658 means that a person's utterance to the effect that she ought to ϕ conversationally
 659 implicates that she is motivated to ϕ throughout such contexts. In other words, such
 660 an utterance standardly carries this implicature. In particular, given that moral
 661 conversations generally have the purpose to influence action, they have this purpose

47FL01 ⁴⁷ Grice (1989a, p. 26).

48FL01 ⁴⁸ This holds only on the condition that the person does not make an additional utterance, or the context
 48FL02 contains information, that cancels the implicature. It seems reasonable to think that a person's utterance to
 48FL03 the effect that she ought to ϕ usually conveys that she is motivated to ϕ to a significant extent, since it is
 48FL04 difficult to see how such utterances could influence action in any substantial manner if this were not
 48FL05 assumed to be the case. However, the fact that the person is motivated to ϕ is compatible with her being
 48FL06 motivated not to ϕ and that she has stronger motivation to do something else. Additional utterances or
 48FL07 contextual information can make clear that she is less motivated to ϕ than what normally is presumed to
 48FL08 be the case. Thus, a person's moral utterance can conversationally implicate different strengths of
 48FL09 motivation depending on additional utterances or contextual information, and our responses to her moral
 48FL10 utterance might vary accordingly. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for *The Journal of Ethics* for
 48FL11 raising this point.

49FL01 ⁴⁹ In Strandberg (forthcoming a), I discuss how the kind of GCI considered in this section can be
 49FL02 calculated and cancelled.



662 also in the absence of specific contextual features. That is, they have this purpose
 663 even if the context lacks any special features indicating that this is the purpose of the
 664 conversation in question. This purpose thus works as a kind of tacit assumption that
 665 governs our understanding of moral utterances. As a result, a person's utterance to
 666 the effect that she ought to ϕ conversationally implicates that she is motivated to ϕ
 667 even if the context in which it is uttered lacks special features of the mentioned sort;
 668 such an utterance carries the implicature unless there are any special circumstances
 669 that defeat it.

670 It might be objected that there are cases in which moral conversations do not
 671 have the purpose to influence action but a person's utterance to the effect that she
 672 ought to ϕ nevertheless conveys that she is motivated to ϕ . This might be the case
 673 when the subject matter of the conversation is not practically significant; for
 674 example, when it concerns matters people cannot influence or when it concerns
 675 abstract moral issues.

676 To respond to this objection, let us start by observing that there are various
 677 commonly accepted views that constitute a set of background presumptions about
 678 moral utterances and beliefs. For instance, it is generally the case that someone who
 679 utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to ϕ is motivated to ϕ . It is not difficult
 680 to explain this presumption on the view defended above, as it maintains that such
 681 utterances carry a GCI to the mentioned effect. According to another background
 682 presumption, it is generally the case that a person who *thinks* that she ought to ϕ is
 683 motivated to ϕ . There are presumably a number of psychological and social
 684 explanations of this assumption, such as moral upbringing, socialization, and certain
 685 fundamental human features and conditions.⁵⁰ Another explanation concerns
 686 normative reasons. As observed above, the view defended in this paper is not
 687 committed to the claim that a sentence according to which a person ought to ϕ
 688 entails that she has a normative reason to ϕ , where normative reasons are
 689 understood in terms of rationality. However, it is not farfetched to assume that we
 690 regularly believe that we have strong normative reasons to do what we morally
 691 ought to do. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that we are motivated to do what
 692 we think we have strong normative reasons to do in so far as we are rational. On the
 693 assumption that we generally are rational, it can consequently be expected that we
 694 regularly are motivated to do what we think we morally ought to do.

695 Return now to a person who utters a sentence to the effect that she ought to ϕ in a
 696 conversation which does not have as a purpose to influence action. In consideration
 697 of the kind of background assumptions I just mentioned, it is nevertheless plausible
 698 to assume that we understand the person's utterance as conveying that she is
 699 motivated to ϕ .

