Over the years, egalitarian philosophers have made some challenging claims about the nature of egalitarianism. They have argued that egalitarian reasoning should make us reject the Pareto principle; that the Rawlsian leximin principle is not an egalitarian idea; that the Pigou–Dalton principle needs modification; that the intersection approach faces deep problems; that the numbers should not count within an egalitarian framework, and that egalitarianism should make us reject the property of transitivity in normative reasoning. In this paper, taking the recent (...) philosophical debate on equality versus priority as the starting point, I review these claims from the point of view of an economist. (shrink)

The most influential egalitarian perspective is undoubtedly Rawls's (1971, 1993), which assigns absolute priority to the least advantaged in society (the difference principle). However, many have claimed that even though an egalitarian perspective should imply some priority to the worst off, the Rawlsian perspective is too demanding. One response to this criticism is to argue in favour of an egalitarian perspective that never assigns absolute priority to the worse off, but which still includes limited priority to those members of society (...) in distributive conflicts. A different response to the demandingness criticism is to agree that the worse off should not always be given absolute priority, but to argue that there are some cases where they should be. In this paper, we elaborate on this view, and look at the possibility of deviating from the leximin approach within this category of egalitarian principles. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences, and that introspection of emotional experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non-classificatory introspective state, i.e., one that does not depend on the subject’s classifying the introspected emotion as an instance of any experience type. We call such a non-classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection. Our main goal is to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection (...) is a necessary ground to acquire knowledge of emotions. Our main argument is phenomenological: by examining a variety of examples, we suggest that an accurate analysis of the introspective process through which one comes to know, or refines one’s knowledge of, one’s current emotion requires that one primitively introspects it. (shrink)

This paper discusses the argument for preference utilitarianism proposed by Richard Hare in Moral Thinking(Hare, 1981). G. F. Schueler (1984) and Ingmar Persson (1989) identified a serious gap in Hare’s reasoning, which might be called the No-Conflict Problem. The paper first tries to fill the gap. Then, however, starting with an idea of Zeno Vendler, the question is raised whether the gap is there to begin with. Unfortunately, this Vendlerian move does not save Hare from criticism. Paradoxically, it instead endangers (...) the whole argumentative enterprise. (shrink)

We shall focus on moral theories that are solely concerned with promoting the benefits (e.g., wellbeing) of individuals and explore the possibility of such theories ascribing some priority to benefits to those who are worse off—without this priority being absolute. Utilitarianism (which evaluates alternatives on the basis of total or average benefits) ascribes no priority to the worse off, and leximin (which evaluates alternatives by giving lexical priority to the worst off, and then the second worst off, and so on) (...) ascribes absolute priority to the worse off (i.e., favors even a very small benefit to a worse off person over very large benefits to large numbers of better off people). Neither extreme view, we assume, is plausible. (shrink)

Summary A. Vagueness is not definable in terms of behaviour (Section 4).

Körner's notion of vagueness, its relation to ostension and the alledged gulf between logic and experience are examined. Ostension is seen not to cause vagueness ~ there are precise concepts of mathematics which can be ostensively introduced. A distinction is drawn between classical logic not applying to the vague world and not applying to the vague language. The claims about logic and the vague world are unverifiable claims about existence. Körner's attempt to elimmate the seeming incompatibility between vague language and (...) logic leads to a Protagorean relativism which is rejected. It is denied that the incompatibility between vagueness and classical logic causes a gulf between two sublanguages; instead, ordinary language is held to contain both and so to be inconsistent. (shrink)

Körner's notion of vagueness, its relation to ostension and the alledged gulf between logic and experience are examined. Ostension is seen not to cause vagueness ~ there are precise concepts of mathematics which can be ostensively mtroduced. A distinction is drawn between classical logic not applymg to the vague world and not applymg to the vague language. The claims about logic and the vague world are unverifiable claims about existence. Körner's attempt to elimmate the seeming incompatibility between vague language and (...) logic leads to a Protagorean relativism which is rejected. It is denied that the incompatibility between vagueness and classical logic causes a gulf between two sublanguages; mstead, ordinary language is held to contam both and so to be inconsistent. (shrink)

