I defend the compatibility of the classical theistic doctrine of divine providence, which includes infallible foreknowledge of all future events, with a libertarian understanding of creaturely free will. After setting out the argument for theological determinism, which purports to show the inconsistency of foreknowledge and freedom, I reject several responses as inadequate and then defend the ‚Ockhamist‛ response as successful. I further argue that the theory of middle knowledge or ‚Molinism‛ is crucial to the viability of the Ockhamist response, and (...) proceed to defend Molinism against the most pressing objections. Finally, I argue that a proper understanding of the Creator-creature relationship accounts for why no explanation can be given for how God’s middle knowledge comes about. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to learn how spiritual attitudes and beliefs impact the work of external organization consultants. The growing interest in spirituality in the workplace and in organization development (OD) are the background for this study. The twelve participants were women and men from different racial and religious backgrounds, including African-Americans, Asians, Latino/as, South African white males, Buddhists, Christians, Jews, and those with no religious affiliation. This study reviewed two distinct literatures: spirituality/religion and organization development. Participants discussed (...) their definition of spirituality, how they arrived at their beliefs, and how their attitudes affect their consulting work in in-depth phenomenological interviews. The analysis of the interviews revealed the following themes: (1) participants made a clear distinction between spirituality and religion; (2) participants described spirituality in terms of universal principles such as unity, interconnectedness, love, compassion, energy and intuition; (3) participants described spirituality as a personal experience involving action, service and requiring self-awareness; (4) spiritually-oriented participants experienced life's events as inter-connected lessons and applied this understanding in their consulting work; (5) balance and detachment are important but difficult to maintain in stressful consulting work; (6) participants used their attitudes and actions as tools for consulting work, including the use of intuition; (7) participants maintained their spiritual orientation through practices such as yoga, meditation, and understanding of the Chakra system. This study highlights the difference between spirituality and religion, points out the complexities of openly discussing spirituality in OD, and stresses the need to address issues of religious freedom in the workplace. (shrink)

David Hume has traditionally been regarded as a skeptic, perhaps the most formidable in the history of Western philosophy. Since the publication of Norman Kemp Smith's Philosophy of David Hume in 1941, however, there has been an increasing tendency to downplay the skeptical dimension of Hume's philosophy, in some cases to the point of denying that Hume is a serious skeptic, or even a skeptic at all. Much of the motivation for a nonskeptical reading of Hume comes from recognition of (...) his endorsement of empirical science and his own project of founding a "science of man." Recent scholarship has, in my opinion correctly, recognized Hume as a constructive rather than a purely destructive thinker. Yet this recognition has, in my opinion incorrectly, gone hand in hand with a tendency to overlook or deny the skeptical side of Hume's thought. In this work, I address the issue of Hume's skepticism. I believe that though the issue of Hume's skepticism is more complicated than is suggested by some of those who interpret him as a skeptic, nevertheless the traditional view is more true to Hume's texts than is a nonskeptical interpretation. I argue, on the basis of a reading of the Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic with regard to much of our alleged knowledge. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that Hume's skeptical pronouncements are in general sincere, not ironic, Hume's skepticism extends to a large part of our alleged knowledge, and Hume's skepticism is a result of his substantive philosophical views. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that though Hume doesn't prescribe eschewal of beliefs that are not rationally justified, he thinks that much of our alleged knowledge essentially involves beliefs that cannot be rationally justified and that hence much of our alleged knowledge is not knowledge at all. (shrink)