700 This can be accounted for in terms of Grice's second maxim of quantity, which
 701 declares "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required."⁵¹
 702 In order to understand the person above as complying with this maxim and, hence,

50FL01 ⁵⁰ See, e.g., Boyd (1988, pp. 215–216); Brink (1989, p. 49); Svavarsdóttir (1999, pp. 183–187); and
 50FL02 Shafer-Landau (2003, pp. 159–160).

51FL01 ⁵¹ Grice (1989a, p. 26). Cf. Harnish (1998, p. 267); Levinson (2000, pp. 37–38, 112–134); Horn (2004,
 51FL02 pp. 12–17); and Jaszczolt (2005, pp. 55–58). Cf. Searle (1969, pp. 141–146).

703 as not providing more information than is called for, we need to understand her
 704 utterance in such a way that she has no reason to submit any information that
 705 modifies it. In particular, we need to assume that she has no reason to inform us that
 706 what ordinarily is taken for granted to be the case as a matter of fact is not the case
 707 in the particular situation at hand. As a result, it seems that the best explanation
 708 of her utterance is that there is no exception to the background presumptions
 709 I mentioned above. Consequently, the person's utterance conversationally impli-
 710 cates that she is motivated to ϕ .⁵²

711 Once again it is a matter of a GCI rather than a PCI. As I suggested above, it
 712 plausible to think that these background presumptions are quite commonly taken for
 713 granted in the various contexts in which people are engaged in moral conversations.
 714 This means that a person's utterance to the effect that she ought to ϕ
 715 conversationally implicates that she is motivated to ϕ throughout such contexts.
 716 The fact that people who are engaged in a moral conversation share certain
 717 background presumptions about moral utterances and beliefs is part of its context,
 718 but since these presumptions standardly are taken for granted, they are not *special*
 719 contextual features. They are, in other words, not features that merely belong to
 720 individual contexts, but rather standing contextual features of moral conversations.
 721 As a result, a person's utterance to the effect that she ought to ϕ conversationally
 722 implicates that she is motivated to ϕ even in the absence of special contextual
 723 features; such an utterance carries the implicature granted that there are no special
 724 circumstances that defeat it.

725 We have seen that even if we assume that a moral conversation lacks the second
 726 purpose, a person's utterance according to which she ought to ϕ might carry a GCI
 727 to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ . Hence, an utterance of this type might carry
 728 such a GCI even if the purpose of that particular conversation is not to influence
 729 action. The reason is, as we have seen, that there are certain commonly shared
 730 background presumptions that generally are present in moral conversations.

731 6 Explaining our Conception of Moral Language and Motivation

732 We are now in the position to see that DAA can explain our conception of the
 733 connection between moral language and motivation as it manifests itself in our
 734 responses to the various types of thought experiments we considered in Sect. 4.

735 (i) As far as DAA is concerned, there is no conceptually necessary connection
 736 between moral judgments and motivation, contrary to what a conceptual version of
 737 MJI maintains. That is, DAA does not state that a sentence of the type "I ought to
 738 ϕ ," merely in virtue of its conventional meaning, expresses a judgment such that if
 739 a person holds it, she is motivated to ϕ . In spite of this, DAA can explain our
 740 response to individual cases such as C1. The reason is that it states that a person's
 741 utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to ϕ carries a GCI to the effect
 742 that she is motivated to ϕ , which means that utterances of such a sentence
 743 standardly convey this piece of information. As there is such a standardized

52FL01 ⁵² Again, this only holds on the condition that the implicature in question is not cancelled.



744 connection between utterances of this type of sentence and motivation, we are
745 puzzled if a person makes such an utterance without being motivated to ϕ .

