In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers :6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is not incoherent, even if it is implausible and empirically false. Our paper argues against this: strong illusionism is poorly established. The first part presents the reasoning leading to strong illusionism; i.e., it describes the initial conditions and relations among them for its establishment. The second part of the paper argues that strong illusionism is (...) not constructed in a satisfactory way and calls the flaw in establishing it the pre-illusion problem. The third part demonstrates that the existing defense of strong illusionism does not save it from the pre-illusion problem, while the fourth part of the paper outlines two strategies to fight the pre-illusion problem, concluding, however, that they fail to do so, and indicates one possible way in which illusionism might be, nevertheless, coherently established. (shrink)

Neurophysiological research suggests our mental life is related to the cellular processes of particular nerves. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, some authors take these connections as reductions of psychological terms and kinds to molecular- biological mechanisms and patterns. Bickle’s ‘intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviourally’ reduction is one example of this. Here the mental is being reduced to the physical in two steps. The first is, through genetically altered mammals, to causally alter activity of particular nerve cells, i.e. neurons, at (...) the molecular level and then, under controlled experimental conditions, to use generally-accepted rules of behaviour within psychology to monitor the results of these manipulations. In this article, we argue that Bickle’s case example for molecular reduction, i.e. the reduction of long-term memory to its cellular-molecular mechanisms, cannot support his claims, because it turns out that his chosen molecular pathway is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the memory consolidation switch, and thus, instead of rejecting the multiple realization argument, Bickle’s argument actually speaks in favour of it. Therefore the idea of reductive connections between our mental life and the activity of particular nerves is, at present, still more fiction than reality. (shrink)

Es liegt auf der Hand, warum das antireduktionistische Bild der mentalen Verursachung, die mentale Phänomene für kausal wirkungsvoll hält, so attraktiv ist: Es bewahrt die einmalige Natur des Mentalen , während es gleichzeitig dem Mentalen in unserer Welt seinen Platz zu sichern sucht, was mit der physikalistischen Ideologie kompatibel ist. Doch Kims so genanntes Supervenienzargument erinnert an das Dilemma, dem wir begegnen, wenn wir antireduktionistischen Lösungen der mentalen Verursachung den Vorzug geben, was uns dazu zwingen kann, diese aufzugeben, um nach (...) anderen, plausibleren zu suchen. Das Problem liegt nämlich im Folgenden: Entweder besitzen mentale Eigenschaften kausale Fähigkeiten, oder sie besitzen sie nicht. Wenn sie sie besitzen, dann verstoßen wir gegen das Kausalprinzip der Schlussfolgerung, was eine Negation des Physikalismus bedeutet. Wenn nicht, dann akzeptieren wir den Epiphänomenalismus, der kausale mentale Fähigkeiten jedweder Art negiert. Somit geben wir entweder den Physikalismus auf oder wir akzeptieren den Epiphänomenalismus. Da der Antireduktionismus in beiden Fällen verliert, bildet keine dieser Optionen eine echte Alternative für seine Proponenten. Aus diesem Grunde glauben einige Autoren, dass wir uns an den Reduktionismus halten sollten, um mentale Kausalitäten zufriedenstellend erklären zu können. Gleichwohl ist hierbei der traditionelle, von Nagel geprägte Reduktionismus nicht angebracht, ein anderes ausgeklügeltes Modell sollte auf den Plan treten. Der erste Teil des Artikels stellt Gründe für die Abkehr von der klassischen Reduktion vor, der zweite beschreibt Kims funktionales Modell der Reduktion als eines seiner möglichen Nachfolger, während der Schlussteil den Ursachen seines Scheiterns auf den Grund geht. (shrink)

