In following paper an attempt will be made to analyse the statistical relationships between variables as the functions of causal relations existing between them. Our basic assumption here is that statistical relationships between traits, events, or characteristics of objects, may be logically derived from the pattern of their mutual causal connections, if this pattern is described by appropriate concepts and with sufficient precision. The first part of the paper presents basic concepts, which according to author's view may serve for the (...) description of different patterns of causal relations in such a way, that statistical relationships corresponding to each pattern may be derived. It gives also examples of such a derivation for some less complicated cases. The second part of the paper is an attempt of application of proposed method to the understanding and critical consideration of some standard techniques of statistical analysis, especially those mostly used in social sciences. (shrink)

How does affectivity contribute to moral judgment making? -- Normative dissonance vs. the order of argumentation -- Facing otherness as an ethical experiment -- The concepts of respect revisited -- What is universal? Between subjectivity and intersubjectivity -- Experimenting with values in legal contexts : Hegel and Radbruch -- Democracy begins in the mind. Developing democratic personality.

Do technologies advance our self-identities, as they do our bodies or cognitive skills? Are doomed to disintegration and an episodic self? This book examines how technologies affect our selves from the perspective of health humanities (e.g., transplantology, bionics, disability studies), phenomenology, philosophy of mind and posthumanism.

Examines widespread myths about transhumanism and explores the most pressing ethical issues in the debate over technologically assisted human enhancement.

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins’ view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since (...) it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins’ argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything. (shrink)

"Der vorliegende Band geht auf logikbezogene Spurensuche und vereinigt durchdachte, hochintelligente und zahlreiche neue Einsichten versprechende Texte. Wer sich ernsthaft mit Musik beschäftigt, sollte sich diesen Band nicht entgehen lassen." (bs, Musica sacra 4/2015) Texte zur Praxis, Theorie und Ästhetik der Musik beanspruchen den Begriff ›musikalische Logik‹, wobei die Vorstellungen über Geltung, Inhalt und Umfang dieses Begriffes weit divergieren. Im vorliegenden Buch wird eine problemgeschichtliche Klärung unternommen. Musikalische Logik erweist sich als Inbegriff der Bedingungen, unter welchen Musik als in sich (...) selbst begründeter Prozess erscheinen kann. Sie besteht in einem musikalischen Denken, dessen Zusammenhang generiert wird durch Differenzierung von Klangrelationen und Zeitmaßen, durch Bildung von Verknüpfungsweisen und Verlaufsformen, durch den variativen Gebrauch der resultierenden Modelle sowie durch Aufhebung und Neubildung der Konstituenten; als produktives Denken lässt sich das musikalische Denken die Wege nicht festlegen, die sich für seine Ausdrucks- und Kommunikationsweise bewährt haben. Musikalische Logik kann sich in voraushörbarer Konsequenz zeigen, aber auch und besonders in der Art, wie sich ein nicht zu antizipierender Prozess als in sich begründet erweist. Die Vielfalt der Möglichkeiten spricht nicht gegen die Erwartung von Logik in der Musik, sondern erfüllt die Eigenart des Logischen im Bereich des Schaffens gegenüber dem Logischen im Bereich des Erkennens. Die historische Darstellung führt von der Spätantike bis in die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Texts on the practice, theory and aesthetics of music make use of the term ‘musical logic’, although conceptions of the application, content and scope of the term differ greatly. This book attempts to solve this historical problem. Musical logic proves to be the embodiment of the conditions under which music can appear as a process founded in itself. It consists of musical thinking with ist context generated by the differentiation of relationships between sounds and of tempi, by the creation of forms of connection and progression, by the variational use of the resulting models and the suspension and re-creation of the constituent parts; as a form of productive thinking, music cannot define proven means for ist own expression and communication. Musical logic can manifest itself in consequences that can be aurally predicted, but also, and especially, in the ways in which a process that cannot be anticipated proves to be founded in itself. The range of possibilities does not contradict the expectation of logic in music but conforms to the peculiarity of logic in the sphere of creation as opposed to logic in the sphere of cognition. The historical presentation ranges from late antiquity to the mid 20th century. (shrink)

t. 1. Dialektyka.--t. 2. Ontologia i epistemologia.