746 What are we to say about someone who makes such an utterance without being
747 accordingly motivated? Given that a sentence of the type “I ought to ϕ ” does not
748 convey motivation to ϕ merely by means of its conventional meaning, it is not
749 strictly accurate to claim that her use of the sentence is semantically incorrect. But
750 we are surely justified to object that her use of the sentence is extremely misleading
751 in view of the fact that an utterance of such a sentence carries the mentioned GCI.⁵³
752 It is also understandable if we experience her use of it as plainly incorrect. As there
753 is a standardized correlation between uses of this type of sentence and motivation, it
754 is easy to get the impression that moral motivation is a matter of the meaning of the
755 sentence, as a conceptual version of MJI maintains.⁵⁴

756 Assume that the person’s utterance is made in a moral conversation that has both
757 the purposes we identified earlier. In that case her utterance violates the maxim of
758 relation, since it is not relevant in view of the purpose of influencing action.
759 Furthermore, her utterance violates the second maxim of quantity, since it conveys
760 information that is uncalled for: the utterance conversationally implicates that she is
761 motivated to ϕ although she is not. If the moral conversation she is involved in does
762 not have the second purpose, her utterance only violates the latter maxim, but we
763 will still find it puzzling.

764 Moreover, DAA can explain why we might come to doubt that a person who
765 utters that she ought to ϕ , without being motivated to ϕ , even *thinks* (i.e., judges)
766 that she ought to ϕ . First, a person’s utterance of a truth-evaluable sentence
767 standardly conveys that she asserts it and, hence, that she entertains the belief
768 expressed by the sentence.⁵⁵ Second, according to DAA, a person’s utterance of a
769 sentence according to which she ought to ϕ carries a GCI to the effect that she is
770 motivated to ϕ , which means that such an utterance standardly conveys this
771 information. As a consequence, it is plausible to suggest that, if a person utters a
772 sentence of this type without being motivated to ϕ , we might come to doubt that she
773 asserts it and, hence, that she believes that she ought to ϕ . Compare: According to
774 an influential view, a person’s utterance of a sentence of the type “X or Y”
775 standardly conveys that not both X and Y are the case, and this can be accounted for
776 in terms of a certain GCI. If a person utters “David or Saul will be admitted to the
777 master programme” at the same time as we are told that she believes that David *and*
778 Saul will be admitted, we might come to doubt that she asserts the sentence and,
779 hence, that she believes that David *or* Saul will be admitted to the programme.

780 It can further be argued that DAA is able to explain why we find cases such as C3
781 puzzling in which a person is reported to *think* (i.e., judge) that she ought to ϕ at the
782 same time as she lacks motivation to ϕ . Let us first observe that given the
783 background assumptions considered in the last section, we presume that a person

53FL01 ⁵³ Cf. Copp (2001, p. 32).

54FL01 ⁵⁴ I provide a fuller explanation in Strandberg (forthcoming a). Cf. Grice (1989a, pp. 37–38).

55FL01 ⁵⁵ According to one view, a person’s utterance of a truth-evaluable sentence carries a GCI to the effect
55FL02 that she asserts the sentence and, hence, entertains the corresponding belief. This is in turn explained in
55FL03 terms of the maxim of quality, which says “try to make your contribution one that is true” (Grice (1989a,
55FL04 pp. 26).

784 who thinks that she ought to ϕ is motivated to ϕ because of factors such as
 785 upbringing, socialization, and the connection between morality and normative
 786 reasons. This means that DAA already accommodates the notion that there is a close
 787 connection between moral thought and motivation.