Il est évident pourquoi l`image antiréductionniste de la causalité mentale, selon laquelle les phénomènes mentaux sont considérés comme des causes efficientes est si attirante : elle préserve la nature unique du mental , tout en essayant d`assurer la place pour le mental dans notre monde, ce qui est compatible à l`idéologie physicaliste . Mais le soi disant argument de Kim provenant de la survenance nous rappelle le dilemme auquel nous devons faire face lorsque nous favorisons les solutions antiréductionnistes de la (...) causalité mentale, qui pourraient nous forcer à les abandonner et en chercher d`autres plus plausibles. La difficulté est la suivante: les propriétés mentales ont des pouvoirs causals ou non. Si elles en ont, nous violons alors le principe de la conclusion causale, ce qui est la négation du physicalisme. Si ce n`est pas le cas, nous acceptons l`épiphénoménalisme qui conteste les pouvoirs mentaux causals de toutes sortes. Ainsi, soit on renonce au physicalisme, soit on accepte l`épiphénoménalisme. Puisque, dans les deux cas, l`antiréductionnisme est perdant, aucune des deux options ne présente une vraie alternative pour ses tenants. Pour cette raison-là certains auteurs pensent que nous devons nous adresser au réductionnisme afin d`expliquer la causalité mentale d`une manière plus satisfaisante. Pourtant, ce n`est pas le modèle traditionnel de réduction de Nagel qui est ici en jeu, mais il s`agit plutôt d`autres modèles plus sophistiqués. La première partie de cet article présente les raisons pour que soit abandonnée la réduction classique, la deuxième décrit le modèle fonctionnel de réduction de Kim, qui en est un successeur potentiel, alors que la fin traite les raisons de son échec. (shrink)

The article critically examines Jaegwon Kim’s book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It recognizes the »near enough type of physicalism« involving functional reduction and covering the relational properties of qualia. Its intrinsic qualites are left out, but since it is qualia’s differences and similarities that matter, i.e. which affect our cognition and behaviour, this is, according to Kim, “no big loss”. While appreciating the book’s effort to offer an intelligible physicalistic theory of the world, the (...) paper concludes that it fails to do so. (shrink)

It is obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation, which considers mental phenomena to be causally efficacious, is so attractive: it preserves the unique nature of the mental , while at the same time it tries to secure a place for the mental in our world which is compatible with a physicalist ideology . But Kim’s so called argument from supervenience reminds us of the dilemma that we face while favouring antireductionist solutions of mental causation which might force us (...) to abandon them and look for some other more plausible ones. The trouble is, namely, the following: either mental properties have causal powers or not. If they have them then we violate the causal closure principle which means a denial of physicalism. If not, then we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies the mental causal powers of any sort. So, either we give up physicalism or accept epiphenomenalism. Since antireductionism loses both ways neither of these options represents a true alternative for its proponents. For this reason some authors think that we should look at reductionism in order to explain mental causation in a more satisfactory manner. However, it is not the traditional Nagel model of reduction that is in play here, but some rather more sophisticated ones. The first part of the article presents the reasons for dropping classical reduction, the second part describes Kim’s functional model of reduction as one of its possible successors, and the final part of the article discusses the reasons for its failure. (shrink)

It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of (...) the causal closure of the physical domain; if they do not have them, we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies any sort of causal powers to the mental. So, either we violate the causal closure of physics, or we end up with epiphenomenalism. The first two sections of the article describe the problem of causal exclusion and Kim’s causal dilemma. The last two introduce Horgan’s antireductionist answer and my objection to that answer. (shrink)

The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...) beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept. (shrink)

Using the results of the latest neurophysiological research on colour, the article rejects outright physicalism and dispositionalism as appropriate approaches to solving the problem of colour realism. Physicalism sees colour as a real property of objects, i.e. the reflectance profile, while dispositionalism takes subjects, objects and light as necessary elements for colour production. First, it briefly outlines the historical development of the theory of colour, pointing towards dispositionalism which, in some sense, considers colour as a real entity of the world, (...) and then introduces the problem of colour realism, focusing on objections to physicalism as well as dispositionalism. After delineating the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the visual experience of colour, and with the help of the concrete results of practical neurophysiological experiments, the article points to why the physicalist and any dispositionalist theories of colour in the light of a new physiological objection do not present credible views on the nature of colour. (shrink)

A person as an ethical being establishes herself/himself through dialogue with others. Dialogue is also an anthropological basis of a woman/man and of her/his growth as a person. The first years of life are particularly decisive. In these years, a young person assimilates the codes necessary to perceive the self, others, and, through them, the whole world. Dialogue is a basic task by which one's personal life is organized and how one acts in a human way. The emotional dimension is (...) more important than the grammatical-symbolic one. Yet, a one-sided socio-cultural development hinders such personal dialogue. This is the very case in totalitarian systems, as well as in the consumer-society. Because of such obstacles, the global society needs a global dialogue to secure the life for future generations. This book examines the challenges of a dialogical development in a global society. (Series: Philosophy of Religion Forum / Forum Religionsphilosophie - Vol. 32). (shrink)

