In this paper, I provide a novel approach to the issue of religious diversity: I reject classical pluralist approaches to the issue, such as John Hick’s, and argue that their attempts to construe commonalities between the religions are contrived. The reason that they attempt to find commonalities at all costs is that they presuppose a bivalent notion of truth according to which that which is different is false. I suggest that, in order to get a robust theory on religious diversity (...) off the ground, we should rely on the notion of justification rather than that of bivalent truth. Justification is pluralizable, dependent upon the circumstances, whereas bivalent truth is not. Armed with a pluralizable notion of justification, we can acknowledge that other religious beliefs are genuinely different without necessarily being false: They can be justified, given the circumstances a believer of a different religion is in. Perceiving religious differences in this way allows to liberate the interreligious dialogue from the pressure to find commonalities between religions at all costs, to respect the religious Other in her Otherness, and to ‘mirror’ one’s own religion in light of other religions. (shrink)

English summary: It seems that reason is less a universal principle than something inherently bound to the contexts in which it appears. These contributions to a conference held on the occasion of Christoph Schwobel's 60th birthday explore the character of reason's manifold contexts: the grounding of reason in the inner word of God 's Trinitarian life as well as the disclosure of reason and and its limits in human conversation. German description: Vernunft scheint in der Gegenwart weniger ein allgemeines Prinzip (...) als eine in Kontexte eingebundene Grosse zu sein. Die Beitrage einer Tagung anlasslich von Christoph Schwobels 60. Geburtstag, gehen der Frage nach dem Charakter dieser Kontextbindung nach: der Begrundung der Vernunft im trinitarischen Gesprach wie der Erschliessung und Problematisierung der Vernunft im menschlichen Gesprach. Mit Beitragen von V. Brummer, G. van den Brink, C. Drobe, H. J. Eckstein, D.-M. Grube, J. Halfwassen, S. Heine, F. Hermanni, E. Herms, W. Harle, W. Homolka, W. Jeanrond, R. W. Jenson, D. Kelsey, A. F. Koch, A. Kupsch, V. Leppin, P.-C. Lai, P. Lo, A. Min, J. Moltmann, M. Muhling, P. Peterson, M. Sarot, F. Schweitzer, A. Torrance, J. Webster, M. Welker, M. Wendte, M. Wisse, H. Wisskirchen und L. Zak. (shrink)

In this reply, I take up the challenges the five respondents raised. In particular, I deal with the issues of truth, bivalence, tolerance, and justification.

In chapter I, different types of interpretations of Lessing’s ring-parable are introduced. After a summary of them , the different types are sketched and their plausibility is evaluated . I suggest preferring the interpretation according to which Lessing suggests that, although the truth of religion is undecided, we can nevertheless be epistemically justified to continue believing in our Christian, Jewish, Muslim ...religion . In chapter II, I defend the philosophical tenability of Lessing’s solution. He does not advocate the philosophically untenable (...) idea that truth can be relativized . His contentions should be interpreted as not primarily targeting questions of truth proper but, rather, questions of justification. After sketching the difference between accounts of justification and of truth proper, I show in which fashion Lessing answers questions of justification . In chapter III, I show that a solution along Lessing’s lines brings fresh and promising resources to the study of the philosophy of religion. What I call the standard paradigmin the philosophy of religion, viz. the attempt to demonstrate the truth or falsity of religion, has provided inconclusive results in my judgment. And there is little hope that the decisive argument for or against religion will surface in the foreseeable future. Thus I suggest that, rather than devoting our energies to the standard paradigm, we should devote them to what I call the new paradigm. According to the latter, the question whether or not certain religious utterances are epistemically justified rather than the question whether they are true is crucial . Finally, I show in which fashion William James, Alvin Plantinga, and my own coherentist holism are all proponents of this new paradigm, thus intellectual allies of Lessing. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that, historically, Christianity emerges out of Judaism by way of a paradigm shift in Thomas Kuhn’s sense of the word and that this emergence has normative consequences regarding the legitimacy of Christianity. Paradigm shifts are characterized by observational anomalies triggering particular kinds of theoretical modifications, e.g. meaning-changes of key terms, leading to a coherent re-disclosure of reality. The first Christians underwent such a paradigm shift: The anomalous experience that the dead Jesus has risen triggered theoretical modifications – (...) the term ‘Messiah’ underwent a meaning-change – so that reality could be coherently re-disclosed as eschatological reality. If Christianity emerges by way of a paradigm shift, this shift should be the foundation of Christological theorizing: Rather than basing Christology on what the ‘historical Jesus’ did or said, the reconstruction of Jesus as the Christ in the context of this shift is foundational for Christ... (shrink)