"Provides translations of Bolzano's most important work on grounding, including previously untranslated material"--.

Stefan Collini challenges the common claim that universities need to show that they help to make money in order to justify getting more money.

In this chapter we deal with the challenge to the existence of free will and moral responsibility that is raised by the threat of determinism from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Our argument starts by briefly recapitulating Wittgenstein’s analysis of the practice of doubt in On Certainty. We subsequently turn to the problem of free will. We argue that the existence of free will is a basic certainty and that the thesis of determinism fails to cast doubt on it. We thereby make (...) use of – but also try to go beyond – Wittgenstein’s own remarks in his “Lectures on Freedom of the Will”. In the final section we focus more explicitly on moral responsibility. Inspired by P.F. Strawson’s work on free will and moral responsibility, which we take to be deeply Wittgensteinian, we argue that our practices of holding each other responsible manifest basic human certainties which cannot be meaningfully challenged by invoking the thesis of determinism. (shrink)

Users of sociotechnical systems often have no way to independently verify whether the system output which they use to make decisions is correct; they are epistemically dependent on the system. We argue that this leads to problems when the system is wrong, namely to bad decisions and violations of the norm of practical reasoning. To prevent this from occurring we suggest the implementation of defeaters: information that a system is unreliable in a specific case (undercutting defeat) or independent information that (...) the output is wrong (rebutting defeat). Practically, we suggest to design defeaters based on the different ways in which a system might produce erroneous outputs, and analyse this suggestion with a case study of the risk classification algorithm used by the Dutch tax agency. (shrink)

The paper begins with a proposal for a reconstruction of three major statements of the traditional Marxian version of historical materialism. The general concept of an adaptive mechanism is introduced to explain how, in the Marxian sense, several parts of the superstructure are to be thought of as determined by the economic base. The paper proceeds by asking whether the classical type of economic determination is valid not only for precapitalist and capitalist societies, but for socialist societies as well. An (...) answer in the negative is given. The author tries to outline a type of historical materialism which takes into account the autonomous role of political institutions and social relations as determinants in socialist societies. (shrink)

In order to explain that sentences containing empty definite descriptions are nevertheless true or false, Russell famously analyzes sentences of the form ‘The F is G’ as ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’. Against this it has been objected that Russell’s analysis provides the wrong truth-conditions when it comes to non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. For example, according to Heim, Kripke, and Elbourne (HKE), there are circumstances in which (1) is true and (2) is false. Hans wants the ghost (...) in his attic to be quiet tonight.Hans wants there to be exactly one ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet tonight. After all, the argument goes, unlike (2), (1) can be true without Hans wanting there to be exactly one ghost in his attic. Kaplan and Neale famously reply that the HKE objection presupposes that non-doxastic attitudes are closed under entailment, which they are not. For Rostworowski, on the other hand, the problematic principle used by the HKE objection is a substitutivity principle for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. This is further supported by the fact that, as Elbourne points out, Russell’s analysis already leads to a problem similar to the HKE objection together with substitutivity alone. By questioning substitutivity for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, Rostworowski tries to block both the HKE objection and Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection. In this paper, I will argue that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions leads to a variant of the HKE objection even in the context of doxastic attitude ascriptions. Since, as we will see, doxastic attitude ascriptions do not seem to suffer from the substitutivity problems discussed by Rostworowski in the context of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, this will further exacerbate the problem for Russell’s analysis. I will then discuss the possibility to reject substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions using a contextualist analysis of attitude ascriptions. However, we will see that, independent of whether we accept substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions, a complete solution of the doxastic problem has to reject Russell’s analysis of the truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘The F is G’. Concluding, I will show that, unlike Russell’s analysis, the Frege–Strawson analysis of definite descriptions, according to which a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ presupposes that there is exactly one F, rather than asserting it, provides an explanation of the HKE objection, Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection, and the doxastic problem presented in this paper. This will speak not only in favor of a Fregean analysis of definite descriptions, but also of a Fregean conception of propositions. (shrink)

Transhumanism : in a nutshell -- On a silicon-based transhumanism -- On a carbon-based transhumanism -- A fictive ethics -- The end of the beginning.

