In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Truth MattersOnce in a while stunning new ideas that energize a scholarly discipline—or even wreck it altogether—come from the outside. The most influential philosopher of science in the last generation was not a philosopher at all, but an historian and physicist, Thomas Kuhn. Ernst Gombrich, an art historian, has deeply informed the philosophy of art, as the linguist Noam Chomsky has affected the philosophy of language. And Jacques Derrida (...) continues to cast his stupefying spell over many a literature department, even if most philosophers remain unimpressed.In a minor but spectacular way (how else to describe an event first encountered on the front page of the New York Times?), Alan Sokal has barged in on this honorable tradition. As a physicist, he successfully placed a barely-coherent, factually ludicrous, jargon-ridden article in a major journal of cultural studies.When we caught up with Sokal’s hoax, our initial reaction was sympathy for the hapless editors of Social Text. They weren’t the first journal editors to be landed with a contribution that went sour (though the only other episodes we could recall were plagiarism, not parody). However, when one of these chaps, Stanley Aronowitz, reacted in the Times by calling Sokal “ill-read and half-educated” (May 18, 1996), editorial fellow-feeling began to evaporate. And when Stanley Fish, executive director of the Duke University Press, which publishes Social Text, launched a bitter counterattack on Sokal three days later, it was hard not to regard Fish’s indignation, as E. D. Hirsch described it in a subsequent letter to the Times, as “the indignation of Tartuffe on being exposed.” [End Page 299]After some tedious preliminaries, Fish accused Sokal of failing to understand that the sociology of science is an enterprise “distinct” from science, “with objects of study, criteria, and goals all its own.” Sokal knows this, naturally, as he had already made clear in his Lingua Franca article on the hoax, and as he explains again in his afterword in this issue of our journal. But Fish went on to a more sweeping generalization. Imagining Sokal believed that cultural studies threaten the stability or integrity of the sciences, Fish said not to worry: “A research project that takes the practice of science as an object of study is not a threat to that practice because, committed to its own goals and protocols, it doesn’t reach into, and therefore doesn’t pose a danger to, the goals and protocols it studies.”With this account of a well-ordered academic world, Fish inadvertently reveals what some see as a serious failing of cultural studies and postmodern theory: it poses a threat to absolutely nothing. Leave science aside for a moment, and consider a sociology of, say, astrology, or medicine, or the fashion industry. Could we envision a proper sociology of astrology which posed no danger to “the goals and protocols” in using planetary/zodiacal patterns to predict the future or retrodict the characters of subjects? Hardly; it’s the business of the sociology of any human activity to identify and question the intellectual claims and practical ambitions of that enterprise. And that is exactly what Alan Sokal did: he invented a clever test of the intellectual rigor of cultural studies in general and its version of poststructuralist sociology of science in particular. He then subjected Social Text—and implicitly in many minds the intellectual standards of the field it represents—to the test. It failed.Sokal’s methodology was not unique; it can be applied in different ways to many other disciplines. If you want to evaluate, for example, the intellectual pretensions of astrologers there is a fine way to do it; it essentially adapts the double-blind placebo procedure used in drug research, another celebrated testing methodology. Allow a group of astrologers to agree on a set of character readings based on accurate birth charts. Give these back, shuffled, with identifying information stripped off, to the subjects of the astrological readings. If the subjects can pick out their own readings from character descriptions alone (descriptions created by astrologers on the basis of birth information only, without meeting the subjects in question), then astrology must possess... (shrink)