Es incuestionable el hecho de la evolución, así como la admisión de una realidad previa de la cual partir, sea creada o no. Pero luce cuestionable el mecanismo de la evolución en clave de “selección natural” cuando se la entiende como netamente naturalista. El evolucionismo darwinista no tiene fundamento suficiente para afirmar que las especies evolucionan de modo totalmente aleatorio y sin finalidad definida. Los más recientes descubrimientos socavan los cimientos del darwinismo (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), y nos hablan de un (...) Diseñador creando el universo de la nada en un tiempo finito y aceptando la evidencia del Big-Bang (William Lane Craig). Otros tipos de evolucionismo, aunque rechazan la teleología, admiten sin embargo, la teleonomía, que no es incompatible con la tesis agustiniana del “creacionismo evolutivo”. En estos tipos de evolucionismo sí cabe una tendencialidad antrópica como la defendida por Agustín, a través de sus razones seminales-causales y de los distintos modos de creación derivados de aquel “simul et in ictu” creacional. Las distintas creaciones virtuales, también simultáneas y derivadas de la creación propia “ex nihilo”, no implican que sean efectivas “simul” también las especies o prototipos. Una cosa es el hecho de la creación simultánea y otro el de su real y existencial efecto en el tiempo. En esta idea encontramos la fundamentación para defender un creacionismo evolutivo a lo agustiniano, que podría sintonizar con otros evolucionismos al estilo de X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Palabras clave: creacionismo; creacionismo evolutivo; creación virtual; evolucionismo; razón seminal; fixismo (o fijismo); principio o sentido antrópico. Saint Augustine versus Darwin: Evolutionary Creacionism of ‘Seminal Reasons’Evolution is an unquestionable fact, and so is the admission of a previous reality from which to start up, whether created or not. But the mechanism of evolution in terms of “natural selection” does look questionable, when the latter is understood as entirely naturalistic. Darwinist evolutionism has no sufficient grounds to assert that species evolve in a totally random way, without a defined end. The most recent discoveries undermine the foundations of Darwinism (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), and tell us about a Designer creating the universe out of nothing in a finite time, accepting the big bang theory (William Lane Craig). Other types of evolutionism, while rejecting teleology, do admit teleonomy, which is not incompatible with the Augustinian thesis of “evolutionary creationism”. In these kinds of evolutionism it is indeed possible to speak of anthropic tendencies, as was defended by Augustine by means of his seminal-causal reasons and the different modes of creation derived from that creational “simul et in ictu”. The different virtual creations, simultaneous as well and derived from the “ex nihilo” creation, do not entail that the species or prototypes should also be effective “simul”. One thing is the fact of simultaneous creation; a different one is its real and existential effect over time. In this idea we find the grounds on which to defend an Augustinian-like evolutionary creationism, which might be compatible with other types of evolutionism like those of X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Keywords : Creationism;Evolutionary Creationism; Virtual Creation; Evolutionism; Seminal Reason; Fixism; Anthropic Sense or Principle. (shrink)

Neither any technological development nor any institutional mechanisms (economical, legal, political etc.) can compensate the lack of ethical persons. Reaching sustainable development and life of quality is possible only on the basis of view which is not trapped, flat and reducing, on the basis of an effort, which ca - founded on temperance and humility (in relation to the nature, self, others and (O)other) - (co)create cooperation, higher order synthesis and synergy of the crafts that are the conditio sine qua (...) non of survival, harmonious world and (decent) existence of a human (as a human) in it. Professor Janez Juhant, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Theology, the Head of Chair of Philosophy Bojan Zalec, Senior Research Associate, the Head of Institute of Philosophy and Social Ethics, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Theology. (shrink)