SummaryIn this article, I argue that Barth resists the modern “turn to the subject” and that important features of his approach can be explained as being motivated by this resistance. Under the parameters of this “turn”, the human subject occupies a position which should be reserved for God. As an antidote to this turn, Barth suggests an exchange of subjects: The role that the subject occupies under subjectivist parameters should be taken over by a Trinitarian notion of God. This suggestion (...) explains to a great extent the approach he takes since his famous “breakthrough” and explains also his harsh rejection of Brunner.ZusammenfassungIn diesem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass eine der treibenden Kräfte von Barths theologischem Ansatz seine Opposition gegen den »turn to the subject« in der Philosophie und der Theologie ist. Er kritisiert alle Formen der Theologie, bei denen das Subjekt im Mittelpunkt steht. Demgegenüber setzt er betont den Gottesbegriff in die Funktion ein, die der Subjektbegriff in der subjektzentrierten Theologie inne hat.Die seit der Moderne verbreitete Idee, dass ein Erkenntnisgegenstand zunächst als möglich aufgewiesen werden muss, bevor über seine Realität etwas ausgesagt werden kann, steht im Mittelpunkt von Barths Kritik seit seiner »Wende«: Während in der englischen Übersetzung vom »Unterricht in der christlichen Religion« dieser Punkt verloren zu gehen droht, wird im deutschen Original deutlich, dass, in theologicis, die Realität der Möglichkeit vorgeordnet wird.Nach einem kurzen Exkurs zur Entstehung der subjektzentrierten Philosophie bei Descartes und Kant wird gezeigt, wie die Theologie durch diesen »turn to the subject« beeinflusst ist. In Kap. VI wird aufgewiesen, dass ein nicht zu entschärfender, prinzipieller Gegensatz besteht zwischen subjektzentrierter Theologie und traditioneller Theologie bezüglich der Frage, wer im Mittelpunkt steht, das Subjekt oder Gott. Nachdem das Thema des Subjektwechsels im »Unterricht« genauer analysiert worden ist, wird gezeigt, dass Barths berühmtes »Nein!« voraussetzt, dass Brunner genau diesen Wechsel nicht mit vollzieht und darum noch subjektzentrierten Kategorien verhaftet ist. (shrink)

This volume synthesizes cutting-edge philosophical reflections on interpretation with their application to the practice of interpreting religious texts, combining new philosophical insights with a thorough analysis of their application to religion.

