Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this: the simulation constraint theory (Bering, Citation2002); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, Citation2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of these theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal immortality, (...) leave an explanatory gap in that they do not explain why one would intuitively attribute survival of death to others. To fill in the gap, I offer a cognitive theory based on offline social reasoning and social embodiment which provides for the belief in an eternal social realm in which the deceased survive—the afterlife. (shrink)

This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are diff erent substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally (...) identical, and that the mind is the sole source of identity) are not compatible with cultural representations such as mythologies, funerary rites, iconography and doctrine as well as empirical evidence concerning intuitive folk reasoning about the mind and body concerning the afterlife. Finally, the article suggests an alternative and more parsimonious explanation for understanding intuitive folk representations of the afterlife. (shrink)

The author argues for three interconnected theses which provide a cognitive account for why humans intuitively believe that others survive death. The first thesis, from which the second and third theses follow, is that the acceptance of afterlife beliefs is predisposed by a specific, and already well-documented, imaginative process - the offline social reasoning process. The second thesis is that afterlife beliefs are social in nature. The third thesis is that the living imagine the deceased as socially embodied in such (...) a way as to continue to fulfill on-going social obligations with others. The author further suggests six reasons why the fantasy/reality distinction breaks down for the imaginer such that the continued existence of the decedent in the afterlife is believed to be real. Finally, the author suggests avenues for further research which would support this cognitive account. (shrink)

The author introduces and critically analyzes two recent, curious findings and their accompanying explanations regarding how the folk intuits the capabilities of the dead and those in a persistent vegetative state. The dead are intuited to survive death, whereas PVS patients are intuited as more dead than the dead. Current explanations of these curious findings rely on how the folk is said to conceive of death and the dead: either as the annihilation of the person, or that person’s continuation as (...) a disembodied being. The author argues that these two conceptions are incompatible and inconsistent with each other and the evidence. Contrariwise, the author argues that the folk intuition about dead-survivors and the living dead are more easily explained by appealing to cross-culturally established concepts: the folk biological concept of death the existential concept of death, and the concept of social death. (shrink)

Both philosophers and scientists have long assumed that the impetus to develop and hold afterlife beliefs was primarily provided by one’s fear of one’s own death (an egocentric view). Recent empirical studies, however, present compelling evidence against this assumption: it has been observed that participants intuitively believe that others survive death (an allocentric view). Despite this, most theories offered to explain this finding rely on egocentric mechanisms and claim that the deceased are represented as disembodied minds. Here, the author offers (...) an allocentric explanation for intuitive afterlife beliefs based on the intentional stance and offline social reasoning which suggests that the deceased should be represented as socially embodied. The author then argues that this socially embodied representation is more in line with both the findings and folk descriptions of those in the afterlife. Finally, the author discusses the impact on both the scientific and philosophical investigations into afterlife beliefs. (shrink)

Recent research (Bering 2002, 2006) into what has become known as “the folk psychology of souls” demonstrates that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. Additional research (Harris & Gimenéz, 2005; Astuti & Harris, 2008) has demonstrated that this belief is highly context sensitive. In this thesis, the author presents this research and provides a critical analysis of the findings based on philosophical and empirical concerns. The author also presents and critically analyses several theories that have been proposed to explain (...) this intuitive belief: intuitive Cartesian substance dualism (Bloom, 2004); the simulation constraint theory (Bering, 2006); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, 2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008; Vail III, et al., 2010). The author argues, based on philosophical concerns, and anthropological and psychological empirical evidence, that none of the proposed theories are up to the task of giving a cognitive account of the folk psychology of souls. The author then argues for three interconnected theses to provide a cognitive account for why humans intuitively believe that others survive death. The first thesis, from which the second and third theses follow, is that the acceptance of afterlife beliefs is predisposed by a specific, and already well-documented, imaginative process—the offline social reasoning process. The second thesis is that afterlife beliefs are social in nature. The third thesis is that the living imagine the deceased as socially embodied in such a way as to continue to fulfill on-going social obligations with others. The author further suggests six reasons why the fantasy/reality distinction breaks down for the imaginer such that the continued existence of the decedent in the afterlife is believed to be real. Finally, the author suggests avenues for further research that would support this cognitive account. (shrink)

This thesis has two main goals: (1) to argue that myths are natural products of human cognition; and (2) that structuralism, as introduced by Claude Levi-Strauss, provides an over-arching theory of myth when supplemented and supported by current research in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and cognitive anthropology. With regard to (1), we argue that myths are naturally produced by the human mind through individuals’ interaction with their natural and social environments. This interaction is constrained by both the type of (...) body the individual has and the environment in which the individual is situated. From this interaction, we argue, is produced the human-body metaphor which plays an essential role in forming analogical mental models which humans use to navigate, predict, and think about their environment(s). With regard to (2), we argue that these analogical mental models are the structures from which myths are created, just as structural anthropology suggests. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Practical? Moral? The Moral Alternative Punishing Immorality Morality Regardless What About the Children? Getting Tough Moral Arguments for Prohibition Moral Arguments Against Prohibition Proportionality of Punishment.

