At seven-thirty-one A.M. on Saturday morning I am awakened by a phone call from mom, "Oh honey--it's a beautiful sunny day that knew you wouldn't want to sleep through. Now that you are awake go outside and breathe the morning air....No, no, that's ok, I'll wait...you go ahead and do that.." After I breathe and get mom off the phone I reach over and turn on my stereo. As New Age music fills the room I remember when my roommate switched (...) the George Winston music I fall asleep to with a subliminal weight-loss tape.. I grab my shoes and head toward the door--I don't want to be late for skydiving class--but as I am leaving my friend W. pulls into the driveway blocking my car. She jumps out, pulls me into her car and drives away, saying "Skydiving is for dangerous fools. I am taking you to play bingo instead." More than likely you or I would not wake up to a day like this one, but the example is meant to illustrate something important. Paternalism is a common phenomenon, one we probably encounter more often than we realize. Even though we do not always realize them as such, thoughts and judgments on paternalism are employed in decisions we make in day-to-day situations about how to treat people. An investigation of this liberty-limiting principle, then, should be of practical interest to everyone, not just philosophers interested in theory. I will investigate the subject of paternalism by looking at a variety of definitions and examples, exploring the autonomy-based antipaternalist positions of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, and finally, incorporating the ideas of Christine Korsgaard, a neo-Kantian philosopher, on personal identity into an argument for a Kantian version of respect for autonomy. Finally, I will present some general guidelines for paternalistic interference that can be applied practically. (shrink)

This paper aims to elucidate the dyadic concepts of machismo and marianismo in Latinx culture, especially Chicano culture. Though most people have an understanding of what it is for someone, especially a man, to “be macho,” the concept of machismo is elusive. Marianismo is lesser known, but to the extent that it is understood, it’s understood as reinforcing the oppressive properties traditionally associated with machismo. Following Audre Lorde’s analysis of the erotic, my analysis of machismo and marianismo will reveal that (...) while these concepts include misogynist subcultures, they also offer empowering modes of being in a racist society that any Latinx can embody regardless of their gender identity. Taken in this latter way, machismo and marianismo can actually be used to dismantle some of the oppressive structures that have held toxic versions of these concepts in place. For example, when Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is challenging her male colleagues in Congress, she is performing machismo in an empowering, patriarchy-disrupting way. Typically, the machismo-marianismo dyad tracks closely to the masculine-feminine binary, but I reject this notion. The dyadic relationship between machismo and marianismo is characterized by two types of empowering energy. On the one hand, machismo is proud, aggressive, resistant, and status-focused. On the other hand, marianismo is humble, supportive, submissive, and family-focused. Machismo is associated with non-domestic spheres primarily, e.g., business, commerce, and professional achievement. Marianismo is associated with nurturing, soothing, spirituality, and domestic diplomacy. In a patriarchal society, men tend to perform machismo and women tend to perform marianismo, but this dyad is fluid with respect to gender. Women can perform machismo, men can perform marianismo, and individuals across the spectrum can perform both. In this ameliorative project, the machismo-marianismo dyad will be a resource for marginalized groups to tap into in order to overcome systemic oppression. My goal is for machismo and marianismo to be used when needed by all Latinx gender identities to uplift them and give them strength to overcome systemic injustice while also addressing the historical impacts that machismo has had on Latinx feminist movements. (shrink)

Over the last decade, many political analyst’s multiple has observed what they perceive to be a crisis of democracy in advanced developed democracies. These analysts associate the crisis of democracy with declines in party membership, widespread distrust in representative government, and a lack of participation in electoral practices. However, although there is a large literature that maintains that political parties are the ‘gatekeepers’ of democracy, the critical role of political parties in intensifying the democratic crisis has not been adequately examined. (...) This paper offers a theoretical account of party function for the electorate, the party organization, and the government to understand how the diminishment may undermine democratic norms. This paper focuses its empirical analysis on polarization in the United States and examines changes in co-sponsorship of congressional bills and circuit court judge confirmations. (shrink)

This paper deals with the conditions of liability to self-defense. When I use the term liability, I mean moral liability. This is different from desert. If I am liable to be killed in self-defense, it does not follow that I deserve to be killed. In short, desert entails liability but liability does not entail desert. My use of the term in this paper may be stated succinctly as follows: if killing a person will neither wrong him nor violate his rights, (...) he is morally liable to be killed. A person poses an unjust threat when he threatens harms that are neither justified nor excused. A person is culpable for an unjust threat if he intends the threat he poses, is a morally responsible agent, and there are no mitigating circumstances, such as duress, that excuse his actions. A person is at fault, but not culpable, for an unjust threat if he is a morally responsible agent, has acted unreflectively, recklessly, though not maliciously, in a way that poses risks to others. Though culpability entails fault, fault does not entail culpability; as I will explain later, a person does not have to be culpable in order to be at fault for an unjust threat. (shrink)

