OAI Archive: OpenstarTs
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100 entries most recently downloaded from the archive "OpenstarTs"
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- Antonio-Maria Nunziante, Naturalismo E Neuroscienze. Sulla Genesi Storica di Un Legame Teorico.The first part of the paper offers an historical reconstruction of the relationship between philosophy and neuroscience. The goal of this part is to show that such relationship has been generated on the basis of a theoretical common ground; that this common story was essentially tied to the American philosophical naturalism; that naturalism entails a metaphilosophical constraint, such that between philosophy and the natural sciences subsists a strong cognitive asymmetry. In the second part of the paper, it has been taken (...)No categories
- Arnold Eckhart, Simulation Models of the Evolution of Cooperation as Proofs of Logical Possibilities. How Useful Are They?This paper discusses critically what simulation models of the evolution of cooperation can possibly prove by examining Axelrod’s “Evolution of Cooperation” (1984) and the modeling tradition it has inspired. Hardly any of the many simulation models of the evolution of cooperation in this tradition have been applicable empirically. Axelrod’s role model suggested a research design that seemingly allowed to draw general conclusions from simulation models even if the mechanisms that drive the simulation could not be identified empirically. But this research (...)
- Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla, Cooperation, Competition, and the Contractarian View of Scientific Research.Using the approach known as ‘Economics of Scientific Knowledge’, this paper defends the view of scientific norms as the result of a ‘social contract’, i.e., as an equilibrium in the (second order) game of selecting the norms under which to proceed to play the (first order) game of scientific research and publication. A categorisation of the relevant types of scientific norms is offered, as well as a discussion about the incentives of the researchers in choosing some or other alternative rules.No categories