We establish the thesis that in moral education, particularly in the first years of the child’s development, unreflexive acts or unreflexiveness in certain behaviours of adults is a condition for the development of the personality structure and virtues that enable autonomous ethical reflection and a relation to the Other. With the notion of unreflexiveness we refer to resolvedness in the response of adults when it is necessary to establish a limit, or cut, in the child’s demand for pleasure, as well (...) as to resolvedness as one of the structurally essential elements in behaviours with which the adult subordinates the child to the symbolic order or language. In philosophy, a symptomatic position in this context is represented by Kant’s theory of education. On the basis of the “traditional” concept of “negative education”, and through Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalytic concepts, we identify two principles that should, in contemporary times, be an essential part of the moral educational behaviours of adults: the principle of a delimited response to the child’s demand for the satisfaction of pleasure, and the principle of reasoned, reflected, but nevertheless certain, persevering, resolved unreflexiveness in the subordination of the child’s desire to the symbolic order . On the basis of the preceding analysis, we highlight certain consequences of this structure of the subject for the contexts of particular theoretical discussions and for school practice. (shrink)

Whereas mainstream theories of environmental art and sustainable development consider art as a domain suitable for the application of environmentally friendly procedures, such as the circular economy, trash management and digitization, this research article focuses on the internal development of the autopoetic and self-referential art machine, which generates an art-specific sustainability. The circular environmental economy coexists with the circular art economy, which implies changes in the aesthetics and poetics of the artwork; it deploys upcycling to use art trash in creating (...) a new, higher value object. Art-specific sustainability contributes to the power and complexity of the art machine with new conceptual interventions and devices. These devices allow art to resist threats from other fields and to redefine itself. As sustainable development agendas of international organizations take into account the social, political, and economic initiatives that promote ethics, inclusion, and tolerance, this article discusses the contributions of contemporary environmental art to expanded concepts of the political and science. In particular, art activism, in cooperation with civil society, can be an important driver in areas that parliamentary politics overlooks. (shrink)

Contemporary post-aesthetic art implies an expanded concept of the work of art that also includes political functions. Beuys’s concept of social sculpture and Marcuse’s idea of society as a work of art can be complemented by Abreu’s project of a musical orchestra as a social ideal and the Neue Slowenische Kunst transnational state formed from the core of art. These concepts are close to the views of Hakim Bey, with D’Annunzio also touching upon them with his State of Fiume, for (...) which he wrote the constitution and defined music as its central governing principle. Although the art state is a utopian project, art can serve a variety of emancipatory functions even in the dystopian present to intervene in and change the political. In this article, we also discuss the case of art activism in Slovenia, where culture has become a central part of civil society oriented towards social change. Art activism contributes to an expanded concept of the political, which includes new subjects and new forms of antagonisms. Likewise, such repurposing of art emphasises its role in research. (shrink)

Today we come across new media art projects as post-industrial art services that occur at the intersection of contemporary art, new economy, post-political politics (activism, hacktivism), technosciences and techno lifestyles. The artwork is not a stable object anymore, it is a process, an artistic software, an experience, a service devoted to solving a particular (cultural and non-cultural) problem, a research, an interface which demands from its user also the ability for associative selection, algorithmic (logical) thinking and for procedures pertaining to (...) DJ and VJ culture, such as mixing, cutting, sampling and recombination. The art service is not so much the manufacturing of things as it is a process of reshaping the thing, moving it, repurposing it, connecting it and incorporating it into new contexts and relations. The service presupposes a problem, a challenge or an order to be solved or carried out. The performer of the service is always faced with a certain task, challenged to solve it in a sequence of steps, chosen as economically as possible. The service therefore ends with a solution of the problem (or its removal) and not with the manufacturing of a finished object. The service always implies an algorithmic procedure that has to be as rational as possible, economical, divided into phases, steps, instructions needed for it to be carried out. By defining the new media art in terms of post-industrial service activity, the traditional concepts of aesthetic and autonomous art are left behind and replaced with novel theoretical devices, e.g. software, repurposing, remixing, recombination, rewriting and hybridization. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the notion of algorithmic culture in relation to new media and electronic literature. Such a culture considers human as being immersed in smart technology, which with its code and algorithms defines individual’s behaviour and decision-making, modes of socializing and participation, experiencing and perception. The following lines unveil the paradigm shift that involves semiotic crossings between human and machine languages. In order to do so, it addresses some crucial particularities of the emerging field of electronic literature.