At seven-thirty-one A.M. on Saturday morning I am awakened by a phone call from mom, "Oh honey--it's a beautiful sunny day that knew you wouldn't want to sleep through. Now that you are awake go outside and breathe the morning air....No, no, that's ok, I'll wait...you go ahead and do that.." After I breathe and get mom off the phone I reach over and turn on my stereo. As New Age music fills the room I remember when my roommate switched (...) the George Winston music I fall asleep to with a subliminal weight-loss tape.. I grab my shoes and head toward the door--I don't want to be late for skydiving class--but as I am leaving my friend W. pulls into the driveway blocking my car. She jumps out, pulls me into her car and drives away, saying "Skydiving is for dangerous fools. I am taking you to play bingo instead." More than likely you or I would not wake up to a day like this one, but the example is meant to illustrate something important. Paternalism is a common phenomenon, one we probably encounter more often than we realize. Even though we do not always realize them as such, thoughts and judgments on paternalism are employed in decisions we make in day-to-day situations about how to treat people. An investigation of this liberty-limiting principle, then, should be of practical interest to everyone, not just philosophers interested in theory. I will investigate the subject of paternalism by looking at a variety of definitions and examples, exploring the autonomy-based antipaternalist positions of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, and finally, incorporating the ideas of Christine Korsgaard, a neo-Kantian philosopher, on personal identity into an argument for a Kantian version of respect for autonomy. Finally, I will present some general guidelines for paternalistic interference that can be applied practically. (shrink)

Kuhn argues that a paradigm generally emerges from among such competing schools as the result of a particularly attractive or powerful accomplishment that places one school in a better position than the others. With the establishment and common acceptance of one particular theoretical structure, researchers can direct their observations and experiments in accordance with the ontological and methodological landscape provided by the agreed upon paradigm. Under such guidance, scientists are in a position to judge the value of various observations, and (...) delineate between important lines of investigation and those without promise. Thus normal science, in contrast to its "immature" precursor, is characterized as purposeful, directed, and capable of advancement just in light of the fact that a paradigm exists as a qualifying standard. (shrink)

Religous experience is a puzzling phenomenon. It has appeared extensively throughout the history of man as a primary element in shaping his culture....I will try to examine the nature of the religious experience as it is conceived by the existential theologian Soren Kierkegaard and the Lin Chi or Rinzai school of Zen Buddhism. Further, I hope to point out the similarities of their methods in attaining this level of experience.

The mind. Sanctum sanctorum of subjectivity. Soundstage of the mental. Consciousness' cockpit. Romping-grounds of the intentional. A great deal, it would seem, rides on the notion of mind. It's not just that naughty children never do, or that people when irritated often claim to have half-a-one. Though perhaps telling in other ways, it isn't so important that while we all think we lose ours from time to time, we rarely-if ever-doubt that we had one to begin with. Solipsists are perfectly (...) willing to doubt that anyone else actually possesses one, but no one suspects that everyone but herself has one. The reason seems clear and distinct as Cartesian water; it just makes sense, which is another thing that minds are rumored to be responsible for. One could go on and on-the idioms seem endless-but nevermind. (shrink)

The universe is permeated by rhythm, harmony, and patterned movement--the movement of stars through the galaxy, the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the seasons, the cycle of birth, growth and death. Therefore, it is perfectly natural that man respond deeply and significantly to these ordered rhythms that make up his life, his world, and his universe.

Durkheim owes much of his ethical theory to Kant, and wishes to retain a great deal of Kantianism in the theory. However, he does so at great cost to his own theory. Instead of reconciling the competing claims of rationalism and empiricism, which is his ultimate goal in utilizing Kant, Durkheim ends up with an ethical theory which is full of contradictions and which is basically a solely empiricist account of morality. By exploring both Kant's and Durkheim's ethical theories, I (...) will demonstrate both the problems inherent in Durkheim's attempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism, and his failure in retaining a universalistic account of morality, given the context of his theory. The result is an ethical theory with relativistic implications. (shrink)

In her book. Gender Trouble, Judith Butler reinforces the conception held by many feminist philosophers that gender identity is not natural but rather culturally-constructed. Butler supports this conception of gender mainly by reading Freud. I will undertake a critical reconstruction of Butler's claims about gender identity which are based on Freud. In order to complete this project, I will outline currents of feminism leading us to this question of the constructedness of gender, Freud's theories, especially his account of sexual development (...) and two of Butler's main criticisms of Freud. Through this exploration, I will explain Butler's use of Freud in constructing a theory ofgender identity. (shrink)