788 As I have already indicated, DAA is able to provide a further explanation of our
 789 response to cases such as C3. To see this, let us start by considering our response to
 790 the corresponding non-moral case in the form of C4. We saw that our response to
 791 C4 should not be explained by the conventional meaning of a sentence of the type
 792 “X or Y,” but that it has to be explained pragmatically. It is widely assumed that an
 793 utterance of a sentence of the type “X or Y” standardly conveys that not both X and
 794 Y are the case, and that this can be accounted for in terms of a certain GCI. Our
 795 response to C4 thus makes it reasonable to assume that this has formed our
 796 conception of the relation between “X or Y” and “not X and Y.” As a consequence
 797 of this fact, we find it misleading to describe a person as thinking that David or Saul
 798 will be admitted to the master programme at the same time as she is described as
 799 thinking that both of them will. For the same reason, the very thought of a person
 800 who combines these beliefs might seem paradoxical. Now, DAA provides an
 801 analogous explanation of our response to cases such as C3. That is, it might be
 802 suggested that the standardized pragmatic connection between moral utterances and
 803 motivation is so strong that it has come to affect our conception of the connection
 804 between moral beliefs and motivation. As a consequence, we find it misleading to
 805 describe a person as thinking that she ought to ϕ at the same time as she is described
 806 as not being motivated to ϕ . Moreover, we might find the very thought of such a
 807 person paradoxical.

808 It is further worth observing that on the standard amoralist objection against MJI,
 809 we find it possible to *conceive* of a person who thinks that she ought to ϕ without
 810 being motivated to ϕ , even if we may find such a person *peculiar*. This impression is
 811 not difficult to explain on DAA. An amoralist *is* conceivable on this view because
 812 there is no conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and
 813 motivation. Yet, we find her utterly peculiar since our conception of the connection
 814 between moral beliefs and motivation is influenced by the fact that there is a
 815 standardized connection between certain uses of moral language and motivation.

816 (ii) As far as DAA is concerned, there is no necessary connection between moral
 817 judgments and motivation. That is, there is no necessary connection of this kind that
 818 needs to apply to other moral judgments in the manner a generalizable version of
 819 MJI maintains. As a result, DAA can account for the fact that our responses to cases
 820 such as C1 and C3 do not provide any evidence that MJI is generalizable.

821 It is also important to observe that, according to DAA, the standardized
 822 pragmatic connection that holds between utterances of a certain type of moral
 823 sentence and motivation need not be generalizable to utterances of other types of
 824 moral sentences. More precisely, it is only a person’s utterance of a particular
 825 type of sentence that needs to carry a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ :
 826 a type of sentence which entails that she has a *moral reason* to ϕ . An essential part
 827 of the explanation as to why a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which
 828 she ought to ϕ carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ consists in the
 829 fact that such a sentence entails that she has a moral reason to ϕ . It is particularly



830 this fact which explains why it is inconsistent with the maxim of relation to make
 831 such an utterance without being motivated to ϕ in a moral conversation which has
 832 as a purpose to influence action.⁵⁶ This means that utterances of moral sentences
 833 which do not entail the existence of moral reasons of this kind need not convey that
 834 the person in question is accordingly motivated.⁵⁷ It should be stressed, though, that
 835 DAA is compatible with the view that utterances of other types of moral sentences
 836 convey other kinds of action-guiding states by pragmatic means.

837 (iii) As far as DAA is concerned, motivation is not constitutive of moral
 838 judgments, contrary to what an intrinsic version of MJI maintains. That is, DAA
 839 does not state that a person's judgment that she ought to ϕ is by itself sufficient for
 840 her to be motivated to ϕ . This view is consequently able to explain why our
 841 responses to cases such as C1 and C3 do not provide support to the view that there is
 842 something in the nature of the moral judgment that explains her motivation to ϕ .
 843 As already stressed, I suggest that DAA should be combined with MJE. This means
 844 that in order for a person to be motivated to ϕ , she needs to be in a motivational
 845 state that is entirely distinct from her moral judgment.⁵⁸

846 From the perspective of DAA, the underlying reason as to why a person's
 847 utterance according to which she ought to ϕ carries a GCI to the effect that she is
 848 motivated to ϕ is that it thereby fulfills the purpose of moral conversations to
 849 influence action. What is most important from this perspective is consequently *that*
 850 a person who makes such a utterance is motivated to ϕ , not *what* motivates her to ϕ .
 851 At the same time it should be recalled that she utters a sentence which entails that
 852 she has a moral reason to ϕ . This means that when a person's moral utterance
 853 carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ , her motivation to ϕ typically
 854 can be explained by her considerations regarding her moral reason to ϕ .⁵⁹ As a
 855 consequence, DAA can explain why we might be puzzled if a person who makes
 856 such an utterance is motivated to ϕ but is not motivated by any *moral* considerations
 857 in relation to ϕ ing.

