In Perplexity in the Moral Life Santurri discusses how situations of moral perplexity are to be construed and how the interpretation of these situations might be constrained by the presuppositions of Christian ethics.

In "The Law of Peoples" John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls "political realism." Here, I contend that a certain version of "Christian political realism" survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of "empirical political realism" is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of "normative political realism" is in (...) tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in "The Law of Peoples." That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work. (shrink)

The author provides explicit philosophical terminology to clarify Kierkegaard's notion of a "teleological suspension of the ethical." He claims that the feature of Abraham's act that placed it beyond the sphere of the ethical was the impossibility of describing it as part of a way of life that one is prepared to commend to others. Thus, the only appropriate response to Abraham is silence.

Aquinas holds that human actions are directed to a last end which is the supreme good and the complete satisfaction of the agent’s desires. He confronts serious difficulties in explaining how morally wrong or sinful choices and renunciatory acts are possible and in avoiding psychological egoism. The distinction that he makes between the concept of the last end as the fulfillment of desire and the object (God) in which that ful fillment is found enables him to alleviate these difficulties but (...) still leaves him with a predominantly instrumental view of morality. (shrink)

The author notes an unclarity in David Novak's defense of Reinhold Niebuhr against Stanley Hauerwas's critique and identifies some issues left unsettled in the exchange between Novak and Hauerwas over Niebuhr's ethics. Specifically, the author proposes that the Barthian-Hauerwasian communitarian rejection of Niebuhrian natural theology and natural law ignores the historical abuse of biblical theology in the German Christian response to the Nazis, fails to account for the fact of general moral revulsion against Nazism, and flirts itself with a conventionalist (...) form of nihilism. (shrink)

In response to Meilaender’s critique of my earlier work, I argue that Rawlsian and Augustinian ‘liberalisms’ are closer in spirit than Meilaender allows. Rawlsians and Augustinians can agree that the concern to preserve temporal peace under modern pluralistic conditions affords a warrant for political arrangements that require allegiance to no particular all-encompassing world view. This agreement on a certain kind of political neutrality extends to constitutional essentials but does not prohibit appeals to particular comprehensive visions in political debate so long (...) as such appeals are consistent with maintaining the social peace that liberal institutions are designed to preserve. (shrink)

This volume examines some of the most contentious social justice issues present in the corpus of Augustine's writings. Whether one is concerned with human trafficking and the contemporary slave trade, the global economy, or endless wars, these essays further the conversation on social justice as informed by the writings of Augustine of Hippo.

Virtue and the Moral Life brings together distinguished philosophers and theologians with younger scholars of consummate promise to produce ten essays that engage both academics and students of ethics. This collection explores the role virtues play in identifying the good life and the good society.

Virtue and the Moral Life brings together distinguished philosophers and theologians with younger scholars of consummate promise to produce ten essays that engage both academics and students of ethics. This collection explores the role virtues play in identifying the good life and the good society.

Barth and Niebuhr seemed to be wary of natural law because each of them thought that the “natural” in natural law means that natural law has to be rooted in natural theology. However, natural law today is more cogently formulated without any natural theology at all. “Natural law” means that law can be derived from the twofold character or nature of human personhood: the capacity for a communal relationship with other humans, and the capacity for a covenantal relationship with God, (...) both of which continually overlap in human life. The natural or external world only provides the backdrop for these human capacities; it does not determine them. (shrink)

The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes. Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as "Typescript C") on which Husserl wrote in 1933: "Cartes. Meditationen (...) / Originaltext 1929 / E. Husserl / für Dorion Cairns". Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserl’s practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a foornote. The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the other – usually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote. (shrink)

En los esfuerzos de Descartes por encontrar una verdad indubitable en absoluto, Para partir de ella y reconstruir el saber humano entero y aun la vida humana toda, no pod a menos de reconocer Husserl un primer y principal antecedente cl sico preciso de sus propios esfuerzos por constituir definitivamente la filosof a en ciencia rigurosa. Estas Meditaciones son una breve y especialmente accesible -adem s de completa- exposici n de la fenomenolog a; su importancia, inter s y utilidad las (...) ha convertido en la obra por la cual su autor es m s conocido y justifican plenamente que sean incluidas en la colecci n Conmemorativa del FCE, que las public por vez primera en 1986. (shrink)

