Abstract:Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.

We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self‐knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense , Frankfurtian wholeheartedness , existential self‐knowledge , and spontaneity . Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self‐knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of authenticity conflicts with the value of self‐knowledge.

The badness of having conflicting emotions is a familiar theme in academic ethics, clinical psychology, and commercial self-help, where emotional harmony is often put forward as an ideal. Many philosophers give emotional harmony pride of place in their theories of practical reason.1 Here we offer a defense of a particular species of emotional conflict, namely, ambivalence. We articulate an conception of ambivalence, on which ambivalence is unresolved inconsistent desire (§1) and present a case of appropriate ambivalence (§2), before considering two (...) alternative defenses of emotional conflict (§3). We then argue that inconsistent desires can be fitting (§4) and that it can be reasonable not to resolve inconsistent desires (§5), before considering an objection (§6) and concluding the discussion (§7). (shrink)

We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (section 2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (section 3), existential self-knowledge (section 4), and spontaneity (section 5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of (that species of) (...) authenticity conflicts with the value of self-knowledge. (shrink)

: Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.

Simon D. Podmore claims that becoming a self before God is both a divine gift and an anxious obligation. Before we can know God, or ourselves, we must come to a moment of recognition. How this comes to be, as well as the terms of such acknowledgment, are worked out in Podmore’s powerful new reading of Kierkegaard. As he gives full consideration to Kierkegaard's writings, Podmore explores themes such as despair, anxiety, melancholy, and spiritual trial, and how they are (...) broken by the triumph of faith, forgiveness, and the love of God. He confronts the abyss between the self and the divine in order to understand how we can come to know ourselves in relation to a God who is apparently so wholly Other. (shrink)

Some claim that digital phenotyping will revolutionize understanding of human psychology and experience and significantly promote human wellbeing. This paper investigates the nature of digital phenotyping in relation to its alleged promise. Unlike most of the literature to date on philosophy and digital phenotyping, which has focused on its ethical aspects, this paper focuses on its epistemic and methodological aspects. The paper advances a tetra-taxonomy involving four scenario types in which knowledge may be acquired from human “digitypes” by digital phenotyping. (...) These scenarios comprise two causal relations and a correlative and constitutive relation that can exist between information generated by digital systems/devices on the one hand and psychological or behavioral phenomena on the other. The paper describes several modes of inference involved in deriving knowledge within these scenarios. After this epistemic mapping, the paper analyzes the possible knowledge potential and limitations of digital phenotyping. It finds that digital phenotyping holds promise of delivering insight into conditions and states as well producing potentially new psychological categories. It also argues that care must be taken that digital phenotyping does not make unwarranted conclusions and is aware of potentially distorting effects in digital sensing and measurement. If digital phenotyping is to truly revolutionize knowledge of human life, it must deliver on a range of fronts, including making accurate forecasts and diagnoses of states and behaviors, providing causal explanations of these phenomena, and revealing important constituents of human conditions, psychology, and experience. (shrink)

In response to prevailing perceptions, I contend that Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55) conceives of the wholly otherness of God via his dialectical category of the ‘infinite qualitative difference’ between the human and the divine, initially through the self's consciousness of sin and ultimately through the self's acceptance of the gift of forgiveness. Therefore, I claim that while the common designation of Kierkegaard's God as ‘Wholly Other’ may initially evoke the alterity of sin; it is not ultimately sufficient to describe the divine (...) alterity which Kierkegaard regards as more faithfully manifest in the ‘impossible possibility’ of forgiveness. Through this reading, I finally suggest that the ‘Wholly Other’ is not ultimately representative of God in Kierkegaard's writings and might be more faithfully supplemented by the appellation of the Holy Other. (shrink)

By focusing discussion through Søren Kierkegaard's view of Martin Luther's initiation into the monastery , it is suggested that an analogy can be discerned for Kierkegaard's own sense of divine vocation and the ensuing self‐mortification of melancholy and religious scrupulosity which commentators have suspected in both figures. Kierkegaard's often ambivalent critique of Luther's Anfechtung is thus read as bearing ironic significance for his own struggles with ‘spiritual trial’ [Anfægtelse]. In this reading, Luther's Anfechtung is taken to signify for Kierkegaard both (...) the anguish inherent to the authentic God‐relationship and also the dangerous possibility of the individual imagination's [Phantasi] capitulation into the precariously embellished realm of ‘the fantastic’ [Phantastiske]. It is here that Kierkegaard's emphasis upon individual responsibility – contrasted with Luther's concentration upon the role of the devil – demonstrates the fundamental differentiation between Kierkegaard's anatomy of Anfægtelse and Luther's Anfechtung. (shrink)

Tracing Kierkegaard's reception at the interfaces of anthropology, sociology, and psychology, this chapter focuses on his treatment in key figures such as Max Weber, Ernest Becker, Erich Fromm, Jean Baudrillard, René Girard, and Anthony Giddens. The chapter also contemplates Kierkegaard's psychosocial analysis of the relationship between the individual and society, concluding with an exploration of the insider/outsider dimensions of his critiques of modernity's despair and lived Christianity.