858 (iv) It should next be noticed that DAA is able to explain why we are more
 859 puzzled by cases (such as C6) in which a person utters that she ought to ϕ , is not

56FL01 ⁵⁶ According to the explanation above which refers to various background presumptions about moral
 56FL02 utterances, it is only utterances of a moral sentence that entails moral reasons that have the relevant
 56FL03 connection to motivation. A similar claim holds for our presumptions about moral judgments.

57FL01 ⁵⁷ Thus, on DAA there are no grounds to think that the following types of utterances need to convey that
 57FL02 the person in question is motivated to ϕ . First, utterances of sentences that do not entail that there is a
 57FL03 moral reason to ϕ (such as conditionals and disjunctions). Second, utterances of sentences that do not
 57FL04 entail, or indicate, that the person herself has a moral reason to ϕ . Third, utterances of sentences that do
 57FL05 not entail that the person in question has a moral reason to ϕ now or in the future, e.g., utterances
 57FL06 concerning her past behaviour. However, in the two latter cases, moral utterances might pragmatically
 57FL07 convey other kinds of action-guiding states; see Strandberg (forthcoming a).

58FL01 ⁵⁸ In Strandberg (2007, pp. 249–260), I propose the following externalist explanation of why a person
 58FL02 who believes she ought to ϕ is motivated to ϕ . First, she believes that there are certain non-moral
 58FL03 properties that make actions such that they ought to be performed. For example, she might think that
 58FL04 helping people in need are among the properties that have this function. Second, she thinks that ϕ ing has
 58FL05 (some of) these properties. Likewise, (some of) these properties presumably constitute what she takes to
 58FL06 be her reason to ϕ . Third, she has a desire to perform actions that have these non-moral properties. As a
 58FL07 consequence, she is motivated by a *desire de re*, not a *desire de dicto*, to ϕ .

59FL01 ⁵⁹ See above for this kind of explanation.

860 motivated to ϕ , and is reported not to suffer from any mental condition like
 861 depression or apathy, than by cases (such as C5) in which she is reported to suffer
 862 from such a deficiency. This also means that DAA can explain why a conditional
 863 version of MJI might seem more plausible than an unconditional variant of this
 864 view.

865 First, it should be observed that even if, as externalists maintain, a person's
 866 judgment that she ought to ϕ and her motivation to ϕ are entirely distinct mental
 867 states, her mental condition can influence to what extent she is motivated in
 868 accordance with her moral judgment.⁶⁰ Second, it is plausible to assume that it is
 869 part of folk psychology that a person's motivation to do what she thinks she ought to
 870 do might be negatively influenced by her mental condition. It is therefore plausible
 871 to suppose that this aspect of folk psychology is part of the kind of background
 872 presumptions regarding the connection between moral judgments and motivation
 873 I mentioned in the last section.

874 Assume that a person utters that she ought to ϕ , but that she is not motivated to ϕ .
 875 Moreover, assume that her utterance is made in a context in which there are no
 876 indications that she suffers from a mental condition such as depression, apathy or
 877 emotional disturbances. In consideration of the mentioned background presumption
 878 regarding the connection between moral judgments and motivation, it is very likely
 879 that they find such a case more puzzling than a case in which a person makes such
 880 an utterance without being motivated to ϕ , but where there are indications that she
 881 suffers from such a mental condition. In the second case, there is a plausible
 882 explanation, in the form of her mental condition, as to why a person says that she
 883 ought to ϕ , and thinks this to be the case, at the same time as she fails to be
 884 motivated to ϕ . Importantly, in such a case the person's utterance need not carry a
 885 GCI to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ , as a result of the contextual evidence
 886 regarding her mental condition.⁶¹ Thus, it is plausible to understand DAA as saying
 887 that a person's utterance according to which she ought to ϕ carries a GCI to the
 888 effect that she is motivated to ϕ , provided that she is not understood to suffer from a
 889 mental condition such that it can influence her motivation to ϕ negatively.

