Birke, a feminist biologist who has written extensively on the connections between feminism and science, seeks to bridge the gap between feminist cultural analysis and science by looking "inside" the body, using ideas in anatomy and physiology to develop the feminist view that the biological body is socially and culturally constructed. She rejects the assumption that the body's functioning is fixed and unchanging, claiming that biological science offers more than just a deterministic narrative of how nature works. Annotation copyrighted (...) by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

The book then addresses the human/animal opposition implicit in much feminist theorizing, arguing that the opposition helps to maintain the essentialism that feminists have so often criticized. The final chapter brings us back from ideas of what 'the animal' is, to ask how these questions might relate to environmental politics, including ecofeminism and animal rights.

What role do nonhuman animals play in the construction of medical knowledge? Animal researchers typically claim that their use has been essential to progress – but just how have animals fitted into the development of biomedicine? In this article, I trace how nonhuman animals, and their body parts, have become incorporated into laboratory processes and places. They have long been designed to fit into scientific procedures – now increasingly so through genetic design. Animals and procedures are closely connected – animals (...) in science are disassembled and reassembled in various ways. Indeed, biomedical knowledge can be said to rest on a large pile of animal bodies and body parts. The process of producing animal body parts to order has implications for how we conceptualize the body (human or nonhuman), which I discuss in the final section. (shrink)

Turning animals into art through genetic manipulation poses many questions for how we think about our relationship with other species. Here, I explore three rather disparate sets of issues. First, I ask to what extent the production of such living “artforms” really is as transgressive as advocates claim. Whether or not it counts as radical in terms of art I cannot say: but it is not at all radical, I argue, in terms of how we think about our human place (...) in the world. On the contrary, producing these animals only reinforces our own sense of our importance. The second theme I explore is the extent to which making transgenic organisms for any purposes is radical in terms of complexity. Here, I focus on the idea of complexity as a concept in developmental biology; genetic manipulation may be successful to commercial companies, but it is deeply troubling to many biologists who consider that its deeply entrenched reductionism is enormously problematic. What risks do we run by ignoring nature’s own complexity—and creativity? And—in particular—what risks do we run of damaging or compromising animal welfare? The third theme turns to public perceptions of these new technologies (whether in science or art), and notes the extent of public unease. This unease is not simply a question of public ignorance about the technology, but reflects the enormously rich ways in which we make meanings about animals, and relate to them. These are, I suggest, a far more potent source of creativity than simply moving genes around to make photogenic animals. (shrink)

This is an interview with Professor Lynda Birke, one of the key figures of feminist science studies. She is a pioneer of feminist biology and of materialist feminist thought, as well as of the new and emerging field of hum-animal studies. This interview was conducted over email in two time periods, in the spring of 2008 and 2010. The format allowed for comments on previous writings and an engagement in an open-ended dialogue. Professor Birke talks about her (...) key arguments and outlooks on a changing field of research. The work of this English biologist is typical of a long and continuous feminist engagement with biology and ontological matters that reaches well beyond the more recently articulated ‘material turn’ of feminist theory. It touches upon feminist issues beyond the usual comfort zones of gender constructionism and human-centred research. Perhaps less recognized than for instance the names of Donna Haraway or Karen Barad, Lynda Birke’s oeuvre is part of the same long-standing and twofold critique from feminist scholars qua trained natural scientists. On the one hand, theirs is a powerful critique of biological determinism; on the other, an acutely observed contemporary critique of how merely cultural or socially reductionist approaches to the effervescently lively and biological might leave the corporeal, environmental or non-human animal critically undertheorized within feminist scholarship. In highlighting the work and arguments of Lynda Birke, it is hoped here to provide an accessible introduction to the critical questions and challenges that circumvent contemporary discussions within feminist technoscience as theory and political practice. (shrink)