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Beitrag konzentriere ich mich auf Bayers Interpretation von Luthers Rechtfertigungsverständnis als promissio. In Teil I skizziere ich Bayers zentralen Gedanken, dass dieser Begriff als performativer Sprechakt in Austins Sinne verstanden werden muss, d.h. als ein Akt, der durch seinen Vollzug neue 〉Tatsachen〈 konstituiert und nicht nur schon existierende Tatsachen registriert. Die Worte der Absolution registrieren nicht, dass der Sünder gerechtfertigt ist, sondern vollziehen die Rechtfertigung, wenn sie im richtigen Kontext gesprochen werden.In Teil II beurteile ich die Konsequenzen dieser (...) Interpretation der Rechtfertigung. Einerseits schlage ich vor, dass Bayers Interpretation die Aspekte des Rechtfertigungsverständnisses zum Ausdruck bringt, die für das Luthertum charakteristisch sind und verteidigt werden sollten. Andererseits jedoch kritisiere ich Bayers Behauptung, dass dieses Verständnis der Rechtfertigung als promissio alle Versuche unterminiert, theologische Aussagen zu verifizieren. Ich fasse diese Spannung zwischen der religiösen, pro-lutherischen Perspektive und der philosophischen, Luther-kritischen Perspektive in einem Dialog zwischen dem lutherischen Herzen und dem philosophischen Verstand zusammen.In Teil III stelle ich dar, dass diese Spannung zwischen dem lutherischen Herzen und dem philosophischen Verstand nicht leicht aufzulösen ist, da beide auf ihre Weise wertvoll sind. Trotzdem mache ich in der Konklusion zwei vorsichtige Vorschläge: Der erste besteht darin, dass der Gedanke der 〉Verifikation〈 in einer im weitesten Sinne pragmatischen Form rekonstruiert werden sollte, um aus lutherischer Perspektive akzeptabel zu sein. Der zweite Vorschlag besteht darin, den nicht-relationalen Hintergrund, der vorausgesetzt ist, wenn Rechtfertigung relational interpretiert wird , als ein 〉Vorurteil〈 im Sinne Gadamers zu verstehen, d.h. als in jedem Akt des Verstehens vorausgesetzt und doch jederzeit revidierbar.SummaryIn this contribution, I focus on Bayer's interpretation of Luther's concept of justification as promissio. In part I, I sketch Bayer's central idea that this concept is to be understood as a performative speech-act in Austin's sense, i. e. as an act constituting novel ‘facts’ while being performed rather than registering already existing ones. The words of the absolution do not only register that the sinner is justified but, when being spoken in the proper circumstances, actually do justify him.In part II, I evaluate the consequences of this interpretation of justification. On the one hand, I suggest that Bayer's interpretation captures the aspects of the concept of justification which are characteristic of Lutheranism and should be defended. On the other hand, however, I criticize Bayer's contention that his concept of justification as promissio undermines all attempts to verify theological claims. I summarize the tension between the religious, pro-Lutheran perspective and the philosophical, Luther-critical perspective in a dialogue between Lutheran heart and philosophical mind.In part three, I suggest that there is no easy way out of the tension between Lutheran heart and philosophical mind since both are valuable in their own way. Nevertheless, I offer two cautious suggestions by way of conclusion: The first is that the idea of ‘verification’ should be reconstructed in a pragmatic spirit in order to be acceptable from a Lutheran perspective. The second is that the non-relational background which is presupposed by construing justification in a relational fashion should be construed as a Gadamerian ‘prejudice’, i. e. as being presupposed in every act of understanding, yet, as always being open to revision. (shrink)

In dieser Aufsatzsammlung werden die Probleme und Konsequenzen des Offenbarungsbegriffs im Denken Paul Tillichs untersucht. Zunächst wird dieser Begriff näher thematisiert anhand der Fragen, wie dieser gewonnen wird und welche Rolle dabei die Phänomenologie spielt, ob dessen Ausarbeitung zu stark von subjektivistischen Voraussetzungen geprägt ist und wie sich die Offenbarungserkenntnis zur wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis verhält.Im Anschluss daran werden charakteristische Aspekte von Tillichs Theologie analysiert: sein Postulat mystischer Unmittelbarkeit als Grund von Offenbarung, die Frage nach der Rolle der Erfahrung bei der Begründung (...) von Offenbarungserkenntnis, seine Korrelationsmethode, d.h. die Zuordnung von philosophischen Fragen und theologischen Antworten, sowie die Bedeutung von Tillichs Christologie - in der Spannung zwischen absoluten Geltungsansprüchen und deren Relativierung - für den interreligiösen Dialog heute. Auf diese Weise wird deutlich, dass die Impulse von Tillichs Ansatz von bleibender Bedeutung für die gegenwärtige Theologie sind, besonders was das Gespräch mit den nicht-christlichen Religionen und der Philosophie angeht. (shrink)

The relationship between religion and contingency is investigated historically and systematically. Its historical part comprises analyses of important philosophers’ interpretation of this relationship, viz. that of Leibniz, Kant, Lessing, Jaspers, and Heidegger. Its systematic part analyses how this relationship should be currently interpreted.