What can the actions of stockbreeders, as they select the best individuals for breeding, teach us about how new species of wild animals and plants come into being? Charles Darwin raised this question in his famous, even notorious, Origin of Species (1859). Darwin's answer - his argument by analogy from artificial to natural selection - is the subject of our book. We aim to clarify what kind of argument it is, how it works, and why Darwin gave it such prominence. (...) As we explain more fully in our Introduction, we believe that the argument becomes much more intelligible when set, contextually, in a story stretching from classical Greek mathematics to modern evolutionary genetics: a long story, and a broad one too, encompassing everything from Darwin's earliest notebook theorising on the births and deaths of species, to agrarian capitalism as a distinctive form of economic life, to shifting Western reflections on art-nature relations. (shrink)

This article identifies an ostracism joke in Menander's Samia (364–6) during a climactic scene in which the Athenian Demeas ejects the titular Chrysis from his house. The joke, uttered by a cook who is reacting to Chrysis’ expulsion, plays on the usage of ὄστρακα—broken pieces of pottery—as ballots in the institution of ostracism. The article proposes that the joke references the final abolition of ostracism during Demetrius of Phalerum's reign and reveals Menander's support for the regime.

Provides theories and techniques behind the investigations of intoxication and how subjective experiences relate to addictive potential, which should help ...

Music as an Imitation of Harmonious Balance.

This book originates from an international research program that is reassessing when and why modern careers emerged. With fifteen essays this volume brings together some of the most important results of this new field of research. Based upon the innovative use of micro-level historical sources, the contributions by economic and social historians reveal the emergence of identifiable career paths in a wide range of occupational settings in Europe and the Americas over the period 1800 to the end of World War (...) II. They highlight the economic and social forces that shaped the creation of both formal and informal career paths and led to their diffusion throughout the workforces of most developed economies by the early 1950s. (shrink)

Rarely in the short history of liberal-democratic government has a primer on basic liberal-democratic values and institutions been more needed than now. Popular discontent, even anger, with democratic governments has grown steadily over the past twenty years. And not since the 1930s have citizens and their elected officials been so baffled about their respective roles in the maintenance of both democratic governments and liberal economies. This book attempts to address this growing need. Especially written as a primer for courses in (...) Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE), it has introductory chapters on all three main disciplines. It also has chapters on the rule of law and on three important public-policy areas: Corruption, Climate, and Civil Society. Individual topics discussed include free and fair elections, populism, responsible government, republican and Westminster systems of government, regulated free markets, the Great Recession of 2008, globalization, greenwashing, identity politics, academic freedom, utilitarianism, social contract theory, positive and negative liberty, and the good life. Historically informed, The Ethics and Economics of Liberal Democracies: Foundations for PPE is sure to be of interest to students who are interested in public-policy work, as well as those who are interested in both the theory and practice of democratic government. (shrink)

Explains relativity--matter and energy, anti-matter, tachyon, etc.--tracing from discovery to discovery the steps that led to the next development in the field.

The question of truth is bound to the question of the relation between identity and difference. Historically, the bond between truth and the primacy of identity was forged through the conviction that to speak of truth is to speak of being, or what is (the case). Since Parmenides, being becomes intelligible solely in relation to identity, or the One, with difference either being excluded from “what is” altogether, or as in Plato and Aristotle, finding its subordinate “place” within being. After (...) Hegel, whose thought accomplishes this “placing” in an absolute way, philosophy has sought to reverse this priority, while still insisting, necessarily, on thinking and speaking about what is the case, and therefore of truth. This essay raises the question of the coherence of this reversal. Characterizing the past century as the one in which philosophy’s aim was the overcoming of the perennial priority of identity, it attempts to show not only that post-Hegelian thought was at multiple levels divided on this aim, but that what Gillian Rose called the “metaphysics of pure difference” went uniquely awry—both in terms of its consequences and in its failure to maintain a genuinely critical relation to so-called “philosophies of representation.”. (shrink)

In this paper we explore a connection between descriptive set theory and inner model theory. From descriptive set theory, we will take a countable, definable set of reals, A. We will then show that , where is a canonical model from inner model theory. In technical terms, is a “mouse”. Consequently, we say that A is a mouse set. For a concrete example of the type of set A we are working with, let ODnω1 be the set of reals which (...) are ∑n definable over the model Lω1 , from an ordinal parameter. In this paper we will show that for all n 1, ODnω1 is a mouse set. Our work extends some similar results due to D.A. Martin, J.R. Steel, and H. Woodin. Several interesting questions in this area remain open. (shrink)

In Sensations of History, James J. Hodge argues that animation in new media art transforms historical experience in the digital age. Combining close textual analysis of experimental new media artworks with discussion of key phenomenological texts, Sensations of History argues for the broad critical significance of animation as we shift from analog to digital technologies. Hodge looks closely at animation aesthetics, which allow for a clear grasp of the ways digital technologies transform our sense of historical experience.