Feminist science studies have given scant regard to non-human animals. In this paper, we argue that it is important for feminist theory to address the complex relationships between humans and other animals, and the implications of these for feminism. We use the notion of performativity, particularly as it has been developed by Karen Barad, to explore the intersections of feminism and studies of the human/animal relationship. Performativity, we argue, helps to challenge the persistent dichotomy between human/culture and animals/nature. It emphasizes, (...) moreover, how animality is a doing or becoming, not an essence; so, performativity allows us to think about the complexity of human/animal interrelating as a kind of choreography, a co-creation of behaviour. We illustrate the discussion using the example of the laboratory rat, who can be thought of both in terms of a materialization of specific scientific practices and as active participants in the creation of their own meaning, alongside the human participants in science. There are three, intertwined, senses in which we might think about performativity - that of animality, of humannness, and of the relationship between the two. Bringing animals into discussions about performativity poses questions for both feminist theory and for the study of human/animal relationships, we argue: both human and animal can conjointly be engaged in reconfiguring the world, and our theorizing must reflect that complexity. We are all matter, and we all matter. (shrink)

This paper explores how horses are represented in the discourses of "natural horsemanship" , an approach to training and handling horses that advocates see as better than traditional methods. In speaking about their horses, NH enthusiasts move between two registers: On one hand, they use a quasi-scientific narrative, relying on terms and ideas drawn from ethology, to explain the instinctive behavior of horses. Within this mode of narrative, the horse is "other" and must be understood through the human learning to (...) communicate and through appropriate training. On the other hand, NH enthusiasts—like many horse owners—seek to emphasize partnership. In this type of discourse, people portray their horses as almost human. The tensions between these two ways of talking about horses reflect contradictory ideas about control versus freedom in relating to horses, especially as related to emotions expressed by caregivers about their relationships with horses. (shrink)

This paper examines the rise of what is popularly called "natural horsemanship" , as a definitive cultural change within the horse industry. Practitioners are often evangelical about their methods, portraying NH as a radical departure from traditional methods. In doing so, they create a clear demarcation from the practices and beliefs of the conventional horse-world. Only NH, advocates argue, properly understands the horse. Dissenters, however, contest the benefits to horses as well as the reliance in NH on disputed concepts of (...) the natural. Advocates, furthermore, sought to rename technologies associated with riding while simultaneously condemning technologies used in conventional training . These contested differences create boundaries and enact social inclusion and exclusion, which the paper explores. For horses, the impact of NH is ambiguous: Depending on practitioners, effects could be good or bad. However, for the people involved, NH presents a radical change—which they see as offering markedly better ways of relating to horses and a more inclusive social milieu. (shrink)

This article considers how scientists involved in animal experimentation attempt to defend their practices. Interviews with over 40 scientists revealed that, over and above direct criticisms of the antivivisection lobby, scientists used a number of discursive strategies to demonstrate that critics of animal experimentation are ethically and epistemologically infenor to British scientific practitioners. The scientists portrayed a series of negative "others" such as foreign scientists, farmers, and pet owners. In this manner, they attempted to create a "socioethical domain" which rhetorically (...) insulated them from criticism while simultaneously problematizing the critiques of the anti- animal-experimentation public. Some of the implications for relations between science and the public, especially regarding scientific credibility, are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore how caretakers experience living with disabled companion animals. Drawing on interviews, as well as narratives on websites and other support groups, we examine ways in which caretakers describe the lives of animals they live with, and their various disabilties. The animals were mostly dogs, plus a few cats, with a range of physical disabilities; almost all had been rehomed, often from places specializing in homing disabled animals. Three themes emerged from analysis of these texts: first, (...) respondents drew heavily on the common narrative of disabled individuals as heroes, often noted in disability rights literature – while simultaneously drawing on, and challenging, ideas of disability as incapacity. The second theme was love and empathy. Several of our interviewees spoke of empathy being enhanced thro We discuss these caretakers' stories of animal disability in relation to both studies of human-animal relationships, and to disability rights, as well as to ideas about what constitutes care. What these narratives emphasize is a particular sense of sharing and reciprocity, felt through the body, especially when caretakers spoke of their own ill-health. They saw disability – the animals' or their own – not as limiting, but as enabling both to flourish within caring relationships. (shrink)

Our bodies are ourselves: yet we are also more than our bodies. In the early years of “second‐wave” feminism in the West, embodiment was acknowledged implicitly in the action of women's health groups, and campaigns for reproductive rights. But simultaneously, bodies failed to enter our theorizing. Central to theorizing then was a distinction between “sex,” (which anatomically distinguishes males and females) from “gender” (the processes of becoming “woman” or “man”). Although recent feminist writing tends to decry that simple opposition, the (...) ghost of biology still haunts us: biological sex, the biological body, remain problematic concepts for feminist theorizing. (shrink)

