The principal contemporary moral views are treated under three headings: 1) Intuitionism, represented by G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross; 2) Emotivism, as expounded by C. L. Stevenson; and 3) Prescriptivism, R. M. Hare's view. Warnock carefully distinguishes the questions these views were designed to answer from the questions which he feels they do in fact answer. Warnock emphasizes throughout the problem of the relation between moral discourse and conduct, as well as the question of (...) the possibility of moral "argument" in the sense of giving "reasons" for a moral viewpoint. In the latter half of the volume Warnock sketches what he takes to be some of the necessary requirements for a more adequate moral theory. He discusses "Naturalism" and rejects the blanket term as misleading unless the precise view one labels "naturalistic" is spelled out. Warnock distinguishes two "anti-naturalist" views: 1) that description and evaluation are different, i.e., that evaluation is not "reducible" to description and 2) that they are logically independent. He considers 1) a platitude. He accepts 2), but rejects what might be considered a further implication of this view—that absolutely anything might be regarded as a criterion of evaluation. In conclusion Warnock suggests that it might be profitable to look for the distinctive features of moral discourse in the content rather than the form. A good introduction to critical thinking, Warnock's account raises more questions than it answers.—C. L. H. (shrink)

CHARLES LESLIE STEVENSON, Associate Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, though an American, has an important place in the evolution of British ethics in this century. It was in Mind that his first papers on ethics were published in 1937-8. They had considerable influence in Britain in promoting the emotive-persuasive theory of moral language. The author of the theory that much of philosophy and ethics is persuasive rhetoric, was himself a plausible illustration of his own theory. His (...) breeziness of style seemed to sweep difficulties out of the way. His papers had an unconventionality which appealed all the more to the younger generation of philosophers because it shocked the older. He seemed to discredit critics by not appearing able to understand the archaic language they were talking. The ideas of these early papers were taken up into a book, Ethics and Language published in 1944. The book is more ponderous and indeed somewhat pedantic. In it, Stevenson’s ideas lose in freshness what they gain in professorial gravity. But the impressive size of the book, the number and variety of the examples of moral argument which it discussed, the apparently wide range of the treatment, made the book for some time a sort of bible of emotivism. The book was also important as the first major study of ethics based on the neo-Wittgensteinian slogan that moral philosophy is the analysis of moral language. (shrink)

CHARLES LESLIE STEVENSON, Associate Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, though an American, has an important place in the evolution of British ethics in this century. It was in Mind that his first papers on ethics were published in 1937-8. They had considerable influence in Britain in promoting the emotive-persuasive theory of moral language. The author of the theory that much of philosophy and ethics is persuasive rhetoric, was himself a plausible illustration of his own theory. His (...) breeziness of style seemed to sweep difficulties out of the way. His papers had an unconventionality which appealed all the more to the younger generation of philosophers because it shocked the older. He seemed to discredit critics by not appearing able to understand the archaic language they were talking. The ideas of these early papers were taken up into a book, Ethics and Language published in 1944. The book is more ponderous and indeed somewhat pedantic. In it, Stevenson’s ideas lose in freshness what they gain in professorial gravity. But the impressive size of the book, the number and variety of the examples of moral argument which it discussed, the apparently wide range of the treatment, made the book for some time a sort of bible of emotivism. The book was also important as the first major study of ethics based on the neo-Wittgensteinian slogan that moral philosophy is the analysis of moral language. (shrink)

CHARLES LESLIE STEVENSON, Associate Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, though an American, has an important place in the evolution of British ethics in this century. It was in Mind that his first papers on ethics were published in 1937-8. They had considerable influence in Britain in promoting the emotive-persuasive theory of moral language. The author of the theory that much of philosophy and ethics is persuasive rhetoric, was himself a plausible illustration of his own theory. His (...) breeziness of style seemed to sweep difficulties out of the way. His papers had an unconventionality which appealed all the more to the younger generation of philosophers because it shocked the older. He seemed to discredit critics by not appearing able to understand the archaic language they were talking. The ideas of these early papers were taken up into a book, Ethics and Language published in 1944. The book is more ponderous and indeed somewhat pedantic. In it, Stevenson’s ideas lose in freshness what they gain in professorial gravity. But the impressive size of the book, the number and variety of the examples of moral argument which it discussed, the apparently wide range of the treatment, made the book for some time a sort of bible of emotivism. The book was also important as the first major study of ethics based on the neo-Wittgensteinian slogan that moral philosophy is the analysis of moral language. (shrink)

In this thesis I shall summarize and critically examine the central features of the theories of values of four contemporary moral philosophers: A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, R.M. Hare, and P.H. Nowell - Smith. I shall first look back, however, to the theory of moral philosophy of the most influential 'forefather' of this group, David Hume. Hume's theory stands as a challenge to moral philosophers who would assume that moral judgments are primarily, in some sense, acts of 'reason'. Although our (...) four contemporaries follow Hume in this, his challenge, in the form I shall indicate shortly, will provide the main theme for this thesis. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Stevenson's major contribution to philosophy was his development of emotivism, a theory of ethical language according to which moral judgments do not state any sort of fact, but rather express the moral emotions of the speaker and attempt to influence others. Stevenson's emotive theory of ethical language Some advantages of emotivism Some difficulties for emotivism Some related theories.

This expanded edition of C L Hardin's ground-breaking work on colour features a new chapter, 'Further Thoughts: 1993', in which the author revisits the dispute ...

THE emotive theory of ethics made its first brief and rather tentative appearance in The Meaning of Meaning by Ogden and Richards in 1922. It did not gain currency, however, nor receive anything like a complete formulation until it was adopted by Logical Positivism, and in particular by A J Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer’s account was soon superseded by that of Charles L Stevenson, whose views were finally elaborated in Ethics and Language in 1942. This, the (...) classic statement of emotivism, is one of the great works of moral philosophy of this century, worthy to be ranked with the Principia Ethica of G E Moore. (shrink)

This detailed and sympathetic, but not uncritical, study of On Liberty' argues for the general consistency and coherence of Mill's defence of individual liberty, but maintains that there are significant non-utilitarian elements in his arguments.

One dark and rainy night, Yuso sexually assaults and tortures Zelan. In escaping from the scene of his crime, he falls heavily and becomes an impotent paraplegic. Instead of treating his fate as divine retribution for his wicked acts, Yuso sees it as sheer bad luck. He shows no remorse for what he has done, and vainly hopes that he will recover his powers, which he now treats as involuntarily hoarded resources to be used on less rainy days. In the (...) presence of others, he pretends that he has turned over a new leaf. He asks for religious and educational books, hoping to make up for his poor education and deprived social background. But he immediately discards them when he is alone in favor of the pornographic magazines which he has bribed a nurse to smuggle in for him. His deception and various obscene acts committed in the hospital are exposed; by the time he comes up for trial, everyone knows that he is still a lustful, sadistic, and unrepentant man. Most retributivists have a sufficient justification for punishing Yuso independently of the social consequences of his punishment. Two features of the case might cause some difficulties. First, Yuso has already experienced considerable suffering and deprivation both before and after his crime, and retributivists might disagree about the relevance of the suffering to his punishment. Secondly, Yuso is unrepentant, and it is unlikely that punishment will change him. This might, as we shall see, create a problem for those who think that the justifying aim of punishment is the moral reform of the offender. (shrink)