Once in a while stunning new ideas that energize a scholarly discipline — or even wreck it altogether — come from the outside. The most influential philosopher of science in the last generation was not a philosopher at all, but an historian and physicist, Thomas Kuhn. Ernst Gombrich, an art historian, has deeply informed the philosophy of art, as the linguist Noam Chomsky has affected the philosophy of language. And Jacques Derrida continues to cast his stupefying spell over many a (...) literature department, even if most philosophers remain unimpressed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Truth MattersOnce in a while stunning new ideas that energize a scholarly discipline—or even wreck it altogether—come from the outside. The most influential philosopher of science in the last generation was not a philosopher at all, but an historian and physicist, Thomas Kuhn. Ernst Gombrich, an art historian, has deeply informed the philosophy of art, as the linguist Noam Chomsky has affected the philosophy of language. And Jacques Derrida (...) continues to cast his stupefying spell over many a literature department, even if most philosophers remain unimpressed.In a minor but spectacular way (how else to describe an event first encountered on the front page of the New York Times?), Alan Sokal has barged in on this honorable tradition. As a physicist, he successfully placed a barely-coherent, factually ludicrous, jargon-ridden article in a major journal of cultural studies.When we caught up with Sokal’s hoax, our initial reaction was sympathy for the hapless editors of Social Text. They weren’t the first journal editors to be landed with a contribution that went sour (though the only other episodes we could recall were plagiarism, not parody). However, when one of these chaps, Stanley Aronowitz, reacted in the Times by calling Sokal “ill-read and half-educated” (May 18, 1996), editorial fellow-feeling began to evaporate. And when Stanley Fish, executive director of the Duke University Press, which publishes Social Text, launched a bitter counterattack on Sokal three days later, it was hard not to regard Fish’s indignation, as E. D. Hirsch described it in a subsequent letter to the Times, as “the indignation of Tartuffe on being exposed.” [End Page 299]After some tedious preliminaries, Fish accused Sokal of failing to understand that the sociology of science is an enterprise “distinct” from science, “with objects of study, criteria, and goals all its own.” Sokal knows this, naturally, as he had already made clear in his Lingua Franca article on the hoax, and as he explains again in his afterword in this issue of our journal. But Fish went on to a more sweeping generalization. Imagining Sokal believed that cultural studies threaten the stability or integrity of the sciences, Fish said not to worry: “A research project that takes the practice of science as an object of study is not a threat to that practice because, committed to its own goals and protocols, it doesn’t reach into, and therefore doesn’t pose a danger to, the goals and protocols it studies.”With this account of a well-ordered academic world, Fish inadvertently reveals what some see as a serious failing of cultural studies and postmodern theory: it poses a threat to absolutely nothing. Leave science aside for a moment, and consider a sociology of, say, astrology, or medicine, or the fashion industry. Could we envision a proper sociology of astrology which posed no danger to “the goals and protocols” in using planetary/zodiacal patterns to predict the future or retrodict the characters of subjects? Hardly; it’s the business of the sociology of any human activity to identify and question the intellectual claims and practical ambitions of that enterprise. And that is exactly what Alan Sokal did: he invented a clever test of the intellectual rigor of cultural studies in general and its version of poststructuralist sociology of science in particular. He then subjected Social Text—and implicitly in many minds the intellectual standards of the field it represents—to the test. It failed.Sokal’s methodology was not unique; it can be applied in different ways to many other disciplines. If you want to evaluate, for example, the intellectual pretensions of astrologers there is a fine way to do it; it essentially adapts the double-blind placebo procedure used in drug research, another celebrated testing methodology. Allow a group of astrologers to agree on a set of character readings based on accurate birth charts. Give these back, shuffled, with identifying information stripped off, to the subjects of the astrological readings. If the subjects can pick out their own readings from character descriptions alone (descriptions created by astrologers on the basis of birth information only, without meeting the subjects in question), then astrology must possess... (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Molière.--Pascal.--Mistral.--Balzac.--Balzac et les idées.--Paul Valéry et les idées.--Platon et les contemporains: Stephen Hudson, Valéry, Proust.--Meredith, et Proust.--Le judaïsme de Proust.--Le génie malade.--Proust.--Henri Bremond.

Peu connu du grand public, le philosophe Henri Van Lier a rédigé à la fin de sa vie une œuvre monumentale, l'Anthropogénie, qui apporte un éclairage nouveau et pour tout dire fascinant sur ce drôle d'animal qu'est l'homme, depuis ses performance les plus basiques, jusqu'à ses réalisations les plus élaborées. Extraordinaire par son ampleur et sa fécondité, cet ouvrage de plus de 1000 pages est d'une lecture difficile car pour mener à bien son entreprise, Van Lier a - Philosophie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

The Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Française and the Société de législation comparée joined the academic network on European Contract Law in 2005 to work on the elaboration of a "common terminology" and on "guiding principles" as well as to propose a revised version of the Principles of European Contract Law. The results of this work were sent to the European Commission and have already been published in French. The English translation is now being published by (...) sellier.elp. This work could contribute to the wider European project. The part on the guiding principles could be a component of the CFR, in the form of "black letter" model rules or recitals. The part on terminology is, in itself, useful for the elaboration of the final various linguistic versions of the CFR. It finds its place within the materials which will accompany the model rules. Last but by no means least, the revised version of the PECL should be considered by the European institutions as an alternative set of model rules on contract law. (shrink)

The falsifiability debate has developed largely in response to a challenge offered in the name of this principle by Antony Flew. His basic contention is that since the assertion of any state of affairs is logically equivalent to a denial of its negation, it must always be possible to designate an actual or possible state of affairs which would "count against" or falsify the original assertion. "And," he concludes, "if there is nothing which a putative assertion denies then there is (...) nothing which it asserts either: and so it is not really an assertion." Hence, if the theologian wishes to claim that a typical "theological utterance" such as our suggested paradigm, is a genuine assertion, he must be prepared to stipulate what conceivable occurrence would falsify it. (shrink)