Diverse beliefs about the nature and essence of scientific truth are pervasive in the nursing literature. Most recently, rejection of a more traditional and objective truth has resulted in a shift toward an emphasis on the acceptance of multiple and subjective truths. Some nursing scholars have discarded the idea that objective truth exists at all, but instead have argued that subjective truth is the only knowable truth and therefore the one that ought to govern nursing's disciplinary inquiry. Yet, there has (...) been relatively little critical debate or dialogue about the implications of adopting subjective and multiple truths as a maxim to govern the discipline. In this paper we examine what it might mean to adopt subjective forms of truth as the only knowable truths for nursing, and to accept the possibility of multiple co-existing realities. We understand the implications of such a philosophical stance for the epistemological basis of a practice science to be considerable, therefore we consider what it might mean for a practice-based discipline such as nursing to remain ambiguous on the question of truth, and examine the implications of failing to achieve consensus on what constitutes a truth claim. On the basis of this examination, we urge a cautious approach to the extremes of either position and argue for a more thoughtful and rigorous dialogue about ‘truth’ and knowledge in nursing practice, education, and research. (shrink)

In this article several justifications of what I call ‘the claim from adoption’ are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead of expending resources on bringing new children into the world using reproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children. Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a (...) use of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then argued that a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supports the claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because the support it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seems morally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption rather than assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves upon Munthe’s utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in the cases in which Munthe’s argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitive implications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concluded that the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism. n a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even though the claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it does not follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resources away from assisted reproduction and towards adoption. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the historical and cultural genealogy of the presumed separation between ethics and economic theory, taking publicly supported care for children of working mothers (or parents) as a case that illuminates problems for thinking about gender justice that arise because of these disciplinary boundaries and the particular concept of “the human individual” that is implicit in them. Care for children of working mothers is an issue that has been important in the West since the inception of “second wave” (...) feminism. However, I argue that the global expectation that women are responsible for care of small children, coupled with the reality that small children really must have caregivers, makes this issue pertinent to women everywhere, and it has lately been recognized as an issue for development and global justice. Predominant political philosophies and neoclassical economics have a common philosophical root in abstract individualist method. I argue that this has made possible a claim of intellectual respectability for neo-liberal politics that resists feminist and postcolonial critique, even though these critiques show its inability to deal with matters, such as the need for child care, that have moral issues inextricably involved in them. The economy of rationalindividual self-interest has so far only generated child care with a very large component of exploitation of caregivers. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the historical and cultural genealogy of the presumed separation between ethics and economic theory, taking publicly supported care for children of working mothers (or parents) as a case that illuminates problems for thinking about gender justice that arise because of these disciplinary boundaries and the particular concept of “the human individual” that is implicit in them. Care for children of working mothers is an issue that has been important in the West since the inception of “second wave” (...) feminism. However, I argue that the global expectation that women are responsible for care of small children, coupled with the reality that small children really must have caregivers, makes this issue pertinent to women everywhere, and it has lately been recognized as an issue for development and global justice. Predominant political philosophies and neoclassical economics have a common philosophical root in abstract individualist method. I argue that this has made possible a claim of intellectual respectability for neo-liberal politics that resists feminist and postcolonial critique, even though these critiques show its inability to deal with matters, such as the need for child care, that have moral issues inextricably involved in them. The economy of rationalindividual self-interest has so far only generated child care with a very large component of exploitation of caregivers. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a (...) general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall suggest that, what Descartes supported in his letter to More of August 1649, when he claimed that God’s essence might be present everywhere, was not that God can’t exist without being extended, i.e. being omnipresent, but that God has necessarily the disposition to be extended. If my interpretation is correct, then the claim that God’s essence is omnipresent is consistent with the thesis that God is omnipresent ratione potentiæ.