In a seminal paper of 1923 on vagueness, Bertrand Russell discussed some of the most important problems concerning the nature of vagueness, its extension within the language, and its relation to truth and logic. The present paper inquires into Russell's theory. The following topics will be analysed and discussed in turn in sections 1?5: Russell's definition of vagueness; his claim that all phrases are vague; his theory of the source of the vagueness in our language; his principles for the transmission (...) of vagueness; and his claim that logic is incompatible with vagueness. This paper is an attempt to give a rational reconstruction of Russell's position as expressed in his paper. Compatible passages in other of his works are also studied. (shrink)

School-based Physical Education is important, especially to students with disabilities whose participation in physical activities out of school is limited. The development over time of participation-related constructs in relation to students’ perceived functioning and achievement is explored. Students in mainstream inclusive secondary school self-rated their PE-specific self-efficacy, general school self-efficacy, aptitude to participate in PE, and perceived physical and socio-cognitive functional skills at two timepoints, year 7 and year 9. Results were compared between three groups of students with: disabilities, high (...) grades, or low grades in PE. Over time, perceived physical skills of students with disabilities became strongly associated with self-efficacy and aptitude to participate. Perceived socio-cognitive skills in the study sample improved and had a positive effect on PE-specific self-efficacy. Efforts should be made to limit the accelerated negative impact of perceived restricted functioning of students with disabilities. Grading criteria need to be developed to comply with standards adapted to fit abilities of students with disabilities. Meaningful learning experiences appear to be created when participation is promoted and capacity beliefs are boosted. Allocating resources to support the development of students’ socio-cognitive skills seem to have potential for overall positive school outcome. (shrink)

Utopian rationalism names the belief that science has made utopia a practical possibility. Its characteristics include determinism, collectivism, distrust of individual initiative and belief in the superiority of collective planning in securing human happiness. The first section traces the utopian and dystopian tradition into modern science fiction. The ideas collected here are systematized in the next section, which on all points dismisses the tenets and claims of utopian rationalism as false, and in a final section, which discusses utopian thinking and (...) its dangers in general. Utopian thinking is traced to three traits of human nature, namely, the quests for happiness, perfection, and submergence. (shrink)

Fairness preferences fundamentally affect individual behavior and play an important role in shaping social and political institutions. However, people differ both with respect to what they view as fair and with respect to how much weight they attach to fairness considerations. In this article, we study the role of family background in explaining these heterogeneities in fairness preferences. In particular, we examine how socioeconomic background relates to fairness views and to how people make trade-offs between fairness and self-interest. To study (...) this, we conducted an economic experiment with a representative sample of 14- to 15-year-old and matched the experimental data to administrative data on parental income and education. The participants made two distributive choices in the experiment. The first choice was to distribute money between themselves and another participant in a situation where there was no difference in merit. The second choice was to distribute money between two other participants with unequal merits. Our main finding is that there is a systematic difference in fairness view between children from low-socioceconomic status families and the rest of the participants; more than 50 percent of the participants from low-SES families are egalitarians, whereas only about 20 percent in the rest of the sample hold this fairness view. In contrast, we find no significant difference in the weight attached to fairness between children from different socioeconomic groups. (shrink)

Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...) (i.e., where who exists does depend on what choice an agent makes). More specifically, we shall develop and discuss it in the context of a person-affecting framework—in which an option is just if and only if it wrongs no one according to certain plausible conditions on wronging. (shrink)

George Berkeley is, with John Locke and David Hume, one of the three major figures in the British empiricist school of philosophy. He has been the centre of much attention recently and his philosophical profile has gradually changed. In the 20th century he was almost exclusively known for his denial of the existence of matter, but today it is no longer reasonable to confine an account of Berkeley to the challenging philosophical inventions that he published when he was a young (...) fellow at Trinity College in Dublin. This is a welcome trend. It shows Berkeley as a contributor not only to epistemology, metaphysics and moral and social philosophy, but also to a wide range of subjects including mathematics, philosophy of science, empirical psychology, political economy and monetary policy. The present collection aims at meeting this new trend by presenting a broad and comprehensive picture of Berkeley's works in their historical context. The contributors are some of the finest international experts in the field. The editors hope that this collection will show George Berkeley as he was: a wide-ranging, widely influential and courageous philosophical innovator. This volume has been published to celebrate the 300th anniversary of George Berkeley's Principles. (shrink)