Both Soren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that there are some truths, located beyond the boundaries of rational understanding, which cannot be communicated directly to others. Wittgenstein was influenced by his reading of Kierkegaard's texts on these matters, and accordingly he, like Kierkegaard, has a place in his philosophy for the importance of inwardness in knowing paradoxical truths. A move of 'inwardness,' for Kierkegaard, is an action that requires a personal and absolute belief that can't be explained directly to others, (...) while 'paradoxical truths', as Kierkegaard uses the phrase, refers to propositions that we regard as incomprehensible but true. For Kierkegaard, we express inwardness when we actively and fully invest ourselves in believing a paradox. It is clear that Wittgenstein also believed that we can understand some things in a non-standard, non-objective way. The passages in which he discusses this kind of nonobjective understanding, however, are notoriously obscure. (shrink)

In "Of Suicide," David Hume argues against the dominant Thomistic doctrine on suicide. Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica, I-IL Q64, Art 5, argues that suicide is morally impermissible because it violates three kinds of duties: one's duty to God, to others, and to oneself. Arguing from within the Thomistic framework, Hume exposes the inconsistencies of Aquinas's theory and refutes Aquinas's arguments against suicide. In this paper I look at only the arguments concerning the ways in which suicide violates a duty (...) to God. My strategy is as follows. First, I argue that G.R. McLean's interpretation of Hume in his paper "Hume and the Theistic Objection to Suicide" is not only philosophically unsound, but also departs significantly from the text of "Of Suicide." I then offer my own interpretation of Hume's arguments in "Of Suicide," which both avoids the problems that McLean's interpretation faces and is closer to the text. Finally, I raise and respond to one possible objection to my interpretation of Hume's argument. Ultimately, I intend to argue that Hume's attack on the Thomistic doctrine on suicide is actually an attack on the broader Thomistic framework, and that to read "Of Suicide" in isolation from Hume's other works leads to error. (shrink)

In his article, "Atheological Apologetics," Scott Shalkowski argues that there is no reason to believe that the theist necessarily has the burden of proof in the debate of God's existence. The strength of his argument lies in his assumptions about facts, knowledge, and justification, positive and negative existence claims, and the relevance of context in a debate. First, Shalkowski argues against Anthony Flew who states in his book, The Presumption of Atheism, that general features about knowledge claims "entail the theist (...) to first, introduce and defend his proposed concept of God; and, second, to provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept of his does in fact have application." Flew uses his claims about knowledge and justification to support what he calls the "presumption of atheism." Secondly, Shalkowski is concerned with the distinction drawn between positive and negative existence claims. He argues that there is nothing intrinsic to positive claims that saddles them with the demand for grounds that exempts negative claims from the same demand. He rests this argument on the concept of context relativity and tries to show that in certain contexts the negative existence claims have a burden for grounds that positive ones do not, and therefore concludes that there is nothing intrinsic to positive claims that suggests that they should bear the burden of argument. I will argue first, that a presumption of atheism is justified but it is not the same presumption of negative atheism that Flew argues for. I do not take Flew's presumption of atheism because Flew does not believe that context plays a role in the application of this presumption and I feel that this is a necessary ingredient to the presumption. Second, Shalkowski's parallel between positive and negative existence claims is ill-founded, and his main point about context relativity ignores the relevance of what today's context is and consequently damages his own position. Further, I will argue that in a scientific era, with the help of rational tools like Ockham's Razor, the presumption for theism is irrational and a presumption of atheism in the traditional sense is justified. (shrink)

Ecofeminism is one of the newest varieties of feminism, and it seems to be one of the brightest. There's something appealing in combining feminist and ecological concerns, and something positively seductive in the implied possibility of one big solution out there somewhere that will end not only the oppression of women but the abuse of nature as well. There seems to be something right about ecofeminism too: it points out that our culture has formed a conceptual association between women and (...) nature which certainly does seem to exist and certainly does seem to have undesirable consequences. And it points out a dichotomy between humans and nonhuman nature that is fundamental to our culture's world-view--this also certainly seems to exist and also certainly seems to have undesirable consequences. (shrink)

In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn advances an ethical theory that welds his quasi-realism to a Humean-Smithean theory of moral sentiments. This paper concerns the latter Humean side of Blackburn's theory, specifically Blackburn's attempt to provide a normative ethical theory. This attempt largely involves getting over the tallest obstacle to any defender of Hume: the famous sensible knave problem.