Wenn digitale Technologien wie künstliche Intelligenz, Blockchain und Robotik auf die Medizin treffen, entstehen zwangsläufig ethische Fragestellungen. Diese lassen sich nicht ohne Weiteres mit medizinisch-technologischen, rechtlichen oder ökonomischen Argumenten allein beantworten. Neue Themenfelder wie die sich wandelnde Rolle der Patienten, die neue Verantwortung von Ärzten und Pflegenden, neue digitale Möglichkeiten in der Medizin, Smart Hospitals im Klinikalltag, die gesellschaftliche Legitimität eines möglichen dritten Datengesundheitsmarktes, eine zukunftsfeste Ausbildungslandschaft für den Gesundheits-/Medizinbereich sowie die Grenzen der digitalen Forschung bedürfen einer kritischen und gleichzeitig (...) thematisch breiten Auseinandersetzung mit ethischen Aspekten in der digitalen Gesundheitswirtschaft und Medizin. (shrink)

Das Werk entkräftet das Vorurteil, Kants Philosophie sei für eine Reflexion der kulturellen Welt unzureichend. Klingner entwickelt die Option einer Kulturphilosophie als Theorie technischer Vernunft mit Bezug auf den kantischen Kulturbegriff und auf seinen Philosophiebegriff. Damit erweist sich zugleich, dass eine kantische Kulturphilosophie rekonstruierbar und in ihrem Gehalt auch heute noch diskussionswürdig ist.

Towards a critical posthumanism -- Genealogy of posthumanism -- Our posthuman humanity and the multiplicity of its forms -- Posthumanism and science fiction -- Interdisciplinarity and the posthumanities -- Posthumanism, digitalization, and new media -- Posthumanity, subject, and system -- Other side of life.

Throughout his philosophical work, Schelling came to increasingly emphasize his conviction that the ultimate principles of philosophy are essentially practical: the ego formally conceived as act in early philosophy, creation as the unfolding of structurally rich action in late philosophy. It remained unclear, however, exactly what constituted the practicality of these principles, namely which concept of action Schelling used and how it is being integrated into the totality of his system. The task this study sets itself is to investigate into (...) these issues in respect to his middle and late philosophy. With the doctrine of potencies serving as point of departure, spirit is first reconstructed as practical consciousness. Creation as an ontotheological original act with the historical world as the space of human action is then systematically developed. Freedom, foresight, purposefulness, intentionality and futurity prove to be the central practical attributes of both human and divine action. Their connection is manifested in the religious consciousness of man and instantiated metaphysically in the relationship of time and eternity. Schelling's positive philosophy shows that these practical aspects are the irreducable prerequisites to render the historical world process intelligible. (shrink)

This chapter discusses some of the central theoretical perspectives on culture and cultural practices implied in Pragmatism and interactive constructivism. The first part of the chapter highlights three major perspectives on cultural theory to be found in Dewey's thought: culture and experience, culture and habit, and culture and communication. The chapter then compares basic conceptual tools and interpretive approaches and shows that Dewey's work continues to provide fundamental resources in this field. Through this connection, it presents a brief introduction to (...) theories of discourse and power and discusses some implications for current controversies regarding multiculturalism. It argues that Dewey's Pragmatism and the Cologne program of interactive constructivism share a robust interest in culture and cultural diversity. (shrink)