Emmet Gowin à la fondation Henri Cartier-Bresson (14 mai-27 juillet 2014) / Lewis Baltz au Bal (23 mai-24 août 2014) Depuis quelques semaines, les Parisiens ont la chance de pouvoir découvrir deux figures légendaires de la photographie américaine contemporaine, deux géants incontournables et pourtant peu exposés en France jusque-là : Lewis Baltz, au Bal, et Emmet Gowin à la fondation Henri Cartier-Bresson. De la même génération (ils sont nés dans les années 1940), ces deux artistes ont en commun (...) - (...) Arts plastiques et autres – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Does cultural diversity lead to a want of respect, intolerance, and violence? Is religious culture in Islamic or other states tending towards a territorial imperative, denying any democracy a chance? Is globalization threatening value, identity and meaning? In the wake of 9/11, war on the Taliban's Afghanistan and Saddam's Iraq, the lingering Israeli–Palestinian tension, and what appear to be re-discovered genres of brutality—such as suicide bombings, beheadings, the wanton destruction of churches and other temples—this article teases out some historical and (...) philosophical contexts in an attempt to assuage contemporary uncertainties. Distinguishing between the Mediterranean and the Middle East as two different realities, the article discusses how seemingly bewildering new theses and premises in a post-war, post-colonial, post-communist world may be read and possibly reconciled during the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Science in a Democratic Society by Philip KitcherHenry S. RichardsonReview: Philip Kitcher, Science in a Democratic Society, Prometheus Books, 2011In examining the place of science in a democratic society, Philip Kitcher is ultimately asking what standards scientific activity is answerable to. Here, as in Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2001), he rejects two extreme possibilities: first, the suggestion that science is autonomous, in the sense that (...) it is answerable only to its own standards; and, second, the suggestion that it is answerable to “vulgar democracy”—that is, to unconstrained majority rule by untutored citizens. In this book, as in the earlier book, he deploys the idea of “well-ordered science,” which he seeks to characterize in part by leaning on the idea of a hypothetical, ideal conversation. Crucially informing this newer book is a much fuller account of nonvulgar democracy. Underlying that account is a much broader picture of “the ethical project”—the title idea of another important Kitcher book from 2011 (Harvard University Press).In order to motivate the friends of science to turn to these broader ethical ideas, Kitcher persuasively rehearses the case against value neutrality in science. Much current distrust of science and scientists, he argues, derives from scientists falsely pretending—whether deludedly or cynically—that science can proceed in a value-neutral way. It cannot do so in resolving competitions among theories, let alone in setting the research agenda or weighing in on practical problems of public concern. By wearing a false mask of value neutrality, scientists succeed only in convincing the public that they are ideologically driven. This, in turn, gives an opening for dissenters motivated by religion or by their own ideologies to develop supposedly scientific counter-claims of their own, such as those that assert creationism or deny the reality of climate change. Better, then, for science and scientists to be frank about its lack of value neutrality. [End Page E-106]What values ought to inform science? To answer this question, Kitcher turns to his conception of the ethical project, of which Chapter 2 gives a summary. As he conceives of ethics, it arose pre-historically as a set of mechanisms helping us to deal with deficiencies in altruistic motivation. Although inspired by evolutionary theory, Kitcher spurns the sociobiologist’s identification of the good with the adaptive. Instead, while giving an elaborate reconstruction of how our ethical practices may actually have arisen, he gives pride of place to the idea of conversation. On his reconstruction, the “egalitarian plateau” touted by Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy [Oxford University Press, 1990], p. 5) and others as the great achievement of the Enlightenment was merely a delayed philosophical echo of the ethical project’s initial feature, one that would have been found in the ethical discussions of human hunter-gatherer bands of forty-thousand years ago. Being more focused on how life is lived than on philosophy, Kitcher, fairly enough, is unwilling to see the Enlightenment as an egalitarian age. Rather, most recent incarnations of the ethical project have been distorted by hierarchies and inequalities. Emphasizing the word, Kitcher writes, “I propose... that we undo the distortion,” and model the ethical project, going forward, as involving an egalitarian conversation. This frankness disarms any worry about the move from ‘was’ to ‘ought’ that might have arisen in the minds of those already puzzled by the current popularity of the cave-man diet; and in any case, since Kitcher’s account of the ethical project is defended at length in his contemporaneous book of that title, doubts about it would be better addressed in that context. Rhetorically, since the ideal of treating persons fundamentally as equals is even more popular than eating meat, he is on strong ground here.The book develops this core egalitarian proposal in three distinct ways, thereby gaining a rich evaluative basis for considering the place of science in society. The first is an account of the purposes to which science is answerable. Kitcher dismisses as unrealistically high-minded and ultimately elitist a conception of scientists as driven by a disinterested quest for truth and a simple love of knowledge for its own sake. Rather, his... (shrink)

A belief ascription such as “Oedipus believes that his mother is the queen of Thebes” can be understood in two ways, one in which it seems true, and another in which it seems false. It can seem true because the woman who was, in fact, Oedipus’ mother was believed by him to be the queen of Thebes. It can seem false because Oedipus himself would have sincerely denied that Jocasta could be correctly characterized as “Oedipus’s mother.” Belief ascriptions thus seem (...) to admit of two interpretations, and this has suggested to many that belief predicates such as “________ believes that his mother is the queen of Thebes” are ambiguous between a de dicto and a de re reading.1 However, the impression of ambiguity is a function of the narrow ranges of examples that philosophers focus on. When we consider our ascriptional practices as a whole, the suggestion that belief predicates are ambiguous is neither plausible nor needed to explain the de dicto/de re distinction. The following will argue that understanding paradigmatic de dicto and de re ascriptions in terms of disavowals from a more basic sort of ascription is preferable to positing a simple ambiguity in which each of the two sorts of ascription are conceptually primitive. (shrink)