In Karl Barth’s famous ‘Epistle to the Romans’, Second edition, the negation seems to be dominant: Each and every possibility to ‘have’ God, i.e. to cognize Him, is denied. More precisely speaking, Barth proposes a dialectics of negation and affirmation within which the negation seems to be dominant: He alludes frequently to the possibility to cognise God but then denies that possibility. An important question in Barth-research is thus how this dialectics is to be interpreted. Most Barth-researchers approach this question (...) via ‘ideengeschichtliche’ means, i.e. via the question what the background of Barth’s dialectics consists of. In chapter I, I scrutinize both of the currently prevailing paradigms for explaining the background of Barth’s dialectics: In line with the majority of current researchers on the issue, I suggest that the neo-Kantian ‘dialectics of origin’ has influenced the formulation of the dialectics in Romans II. Karl Barth became familiar with that dialectics through his brother Heinrich Barth, a neo-Kantian . However, against a recent trend in Barth-research, I suggest that the influence of Sören Kierkegaard’s ‘dialectics of existence’ should not be underestimated. Karl Barth used both sorts of dialectics side by side . In chapter II, I draw the systematic consequences of the ‘ideengeschichtliche’ considerations of chapter I. First, I suggest that philosophical explanations of the above sort account for the basic ‘raison d’être’ for there being such a dialectics, non-philosophical explanations for its specific shape. That is, the classical psychological explanations of the dialectics of Romans II explain the reason why he emphasizes the negation within the dialectics that strongly but cannot sufficiently explain the fact that there is such a dialectics. In II, 2, I utilize the above considerations to answer the classical question whether the negation has priority over the affirmation. I deny that. Barth emphasizes the negation within the dialectics of affirmation and negation strongly in order to reject the thendominant Liberal Theology. Yet, conceptually, his dialectics presupposes a more fundamental affirmation, viz. that God is totaliter aliter. But is the affirmation that God is ‘totaliter aliter’ not inconsistent? Either He is ‘totaliter aliter’ – in this case we cannot say anything meaningful about Him, not even that He is ‘totaliter aliter’. Or, else, we can say something meaningful about Him. But then He is not truly ‘totaliter aliter’. I suggest that a transcendental strategy provides interesting possibilities for getting out of that impasse: By holding that God is to be postulated on transcendental grounds rather than to be cognized in the proper sense of the word, it becomes possible to hold both that God is ‘totaliter aliter’, non-approachable and that we can claim that in a meaningful fashion. I admit, though, that applying transcendental strategies for theological purposes is not without problems. Yet, the prospects they provide for theological theorizing makes it worth investigating them further in spite of their problems. (shrink)

In Karl Barth’s famous ‘Epistle to the Romans’, Second edition, the negation seems to be dominant: Each and every possibility to ‘have’ God, i.e. to cognize Him, is denied. More precisely speaking, Barth proposes a dialectics of negation and affirmation within which the negation seems to be dominant: He alludes frequently to the possibility to cognise God but then denies that possibility. An important question in Barth-research is thus how this dialectics is to be interpreted. Most Barth-researchers approach this question (...) via ‘ideengeschichtliche’ means, i.e. via the question what the background of Barth’s dialectics consists of. In chapter I, I scrutinize both of the currently prevailing paradigms for explaining the background of Barth’s dialectics: In line with the majority of current researchers on the issue, I suggest that the neo-Kantian ‘dialectics of origin’ has influenced the formulation of the dialectics in Romans II. Karl Barth became familiar with that dialectics through his brother Heinrich Barth, a neo-Kantian . However, against a recent trend in Barth-research, I suggest that the influence of Sören Kierkegaard’s ‘dialectics of existence’ should not be underestimated. Karl Barth used both sorts of dialectics side by side . In chapter II, I draw the systematic consequences of the ‘ideengeschichtliche’ considerations of chapter I. First, I suggest that philosophical explanations of the above sort account for the basic ‘raison d’être’ for there being such a dialectics, non-philosophical explanations for its specific shape. That is, the classical psychological explanations of the dialectics of Romans II explain the reason why he emphasizes the negation within the dialectics that strongly but cannot sufficiently explain the fact that there is such a dialectics. In II, 2, I utilize the above considerations to answer the classical question whether the negation has priority over the affirmation. I deny that. Barth emphasizes the negation within the dialectics of affirmation and negation strongly in order to reject the thendominant Liberal Theology. Yet, conceptually, his dialectics presupposes a more fundamental affirmation, viz. that God is totaliter aliter. But is the affirmation that God is ‘totaliter aliter’ not inconsistent? Either He is ‘totaliter aliter’ – in this case we cannot say anything meaningful about Him, not even that He is ‘totaliter aliter’. Or, else, we can say something meaningful about Him. But then He is not truly ‘totaliter aliter’. I suggest that a transcendental strategy provides interesting possibilities for getting out of that impasse: By holding that God is to be postulated on transcendental grounds rather than to be cognized in the proper sense of the word, it becomes possible to hold both that God is ‘totaliter aliter’, non-approachable and that we can claim that in a meaningful fashion. I admit, though, that applying transcendental strategies for theological purposes is not without problems. Yet, the prospects they provide for theological theorizing makes it worth investigating them further in spite of their problems. (shrink)