This paper explores the interaction between medicine and metaphysics in modern natural philosophy and especially in Descartes ' philosophy. I argue that Descartes ' hypothetical account of birthmarks in connection with his embryology provides an argumentative proof of the metaphysical necessity of a substantial union between mind and body, which however does not threaten his doctrine of the real distinction between these two substances. It would appear that his argument relies on a temporal conception of alethic modalities and provides a (...) new answer to Henricus Regius who in 1641 claimed that, for Descartes, the human being is an ens per accidens. (shrink)

Scientific research is subject to a number of regulations which impose incidental (time, place), rather than substantive (type of research), restrictions on scientific research and the knowledge created through such research. In recent years, however, the premise that scientific research and knowledge should be free from substantive regulation has increasingly been called into question. Some have suggested that the law should be used as a tool to substantively restrict research which is dual-use in nature or which raises moral objections. There (...) are, however, some problems with using law to restrict or prohibit certain types of scientific research, including (i) the inherent imprecision of law for regulating complex and rapidly evolving scientific research; (ii) the difficulties of enforcing legal restrictions on an activity that is international in scope; (iii) the limited predictability of the consequences of restricting specific branches of scientific research; (iv) inertia in the legislative process; and (v) the susceptibility of legislators and regulators to inappropriate factors and influence. Rather than using law to restrict scientific research, it may be more appropriate and effective to use a combination of non-traditional legal tools including norms, codes of conduct, restrictions on publication, and scientist-developed voluntary standards to regulate problematic scientific research. (shrink)

While imagination was a major concern for Descartes throughout his work, Cartesian scholars have paid little attention to this faculty, especially regarding to the Meditations of First Philosophy. This article highlights the epistemic role of imagination in the First Meditation. I argue that the way Descartes’s conception of imagination is elaborated in the First Meditation helps question our interpretation of his dualism, and enables us to formulate the hypothesis that imagination belongs to the essence of the mind. It results that (...) Descartes’s dualism should not be interpreted as separation (or separability) regarding to existence. (shrink)

Most contemporary metaphysicians think that a teleological approach to mereological composition and the whole-part relation should be ignored because it is an obsolete view of the world. In this paper, I discuss Descartes’s conception of individuation and composition of material objects such as stones, machines, and human bodies. Despite the fact that Descartes officially rejected ends from his philosophy of matter, I argue, against some scholars, that to appeal to the notion of disposition was a way for him to maintain (...) teleological reference within a mechanistic conception of nature. Through a study of Descartes’s texts, I also want to make clear why it might be difficult to entirely ignore teleological notions, when one wants to account for composition and unity of material objects. (shrink)

Paternalistic behaviour directed towards a person’s informed and competent decisions is often thought to be morally impermissible. This view is supported by what we can call the Anti-Paternalism Principle. While APP might seem plausible when employed to show the wrongness of paternalism by the state, there are some cases of paternalistic behaviour between private, informed, and competent individuals where APP seems mistaken. This raises a difficulty for supporters of APP. Either they need to reject APP to accommodate our intuitions in (...) these cases, or provide grounds for thinking that paternalistic behaviour between certain private individuals is different in a morally relevant sense. In this paper, I explore several possible morally relevant differences, and find all of them unsatisfactory as grounds for maintaining the plausibility of APP. (shrink)

Dominic Wilkinson’s defence of identity-relative paternalism raises many important issues that are well worth considering. In this short paper, I will argue that there could be two important differences between the first-party and third-party cases that Wilkinson discusses, namely, a difference in associative duties and how the decision relates to the decision maker’s own autonomous life. This could mean that identity-relative paternalism is impermissible in a greater number of cases than he suggests.

In this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concerning an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions. I demonstrate that this assumption cannot be grounded by wellbeing reasons, and that autonomy-based reasons of non-interference (...) also cannot adequately explain the difference. Following this, I propose that the difference in the reasons related to an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions can be explained by the value of holding a person responsible for his choices. Nonetheless, this does not result in paternalistic behavior that interferes with autonomy being all things considered wrong. Instead, I show that the reason to hold a person responsible for a diminution of his wellbeing does not necessarily defeat the wellbeing reasons that count in favor of paternalistic behavior. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that even if we hold that at least some paternalistic behaviour is impermissible when directed towards innocent persons, in certain cases, the same behaviour is permissible when directed towards criminal offenders. I also defend the claim that in some cases it is morally preferable to behave paternalistically towards offenders as an alternative to traditional methods of punishment. I propose that the reason paternalistic behaviour is sometimes permissible towards an offender is the same reason that inflicting (...) intentional harm on an offender is permissible – namely, that it is sometimes a morally justified method of punishing an offender for his wrongdoing. (shrink)