This essay attempts to assess whether the perceptual issues posed by the contemporary interface culture, and the constant attitude shift demanded by the new media between the “natural” and the “as if” modes, might be considered a significant challenge for phenomenological aesthetics as understood in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. To demonstrate how the use of a particular interface profoundly shapes the form and structure of an activity as well as enabling perception of a particular kind, the author does (...) not focus directly on the state-of-the-art smart interfaces, but describes the experience of cycling in a large city, with the interface in the form of the bicycle upgraded with an imagined ride simulator. While the former enables a very particular entrance into the world of perception, shaped by its moderate speed and detachment from the ground, the latter enables techno-shaped perception in the “as if” screenic mode. The experience described raises questions concerning the kinaesthetic, proprioceptive and motor features contributing to the cyclist’s mobile perception, as well as pointing to issues related to the reading of the city’s network as a particular spatial configuration generated by the cyclist’s realtime activity. This is the space-time-event-ridescape maintained and modified by the corporeal act of cycling. The spatiality of such a ride does not presume the notion of a space that contains the cyclist, but builds on notions of being-in-the-ridescape (as a kind of cityscape), in terms not only of full corporeal and mental engagement, but also of bodily literacy. The reading of the cityscape enabled by the combination of two interfaces, the bicycle and the ride simulator, is discussed in relation to de Certeau’s account of pedestrian (walking) experience in a big city, his distinction between strategies and tactics, and the notion that each cyclist contributes a novel story to ridetext, which is viewed not as an aesthetic object but as the production of puzzles for the rider to solve. The paper cocludes by questioning the capacity of phenomenology to accommodate the contemporary phenomenon of a “mixed” or “augmented reality” either in concept or in relation to the demands of the phenomenological reduction and the ends of the epoché. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 10, Edition 2, October 2010: 61-71. (shrink)

Contemporary art based on new media is situated at the intersection of art-as-we-know-it, smart technologies, digital and algorithmic culture, networked economy, politics, as well as bio and techno sciences. Contemporary art enters into intense relations with these fields, including interactions, adoption of methodological devices and approaches, changes of the areas of activity, hybridization and amalgamation. This text explores those features of contemporary life and culture which are affected by digital art and the recombination, appropriation, remediation, reusing, repurposing, and transfer of (...) artistic procedures/tools from one context or field to another. (shrink)

Ricœur pose une définition intéressante de l’utopie et de l’idéologie. Afin de rester plus ou moins stable, chaque société doit atteindre l’équilibre entre les deux. En s’appuyant sur sa définition, nous tenterons de qualifier la notion de globalisation dans l’enseignement. La question est de savoir s’il s’agit d’une approche idéologique ou plutôt d’une approche utopiste des politiques scolaires actuelles. Nous portons un intérêt particulier à la question de savoir à qui profite l’unification de l’enseignement, de plus en plus manifeste, en (...) examinant de plus près l’exemple du processus de Bologne. S’agit-il d’un concours d’intérêts économiques, ou d’un besoin qui caractérise l’homme en tant qu’individu qui possède des droits, si l’on met l’accent dans le processus d’enseignement sur la généralité, l’unicité, la comparabilité et la compétence ? La globalisation dans le domaine de l’enseignement, n’est-elle rien d’autre qu’un défi d’une époque, ou répond-elle aux demandes de certains intérêts économiques qui relèvent d’un certain système complexe de capitaux ? Il semblerait que nous soyons à nouveau partagés entre l’utopie de l’attente d’une fraternité universelle et l’idéologie de la justification des intérêts de certains groupes. (shrink)

Dans sa démarche interprétative, l’herméneutique de Ricœur se sert du concept de distanciation, qui implique la sortie de soi-męme du lecteur, de l’auditeur ou du spectateur et la recherche nécessaire d’une sorte d’altérité. On peut reconnaître dans cette altérité la « différance » de Derrida, qui conduit au final dans une direction tout ŕ fait différente que le concept ricśurien de distanciation. Ces deux auteurs peuvent ętre comparés notamment au niveau de leurs recherches respectives sur la métaphore. Si, pour Ricœur, (...) la vraie métaphore est la métaphore vivante, celle qui génčre des significations nouvelles, comme le postulent Richards et Black, pour Derrida de La mythologie blanche, toute la philosophie n’est qu’un ensemble de métaphores oubliées qui conduit d’abord ŕ sa propre mort et ensuite ŕ la mort de la philosophie. Dans ce monde de plus en plus globalisé, oů, d’une part, les frontičres et les différences s’effacent progressivement, on voit, d’autre part, émerger des fondamentalismes qui s’efforcent de montrer ŕ tout prix que les différences sont insurmontables. Dans l’actuel concept européen d’unification, comme dans tout processus de maturation humaine, l’éducation et la formation ont une grande importance pour la préservation de son identité, la compréhension d’autrui et l’action commune. Il nous semble que le concept ricśurien de distanciation pourrait aider ŕ unifier cette double exigence. Or, comme une telle approche de l’éducation et de la formation pourrait s’égarer dans une « nouvelle mythologie », génératrice de cloisonnement fondamentaliste, il est nécessaire de suivre ce processus en mettant ŕ contribution la critique de Derrida. (shrink)

