Suppose your friends had to ascribe a single vice to you in large measure, along with any virtues that could be coherently combined with that salient vice. Suppose further that the vice had to be either cowardice or impatience. Which would you choose? I believe almost everyone would choose impatience without hesitation. There are sound moral as well as purely self-regarding reasons for despising cowardice, and to that extent our preference would be reasonable. If we say that a man who (...) is a coward is also compassionate, we know that his compassion cannot be relied upon in any circumstances where it must contend with fear, and if he has a sense of justice, that will be useless if oppression has to be resisted. We cannot even expect him to pursue his own good whenever he perceives that to be hazardous, and so even the self-regarding virtues are corrupted by his dominating vice. On the other hand, a pronounced impatience may seem to be compossible with abundant virtue. Those who are just but cannot patiently endure tyranny are perhaps the most formidable threat to tyranny, and people who boldly go out to seize their own good often fare rather better than those who patiently await its arrival. (shrink)

Any liberal democratic state must honour religious and cultural pluralism in its educational policies. To fail to honour them would betray ideals of freedom and toleration fundamental to liberal democracy. Yet if such ideals are to flourish from one generation to the next, allegiance to the distinctive values of liberal democracy is a necessary educational end, whose pursuit will constrain pluralism. The problem of political education is therefore to ensure the continuity across generations of the constitutive ideals of liberal democracy, (...) while remaining hospitable to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those very ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this crucial problem. In lucid and elegant prose, Professor Callan, one of the world's foremost philosophers of education, identifies both the principal ends of civic education, and the rights that limit their political pursuit. This timely new study sheds light on some of the most divisive educational controversies, such as state sponsorship and regulation of denominational schooling, as well as the role of non-denominational schools in the moral and political development of children. Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. The series editors are David Miller and Alan Ryan. (shrink)

This timely and important book presents a compelling new theory of political education for liberal democracies. Amidst current concern over the need to encourage a morally sensitive and committed citizenry, Professor Callan's study provides a much-needed balanced discussion of the proper ends of education, as well as the moral rights of parents and children.

Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the development of capacities for revision of conceptions of the good should be corrected by attention to the value of developing capacities permitting a rational adherence to a conception of the good. Exposing children to a diverse but shallow secular and consumer culture might not facilitate goodness‐enhancing (...) autonomy in a way that is superior to the more insular strategies of religious minorities whose child‐rearing practices are criticized by liberals. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; McLaughlin on Parental Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467.

Eamonn Callan; McLaughlin on Parental Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467.

Autonomy as a personal ideal presupposes a conception of the self who owns and rules in a life that exemplifies the ideal. Philosophical discussion of autonomy continues to be injuenced by the thesis that the governing core of the self resides in our capacities for disengaged rational reflection, even when the thesis is not explicitly avowed. This conception of autonomy is shown to be inadequate because it alienates us from what matters in our lives. An alternative conception of autonomy is (...) presented that accords a substantial role to rejection and choice within an autonomous life without falling preq, to the charge of alienation. Some divergent implications of the two rival conceptions of autonomy for an understanding of liberal education are examined. Finally, the question of the value of autonomy from a social perspective is briefly discussed. (shrink)

Educational practices which reinforce cultural diversity are often commended in the name of pluralism, though such practices may be condemned on the same grounds if they are seen as a threat to the fragile sense of political unity which holds a pluralistic society together. Therefore, the educational implications of pluralism as an ideal are often ambiguous, and the ambiguity cannot be resolved in the absence of a clear understanding of the particular civic virtues which a pluralistic society should engender. Two (...) influential conceptions of civic education which purport to affirm the ideal of pluralism are examined and both are found wanting. Liberal political theory proclaims the paramount importance of justice in public life, and justice can be construed in a way that accomodates diversity. However, the kind of civic education which liberalism entails does too little to restrain the centrifugal forces latent in cultural diversity. Communitarian political theory exalts civic friendship as the supreme public virtue, but the civic education it supports is compatible with only a highly attenuated cultural diversity. A third alternative is canvassed which combines the liberal stress on justice with a conception of patriotism distinct from civic friendship. The implications of this alternative for disputes about bias in public schools are briefly discussed. (shrink)

Autonomy as a personal ideal presupposes a conception of the self who owns and rules in a life that exemplifies the ideal. Philosophical discussion of autonomy continues to be injuenced by the thesis that the governing core of the self resides in our capacities for disengaged rational reflection, even when the thesis is not explicitly avowed. This conception of autonomy is shown to be inadequate because it alienates us from what matters in our lives. An alternative conception of autonomy is (...) presented that accords a substantial role to rejection and choice within an autonomous life without falling preq, to the charge of alienation. Some divergent implications of the two rival conceptions of autonomy for an understanding of liberal education are examined. Finally, the question of the value of autonomy from a social perspective is briefly discussed. (shrink)