In this article, evidentialism is refuted by relying on William James’ article ‘The Will to Believe’. After an introduction into the notion of ‘evidentialism’ and James’ attack on it , I distinguish between two sorts of evidentialisms, truth-oriented evidentialism and quiescent evidentialism . In 2.3–2.5, I criticize these forms of evidentialism on the grounds that the first has very limited applicability and the second leads to absurd consequences when applied in the moral domain. In section 3, the evidentialist challenge to (...) religion is refuted by arguing that, first, truth-oriented evidentialism is of only very limited applicability for criticizing religion and second, that quiescent evidentialism cannot be applied in certain situations , particular religious claims being among them. (shrink)

In the first part of this essay, some of the strategies atheists use to claim undeserved privileges for their position are analyzed. In particular, the connection between evidentialism and the idea that atheism is the natural starting position (“presumption of atheism”, Anthony Flew) is discussed. In addition, the extent to which the elimination of agnosticism as the third option between theism and atheism contributes to the discursive privilege of atheism is examined (with Paul Cliteur). In the second part, evidentialism is (...) reconstructed as a context-dependent theory of justification and the (A) theism problem is situated in the context of action instead of the context of knowledge. This avoids one-sided distribution of the burden of justification, especially the atheistic attempt to to burden the theist with the full burden of justification and at the same time to free the atheist from all burdens of justification. In this way, the discourse on the (a) theism problem can be reconstructed without assigning undeserved privileges. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Barth resists the modern “turn to the subject” and that important features of his approach can be explained as being motivated by this resistance. Under the parameters of this “turn”, the human subject occupies a position which should be reserved for God. As an antidote to this turn, Barth suggests an exchange of subjects: The role that the subject occupies under subjectivist parameters should be taken over by a Trinitarian notion of God. This suggestion (...) explains to a great extent the approach he takes since his famous “breakthrough” and explains also his harsh rejection of Brunner. (shrink)

This paper responds to an essay by Dirk-Martin Grube published in this same journal issue. Special attention is drawn to issues such as tolerance, respect, and the recognition of otherness regarding religious beliefs. Grube interestingly suggests that the focus on religious truth should be replaced by a focus on justification. Some critical remarks on these suggestions are made.

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the distinction between justified and unjustified religious diversity, a problem that Dirk-Martin Grube only hinted at in his article ‘Justified Religious Difference.’ This article’s focus is not so much on the epistemological question of justifying religious difference, but on how to deal with it in the societal sphere. This implies that religions and religious diversity will be approached from a practical perspective, that is, as ways of (...) life. I start by examining the opportunities and problems of religious diversity, opposing a universalist and a particularist view on this issue. Religious difference is an opportunity, because it is intertwined with creativity and innovation, but it is also a problem, because it confronts us with incompatible judgments, irreconcilable values, and contrary principles. Notwithstanding the legitimate objections that can be raised against the particularist position, the above observations seriously undermine Grube’s idea that the distinction between justified and unjustified religious difference can be made unambiguously, because of the heterogeneous character of the idea of justification itself. In order to deal with this issue, I propose a re-examination of the idea of tolerance, defined as a virtue: I disapprove of your manner of living, but I respect in it your liberty to live as you please and I recognize your right to manifest it publicly. But this virtue makes only sense against the background of the intolerable, which is the translation of the idea of unjustified religious difference into the language of the public debate. This idea serves as an always fragile limit to tolerance. (shrink)

After discussing the nature of toleration, giving a brief history of the emergence of religious toleration in the West, and presenting my understanding of religion, I develop what I call ‘the dignity argument’ for religious toleration: to fail to tolerate a person’s religion is to treat that person in a way that does not befit their dignity. And to treat them in a way that does not befit their dignity is to wrong them, to treat them unjustly.