There is a tendency for living things to join up, establish linkage, live inside each other, return to earlier arrangements, get along, whenever possible. This is the way of the world.The new phenomenon of cell fusion, a laboratory trick on which much of today's science of molecular genetics relies for its data, is the simplest and most spectacular symbol of the tendency. In a way, it is the most unbiologic of all phenomena, violating the most fundamental myths of the last (...) century, for it denies the importance of specificity, integrity, and separateness in living things. Any cell ‐ man, animal, fish, fowl, or insect ‐ given the chance and under the right conditions, brought into contact with any other cell, however foreign, will fuse with it. Cytoplasm will flow easily from one to the other, the nuclei will combine, and it will become, for a time anyway, a single cell with two complete, alien genomes, ready to dance, ready to multiply. It is a Chimera, a Griffon, a Sphinx, a Ganesha, a Peruvian God, a Ch'i‐lin, an omen of good fortune, a wish for the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY most extensive study of this aspect of Schelling's thought, at least until 1806. However, even if Schelling was not, as it is frequently stated, indifferent to the problems and the vicissitudes of politics, his theoretical thinking on this subject never went beyond temporary systematizations, to be given up, or modified, after a while. The author shows how Schelling, especially in this fieM, was influenced either (...) by his environment in general, or by some personalities he happened to contact: first his "republican" and francofile friends of the Ttibingen Stilt, afterwards the romantic circle of Jena, and, between 1801 and 1803, Hegel. The author studies in his first chapter, devoted tO the non-philosophic writings of the TUbingen period (1790-1795), not only Kant's and Herder's influence on Schelling, which are usually taken for granted, but also the impact of C. G. Heine and of other GSttingen scholars. This is a stimulating suggestion, showing the need for a more detailed study on the diffusion of the "historicocritical" method in circles, as the Ttibingen school, dominated rather by philosophical and theological than by philological and historical interests. In the following chapters, Schelling is closely related again to the intellectual history of his time; Schelling's relationship to the Aufkliirer Nicolai produces some surprises, and the same may be said about some new particulars (implementing F. Rosenzweig's and F. Bthm's research) on the close connection between Schelling and Htlderlin in 1795-1796. The fourth chapter is devoted to the correlation between theories on "natural philosophy" and moral political theories. The fifth concerns the philosophy of history and of government. This remarkable study, founded on sound scholarship, and conducted with a sharp historical mind, is to be recommended not only to students of Schelling, but to all those who have some interest in early XIXth Century German political thought. GIORGIO TONELLI State University of New York at Binghamton Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Ed. Hartmut Buehner and Otto Ptggeler. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968. Pp. 622. DM 86.00) Despite the high reputation Germany has long enjoyed with regard to its scientifically reliable editions, up to this very moment, a historic-critical edition of the totality of Hegel's works has not existed. There were only provisional texts of single works available whose philological reliability differed in its sometimes doubtful variety. This is a rather strange fact, considering that Hegel died in 1831. It can be explained only by a phenomenon peculiar to this philosopher: at the peak of his fame, numerous students from all countries of the world attended Hegel's lectures, assiduously taking notes and frequently publishing as authentic what they had understood and jotted down. The philosopher was very generotis in authorizing various versions of his lectures and thus, the international market was swamped with quite incongruous editions of some of his writings at the moment of Hegel's death. Despite this rather confused state of affairs, distinguished scholars have tried, for BOOK REVIEWS 489 more than six decades, to bring order into the posthumous manuscripts of the philosopher, and these efforts were successful, but only to a certain extent. Next to the pioneering publications of Wilhelm Dilthey, Herman Nohl and Frans Rosenzweig, lesser known savants, in the first place, Georg Lasson and Johannes Hoffmeister have devoted many years of self-denying efforts to make /mportant parts of Hegel's manuscripts available to the public and looked for new possibilities to edit the large body of lectures. But the task proved too difficult for individual scholars. For this reason, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, a government-sponsored organization, has commissioned the publication of an all-encompassing historic-critical edition of Hegel's works and arranged for the appointment of a senatorial commission for advising the editors of such a mammoth undertaking. Members of the commission were the aforementioned scholars (see title) and W. Wieland. The Ministry of Education of the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen has opened a research center, originally directed by F. Nicolin, since 1968 by O. Ptggeler. Thus the edition can now be published continuously. Before discussing the contents of volume four, the only volume hitherto published, let's take... (shrink)

There is a tendency for living things to join up, establish linkage, live inside each other, return to earlier arrangements, get along, whenever possible. This is the way of the world.The new phenomenon of cell fusion, a laboratory trick on which much of today's science of molecular genetics relies for its data, is the simplest and most spectacular symbol of the tendency. In a way, it is the most unbiologic of all phenomena, violating the most fundamental myths of the last (...) century, for it denies the importance of specificity, integrity, and separateness in living things. Any cell ‐ man, animal, fish, fowl, or insect ‐ given the chance and under the right conditions, brought into contact with any other cell, however foreign, will fuse with it. Cytoplasm will flow easily from one to the other, the nuclei will combine, and it will become, for a time anyway, a single cell with two complete, alien genomes, ready to dance, ready to multiply. It is a Chimera, a Griffon, a Sphinx, a Ganesha, a Peruvian God, a Ch'i‐lin, an omen of good fortune, a wish for the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.1 (2002) iii-iv [Access article in PDF] Editorial War of the Worldviews With this issue, PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE enters its second quarter century. For many of the past twenty-five years it has enjoyed the sponsorship of Whitman College and the extraordinarily capable coeditorship of Patrick Henry. Bard College now assumes sponsorship, and the journal will be edited jointly by us, with Pat Henry ascending (...) to the empyrean to look down upon us as Editor Emeritus.From its first issue (a mere 124-page wisp of a journal, but with robust essays by Hazel Barnes, Monroe Beardsley, and a smart young thinker named Martha Nussbaum), PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE has provided a home for anyone convinced by the initially counterintuitive notion that a close study of fiction can play an irreplaceable role in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, and even metaphysics. Philosophy is about life from the broadest possible human perspective, and so is literature. But how different the perspectives! Plato saw fiction, poetry, drama, and passion dug in on one side of the battle lines, with science, philosophy, and reason on the other. Not for the first time, nor the last, he was right. At this journal, we're on no peace mission, and we don't relish vapid compromises. Both sides in Plato's War of the Worldviews will be discomfited and annoyed to learn that they have features in common. Would-be peacemakers will be disappointed to see fresh hostilities breaking out just when they thought differences were being at last reconciled. We're interested more in the facts, arguments, and the healthy entertainment of battle than we are in making anybody comfortable. And let's admit it: the kinds of scholarly disputes we encourage in this journal can be exciting and fun.Watch these pages, therefore, not only for fresh news of ancient disputes, but also for exciting studies that break old boundaries, exploring the myriad linkages between traditional aesthetics and such empirical disciplines as psychology, anthropology, and biology. The [End Page iii] symposium on jazz in this issue marks as well our intention to publish engaging work on the arts and culture in general, not limiting ourselves to the areas named in our title. All the articles in PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE are, as always, offered in the spirit of expanding the reach and depth of humanistic scholarship. But one thing will stay the same around here: our constant concern to offer prose that is characterized by exactitude, insight, refinement, rigor, and above all, clarity.Heartfelt thanks to the many individual readers and writers who have brought PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE to this stage of its evolution. We welcome your suggestions about future directions. And so we roll up our sleeves and plunge into the next twenty-five years. Denis Dutton University of Canterbury Garry Hagberg Bard College... (shrink)