It has become a mantra, that doping is immorally and therefore should be punished with exclusion, fines and stigmatization. In most parts of the world, the doping debate is characterised by an extreme tunnel vision since all athletes, politicians and sports managers who have public airtime express that doping is bad or the invention of the devil. -/- The purpose of 'Doping in Sport: A Defence' is to identify, clarify and challenge some of the central arguments that are used in (...) the often extremely emotional debate that primarily focuses on rejecting the use of doping. I hope that my effort to clarify and challenge the arguments will help cultivate a productive dialogue where all arguments are given a fair trial instead of the prevailing one-sided condemnation of doping. An open dialogue about doping is important since the question of where the line should be drawn when it comes to doping in sports is highly relevant in terms of the scope within which athletes, sports physicians, sports managers, coaches and pharmaceutical companies can operate in the world of sports. (shrink)

In the USA and England and Wales, involuntary treatment for mental illness is subject to the constraint that it must be necessary for the health or safety of the patient, if he poses no danger to others. I will argue against this necessary condition of administering treatment and propose that the category of individuals eligible for involuntary treatment should be extended. I begin by focusing on the common disorder of schizophrenia and proceed to demonstrate that it can be a considerable (...) harm to a person's life without causing the person to be a danger to himself. I illuminate this claim by constructing a thought experiment concerning a person who slips on a banana peel and falls into a malfunctioning version of Robert Nozick's experience machine. I propose that the reasons why we should remove the person from the machine are the same reasons why we should administer involuntary treatment to individuals with schizophrenia. I rebut three objections to the analogy and conclude that if we believe that we have a duty to provide treatment for reasons relating to a person's wellbeing, it follows that we should reject the health or safety requirement and instead broaden the category of individuals who are eligible for involuntary treatment. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that the utilitarian principle of criminalization is sounder than its poor reputation suggests. The paper begins by describing three possible answers to the research question: To what extent should the consequences of criminalization matter morally in a theory of criminalization? Hereafter I explain why I shall discuss only two of these answers. Then follows a detailed and critical specification of UPC. Furthermore, I will argue why criticisms of UPC made by philosophers such (...) as Douglas Husak and Victor Tadros in their recent work are far from convincing. Finally, I will present a positive reason for accepting UPC as a principle of criminalization, namely: that UPC is consistent with what I call the Counterproductive Criminalization Principle, while non-consequentialist theories of criminalization are not. (shrink)

The paper critically discusses the moral view that neurotechnological behavioural treatment for criminal offenders should only be offered if it is in their best interests. First, I show that it is difficult to apply and assess the notion of the offender's best interests unless one has a clear idea of what ‘best interests’ means. Second, I argue that if one accepts that harmful punishment of offenders has a place in the criminal justice system, it seems inconsistent not to accept the (...) practice of offering offenders treatment even when the state will harm them in applying the treatment. Finally, leading penal theories like consequentialists and retributivists would not accept that the offender's best interests, at least in certain situations, impose a necessary condition for the treatment of an offender. (shrink)

The paper critically discusses the moral view that neurotechnological behavioural treatment for criminal offenders should only be offered if it is in their best interests. First, I show that it is difficult to apply and assess the notion of the offender's best interests unless one has a clear idea of what ‘best interests’ means. Second, I argue that if one accepts that harmful punishment of offenders has a place in the criminal justice system, it seems inconsistent not to accept the (...) practice of offering offenders treatment even when the state will harm them in applying the treatment. Finally, leading penal theories like consequentialists and retributivists would not accept that the offender's best interests, at least in certain situations, impose a necessary condition for the treatment of an offender. (shrink)