Le besoin de narrer a non seulement créé des poèmes épiques et de nombreuses mythologies, il est, selon P. Ricoeur, le noyau même de la création de la connaissance de soi. Le processus d’identification à travers la narration ne nous amène pas à nous focaliser sur notre propre narration. Nous rencontrons toujours d’abord les narrations des autres puis commençons seulement à raconter l’histoire de notre vie. À travers le processus d’imitation, la mimesis, comme l’entend Ricoeur, nous pouvons en même temps (...) apprendre tant l’éthique que la morale. Le monde global, avec ses narrations simplifiées du marché, tente de rester proche de la première et la deuxième mimesis et ne peut accéder à la troisième, à partir de laquelle seulement on peut commencer à parler de créativité. L’auteur compare les points de vue philosophiques de Ricoeur sur l’identité à l’expérience littéraire de Frisch dans l’ouvrage Je ne suis pas Stiller. Les deux sont l’exemple d’un entrelacement herméneutique qui mène à l’identité naturelle. Dans ce processus herméneutique, nous pouvons nous redécouvrir dans un monde où nous respecterons notre propre identité en étant ouverts à ses transformations créatives. (shrink)

Ricœur stellt eine interessante Definition der Utopie und Ideologie auf. Jede Gesellschaft, die mehr oder weniger stabil sein will, sollte zwischen den beiden ein Gleichgewicht suchen. Mithilfe seiner Definition versuchen wir, auch das „schulische“ Verstehen der Globalisierung einzuordnen. Es wird die Antwort auf die Frage gesucht, ob es mehr um einen ideologischen oder eher einen utopischen Zutritt bei den gegenwärtigen Schulpolitiken geht. Von besonderem Interesse ist für uns aber die Frage, in wessen Interesse die immer stärkere Unifizierung des Schulwesens ist, (...) wenn man das Beispiel der Reform von Bologna unter die Lupe nimmt. Geht es um ein Geflecht von wirtschaftlichen Interessen oder um das Bedürfnis des Menschen als Wesens im Sinne eines Individuums und seiner Rechte, wenn wir im Bildungsprozess die Durchgängigkeit, Einigkeit, Vergleichbarkeit und die Kompetenz betonen. Ist die Globalisierung im Schulbereich nur eine Herausforderung der Zeit, oder aber werden Bedürfnisse bestimmter Wirtschaftsinteressen eines komplizierten Kapitalsystems befriedigt? Es scheint, dass wir wieder zwischen der Utopie der Erwartung einer universalen Brüderlichkeit und der Ideologie der Rechtfertigung der Interessen einzelner Gruppen gespannt sind. (shrink)

The need to narrate is according to P. Ricoeur the very core of creating the knowledge of self. The process of identification through narration does not lead us to be focused on our own narration. We always find other people’s narrations first and then start telling the narration of our life. Through narration, as understood by Ricoeur, we can simultaneously learn ethics as well as morals. To show this the author compares philosophic view of identity by Ricoeur with Frisch’s literary (...) experiment in the novel I’m Not Stiller. Both of them are a hermeneutic intertwining that brings to natural identity. In this hermeneutic process we can rediscover ourselves in a world, in which we will respect our own identity by being fully open to its creative transformation. (shrink)

