It is a common notion that ICT would create new possibilities for everyone. This should be true especially for disabled people who are expected to benefit a lot from the new technologies which are at their disposal. This is simply not true or, at best, is an oversimplification of the facts. New technologies, including the new social 2.0 versions, are constructed, tested and designed for people without disabilities. ICT empowers people with new capabilities, but heavily relies on the existing ones. (...) Telephones depend on the capacity to speak and to listen, computer screens rely on the ability to see, navigation systems count on the ability to control its commands, to see and hear, and so on. Any new technology brings with it a new power for those who can use it, and a new disability for those who cannot. Once the use of telephones became a standard procedure, people who could not use it acquired a new disability. The same applies to any new technology. Dyslexics experience specific learning difficulties, which impede their ability to recognize and comprehend written words, and in most cases hinder their acquisition of a second language. Since most of the social web relies on written words, people affected by dyslexia will experience a new stronger disability as the use of web 2.0 widens. The more people take for granted the use of the social and semantic web, the more their expectation will grow regarding the normality of its use. Those who cannot use it properly will be excluded. As ICT extends its reach beyond our own language borders, it births a hindrance. This impediment takes the form of an additional disability for people with impaired abilities learning second languages, especially English. (shrink)

Through the analysis of the interpretations of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, the paper aims to demonstrate the following thesis: the Duhem-Quine thesis on empirical underdetermination can be extended to the claim that not only the empirical data, but also the empirical data together with the mathematical formalism of a physical theory do not suffice to determine completely our theories of physical reality. As a consequence, beyond observational data and mathematical physics, cultural and social factors as well as (...) the value-preferences of physicists also play role as constitutive elements of physical theories. For example, the indeterminist interpretations of quantum mechanics are not neutral but value-laden, and deterministic interpretations, which insist on classical determinism as a value, are also possible. On the other hand, the thesis of the underdetermination of physical reality by mathematical physics confirms neither radical relativism, nor extreme versions of sociology of science. On the contrary, the mathematical formalism to be interpreted is autonomous – and in this sense “objective” – to a great extent with respect to cultural, social and other non-scientific factors and, therefore, there is a firm consensus regarding it in science. (shrink)

The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) is traditionally formulated against the bedrock of functionalism, and ongoing debates are typically bogged down with questions concerning the exact relationship between EMT and different versions of functionalism. In this paper, I offer a novel ally for EMT: the new mechanistic approach to explanation. I argue that the mechanistic framework provides useful resources not just to disambiguate EMT, and to show which objections fail to pose a serious challenge, but also to answer some of the (...) deeper problems that stem from the functionalist roots of EMT. (shrink)

We argue that the truth of determinism is not an interpretation-free fact and we systematically overview relevant interpretational choices that are less known in the philosophical literature. After bypassing the well known interpretational problem that arises in quantum mechanics we identify three further questions about the representational role of the mathematical structures employed by physical theories. Finally we point out that even if we settle all representational issues the received view of physical possibility may also allow the truth of determinism (...) to depend on prior philosophical convictions, notably on one's philosophical account of the nature of laws. (shrink)