Employers’ access to and use of criminal records as a selection mechanism in the labor market makes it far more difficult for ex-offenders to find jobs, especially regular, well-paid jobs, than those without criminal convictions. The paper asks whether there is anything morally problematic about this practice. The aims of the paper are twofold. First, arguments based on premises of wrongful discrimination against the current, commonest use of criminal records are critically discussed. It is argued that employers do not necessarily (...) engage in morally wrongful discrimination against job applicants when they use criminal records in recruitment screening. But it is also argued that ex-offenders who apply for jobs are subject to what can be called “structural and morally wrongful discrimination” when laws allow employers to request (or directly access) a job applicant’s full criminal record. Second, preliminary proposals on how criminal records can be used by employers in a way that avoids wrongful structural discrimination of ex-offenders will be presented and critically assessed. I suggest that it should be lawful for an employer to access an applicant’s criminal records only where there is a relevant and special match or link between the crime on the records and the job being applied for and the crime is serious. This proposal is defended against two objections, one based on concerns about crime prevention and the other based on the employer’s interest in knowing whom not to hire. (shrink)

The aim of this critical commentary is to distinguish and analytically discuss some important variations in which legal moralism is defined in the literature. As such, the aim is not to evaluate the most plausible version of legal moralism, but to find the most plausible definition of legal moralism. As a theory of criminalization, i.e. a theory that aims to justify the criminal law we should retain, legal moralism can be, and has been, defined as follows: the immorality of an (...) act of type A is a sufficient reason for the criminalization of A, even if A does not cause someone to be harmed. In what follows, I critically examine some of the key definitions and proposals that have, unfortunately, not always been carefully distinguished. Finally, I propose a definition that seems to capture the essence of what many philosophers refer to when they talk about legal moralism, while also providing more clarity. (shrink)

Two practical measures that have been introduced in an effort to stop sports parents from behaving badly will be critically discussed. The first measure is known under the slogan quiet weekends'. These prohibit parents from attending games in which their child is participating. Although this strategy calls attention to an important issue, it is unfair. The second, and far more elaborate, measure is to have a set of ethical guidelines informing parents how they should behave towards their child and others (...) in the context of sport. Two central values tend to run through these guidelines: namely parental concern for the child's autonomy and parental concern for the child's well-being. These values are discussed as I apply them to cases in what can be called a grey area, where it is not obvious what is morally right or wrong. In the concluding discussion a tentative checklist will be presented which good sports parents can use when they are confronted with ethical issues. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to articulate and critically discuss different answers to the following question: How should decision-makers deal with conflicts that arise when the values usually entailed in ethical guidelines – such as accuracy, privacy, non-discrimination and transparency – for the use of Artificial Intelligence clash with one another? To begin with, I focus on clarifying some of the general advantages of using such guidelines in an ethical analysis of the use of AI. Some disadvantages will also (...) be presented and critically discussed. Second, I will show that we need to distinguish between three kinds of conflict that can exist for ethical guidelines used in the moral assessment of AI. This section will be followed by a critical discussion of different answers to the question of how to handle what we shall call internal and external values conflicts. Finally, I will wrap up with a critical discussion of three different strategies to resolve what is called a ‘genuine value conflict’. These strategies are: the ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable conflict’ view, the ranking view, and value monism. This article defends the ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable conflict’ view. It also argues that even though the ranking view and value monism, from a merely theoretical point of view, are better equipped to solve genuine value conflicts among values in ethical guidelines for artificial intelligence, this is not the case in real-life decision-making. Keywords: AI; ethical guidelines; algorithm-based sentencing; value conflicts. (shrink)