Das Bedürfnis nach Narration schuf nicht lediglich epische Gedichte und ungezählte Mythologien, sondern repräsentiert P. Ricoeur zufolge den wahren Kern der Wissensbildung über das Selbst. Der Identifikationsprozess durch das Erzählen lenkt uns nicht zum Fokus auf unsere eigene Narration. Andauernd wählen wir zunächst Erzählungen anderer Menschen aus und setzen erst hinterher mit eigener Lebensgeschichte ein. Durch den Prozess der Nachahmung, Mimesis – wie von Ricoeur angesehen – sind wir imstande, zeitgleich sowohl Ethik als auch Moral zu erlernen. Die globale Welt (...) mit ihren simplifizierten Narrationen des Marktes neigt dazu, bei der ersten und zweiten Mimesis zu verharren und ist außerstande, zur dritten überzuwechseln, wo erst die Rede von der Kreativität anfangen kann. Der Autor parallelisiert Ricoeurs philosophischen Identitätsbegriff mit Frischs literarischem Experiment im Roman Stiller. Beide sind Exempel hermeneutischer Verflechtung, die zur natürlichen Identität führt. In diesem hermeneutischen Ablauf vermögen wir, uns selbst wieder zu entdecken in einer Welt, in welcher wir unsere eigene Identität achten, indem wir ihren ideenreichen Umformungen aufgeschlossen gegenüberstehen. (shrink)

Potreba za pripovijedanjem ne samo da je stvorila epske poeme i brojne mitologije nego je, prema P. Ricoeuru, sama jezgra stvaranja znanja o sebi. Proces identifikacije kroz naraciju ne navodi nas na usredotočenost na našu vlastitu naraciju. Mi uvijek prvenstveno nailazimo na naracije drugih ljudi i tek onda počinjemo pričati našu životnu priču. Kroz proces imitacije, mimesisa, kako ga shvaća Ricoeur, mi istodobno možemo učiti kako etiku tako i moral. Globalni svijet sa svojim pojednostavljenim naracijama tržišta nastoji ostati pri prvoj (...) i drugoj mimezi te ne može pristupiti trećoj, tek u kojoj možemo početi govoriti o kreativnosti. Autor uspoređuje Ricoeurove filozofske nazore o identitetu s Frischovim literarnim eksperimentom u djelu I’m Not Stiller. Oba su primjer hermeneutičkog preplitanja koje dovodi do prirodnog identiteta. U ovom se hermeneutičkom procesu možemo ponovno pronaći u svijetu u kojem ćemo poštivati vlastiti identitet bivajući otvorenima za njegove kreativne transformacije. (shrink)

Ricœur brings an interesting definition of utopia and ideology. Every society, which has the intention to remain more or less stable, must reach equilibrium between the mentioned. Relying on his definition, we will also try to classify the “educational” notion of globalization. We are trying to find an answer to the question whether current educational policies are characterised, predominantly, by ideological or, primarily, utopian approach. Of particular interest to us is the question of whose interest is the evermore present unification (...) of education, especially if we place the example of the Bologna reform under the magnifying glass. Is this a case of the combination of economic interests, or is it about the need of human as a being, i.e. as an individual together with its rights, if we emphasize universality, equality, comparability and competence in the educational process. Is the globalization in the field of education nothing more than a challenge of our age, or is this a case of satisfying the demands of certain economical interests in a complex capitalistic system? It seems that we are once again torn between the utopia of expecting the universal brotherhood and the ideology that justifies the interests of certain groups. (shrink)

Ricœur postavlja interesantnu definiciju utopije i ideologije. Svako društvo, s namjerom da ostane više ili manje stabilno, mora doseći ravnotežu među njima dvjema. Oslanjajući se na njegovu definiciju, pokušat ćemo razvrstati i »školsko« poimanje globalizacije. Traži se odgovor na pitanje radi li se pretežito o ideološkom ili ponajprije utopijskom pristupu aktualnih školskih politika. Od posebnog zanimanja za nas jest pitanje u čijem je interesu sve izraženija unifikacija školstva, stavi li se pod povećalo primjer Bolonjske reforme. Je li ovdje riječ o (...) spletu ekonomskih interesa, ili o potrebi čovjeka kao bića u smislu individue i njezinih prava, naglasimo li u obrazovnom procesu općenitost, jedinstvo, usporedivost te kompetenciju. Je li globalizacija na polju školstva ništa drugo doli izazov vremena, ili se tu pak podilazi zahtjevima određenih ekonomskih interesa izvjesnog složenog kapitalnog sistema? Čini se kako smo iznova razapeti između utopije očekivanja univerzalnog bratstva i ideologije opravdavanja interesa pojedinih skupina. (shrink)