The current debate as to whether the natural environment should be accorded stakeholder status involves an assumption that it is in some way ‘different’ from other stakeholders, requiring favourable discriminatory treatment. Essentially it is regarded as passive, requiring regulatory agencies to represent its interests or the wider public to demand its protection on the occasion of, for example, oil spills that leave wildlife in a visibly distressed state. But the natural environment does not have ‘consciousness’ as do traditional classes of (...) stakeholders such as employees, shareholders and contractors, nor does it negotiate in markets over the price at which it sells its output in the way that a trader haggles with potential buyers. This paper proposes that in the context of financial markets the natural environment possesses stakeholder status, founded upon the essentiality of ecosystem stability for their proper functioning and the structuring of instruments traded on them. (shrink)

The current debate as to whether the natural environment should be accorded stakeholder status involves an assumption that it is in some way ‘different’ from other stakeholders, requiring favourable discriminatory treatment. Essentially it is regarded as passive, requiring regulatory agencies to represent its interests or the wider public to demand its protection on the occasion of, for example, oil spills that leave wildlife in a visibly distressed state. But the natural environment does not have ‘consciousness’ as do traditional classes of (...) stakeholders such as employees, shareholders and contractors, nor does it negotiate in markets over the price at which it sells its output in the way that a trader haggles with potential buyers. This paper proposes that in the context of financial markets the natural environment possesses stakeholder status, founded upon the essentiality of ecosystem stability for their proper functioning and the structuring of instruments traded on them. (shrink)

(Mereological) nihilism states that there are no composite objects—there are only sub-atomic particles such as quarks. Nihilism’s biggest rival, (mereological) universalism, posits vast numbers of composite objects in addition to the sub-atomic particles, and so nihilism appears to be the more ontologically parsimonious of the two theories. If this is the case, it’s a significant result for the nihilist: ontological parsimony is almost always thought to be a theoretical virtue, so a nihilist victory in the parsimony stakes gives us a (...) defeasible reason to be nihilists. But things aren’t so straightforward. Karen Bennett (2009) has argued that nihilism is no more quantitatively parsimonious than universalism. Furthermore, her argument can be redirected so that it threatens the nihilist’s perceived advantage over universalism in the qualitative parsimony stakes too. I here argue that these arguments are flawed and that nihilism is indeed more quantitatively and qualitatively parsimonious than universalism. (shrink)

The current debate as to whether the natural environment should be accorded stakeholder status involves an assumption that it is in some way ‘different’ from other stakeholders, requiring favourable discriminatory treatment. Essentially it is regarded as passive, requiring regulatory agencies to represent its interests or the wider public to demand its protection on the occasion of, for example, oil spills that leave wildlife in a visibly distressed state. But the natural environment does not have ‘consciousness’ as do traditional classes of (...) stakeholders such as employees, shareholders and contractors, nor does it negotiate in markets over the price at which it sells its output in the way that a trader haggles with potential buyers. This paper proposes that in the context of financial markets the natural environment possesses stakeholder status, founded upon the essentiality of ecosystem stability for their proper functioning and the structuring of instruments traded on them. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin is a persistent but elusive presence in many of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s writings, and the relationship between Lacoue-Labarthe and Benjamin is accordingly both significan...

This paper offers an analysis of Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime with reference to his claim that ‘Nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances the intuition of which brings with them the idea of its infinity’. In undertaking this analysis I challenge Paul Crowther’s interpretation of this species of aesthetic experience, and I reject his interpretation as not being reflective of Kant’s actual position. I go on to show that the experience of the mathematical sublime is necessarily (...) connected with the progression of the imagination in its move towards the infinite. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Kant’s Mathematical Sublime and the Role of the Infinite: Reply to CrowtherVolume 20, Issue 1Simon D. Smith DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415414000302Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Kant’s Mathematical Sublime and the Role of the Infinite: Reply to CrowtherVolume 20, Issue 1Simon D. Smith DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415414000302Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Kant’s Mathematical Sublime and the Role of the Infinite: Reply to CrowtherVolume 20, Issue 1Simon D. Smith DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415414000302Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

In ‘Why not NIMBY?’, Simon Feldman and Derek Turner mount a compelling case that NIMBY claims are not intrinsically morally unjustified, despite the fact that NIMBY-claimants...

By pointing to deep philosophical confusions endemic to cognitive science, Wittgenstein might seem an enemy of computational approaches. We agree that while Wittgenstein would reject the classicist’s symbols and rules approach, his observations align well with connectionist or neural network approaches. While many connectionisms that dominated the later twentieth century could fall prey to criticisms of biological, pedagogical, and linguistic implausibility, current connectionist approaches can resolve those problems in a Wittgenstein-friendly manner. We present the basics of a Vector Symbolic Architecture (...) formalism, inspired by Smolensky, and indicate how high-dimensional vectors can operate in a context-sensitive and object-independent manner in biologically plausible time scales, reflecting Wittgenstein’s notions of language-games and family resemblance; we show how “soft” symbols for such a formalism can be formed with plausible learning cycles using Sparse Distributed Memory, resolving disputes surrounding Wittgenstein’s private language argument; and show how connectionist networks can extrapolate meaningful patterns to solve problems, providing “ways to go on” without explicit rules, which indicates linguistic plausibility. Connectionism thus provides a systematicity and productivity that is more than a mere implementation of a classical approach, and provides Wittgenstein-friendly and Wittgenstein-illuminating models of mind and language for cognitive science. (shrink)

We address simple voting games as mathematical objects in their own right, and study structures made up of these objects, rather than focusing on SVGs primarily as co-operative games. To this end it is convenient to employ the conceptual framework and language of category theory. This enables us to uncover the underlying unity of the basic operations involving SVGs.