890 (v) Let us finally observe that DAA can explain why we find communal cases,
 891 such as C7, puzzling. We have seen that, on this view, the fact that a person's
 892 utterance according to which she ought to ϕ carries a GCI to the effect that she is
 893 motivated to ϕ is a matter of the function of moral language. This view assigns two
 894 major functions to moral language: first, to inform one another about our beliefs
 895 about moral matters and, second, to influence one another's actions. The latter
 896 means that moral language is regarded as an essentially social phenomenon since it
 897 has as a function to regulate the behaviour of people who live together in a
 898 community in such a way that their actions are adjusted to one other. Now, in cases
 899 such as C7 the moral language in an entire community seem to lack the second
 900 function in view of the fact that no one is motivated in accordance with his or her

60FL01 ⁶⁰ Return to the externalist explanation of moral motivation above. A person's mental condition might
 60FL02 weaken, or even eliminate, her desire to perform actions that have the non-moral properties that, in her
 60FL03 view, make actions such that they ought to be performed. For example, her mental condition might
 60FL04 negatively influence her desire to help people in need.

61FL01 ⁶¹ Thus, the GCI in question can be cancelled if the context in question involves this information.



901 moral utterances. As a result, we find such cases quite bewildering. Indeed, on DAA
 902 it might even be claimed that people in this community do not have a moral
 903 language on the ground that their manner of interacting with one another lacks a
 904 function which constitutes a *moral* discourse.⁶²

905 We saw earlier that considerations of communal cases have made some
 906 internalists adopt a communal version of MJI. It is worth observing that DAA can be
 907 combined with a picture of moral language which is quite similar to this view. A
 908 communal version of MJI allows that a person might hold a moral *judgment* without
 909 being accordingly motivated, granted that she is part of a community in which a
 910 significant number of people are motivated in accordance with their moral
 911 judgments. As for DAA, it is possible to maintain that a person might make a moral
 912 *utterance* without being accordingly motivated, granted that her utterance is made in
 913 a community where moral language has as a function to influence action. That is,
 914 unless the utterance is made in a community where moral language has this
 915 function, it cannot influence action in which case it is doubtful whether it can be
 916 regarded as a genuine *moral* utterance.

917 7 Conclusion

918 It is frequently claimed in metaethics that we have “internalist intuitions.” In this
 919 paper, I have in effect argued that this manner of speaking is misleading. We do not
 920 have internalist intuitions in the sense of having intuitions that support internalism.
 921 What we do have are intuitions that indicate that there is a very close connection
 922 between moral language and motivation, but these intuitions can be as readily
 923 explained by externalism. Moreover, I have suggested that externalists should
 924 explain our conception of moral language and motivation by adopting the Dual
 925 Aspect Account: A person’s utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to
 926 ϕ conveys two things: the sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning,
 927 the belief that she ought to ϕ , and her utterance of the sentence carries a generalized
 928 conversational implicature to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ . This view,
 929 I argued, is available to any cognitivist who embraces externalism since it does not
 930 rest on any particular version of cognitivism. Moreover, it enables cognitivists to
 931 defend their view against the internalist argument, since it makes it possible for
 932 them to embrace externalism at the same as they supply an account of our
 933 conception of the connection between moral language and motivation.

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62FL01 ⁶² It is quite natural that we find a communal case, such as C7, more puzzling than an individual case,
 62FL02 such as C1. In C1 it is only one single utterance that does not adhere to the second function of moral
 62FL03 language, whereas in C7 no utterance adheres to this function. Given that a main function of moral
 62FL04 language is to influence action, and this is an essentially social phenomenon, we find C7 more puzzling
 62FL05 than C1.

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