This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children - and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion. Having clarified this argument, I conclude that (...) although it addresses important issues, it is highly problematic for the following reasons. First, if women are being coerced to desire to use AR, we should eradicate the coercive elements in pro-natalist ideology, not access to AR. Second, the argument seems to have the absurd implication that we should prevent all woman, whether fertile or not, to try to have children. Third, it seems probable that women's welfare will be greater if we let well informed and decision-competent women decide for themselves whether they want to use AR. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present and critically discuss a gametheory- based argument in favour of the view that sports organizations ought to ban the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. After presenting the argument in detail, I try to show that the argument is not convincing. First, the argument cannot be used to argue in favour of WADA’s (World Anti-Doping Agency) current ban on doping, at least if it rests on the assumption, that doping use is always (...) harmful. However, that in itself may not be a problem for adherents of the argument, and they can and should modify the harm assumption to cover only harmful use of doping. Second, even with this modification, it is argued that the harm assumption is flawed, for example, because it is not obvious why we should accept certain harms in sport but not harm to athletes caused by doping. Third, the argument is also flawed because it entails the non-competitive assumption: if all athletes dope, then no competitive advantages are gained by any athletes assumptions. The noncompetitive assumption is challenged in view of the observations that doping can have some non-competitive advantages and is, so to speak, not only a positional good and because doping, due to unequal responsiveness, can give some highly responsive athletes a competitive advantage over less responsive athletes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss the plausibility of a certain position in the philosophical literature within which the Repugnant Conclusion is treated, not as repugnant, but as an acceptable implication of the total welfare principle. I will confine myself to focus primarily on Törbjörn Tännsjö’s presentation. First, I reconstruct Tännsjö’s view concerning the repugnance of the RC in two arguments. The first argument is criticized for (a) addressing the wrong comparison, (b) relying on the controversial claim that (...) the privileged people in our actual world only have lives barely worth living and (c) that Tännsjö’s identification between Z-lives and privileged lives is restricted to certain versions of the notion ‘barely worth living’ – a restriction that weakens the force of the argument. The second argument is criticized because some of it premises entailed (b) and (d) for its implausible claim that non-imaginable outcomes cannot be compared. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present and critically discuss a game-theory-based argument in favour of the view that sports organizations ought to ban the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. After presenting the argument in detail, I try to show that the argument is not convincing. First, the argument cannot be used to argue in favour of WADA’s (World Anti-Doping Agency) current ban on doping, at least if it rests on the assumption, that doping use is always harmful. (...) However, that in itself may not be a problem for adherents of the argument, and they can and should modify the harm assumption to cover only harmful use of doping. Second, even with this modification, it is argued that the harm assumption is flawed, for example, because it is not obvious why we should accept certain harms in sport but not harm to athletes caused by doping. Third, the argument is also flawed because it entails the non-competitive assumption: if all athletes dope, then no competitive advantages are gained by any athletes assumptions. The non-competitive assumption is challenged in view of the observations that doping can have some non-competitive advantages and is, so to speak, not only a positional good and because doping, due to unequal responsiveness, can give some highly responsive athletes a competitive advantage over less responsive athletes. (shrink)

In this article several justifications of what I call ‘the claim from adoption’ are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead of expending resources on bringing new children into the world using reproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children. Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a (...) use of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then argued that a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supports the claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because the support it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seems morally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption rather than assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves upon Munthe’s utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in the cases in which Munthe’s argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitive implications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concluded that the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism. n a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even though the claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it does not follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resources away from assisted reproduction and towards adoption. (shrink)

The paper critically discusses a role-model argument (RMA) in favour of banning performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The argument concludes that athletes should be banned from using performance-enhancing drugs because if they are allowed to use such drugs they will encourage, or cause, youngsters who look up to them to use drugs in a way that would be harmful. In Section 2 the structure of the argument and some versions of it are presented. In Section 3 a critical discussion of RMA (...) is presented. It is argued that we should be reluctant to accept the argument as it stands for at least three reasons: (i) it rests on an unsupported empirical claim; (ii) it also makes a false empirical claim; and (iii) the normative premise of the argument is too demanding morally. Further objections to the RMA are also discussed, but argued to be beside the point. (shrink)

An argument against the use of non-medical egg freezing is that women should not use NMEF as it is an individualistic and morally problematic answer to the social problems that women face, for instance, in the labour market. Instead of allowing or expecting women to deal with these problems individually, we should address them by challenging the patriarchal structure of the labour market—for example, by securing equal pay and affordable childcare. In a recent article in Journal of Medical Ethics, I (...) argue that we should distinguish between different versions of this kind of reasoning and that all the versions discussed are implausible.1 In three separate comments following my article in the March 2021 issue of JME, Moen,2 Segers3 and Campo-Engelstein4 have supported and criticised some of my results. It is impossible, in such a short reply, to discuss all of their many relevant comments in detail, but in what follows I will reply to some of their criticism. Moen presents several interesting comments; let me try to deal with what I take to be the two most important ones. The first of these deals with some of my critical comments concerning …. (shrink)

Michael A. PetersBeijing Normal UniversityMy deepest condolences to Pepe, Dom and Marcus and to Jim’s grandchildren. Tina and I spent a lot of time at the Marshall family home, often attending dinn...