Die Begriffe «Vorstellung, Denken, Sprache» umreißen durchgehende Themen der Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds. Steht «Vorstellung» zentral für Reinholds kantische Phase der Elementarphilosophie der 1790er-Jahre, so erweisen sich «Denken» und «Sprache» als Schlüsselbegriffe seines nach 1800 einsetzenden Philosophierens im Geiste eines sich als neue Konzeption von Logik, später auch Projekt der Synonymik verstehenden und gezielt mit dem damaligen transzendentalen und spekulativen Idealismus konkurrierenden rationalen Realismus. Der vorliegende Band nimmt diese Sequenzen auf und legt den Schwerpunkt auf diverse Ausprägungen von Reinhold realistischer (...) Denkentfaltung. Behandelt werden sowohl systematologische, logische, wahrheitstheoretische und sprachphilosophische Fragestellungen von Reinholds späteren philosophischen Hauptbeiträgen als auch bleibende und neu hinzugekommene Auseinandersetzungen Reinholds mit Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart und Herder. Komplettiert wird der Band, der nicht zuletzt der weiteren Erforschung der Philosophie Kants und des Deutschen Idealismus dienen soll, mit Ergänzungen und Korrekturen zur Bibliographie der Schriften von Karl Leonhard Reinhold ab dem Jahre 1804. (shrink)

_Origins of Chinese Political Philosophy_. explores the composition, language, thought, and early history of the _Shangshu_, showing its texts as dynamic cultural products that expressed and shaped the political and intellectual discourses of different times and communities.

_Origins of Chinese Political Philosophy_. explores the composition, language, thought, and early history of the _Shangshu_, showing its texts as dynamic cultural products that expressed and shaped the political and intellectual discourses of different times and communities.

Pediatric oncology has a strong research culture. Most pediatric oncologists are investigators, involved in clinical care as well as research. As a result, a remarkable proportion of children with cancer enrolls in a trial during treatment. This paper discusses the ethical consequences of the unprecedented integration of research and care in pediatric oncology from the perspective of parents and physicians. An empirical ethical approach, combining (1) a narrative review of (primarily) qualitative studies on parents' and physicians' experiences of the pediatric (...) oncology research practice, and (2) comparison of these experiences with existing theoretical ethical concepts about (pediatric) research. The use of empirical evidence enriches these concepts by taking into account the peculiarities that ethical challenges pose in practice. Analysis of the 22 studies reviewed revealed that the integration of research and care has consequences for the informed consent process, the promotion of the child's best interests, and the role of the physician (doctor vs. scientist). True consent to research is difficult to achieve due to the complexity of research protocols, emotional stress and parents' dependency on their child's physician. Parents' role is to promote their child's best interests, also when they are asked to consider enrolling their child in a trial. Parents are almost never in equipoise on trial participation, which leaves them with the agonizing situation of wanting to do what is best for their child, while being fearful of making the wrong decision. Furthermore, a therapeutic misconception endangers correct assessment of participation, making parents inaccurately attribute therapeutic intent to research procedures. Physicians prefer the perspective of a therapist over a researcher. Consequently they may truly believe that in the research setting they promote the child's best interests, which maintains the existence of a therapeutic misconception between them and parents. Due to the integration of research and care, their different ethical perspectives become intertwined in the daily practice of pediatric oncology. Increasing awareness of what this means for the communication between parents and physicians is essential. Future research should focus on efforts that overcome the problems that the synchronicity of research and care evokes. (shrink)

Building on the computer science concept of _code smells_, we initiate the study of _law smells_, i.e., patterns in legal texts that pose threats to the comprehensibility and maintainability of the law. With five intuitive law smells as running examples—namely, duplicated phrase, long element, large reference tree, ambiguous syntax, and natural language obsession—, we develop a comprehensive law smell taxonomy. This taxonomy classifies law smells by when they can be detected, which aspects of law they relate to, and how they (...) can be discovered. We introduce text-based and graph-based methods to identify instances of law smells, confirming their utility in practice using the United States Code as a test case. Our work demonstrates how ideas from software engineering can be leveraged to assess and improve the quality of _legal_ code, thus drawing attention to an understudied area in the intersection of law and computer science and highlighting the potential of computational legal drafting. (shrink)