Die beiden in dieser Studienausgabe veroffentlichten Haupt­ texte wurden von Husserl vom Oktober bis Dezember 1910 ge­ schrieben. Sie wurden zum erst en Mal 1973 im Band XIII der H usserliana, Edmund H usserl, Gesammelte Werke, veroffent­ licht.! Beim ersten Text (S. 1ft) handelt es sich urn eine person­ liche Vorbereitung fur die Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" vom Wintersemester 1910/11, beim zweiten Text (S. 15ft) urn Husserls Manuskript dieser Vorlesungen. Dieses hier abgedruckte Manuskript gibt nicht die ganzen wahrend eines (...) Semesters in zwei W ochenstunden gehaltenen Vorlesungen wie­ der, sondern nur ihren erst en Teil, wohl bis Weihnachten 1910. N ach Husserls eigenen Angaben knupften sich an dies en Teil Dis­ kussionen, in denen er ohne Manuskript frei sprach.2 Diese Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" wa­ ren fur Husserl von entscheidender Bedeutung. In zwei von ihm selbst publizierten Schriften, in Formale und transzendentale Lo­ gik (1929) (Husserliana XVII, S. 250, Anm. 1) und im Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) (Husserliana V, S. 150, Anm.), weist Husserl auf diese Vorlesungen, und auch in seinem Nachlass wird 1 Und zwar als Texte Nr. 5 und Nr. 6. Diese Nummerierung sowie auch diejenige der zugehorigen Beilagen wurde in dieser Studienausgabe beibehalten. Die urspriing­ lichen Seitenzahlen der Husserliana-Ausgabe werden in eckigen Klammern wieder­ gegeben. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology. The Logical Investigations is Edmund Husserl's most famous work and has had a decisive impact on the direction of twentieth century philosophy. This is the first time both volumes of this classic work, translated by J.N. Findlay, have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Logical Investigations in historical context and bringing out its importance for contemporary philosophy.

CELL AND PSYCHE THE BIOLOGY OF PURPOSE By EDMUND W. SINNOTT. PREFACE TO THE TORCHBOOK EDITION: SINCE the publication of this little book, as the McNair Lectures at the University of North Carolina, the author has written two others, as well as a number of papers, on the same gen eral theme. Though these elaborate the argument a little further, the essence of it is in Cell and Psyche. This is admittedly a specula tion, but one based solidly on (...) biological fact. It has been regarded as rather visionary and metaphysical by some people, but others have been attracted to it by the suggestion it offers for a better understanding of the ancient problem of how mind and body are related to each other. This problem is of such paramount impor tance, not only for a knowledge of what man really is but for the construction of a satisfying life philosophy, that any light thrown on it should be welcome. The suggestion that man's physical life grows out of the basic goal-seeking and purposiveness found in all organic behavior and that this, in turn, is an aspect of the more general self - regulating and normative character evident in the development and activities of living organisms, is at least worth serious consideration. If we are to avoid a dualistic idea of man's nature and to construct a true monism that does not require the sacrifice of the significance of either mind or body, some such conception as this seems a rea sonable means of doing so. It is to be hoped that the wider distri bution now made possible for the present book may result in a more general consideration of this particular relationship between biol ogy and philosophy* E. W. S. CONTENTS: Introduction. i I. Organization, the Distinctive Character of All Life 15 II. Biological Organization and Psychological Activity 43 IIL Some Implications for Philosophy 75 Suggested Readings. 112 Index. 117. INTRODUCTION: IN THE CLAMOR and confusion of our times one fact grows ever clearer beliefs are important. One of the major problems with which men now are faced per haps, indeed, the most important one is the wide dis agreement which still exists in their fundamental philos ophies. What course a man will follow, or a nation, is set in no small measure by his basic creed, by what he really thinks about the true nature of a human being his personality, his freedom, his destiny, his relations to others and to the rest of the universe; by the judgments lie makes as to what qualities and courses of action are admirable and should command his allegiance. These are not academic questions merely. They arc ancient mys teries which long have troubled human hearts and seem today almost as far as ever from solution. The answer a ny* n gives to them is the most significant thing that one can know about him. We may be tempted to under estimate the importance of these inner directives and turn instead to outer influences, to economic and social factors, as more decisive for our actions. But when we look at what the philosophy of Marx has done to set one half the world against the other, at the basic divergence between the thinking of East and West, and at so many other differences in political and religious beliefs which now divide mankind, we can hardly doubt the profound practical import of men's philosophies. It is still true today that as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he. In the minds of men are the most fateful battles fought. Against those ideologies we condemn, force in the end will fail. If our opponents cannot be convinced, or their ideas reconci. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Origins and Evolution of Bioethics: Some Personal ReflectionsEdmund D. Pellegrino (bio)AbstractBioethics was officially baptized in 1972, but its birth took place a decade or so before that date. Since its birth, what is known today as bioethics has undergone a complex conceptual metamorphosis. This essay loosely divides that metamorphosis into three stages: an educational, an ethical, and a global stage. In the educational era, bioethics focused on a (...) perceived “dehumanization” of medicine by the rising power of science and technology. Remedies were sought by introducing humanities, ethics, and human “values” into the medical curriculum. Ethics was one among the humanistic disciplines, but not the dominant one. In the second era, ethics assumed a dominant role as ever more complex dilemmas emerged from the rapid pace of biological research. As such dilemmas were applied to medical practice, the need for a more rigorous and more formal analysis of their moral status was clear. Philosophically-trained ethicists had an obvious role. They began to teach, write, and profoundly influence medical education and practice. In the third—and present—period, the breadth of problems has become so broad that ethicists must, themselves, draw on disciplines well beyond their expertise—e.g., law, religion, anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and the like. The era of bioethics as a global enterprise is upon us. The original hope for humanizing medicine has not been overtly successful; however, much has been accomplished of value to patients, the profession, and society. Medical morality has been transformed into a formal, systematic study of a whole range of issues of the greatest significance to humanity. Now the major challenge is one of identity, or inter-relationships and connections between the theoretical and the practical. Bioethics has outgrown its beginnings.I have been invited to give a “personal recollection” of the early development of bioethics. Such invitations are notoriously hard to resist, but also problematic when they are the recollections of a participant [End Page 73] in the events to be described. We need only be reminded of the vagaries common to the plethora of memoirs on the book stands today. Few have escaped the perils of selective memory, self-promotion, or the settling of old scores. Yet their perils notwithstanding, memoirs may serve some useful purpose. They are the raw material—verbal kitchen middens so to speak—out of which historians can later sift fact from fancy. They enable “tribal elders” to give witness to the past from which the present can fashion some sense of continuity.I will organize my reflections around three very arbitrary time periods that represent my own way of thinking about the evolution of bioethics: (1) an era of “proto-bioethics” (1960–1972), (2) an era of philosophical bioethics (1972–1985), and (3) an era of global bioethics (1985-present). Each era, of course, overlaps with the others, and the dominant strand of each runs through the others as well.In the proto-bioethics period, the language of human values predominated; in the era of bioethics philosophically construed, it was the language of philosophical ethics; and in the era of bioethics globally construed, the social and behavioral sciences have gained greater prominence. In each period, interest in the traditional humanities other than philosophy waxed and waned. In the earlier years, religion and theology predominated. Beginning in the 1970s, philosophy took a dominant role. In the last two decades, other disciplines, like law, literature, and the social sciences, have exerted more and more influence (McNeur 1963; Pellegrino 1997; Barker 1987).I make no pretense here of writing any part of the formal “history” of bioethics. Works of this nature are beginning to appear (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 1998 ; Dell’Oro and Viafora 1996). Thomas McElhinney and I are preparing our own account of the work and influence of the Institute on Human Values in Medicine, one of the influential programs of the Society for Health and Human Values (Pellegrino and McElhinney, n.d.). Space limitations as well as prudence preclude any attempt to do justice to all the events, institutions, and people who have made the field of bioethics what it is today. I apologize for these omissions, for any unintentional lapses of... (shrink)

THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research (...) manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A. (shrink)

Die beiden in dieser Studienausgabe veroffentlichten Haupt­ texte wurden von Husserl vom Oktober bis Dezember 1910 ge­ schrieben. Sie wurden zum erst en Mal 1973 im Band XIII der H usserliana, Edmund H usserl, Gesammelte Werke, veroffent­ licht.! Beim ersten Text (S. 1ft) handelt es sich urn eine person­ liche Vorbereitung fur die Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" vom Wintersemester 1910/11, beim zweiten Text (S. 15ft) urn Husserls Manuskript dieser Vorlesungen. Dieses hier abgedruckte Manuskript gibt nicht die ganzen wahrend eines (...) Semesters in zwei W ochenstunden gehaltenen Vorlesungen wie­ der, sondern nur ihren erst en Teil, wohl bis Weihnachten 1910. N ach Husserls eigenen Angaben knupften sich an dies en Teil Dis­ kussionen, in denen er ohne Manuskript frei sprach.2 Diese Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" wa­ ren fur Husserl von entscheidender Bedeutung. In zwei von ihm selbst publizierten Schriften, in Formale und transzendentale Lo­ gik (1929) (Husserliana XVII, S. 250, Anm. 1) und im Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) (Husserliana V, S. 150, Anm.), weist Husserl auf diese Vorlesungen, und auch in seinem Nachlass wird 1 Und zwar als Texte Nr. 5 und Nr. 6. Diese Nummerierung sowie auch diejenige der zugehorigen Beilagen wurde in dieser Studienausgabe beibehalten. Die urspriing­ lichen Seitenzahlen der Husserliana-Ausgabe werden in eckigen Klammern wieder­ gegeben. (shrink)

On accorde d'ordinaire un rôle important à la phonétique dans la description et l'explication phonologiques, en synchronie comme en diachronie. Le présent article met en doute la pertinence de ces facteurs. La palatalisation des consonnes vélaires en polonais remonte au 16ème siècle et s'observe devant voyelle antérieure. Son résultat moderne sont des alternances entre [k, g, x] et [c, ɟ, ç], alternances qui produisent également une distribution sérieusement restreinte de la seconde série de consonnes. En s'appuyant sur des faits synchroniques, (...) diachroniques et dialectaux, l'auteur montre qu'il n'existe aucun lien de cause à effet entre le changement et son contexte. Les analyses antérieures sont basées sur un examen incomplet des données et un enracinement fort dans l'approche phonéticienne qui fait crédit au conditionnement phonétique des régularités phonologiques. Si l'on apprécie l'ensemble des données pertinentes qui sont à notre disposition, la supposée naturalité du processus qui palatalise des consonnes vélaires devant de voyelle antérieure s'avère relever de l'illusion. La conclusion provisoire est que tout conditionnement phonétique qui se veut linguistiquement pertinent doit être phonologiquement fondé. (shrink)