The project of all philosophy may be to gain reconciliation with time, even if not every philosopher has dealt with time expressly. A confrontation with the passing of time and with human finitude runs through the history of philosophy as an ultimate concern. In this genealogy of the concept of temporality, David Hoy examines the emergence in a post-Kantian continental philosophy of a focus on the lived experience of the "time of our lives" rather than on the time of (...) the universe. The purpose is to see how phenomenological and poststructuralist philosophers have tried to locate the source of temporality, how they have analyzed time's passing, and how they have depicted our relation to time once it has been--in a Proustian sense--regained. Hoy engages with competing theoretical tactics for reconciling us to our fleeting temporality, drawing on work by Kant, Heidegger, Hegel, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, Gadamer, Sartre, Bourdieu, Foucault, Bergson, Deleuze, Žižek, and Derrida. Hoy considers four existential strategies for coping with the apparent flow of temporality, including Proust's passive and Walter Benjamin's active reconciliation through memory, Žižek's critique of poststructuralist politics, Foucault's confrontation with the temporality of power, and Deleuze's account of Aion and Chronos. He concludes by exploring whether a dual temporalization could be what constitutes the singular "time of our lives.". (shrink)

After discussing Kant's interpretation of time and Heidegger's productive misreading of Kant, Hoy examines the work of Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, ...

A leading authority on Continental philosophy examines the concept of critical resistance within recent poststructuralist social thought.

This collection gives a complete picture of Foucault's importance as a thinker and social critic who transcended academic boundaries to challenge entrenched, institutionalized models of theoretical rationality and practical normalcy. (Philosophy).

This book serves as both an introduction to the concept of resistance in poststructuralist thought and an original contribution to the continuing philosophical discussion of this topic. How can a body of thought that mistrusts universal principles explain the possibility of critical resistance? Without appeals to abstract norms, how can emancipatory resistance be distinguished from domination? Can there be a poststructuralist ethics? David Hoy explores these crucial questions through lucid readings of Nietzsche, Foucault, Bourdieu, Derrida, and others. He traces (...) the genealogy of resistance from Nietzsche's break with the Cartesian concept of consciousness to Foucault's and Bourdieu's theories of how subjects are formed through embodied social practices. He also considers Levinas, Heidegger, and Derrida on the sources of ethical resistance. Finally, in light of current social theory from Judith Butler to Slavoj Zizek, he challenges "poststructuralism" as a category and suggests the term "post-critique" as a more accurate description of contemporary Continental philosophy.Hoy is a leading American scholar of poststructuralism. Critical Resistance is the only book in English that deals substantively with the topical concept of resistance in relation to poststructuralist thought, discussions of which have dominated Continental social thought for many years. (shrink)

This paper explains the genealogical method as it is understood and employed in contemporary Continental philosophy. Using a pair of terms from Bernard Williams, genealogy is contrasted with phenomenology as an `unmasking' as opposed to a `vindicatory' method. The genealogical method is also compared with the method of Ideologiekritik and recent critical theory. Although genealogy is usually thought to be allergic to universals, in fact Foucault, Derrida, and Bourdieu do not shun universals, even if they approach them with caution. The (...) conclusion is that genealogy is a viable and productive approach to social criticism and self-transformation. (shrink)

Hegel attacks Kantian morality most often without stating an opposing moral theory, tending to subsequently take up discussion of religion or the state. Commentators have variously suggested the logical consequence of Hegel's position is "the dissolution of ethics in sociology" without "room for personal morality of any kind" or that Hegel's argument is against Kantian <i>Moralitat</i>, which allows the private individual to appeal beyond social mores to universal moral standards, with Hegel insisting that concrete values come instead from <i>Sittlichkeit</i>, the (...) social order. If thinking of morality as a purely private matter of the individual's conscience seems too abstract, the Hegelian criticisms should show that moral reflections are vacuous unless they take account of the social world in which they will be realized as concrete actions. From the Hegelian's perspective on morality as seen from the more inclusive context of <i>Sittlichkeit</i>, social action that is also moral will not need to be analyzed in terms of Kant's metaphysical dualisms between reason and inclination, intentions and consequences, or the sensible and the intelligible realms. Whereas Kant thinks moral theory leads directly to religious and metaphysical postulates, Hegel deliberately leads it in another direction. He can be understood historically as going beyond Kant's effort to secularize moral philosophy. Kant begins this process by grounding moral philosophy in reason alone, not in religion. Religious postulates may follow from moral beliefs, says Kant, but morality is not derived from religious premisses. In going from private moral conscience not to religious beliefs but to social, political, and historical considerations (which could include religion seen as a social institution), Hegel extends the process of secularizing moral philosophy." Marcuse and Knox could thus both be right, since Hegel's goal is not to replace Kant's moral philosophy with another, competing moral philosophy, but to accept it, while recognizing its limitations, as a special case of a larger theory of social action. In the Hegelian jargon, from a standpoint recognizing Sittlichkeit, Moralitdt is thus <i>aufgehoben</i>, that is, Kant's formal procedures will be both "negated" (criticized for their limitations) and "preserved" (embedded in a more inclusive philosophy). (shrink)