This handbook presents a comprehensive introduction to the core areas of philosophy of education combined with an up-to-date selection of the central themes. It includes 95 newly commissioned articles that focus on and advance key arguments; each essay incorporates essential background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic, examining the status quo of the discipline with respect to the topic, and discussing the possible futures of the field. The book provides a state-of-the-art overview of philosophy (...) of education, covering a range of topics: Voices from the present and the past deals with 36 major figures that philosophers of education rely on; Schools of thought addresses 14 stances including Eastern, Indigenous, and African philosophies of education as well as religiously inspired philosophies of education such as Jewish and Islamic; Revisiting enduring educational debates scrutinizes 25 issues heavily debated in the past and the present, for example care and justice, democracy, and the curriculum; New areas and developments addresses 17 emerging issues that have garnered considerable attention like neuroscience, videogames, and radicalization. The collection is relevant for lecturers teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of education as well as for colleagues in teacher training. Moreover, it helps junior researchers in philosophy of education to situate the problems they are addressing within the wider field of philosophy of education and offers a valuable update for experienced scholars dealing with issues in the sub-discipline. Combined with different conceptions of the purpose of philosophy, it discusses various aspects, using diverse perspectives to do so. Contributing Editors: Section 1: Voices from the Present and the Past: Nuraan Davids Section 2: Schools of Thought: Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe Section 3: Revisiting Enduring Debates: Ann Chinnery, Naomi Hodgson, and Viktor Johansson Section 4: New Areas and Developments: Kai Horsthemke, Dirk Willem Postma, and Claudia Ruitenberg. (shrink)

Music is part of the cultural practice and, at the same time, is interwoven with biology through its effects on the brain and its likely evolutionary origin. Studies on music, however, are traditionally based on the humanities and often carried out in a purely historical context, without much input from neuroscience and biology. Here, we argue that lullabies are a particularly suited test case to study the biological versus cultural aspects of music.

Problem: Visions of technology, future scenarios, guiding visions represent imaginations of future states of affairs that play a functional role in processes of technological research, development and innovation—e.g. as a means to create attention, communication, coordination, or for the strategic exertion of influence. Since a couple of years there is a growing attention for such imaginations of futures in politics, the economy, research and the civil society. This trend concerns technology assessment as an observer of these processes and a consultant (...) on the implications of technology and innovation. TA faces increasing demands to assess imaginations of futures that circulate in the present and to participate in shaping these through scenarios or foresights. More than ever, this raises the question, which propositions can be made based on these imaginations by TA and how this can be used in advisory practices. Imaginations of futures are relevant for TA not as predictions but in their significance and effectiveness in the present, which need to be understood and assessed.Contents: This discussion paper outlines how present significance and effects of imagined futures in technological research and innovation processes can be conceived and analyzed. In this paper, all forms of imaginations of technology futures will be called “socio-technical futures” because within them technological developments and social changes are interwoven and inseparably interrelated. In this paper, we discuss why TA should analyze socio-technical futures, how such analyses can grasp the societal conditions that are expressed in the imagined futures and how these become effective in processes of technology development, communication, decision making etc. We raise the question which self-reflexive positioning or possible realignment of TA is needed as a response to its increased concern with assessing and even co-producing socio-technical futures. The latter is often demanded regarding the growing attention by politics and publics to imaginations of futures with wide temporal and spatial reach.Addressee of this paper is the TA community in a broader sense. The aim is to sensitize colleagues for the topic and its challenges, to consolidate discussions and to provide theoretical and methodical suggestions for research in TA and related advisory practices with respect to socio-technical futures. This paper has been originally initiated during the workshop “The present of technological futures-theoretical and methodical challenges for Technology Assessment”, in which all of the paper’s authors participated. The contents of this discussion paper are preliminary results that shall initiate and guide further discussions. (shrink)

This book is dedicated to clarify ambiguous concepts from the world of creativity and innovation. One of the initial triggers for the development of the book was the perceived ambiguity of the binomials Design vs. Design Thinking and Innovation vs. Invention. Frequently, designers and innovation consultants are questioned by their clients about the relationships between these kind of concepts. Has the second emerged through the first, or vice-verse? Is one part of the other? Where are the similarities and which are (...) the differences? This conceptual incomprehension makes itself noticeable between many ambiguous concepts in the world of innovation and creativity. What is the difference between Radical and Disruptive Innovation? Or is Social Innovation the same as Social Intervention? And regarding Creativity, are Creativity and Creative Thinking the same? In this book the reader will find answers to these kinds of questions and doubts. 28 authors from 10 different countries and cultural backgrounds are questioning current definitions and perceptions, by comparing different sources and ideas, or simply by giving their personal opinions. Some of the authors have an academic background, others a practical one, being either entrepreneurs, working with innovation in companies, or being innovation/design consultants. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Dirk-Martin Grube’s article elsewhere in this issue. After discussing the points on which I agree with Grube, I explain why his notion of bivalence has not yet received the accuracy it needs.