It is common knowledge that Frank Kermode is engaged in a major study of fiction and the theory of fiction. I assume that "Novels: Recognition and Deception" in the first number of Critical Inquiry is part of that adventure, and that it should be read in association with other essays on cognate themes which he has published in the last two or three years. This may account for my impression that the Critical Inquiry essay is not independently convincing. There are (...) splendid things in the essay, perceptions so definitively phrased that I cannot promise not to steal them. My copy of the journal is heavily marked on Kermode's pages, invariably on passages I dearly wish I had had the wit to write, notably his remark of certain fictions by Henry James that "they create gaps that cannot be closed, only gloried in; they solicit mutually contradictory types of attention and close only on a problem of closure." But these perceptions are like indelible events in the diction of a poem which, as a whole, does not seem to cohere. Denis Donoghue is professor of Modern English and American literature at University College, Dublin. His recent books include The Ordinary Universe: Soundings in Modern Literature, Emily Dickinson, Jonathan Swift: A Critical Introduction, William Butler Yeats, and Thieves of Fire. (shrink)

I resolve a tension in Hegel’s views, which I call the “paradox of irrationalism,” in order to lay the logical foundation of Hegel’s philosophy of the absurd. The paradox is that Hegel both affirms and denies that the world is rational. While critics maintain that this presents a genuine problem for Hegel, I argue Hegel resolves this paradox by showing that reason constitutes itself through the irrational element that it itself grounds. I make my case by investigating the categories of (...) diversity and contingency, which are central to the paradox of irrationalism and Hegel’s account of human agency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Theory of ActionLara DenisRichard McCarty. Kant’s Theory of Action. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xxiv + 250. Cloth, $74.00.This significant, stimulating contribution to Kantian practical philosophy strives to interpret Kant’s theory of action in ways that will increase readers’ understanding and appreciation of Kant’s moral theory. Its thesis is that Kant combines metaphysical freedom and psychological determinism: our actions within the phenomenal world are causally (...) determined by our prior psychological states in that world and are appearances of our free action in the noumenal world. McCarty argues for a metaphysical, “two-worlds” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves over epistemological or methodological “two-standpoints” interpretations familiar from Christine Korsgaard [End Page 533] and Henry Allison (along the way, McCarty also challenges Allison’s “Incorporation Thesis”). Some of the book’s arguments are textual, displaying perceptive readings of Kant’s lecture notes, published works, and philosophical influences. Others primarily concern the philosophical plausibility or moral tenability of various positions one might attribute to Kant. The book’s greatest strength is McCarty’s positive account of Kant’s theory of action. He presents a coherent, even elegant, two-worlds model. His interpretations of maxims, incentives, empirical character, and Gesinnung are insightful.The book’s first two chapters introduce McCarty’s understanding of maxims and incentives and begin tackling what he calls “the problem of justification and explanation.” Chapter 3 defends the claim that Kant embraced psychological determinism. Chapters 4 and 5 present McCarty’s two-worlds interpretation of the transcendental distinction, defend it from objections, and argue for its superiority over two-standpoint interpretations. Chapter 6 focuses on moral motivation, presenting respect for the moral law as an incentive capable of explaining morally justified actions, and distinguishing between morally worthy and virtuous action so as to defend Kant’s ethics from common objections. Chapter 7 similarly disentangles notions of a good will and virtue, provocatively claiming that all human agents have both a good will and virtue. The main task of chapter 7, however, is analysis of the radical evil in human nature. Chapter 8 raises questions about Kant’s conception of the highest good—particularly, the afterlife in which we are to continue our moral progress—as an object of rational hope.I read the book’s main argument as follows:1. Kant’s theory of action must solve “the problem of justification and explanation”: it must show how the reasons that justify a judgment that one ought to do something can also explain one’s doing it. Kant’s theory of action must solve this problem because if what justifies an action cannot also explain it, such justification is “irrelevant.” Only if our actions are explicable in terms of practical reasoning is justification of action by practical reasoning (e.g. by reference to hypothetical or categorical imperatives) “relevant” to our conduct. The problem of justification and explanation arises as it does within Kant’s ethics because Kant holds that pure reason is capable of issuing in action; yet he also holds that human beings and other imperfectly rational agents do not invariably act as we recognize we ought. So we cannot explain our acting as we ought (when we do) simply by appeal to “ought implies can,” internalism, or “the causality of freedom.”2. Psychological determinism, combined with a metaphysical interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction, allows Kant to solve the problem of justification and explanation. Through a timeless, free act in the noumenal world, we each fix our empirical character, which serves as the “causal law” for our actions in the phenomenal world. Maxims, which function as both major premises in practical syllogisms and rules of our empirical characters, provide bases for both the imperatival justifications and motivational explanations of human actions. The “logical force” of a maxim justifies action on it; the “psychological force” of the maxim—specifically, of the incentive incorporated into the maxim—explains action on it.3. Psychological determinism is compatible with and beneficial for Kant’s moral theory. Most crucially, it is compatible with the freedom necessary for moral agency and responsibility.4. Two-standpoint... (shrink)