Educational practices that encourage children to understand ethical diversity commonly conflict with the parental desire to instil unswerving identification with a particular way of life. This paper examines whether the scope of parents’ rights to educational choice includes the option of vetoing such practices. Although parents’ rights are no less important than the rights of their children, the option of denying children experiences that would expose them to ethical diversity cannot be rightfully claimed by any parent without repudiating the egalitarian (...) basis of rights discourse. (shrink)

Educational practices that encourage children to understand ethical diversity commonly conflict with the parental desire to instil unswerving identification with a particular way of life. This paper examines whether the scope of parents’ rights to educational choice includes the option of vetoing such practices. Although parents’ rights are no less important than the rights of their children, the option of denying children experiences that would expose them to ethical diversity cannot be rightfully claimed by any parent without repudiating the egalitarian (...) basis of rights discourse. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; Godless Moral Education and Liberal Tolerance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 267–281, https://doi.or.

Eamonn Callan; Godless Moral Education and Liberal Tolerance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 267–281, https://doi.or.

Pity is an emotion which is intimately connected with virtue. If I were impervious to anger I could still be a paragon of rectitude. My emotional peculiarity might even be explained by moral saintliness. If I had a pitiless heart my entire life would surely be an abject moral failure. The imputation of an inability to pity strikes us as a damning moral criticism; it is one we are likely to make, for example, against those who commit acts of extreme (...) cruelty. Yet pity is hardly ever welcomed by its recipients, and for that reason it differs in a puzzling way from other emotions which are closely associated with virtue, such as gratitude or compassion. The prospect of becoming an object of pity is alarming, and not merely because we fear the misfortune that would evoke pity in others; it is alarming in part because we suspect that being on the receiving end of that emotion could seriously aggravate our plight. We also regard an aversion to being pitied as commendable, perhaps even morally commendable. There is something shameful in wanting to be pitied, just as there is in the indulgence of self-pity. The aged and the physically disabled do not want our pity, as a rule, and we think better of them for not wanting it. Finally, we know that those who give pity are frequently guilty of serious wrongdoing. A pitiless heart may be a terrible thing, but a fondness for dispensing pity is scarcely any better. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; Freedom and Schooling, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 45–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1983.

Eamonn Callan; Freedom and Schooling, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 45–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1983.

Eamonn Callan; Faith, Worship and Reason in Religious Upbringing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 183–193, https://do.

Eamonn Callan; Faith, Worship and Reason in Religious Upbringing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 183–193, https://do.

This chapter contains sections titled: I II.

A liberal society is committed to respecting the rationality and autonomy of its individual members as well as the potential for those characteristics where they have not actually developed. This commitment has provided the basis for liberal criticism of educational practices which instil uncritical convictions in the minds of the young. But the perpetuation of a liberal society depends upon the perpetuation of a strong and widespread allegiance to the contestable values which shape societies of this kind. How can the (...) goal of socialization in a liberal society be achieved while maintaining a thorough respect for the individual learner's potential for rationality and independence of mind? A fashionable answer to this question has been derived from theories of moral reasoning such as R.M. Hare's. In this paper the author argues that the fashionable answer is inadequate and puts forward some positive suggestions about the true nature of a liberal moral education. (shrink)

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Philosophy of Education, Department of Educational Foundations.

Cet article examine quelques idées concernant ce que j’appelle une éthique de la mémoire publique. Plus exactement, il considère comment les citoyens devraient apprendre à se souvenir du mal politique commis et subi dans des sociétés marquées par les circonstances de la réconciliation, dans lesquelles la stabilité politique et les pratiques démocratiques sont mises en péril par des souvenirs collectifs qui alimentent l’antipathie mutuelle et le ressentiment entre les citoyens d’un même État. Comment des communautés démocratiques fonctionnelles peuvent-elles être réparées (...) ou créées à nouveau lorsqu’elles ont été fracturées par des hostilités historiques ? Cet article examine un certain nombre de réponses possibles à cette question en utilisant une conception délibérative de ce qu’une communauté démocratique fonctionnelle devrait être. Cette conception s’incarne en gros dans deux normes démocratiques : l’impartialité et l’inclusion. C’est en référence à ces deux normes que l’article discute différentes tentatives actuelles de remplacer les anciennes histoires nationales, qui s’appuyaient sur les mythes civiques, par des histoires multiculturelles qui les refusent.This article examines some ideas about what I call the ethics of public memory. More exactly, it considers how citizens should learn to remember political evil done and endured in societies marked by the circumstances of reconciliation in which political stability and democratic practices are thwarted by collective memories that fuel mutual antipathy and resentment among citizens of a common state. How democratically functional national communities can be repaired or created anew when they have been fractured by historical enmities? The article examines a number of possible answers using a deliberative conception of what a functional democratic community should be. This conception is roughly embodied in two democratic norms : impartiality and inclusion. It is in reference to those two norms that the article discusses current attempts at replacing the old national histories, which relied on civic myths, by multicultural histories, which eschew them. (shrink)