Do adherents of different religious traditions communicate and, if so, how? What enables them to do so? What is interreligious “communication”? These issues are ad dressed with reference to Wilfred Cantwell Smith's hermeneutical rule, and to inter alia Paul Knitter, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, David Tracy, and John Dunne. Four responses to the question as to what permits interreligious communication are criticised. According to a fifth response, on which the author elaborates, interreligious communication is not – as the objectivist (...) claims – possible because members of different religious traditions speak the very same language, or – as the relativist claims – impossible because they speak radically different languages. Adherents of different religions communicate, if at all, by means of an analogical language. This language is the product of persistent efforts to understand the religion/faith of the other as he or she understands it. Paradoxically, the language that permits inter religious communication is thus the product of such communication. Without thereby reverting to objectivism or an essentialist view of religion, the author identifies five “less unstable” similarities between religions. These and other “less un stable” similarities might assist believers in their efforts to under stand the religious other. (shrink)

English summary: Friedrich Schleiermacher's work as a theologian and Plato scholar marked the start of a new epoch: as a system-forming philosopher, he claimed independent validity, and as church politician, educational policy-maker, and academic theorist, he was one of the most important figures during the Prussian reforms, whose contributions to pedagogy remain influential to this day. This volume provides a clear-sighted overview of the various stages in Schleiermacher's life (1768-1834), with each contribution portraying his fields of work and their contexts, (...) placing his literary work and conceptions in the framework of the respective contemporary debates. Important stages in Schleiermacher reception and impact history are likewise considered. The authors' diverse approaches to interpreting and understanding his output mean that the Guide to Schleiermacher offers concentrated insight into the consensus on and controversies in current Schleiermacher research. German description: Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) hat als Theologe, aber auch als Plato-Forscher Epoche gemacht; als systembildender Philosoph erhob er selbstandigen Geltungsanspruch, als Kirchen- und Bildungspolitiker sowie als Theoretiker der Universitat gehorte er zu den wichtigsten Akteuren der preussischen Reformen, und seine Beitrage zur Padagogik wirken bis heute nach. Die Gliederung des Handbuchs folgt grob Schleiermachers Lebensstationen. Die einzelnen Beitrage schildern seine Arbeitsfelder und -kontexte und stellen seine literarischen Arbeiten und Entwurfe in den jeweiligen zeitgeschichtlichen Debattenlagen dar. Auch wichtige Stationen seiner Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte werden thematisiert.Die Autorinnen und Autoren der Beitrage verfolgen ganz unterschiedliche Interpretations- und Deutungsansatze. Deshalb bietet das Handbuch auch einen konzentrierten Einblick in den gegenwartigen Stand der Schleiermacher-Forschung mit ihren Konsensen und ihren Kontroversen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Albrecht, Andreas Arndt, Bernd Auerochs, Ulrich Barth, Albrecht Beutel, Georg Eckert, Hermann Fischer+, Ursula Frost, Albrecht Geck, Simon Gerber, Wilhelm Grab, Peter Grove, Matthias Heesch, Eilert Herms, Kirsten Huxel, Walter Jaeschke, Lutz Kappel, Hans-Martin Kirn, Dietz Lange, Inken Madler, Helmut Merkel, Martin Ohst, Claus-Dieter Osthovener, Hermann Patsch, Reiner Preul, Andreas Reich, Joachim Ringleben, Jan Rohls, Martin Rossler, Dirk Schmid, Friedemann Voigt, Folkart Wittekind, Matthias Wolfes. (shrink)

Frege hat in seinen Schriften zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Logik eine eigenwillige Konzeption der Wahrheit skizziert, der zufolge das Wahre und das Falsche keine Eigenschaften von Sätzen oder Gedanken sind, sondern Gegenstände, die von Sätzen bezeichnet werden. In dem vorliegenden Sammelband werden zentrale Komponenten dieser Konzeption näher beleuchtet: die Thesen der Undefinierbarkeit der Wahrheit und der Redundanz des Wortes „wahr“, die Auffassung der Wahrheitswerte als Gegenstände, das so genannte slingshot-Argument, die Konzeption der Tatsachen als wahre Gedanken und die Bestimmung (...) der logischen Gesetze als Gesetze des Wahrseins. Mit Beiträgen von Joachim Bromand, Gottfried Gabriel, Martin Grajner, Dirk Greimann, Andreas Kemmerling, Ulrike Kleemeier, Michael Kober, Verena Mayer, Uwe Meixner, Marco Ruffino, Richard Schantz, Hans Sluga und Christian Thiel. (shrink)