There is a certain form of philosophical argument that characteristically begins, "we have no reason to suppose that..." and goes on to deny some proposition we took to be well supported. The claim that there is no inductive argument takes the form: the sample on which such an argument would be based is taken from a special part of the population; but we have no reason to suppose that this special part of the population is not very different from the (...) population as a whole. This claim is refuted by offering a plausible conception of probability and randomness under which the inductive arguments would be undermined only if we had reason to believe that the sample and the population differed. (shrink)

Sometime during the summer of 1981, I received a note in the mail from Denis Dutton, editor of Philosophy and Literature, stating that, due to severe financial constraints, the University of Michigan was going to drop its sponsorship of the journal. The letter had apparently gone out to all those who had either written for the journal or subscribed to it. I had published a short review of Philip Lewis’s book on La Rochefoucauld in the Fall 1978 issue.My family (...) and I were in Charlottesville, Virginia, at the time, where I was taking Arthur Kirsch’s illuminating NEH Summer Seminar on “Shakespeare, Freud, Montaigne, and the Bible.” I can remember calling Denis from an outdoor public phone and telling him that I .. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Aristotle’s views on natural kinds and the compatibility of pluralism and realism, a topic that has generated considerable interest among contemporary philosophers. I argue that, when it came to zoology, Aristotle denied that there is only one way of organizing the diversity of the living world into natural kinds that will yield a single, unified system of classification. Instead, living things can be grouped and regrouped into various cross-cutting kinds on the basis of objective similarities (...) and differences in ways that subserve the explanatory context. Since the explanatory aims of zoology are diverse and variegated, the kinds it recognizes must be equally diverse and variegated. At the same time, there are certain constraints on which kinds can be selected. And those constraints derive more from the causal structure of the world than from the proclivities of the classifier (hence the realism). This distinguishes Aristotle’s version of pluralistic realism from those contemporary versions (like Dupré’s “promiscuous realism”) that treat all or most classifications of a given domain as equally legitimate and not just a sub-set of kinds recognized by the science that studies it. By contrast, Aristotle privileges scientifically important kinds on the basis of their role in causal investigations. On this picture natural kinds are those kinds with the sort of causal structure that allows them to enter into scientific explanations. In the final section I argue that Aristotle’s zoology should remain of interest to philosophers and biologists alike insofar as it combines a pluralistic form of realism with a rank-free approach to classification. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA clear sign of the heightened interest in economic inequality was the surprise popularity of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the twenty-first century. The book reached the top of the bestseller lists and was described as a ‘media sensation’ and Piketty himself as a ‘rockstar economist’. Piketty’s key thesis stated that the return on investment will be higher than economic growth, meaning that inequality is destined to worsen and that the post-war Keynesian period of progress, in terms of a flattening of (...) inequality, was in fact a small break from the norm. What he termed patrimonial capitalism would see continual increases in rates of socio-economic inequality unless drastic action is taken. In this article, Piketty’s book is treated as a paramount example of the mediation of economic inequality. The book received a generally positive response, however some writers acted defensively against the book’s main thesis, that is the secular trend of growing inequality. Exploring the press in the UK,... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 89 To fill the gap between the two worlds seems to have been one of the most important of their problems. Philo filled it with angels and powers, the Gnostics, whatever their individual differences, filled it with other supernatural creatures begotten by their chief god. Origen filled it with Intelligences, created and corporeal spirits who rose or fell according to their sinfulness (p. 437). The discrepancy between (...) the two worlds remains to be bridged by the later Greek philosophers not by reason but by the appeal to myth, imagination and authority. Only in Plotinus, among the late Greek philosophers, does Boas find a significant remainder of rationalism. Plotinus's problem is similar, to be sure, to that of the other late thinkers: to bridge the metaphysical gap. Appeals to myth and to the authority of earlier Greek thinkers are quite as irrational here as in the earlier thinkers. And the resort to powerful metaphors is as pronounced in Plotinus as in any other philosopher one can name. All this is brought out very well. Yet Boas finds it important to try to expound Plotinus's philosophy as "... a sample of rationalism with axioms and inferences, with dialectical distinctions, with the Law of Contradiction utilized to produce consistency" (p. 455). He doesn't claim to have succeeded in doing this; on the contrary, his account gives little ground on which to justify the attempt, and one wonders why it was undertaken. This is not to deny that Plotinus uses rational arguments and logical inferences, but rather to say that the semblance of a "rational structure" depends instead on poetical and metaphorical elements. Nevertheless, the discussion of Plotinus's thought as a "sample of rationalism" is of interest because it serve to bring out an element in the conception of rationalism which emerges only too rarely in the book? Boas pays special attention to Plotinus's "full fledged hierarchy of being," and his attempt to derive (or "deduce"?) the degrees of being from the One. This rests on the "principle of plenitude," or on the notion that all possible being must be exemplified in existence. This in turn is suggested by one or more powerful metaphors. Plotinus's speculative imagination, in other words, was still unfettered to a considerable degree by authority, revelation, or other restrictions. Kegardless of how adequate one might judge Plotinus's system to be in terms of axioms, definitions and consistency (and surely it is very inadequate), Boas's interest in him as a "sample of rationalism" derives from this freedom in speculation and in choice of "assumptions." This does not mean that logical criteria are not the proper tools of the critic nor that they can be disregarded by the speculative philosopher. It means only that Greek rationalism rested on considerably more; a magnificently free and speculative strain of mind. This is one matter that Boas's discussion makes amply clear. JOHN D. GOHEEN Stanford University Origbne et la Philosophie. By Henri Crouzel. (l~tudes Publi6es sous la Direction de la Facult6 de Th6ologie SJ de Lyon-Fourvi~re; Aubier, 1962. Pp. 238.) This is a painstaking and important essay set between fairly narrow limits. It deliberately stays short of becoming a study of Origenism rather than Origen, and thus avoids the mistake made by so many books about Origen. The field is quite difficult of course. We are still a long way from proper evaluation of the Christian-Hellenist synthesis in 4 However, explicitly stated on pp. 355-356. 90 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the thinking of many Christian figures from the second century to the fourth. Could not the same be said perhaps, rnutatis mutandis, of some Hellenist writers, Celsus, Porphyry, Plotinus? Origen, as well as being more important, is considerably more complicated than most. Is he the first great Christian sumrnator, ~ la Aquinas? Is he a Platonist masquerading as a Christian? Or a Christian masquerading as a Hellenist? In the rough phrase that used to be applied in the schools of theology, auctores scinduntur, sometimes with extreme acrimony. He has been receiving a good deal of attention over the past fifty years, from Bohringer, De Faye, Koch--the list is awfully long-right... (shrink)