Let κ R be the least ordinal κ such that L κ (R) is admissible. Let $A = \{x \in \mathbb{R} \mid (\exists\alpha such that x is ordinal definable in L α (R)}. It is well known that (assuming determinacy) A is the largest countable inductive set of reals. Let T be the theory: ZFC - Replacement + "There exists ω Woodin cardinals which are cofinal in the ordinals." T has consistency strength weaker than that of the theory ZFC + (...) "There exists ω Woodin cardinals", but stronger than that of the theory ZFC + "There exists n Woodin Cardinals", for each n ∈ ω. Let M be the canonical, minimal inner model for the theory T. In this paper we show that A = R ∩ M. Since M is a mouse, we say that A is a mouse set. As an application, we use our characterization of A to give an inner-model-theoretic proof of a theorem of Martin which states that for all n, every Σ * n real is in A. (shrink)

In a Society of Peoples as Rawls conceives it, human rights function as “criteria for toleration.” This paper defends the conception of human rights that appears in Rawls’ The Law of Peoples as normatively and theoretically adequate. I claim that human rights function as criteria for determining whether or not a given society or legal system can be tolerated. As such, “human rights” are not themselves basic facts or judgments or ascriptions, but rather the means by which we collectively attempt (...) to secure public criteria for evaluating what can and cannot be tolerated. Human rights are one expression of the fundamental value commitments of Political Liberalism to reasonableness and tolerance. If correct, this account provides good reasons for concluding that Political Liberalism has a normatively adequate conception of global justice. (shrink)

This paper describes how the film “Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner” can be used in the classroom. Drawing on Gilligan’s theory of moral psychology, the paper begins by putting forward a new interpretation of the film. While the central theme of the film is that of miscegenation, another salient topic in the film concerns how to maintain patriarchal privilege in a society that has racial equality. The paper then proceeds to illustrate different ways the film can be used in the (...) classroom, most importantly to illustrate the justice/care distinction. Finally, the pedagogical practice of showing films that support certain ideologies is critically examined. (shrink)

Law is an essential tool for improving public health infrastructure and outcomes; however, existing state statutory public health laws may be insufficient. Built over decades in response to various diseases/conditions, public health laws are antiquated, divergent, and confusing. The Turning Point Public Health Statute Modernization National Collaborative addressed the need for public health law reform by producing a comprehensive model state act. The Act provides scientifically, ethically, and legally sound provisions on public health infrastructure, powers, duties, and practice. This article (...) examines how statutory law can be a tool for improving the public's health, existing needs for public health law reform, themes and provisions of the Turning Point Act, and how it is being used by public health practitioners. (shrink)

An inner model operator is a function M such that given a Turing degree d, M is a countable set of reals, d M, and M has certain closure properties. The notion was introduced by Steel. In the context of AD, we study inner model operators M such that for a.e. d, there is a wellorder of M in L). This is related to the study of mice which are below the minimal inner model with ω Woodin cardinals. As a (...) technical tool, we show that the alternative fine structure theory developed by Mitchell and Steel for mice with Woodin cardinals is equivalent to the traditional fine structure theory developed by Jensen for L. (shrink)

We identify a particular mouse, [Formula: see text], the minimal ladder mouse, that sits in the mouse order just past [Formula: see text] for all [Formula: see text], and we show that [Formula: see text], the set of reals that are [Formula: see text] in a countable ordinal. Thus [Formula: see text] is a mouse set. This is analogous to the fact that [Formula: see text] where [Formula: see text] is the sharp for the minimal inner model with a Woodin (...) cardinal, and [Formula: see text] is the set of reals that are [Formula: see text] in a countable ordinal. More generally [Formula: see text]. The mouse [Formula: see text] and the set [Formula: see text] compose the next natural pair to consider in this series of results. Thus we are proving the mouse set theorem just past projective. Some of this is not new. [Formula: see text] was known in the 1990s. But [Formula: see text] was open until Woodin found a proof in 2018. The main goal of this paper is to give Woodin’s proof. (shrink)

Bioethics committees have issued guidelines that medical interventions should be permissible only in cases of clinically verifiable disease, deformity, or injury. Furthermore, once the existence of one or more of these requirements has been proven, the proposed therapeutic procedure must reasonably be expected to result in a net benefit to the patient. As an exception to this rule, some prophylactic interventions might be performed on individuals “in their best interests” or with the aim of averting an urgent and potentially calamitous (...) public health danger. In order to invoke these exceptions, a stringent set of criteria must first be satisfied. Additionally, where the proposed prophylactic intervention is intended for children, who are unlikely to be able to provide a meaningfully informed consent, a heightened scrutiny of any such measures is required. We argue that children should not be subjected to prophylactic interventions “in their best interests” or for public health reasons when there exist effective and conservative alternative interventions, such as behavioural modification, that individuals could employ as competent adolescents or adults to avoid adverse health outcomes. Applying these criteria, we consider the specific examples of prophylactic mastectomy, immunisations, cosmetic ear surgery, and circumcision. (shrink)