Being a medically qualified patient can be an unpleasant experience for a person who is used to making decisions. For the most part, this applies to the vast majority of doctors and other healthcare professionals. Becoming passive and surrendering the decision-making process to others is alien to the medical culture we were taught. However, when as a hospitalised medically qualified patient, one sees fellow patients in difficulty, or deteriorating clinically, unnoticed by medical staff, the question of whether it is ethical (...) to intervene arises. I report my views on this as a largely passive, but still actively thinking patient. (shrink)

BackgroundInternational partnerships in research are receiving ever greater attention, given that technology has diminished the restriction of geographical barriers with the effects of globalisation becoming more evident, and populations increasingly more mobile.DiscussionIn this article, we examine the merits and risks of such collaboration even when strict universal ethical guidelines are maintained. There has been widespread examples of outcomes beneficial and detrimental for both high and low –income countries which are often initially unintended.SummaryThe authors feel that extreme care and forethought should (...) be exercised by all involved parties, despite the fact that many implications from such international work can be extremely hard to predict. However ultimately the benefits gained by enhancing medical research and philanthropy are too extensive to be ignored. (shrink)

In the context of long waiting time to access rehabilitation services, a large majority of settings use referral prioritization to help manage waiting lists. Prioritization practices vary greatly between settings and there is little consensus on how best to prioritize referrals. This paper describes the prioritization processes for physiotherapy services in Québec and its potential implications in terms of equity in access to services. This is a secondary analysis of a survey of outpatient physiotherapy departments (n=98; proportion of participation was (...) 99%) conducted in 2015 across publicly funded hospitals in Québec. In many settings, persons with acute orthopaedic conditions were prioritized while chronic conditions were given a lower priority. There were 72 different combinations of prioritization criteria used in outpatient physiotherapy departments. Variability was also observed in the type of personnel involved in the prioritization process, the number of priority levels used to rank the referrals and the source of information used to prioritize referrals. These results highlight potential issues regarding equity in access to physiotherapy services: the prioritization of persons with acute conditions to the detriment of those with chronic conditions, the lack of consensus on a fair prioritization process and the importance to adequately assess patients’ needs for treatment. Further research and interventions on prioritization criteria and processes are needed to ensure equitable access to physiotherapy services, especially in the public sector. (shrink)

In the context of long waiting time to access rehabilitation services, a large majority of settings use referral prioritization to help manage waiting lists. Prioritization practices vary greatly between settings and there is little consensus on how best to prioritize referrals. This paper describes the prioritization processes for physiotherapy services in Québec and its potential implications in terms of equity in access to services. This is a secondary analysis of a survey of outpatient physiotherapy departments conducted in 2015 across publicly (...) funded hospitals in Québec. In many settings, persons with acute orthopaedic conditions were prioritized while chronic conditions were given a lower priority. There were 72 different combinations of prioritization criteria used in outpatient physiotherapy departments. Variability was also observed in the type of personnel involved in the prioritization process, the number of priority levels used to rank the referrals and the source of information used to prioritize referrals. These results highlight potential issues regarding equity in access to physiotherapy services: the prioritization of persons with acute conditions to the detriment of those with chronic conditions, the lack of consensus on a fair prioritization process and the importance to adequately assess patients’ needs for treatment. Further research and interventions on prioritization criteria and processes are needed to ensure equitable access to physiotherapy services, especially in the public sector. (shrink)

In his renowned collection Philosophy as a Way of Life, Pierre Hadot suggests that the original trait of philosophy as a method by which one exercises themselves to achieve a new way of living and seeing the world fails with the rise of modernity. In that time, philosophy increasingly takes on a merely theoretical aspect, tending toward a system. However, Hadot himself glimpses at the dawn of modernity some instances of the original trait of philosophy still very much present, and (...) in his wake, Michel Foucault warns that between the late 16th and early 17th centuries the philosophical question of the reform of the mind attests to a still very close link between asceticism and truth. This book aims to develop just such an idea by thoroughly analyzing the most representative works of the reform of the mind in the early modern period: Francis Bacon's New Organon (1620), René Descartes' Discourse on the Method (1637), and Baruch Spinoza's Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (1677). From this analysis it will emerge that these modern works fully deserve to be counted among the tradition of philosophy as way of life. On closer inspection, the inquiries about method elaborated in these works are fully understandable only when read in the light of a broader and more complex philosophical need: to establish the spiritual conditions for accessing truth and aspiring to full self-realization. (shrink)