Viewing the development of French trade and manufacturing between 1650 and 1820, Jeff Horn underscores their great success based largely on overseas markets. His evidence supports the view of Friedrich Engels and Perry Anderson that capitalism developed within the pores of the Old Regime. Yet Horn attempts to deny the leading role of the bourgeoisie in this advance. He claims that it was through the Old Regime system of economic privileges rather than the agency of bourgeois capital accumulation that such (...) progress was made. This article rejects Horn’s exclusive preoccupation with the positive economic role of the privileges granted by the state. It reasserts the importance of the agency of the bourgeoisie in furthering economic development. Moreover, it contends that for all the economic gains made by the system of state privileges, such privileges were more than offset by the weight of rents on the peasantry and to the benefit of the nobility and Church imposed by this same regime of privileges. The distorted development that privileges imposed on economic and social life became an important factor behind the outbreak of the Revolution. (shrink)

An analysis of effectiveness of some of hume's arguments in a framework developed by the author. The author states his position that arguments attacking positions attempt to show that, Given the assumptions of a position, Certain consequences are incompatible with it--A valid species of "argumentum ad hominem". Although this species does not work for constructive philosophical "proofs," it will work inversely in arguments (defending such proofs) which cite possible objections. These charge "petitio": the objection assumes what the position denies or (...) "vice versa". Eight arguments are judged as "ad hominem" or as charging "petitio" and as effective or ineffective in either case. The analyses elaborate the author's position, And the mode of analysis is suggested as an adjunct to considering a philosopher's conclusions. (shrink)