Would a history of the human sciences seem strange if it featured a chapter on the history of consciousness? An argument for including such a chapter could point out that consciousness is often thought to be essential to what it is to be human. Yet the discipline that makes this.

Minimally helpful comparison of constructive interpretation with Gadamer, Derrida, and Habermas. Presents a somewhat imprecise account of Dworkin, a quite general discussion of his similarities with Gadamer, and a gloss of Derridean deconstruction with regards to the Declaration of Independence. Then offers an evaluation of Dworkin in terms of Gadamer and Derrida.

This chapter contains sections titled: Martin Heidegger on Being‐toward‐Death Jean‐Paul Sartre's Critique of Heidegger.

Opponents of Hegel's philosophy traditionally support their arguments against his metaphysics and dialectical methodology by implying that the lack of an ethics in his system has unfortunate consequences for personal and political life. In rebuttal, defenders of Hegel then block thead hominemcharges by pointing out examples of sound moral and political behavior in Hegel's own life and by arguing that amoral or immoral conduct is not entailed by Hegel's dialectical reasoning. The success of this defense of the biographical Hegel has (...) not yet been matched, however, by a systematic explanation of the nature of morality based on Hegel's philosophical writings themselves. Instead of supplying an alternative to Kant's conception of morality, Hegel's texts indeed seem to involve the devious strategy of attacking Kantian morality and then abruptly moving on to another topic. The shift of discussion to religion or the state appears to force commentators to conclude either that his philosophy lacks a systematic moral philosophy or that it surreptitiously preserves an essentially Kantian ethics. In the former case his system apparently permits immoral conduct, and in the latter the philosopher merely deceives us with a dialectical sleight of hand. In either case, Hegel's morals are still in doubt. (shrink)

Books on the major thinkers in the history of philosophy are faced with difficult tasks. Not only do they run the risk of being too scholarly for the nonspecialist or insufficiently detailed for the specialist, but also they must observe the fine line between avoiding anachronism and establishing the current relevance and merits of the past philosopher. These problems are compounded for the English-speaking philosopher by a figure like Hegel who is either identified with a very unhegelian British idealism, or (...) largely ignored. The anglophone interpreter of Hegel must find fresh ways of expressing his ideas and methods for a philosophical audience whose recent resurgence of interest in Hegel emerges from a zero degree, or worse, of understanding or empathy. Charles Taylor's book is brilliantly successful at rehabilitating Hegel and providing a vigorous, stimulating reading of his major works. (shrink)

This discussion of ?Disclosing New Worlds? by Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert Dreyfus raises four groups of questions. First, do skills, which are largely unreflective, need to be distinguished more sharply from strategies for social action, which are more reflective and deliberative? Second, is there a tension between the article's emphasis on the importance of background practices, which are collective and nonindividual, and its frequent appeal to examples of single individuals (the entrepreneur, the cultural hero) who are able to (...) transform these practices? Third, why does the appeal to solidarity not undermine democratic action, since solidarities compete and conflict with one another, and are often formed by excluding others? Or are the ideas of solidarity and universality not necessarily inconsistent with each other? Fourth, without universalistic values how will a theory of pluralistic solidarities explain social resistance to perceived oppression? Is the authors? notion of being willing to die for the group's commitments too extreme a test for social solidarity? Even if it were offered as only a limiting case, is it an adequate test for the value or justice of the commitments themselves? (shrink)

The Critical Circle investigates the celebrated hermeneutic circle, especially as it manifests itself in historical inquiry and literary criticism. Formulated variously in different theories of hermeneutics, the circle generally describes how, in the process of understanding an interpretation, part and whole are related in a circular way: in order to understand the while, it is necessary to understand the parts, while to understand the parts it is necessary to have some comprehension of the whole. --from the Foreword.

This chapter contains sections titled: John Rawls on Hegel Legislating and Testing Moral Rules: Christine Korsgaard vs. Hegel Moralität and Sittlichkeit: Transcendental Argument or Reflective Equilibrium? Conclusion: The Transition from Reason to Spirit References Further Reading.