The philosophy of mind has historically been concerned to a large part with two central phenomenon of human experience. The first is the intentionality of our mental states, the fact that they seem to be meaningful. The second is the fact that humans are conscious beings. Not only do we receive and process information, we seem to be aware of the experiences which constitute our input and are cognizant and in control of many of the processes which are performed upon (...) this information. It is of obvious interest how we manage to have intentional mental states and be conscious beings. Traditional discussion of these phenomena has usually relied upon the postulation of a mind which implies a dualist ontology. The presumption of a mind, which is composed of non-physical, mental, substance makes these problems relatively easy to solve. Mental substance which is by nature unobservable can serve just about any purpose which we can imagine for it, including possesing meaning and constituting consciousness. (shrink)

This paper examines the function of communication, philosophy, and religion and moreover, their necessity to the awareness of being.

This paper compares Rudolph Bultmann and Emil Brunner, and combines and analyzes existentialism, theology, and demythologizing.

This paper contributes to the defense of the nonderivability thesis; that is, the thesis that no set of purely descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement. Thus, it is impossible to give objective justification of any value judgment.

This paper begins with a study of the philosophical thought preceding Platonism and Aristotlianism [sic], in order that we might have a clear understanding of the issues with which these two men dealt. It is essential for us to understand Platonism and Aristotlianism [sic] for two reasons: first, it is within the framework of thought of these two men that succeeding philosophy has largely worked; secondly, if one understands the issues with which these men struggled, he will understand the issues (...) with which modern philosophy deals. Therefore, some space in the paper has been allotted to the thought of these men. (shrink)

As interesting as it is, my aim in this paper, however, is not to mark the various trends that have come and gone in the history of semantics. Rather, I consider how semantics has treated a small portion of language that involving demonstrative expressions in order to flesh out how semantics simpliciter has fallen on a mistake; or more accurately, a misdiagnosis. This misdiagnosis has either led incorrect semantic treatments of demonstratives, or has created a "shadow-sickness"; which is bound to (...) be left untreated b)' any account semantics can give, because those accounts process machinery ill-equipped to deal with such a sickness. To push the medical metaphor a bit further, the former result of the misdiagnosis is like the doctor who, after being mislead by one of a patient's symptoms, is led to offer the wrong method of treatment. The latter result of the misdiagnosis is like the specialized doctor who, upon encountering a patient with two distinct illnesses, is misled into trying to treat both illnesses; though one happens to be outside of her specialization. (shrink)

Within this paper a physicalist account of phenomenal experience is presented in a roughly four part process. First, Levine's "explanatory gap" and Kripke's argument against type-identity physicalism are presented as examples of anti-physicalist arguments to be countered. Kripke's arguments request an explanation for the felt contingency of the statement 'pain is C-fiber firing.' Levine's explanatory gap is the inability of statements like 'pain is C-fiber firing' to explain within physicalist theories why C-fiber firing feels like pain. In the second part (...) a physicalist account ofphenomenal experience is presented. This account relies upon a formalization of the mereological structure of events. A relation between events called the 'observation relation' is introduced and used to formalize observations made in everyday life. In the third step this account of events is used to defeat Kripke's argument and Levine's explanatory gap. Kripke's argument is overcome by providing an explanation for the felt contingency ofthe statement 'pain is C-fiber firing.' Levine's explanatory gap is defeated by clarifying the question "Why do C-fiber firings feel like pain?" and showing that asking this question is essentially inappropriate. Thus, the physicalist's inability to explain why C-fiber firings feel like pain is not a failing of physicalism. In the fourth part the physicalist theory of phenomenal experience is compared to some classic views of phenomenal experience from Rosenthal, Nagel, and Dennett. (shrink)

In his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Laurence Bonjour criticizes advocates of externalist versions of foundationalism. According to Bonjour, "externalism reflects an inadequate appreciation of the problem at which it is aimed."l With this in mind, Bonjour sets out to argue that externalism is not an acceptable theory for the foundationalist to appeal to in his attempt to solve the regress problem. In order to avoid a complete stalemate over doctrine, Bonjour's attempt to argue that externalism is unacceptable proceeds (...) as an appeal to intuition. As such he allows that"although this intuition may not constitute a conclusive objection to the view, it is enough... to place the burden of proof squarely on the externalist." Bonjour's criticism is aimed at the externalist conception of justification. I contend that Bonjour's demand of proof can be met by the externalist. Moreover, as I shall argue, the proper conception of justification involves the use of both internalist and externalist requirements. To establish my contention I shall draw the internalist/externalist distinction with regard to justification and examine the intuitive strengths of each. Having completed these tasks we shall find that a proper epistemology incorporates a level distinction between non-epistemological claims on the first level and epistemological claims on the second level. Justification on the first level, I shall argue, warrants externalist requirements, while justification on the second level warrants internalist requirements. (shrink)