Dans le monde philosophique français, tout allait bien jusqu'à ce matin de juin 1976 oáu Bernard-Henry Lévy, dans un dossier des "Nouvelles littéraires", annonçait l'irruption d'une "authentique relève dans le monde de la pensée": les "nouveaux philosophes". Les passions se déchaînent. S'agit-il de "jeunes oracles", de "nouveaux gourous", "d'imposteurs"? On connaît les noms. On a pris connaissance des volumes suscités par la tempête; on a peut-être lu certains articles de presse, qui ont fait écho à la bataille. Les livres (...) restent, alors que les articles de presse risquent d'être emportés par la tempête du temps et, de toute façon, sont dispersés: Sylvie Bouscasse et. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY most extensive study of this aspect of Schelling's thought, at least until 1806. However, even if Schelling was not, as it is frequently stated, indifferent to the problems and the vicissitudes of politics, his theoretical thinking on this subject never went beyond temporary systematizations, to be given up, or modified, after a while. The author shows how Schelling, especially in this fieM, was influenced either (...) by his environment in general, or by some personalities he happened to contact: first his "republican" and francofile friends of the Ttibingen Stilt, afterwards the romantic circle of Jena, and, between 1801 and 1803, Hegel. The author studies in his first chapter, devoted tO the non-philosophic writings of the TUbingen period (1790-1795), not only Kant's and Herder's influence on Schelling, which are usually taken for granted, but also the impact of C. G. Heine and of other GSttingen scholars. This is a stimulating suggestion, showing the need for a more detailed study on the diffusion of the "historicocritical" method in circles, as the Ttibingen school, dominated rather by philosophical and theological than by philological and historical interests. In the following chapters, Schelling is closely related again to the intellectual history of his time; Schelling's relationship to the Aufkliirer Nicolai produces some surprises, and the same may be said about some new particulars (implementing F. Rosenzweig's and F. Bthm's research) on the close connection between Schelling and Htlderlin in 1795-1796. The fourth chapter is devoted to the correlation between theories on "natural philosophy" and moral political theories. The fifth concerns the philosophy of history and of government. This remarkable study, founded on sound scholarship, and conducted with a sharp historical mind, is to be recommended not only to students of Schelling, but to all those who have some interest in early XIXth Century German political thought. GIORGIO TONELLI State University of New York at Binghamton Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Ed. Hartmut Buehner and Otto Ptggeler. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968. Pp. 622. DM 86.00) Despite the high reputation Germany has long enjoyed with regard to its scientifically reliable editions, up to this very moment, a historic-critical edition of the totality of Hegel's works has not existed. There were only provisional texts of single works available whose philological reliability differed in its sometimes doubtful variety. This is a rather strange fact, considering that Hegel died in 1831. It can be explained only by a phenomenon peculiar to this philosopher: at the peak of his fame, numerous students from all countries of the world attended Hegel's lectures, assiduously taking notes and frequently publishing as authentic what they had understood and jotted down. The philosopher was very generotis in authorizing various versions of his lectures and thus, the international market was swamped with quite incongruous editions of some of his writings at the moment of Hegel's death. Despite this rather confused state of affairs, distinguished scholars have tried, for BOOK REVIEWS 489 more than six decades, to bring order into the posthumous manuscripts of the philosopher, and these efforts were successful, but only to a certain extent. Next to the pioneering publications of Wilhelm Dilthey, Herman Nohl and Frans Rosenzweig, lesser known savants, in the first place, Georg Lasson and Johannes Hoffmeister have devoted many years of self-denying efforts to make /mportant parts of Hegel's manuscripts available to the public and looked for new possibilities to edit the large body of lectures. But the task proved too difficult for individual scholars. For this reason, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, a government-sponsored organization, has commissioned the publication of an all-encompassing historic-critical edition of Hegel's works and arranged for the appointment of a senatorial commission for advising the editors of such a mammoth undertaking. Members of the commission were the aforementioned scholars (see title) and W. Wieland. The Ministry of Education of the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen has opened a research center, originally directed by F. Nicolin, since 1968 by O. Ptggeler. Thus the edition can now be published continuously. Before discussing the contents of volume four, the only volume hitherto published, let's take... (shrink)

A deferred prosecution agreement, or DPA, allows a corporation, instead of proceeding to trial on a criminal charge, to settle matters with the state by acknowledging the facts on which any charge would be based, pay a reduced fine, and agree to change the way they conduct business. Critics of DPAs have suggested that, because the defendant corporation must pay a fine and submit to structural reform without having been found guilty at trial, DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence. This (...) paper argues that they do not. The paper appeals to the role of civic trust in a liberal political community. The obligations a corporation assumes in a DPA can be framed as a reasonable retributive response to a breach by that corporation of the community’s laws, and an appropriate reassurance by that corporation to the community that such breaches will not reoccur. This framing is sufficient to deny that DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence. (shrink)

Parce que le Liber de causis etait au programme de l'enseignement universitaire parisien au XIIIe siecle, il etait naturel pour le professeur, frere Thomas d'Aquin, de composer un commentaire sur ce texte attribue alors a Aristote. Mais parce que, a ce moment meme, le dominicain Guillaume de Moerbeke venait de decouvrir les Elements de theologie de Proclus et de les traduire en latin (18 mai 1268), Thomas, enregsitrant aussitot cet apport nouveau, comprenait que le Liber de causis etait un sous-produit (...) des Elements de Proclus et devait donc etre retire a Aristote. Du meme coup, il saisissait la nature platonicienne de ce texte qui le rapprochait des doctrines du Pseudo-Denys et permettait d'evaluer son platonisme. C'est pourquoi le Commentaire de Thomas sur le Liber de causis offre une presentation des doctrines platoniciennes dans la construction theologiques des premiers principes. Dans l'elaboration de ce commentaire, Thomas se revele un veritable humaniste en avance de deux siecles sur les savants de la Renaissance. (shrink)

Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With reference (...) to Brandom’s (1994; 2000; 2008) broad semantic inferentialism, we show that a theory of meaning can be at the same time a variety of active externalism. While we grant that supporters of other varieties of content externalism (e.g., Putnam 1975 and Burge 1986) can deny active externalism, this is not an option for semantic inferentialists: On this latter view, the role of the environment (both in its social and natural form) is not ‘passive’ in the sense assumed by the alternative approaches to content externalism. (shrink)