Luce once declared that his and Jessop’s interpretation of Berkeley is “reflected in our edition of the Works.” The appearance of a recent article by Stephen Daniel draws attention to two examples of the implications of this interpretive model of editing. One is Luce’s and Jessop’s rejection of Alciphron as a reliable source for Berkeley’s philosophy, because we have access to his true philosophy elsewhere , and “it is idle to turn to Alciphron for Berkeleianism,” for he does not rest (...) his case there “on his own philosophy” . The other is the “correction” of Alciphron by incorporating an anonymous letter to Peter Browne “as a supplement” to Berkeley’s work—something that Daniel criticizes for circularity and lack of scholarly accuracy. The question arises as to whether Alciphron is the only example of a text in the Worksthat is biased in favor of the editors’ private interpretation. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there is a paradigm shift in George Berkeley's philosophy between his early, unpublished manuscripts (1707-1708) and the Theory of Vision (1709). If so, the traditional method of mixing published and unpublished material will lead to a confused picture of both his early, unpublished view and the doctrine that he published. Cet article montre qu'il y a eu un changement de paradigme dans la philosophie de Berkeley entre ses premiers manuscrits, non publiés, de 1707-1708 et (...) la Théorie de la vision de 1709. Dans ces conditions, la méthode d'analyse traditionnelle consistant à mêler textes publiés et non publiés ne peut conduire qu'à fausser la représentation tant de ses premières idées restées inédites que de la doctrine qu'il a publiée. (shrink)

George Berkeley opens the Principles (Part I) with "a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" including such ideas "as are perceiv'd by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind." Scholars have rejected this passage as being "philosophically impossible," not seriously meant, just a reference to John Locke's ideas of reflection, or not at all about "ideas." It is true, in a few unpublished manuscripts Berkeley used the term "ideas" for image-pictures of particular things (the Old Paradigm). But, (...) I argue, in the Theory of Vision he develops a New Paradigm; and if we follow Berkeley's advice to read his book "in the order [he] published them," then his "Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" makes perfect sense in the light of this New Paradigm. (shrink)

Did George Berkeley, as I argued long ago in Belfrage (1986), defend a theory of "emotive meaning" in his Manuscript Introduction (an early version of the introduction to the Principles)? This question has raised a broad spectrum of different issues, which I think it is important to keep apart, such as rhetorical, psychological, semantic, ethical, metaphysical, and theological aspects. In the present paper, I hope to clear the ground of ambiguities, which have led to serious misunderstandings on this interesting point (...) in Berkeley's unpublished philosophy. I open with a summary account of the historical context. (shrink)

The Value of the Emotional Knowledge Emotional knowledge is a form of self-knowledge which holds great interest for ordinary individuals. It is not obtained by any obligation but rather because we think it is crucial to obtain. In this article it is a matter of demonstrating that emotional knowledge holds an instrumental and a prudential value. By arguing that it can allow a control over our emotions, I shall maintain that emotional knowledge affects individual marginalization or acceptance in society. In (...) addition, this type of knowledge is revealing of our personality by allowing us to identify our affective identities. Finally, I shall defend the idea that emotional knowledge contributes to the conduct of a good life. As such, my hypothesis could be viewed as incompatible with widespread ideas, according to which the knowledge of our own emotions can trigger negative emotional states, e.g. mental rumination, anxiety, that do not contribute to our well-being. (shrink)

Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, bertil.tungodden{at}nhh.no ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Liberal egalitarian theories of justice argue that inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors should be eliminated, but that inequalities arising from responsibility factors should be accepted. This article discusses how the fairness argument for redistribution within a liberal egalitarian framework is affected by a relocation of the cut between responsibility and non-responsibility factors. The article also discusses the (...) claim that equalization of some non-responsibility factors will reduce the ideal level of redistribution. Key Words: responsibility • liberal egalitarianism • redistribution. (shrink)

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is, with John Locke and David Hume, one of the three major figures in the British empiricist school of philosophy. He has been the centre of much attention recently and his philosophical profile has gradually changed. In the 20th century he was almost exclusively known for his denial of the existence of matter (as this term was defined in those days), but today it is no longer reasonable to confine an account of Berkeley to the challenging philosophical (...) inventions that he published when he was a young fellow at Trinity College in Dublin. This is a welcome trend. It shows Berkeley as a contributor not only to epistemology, metaphysics and moral and social philosophy, but also to a wide range of subjects including mathematics, philosophy of science, empirical psychology, political economy and monetary policy. The present collection aims at meeting this new trend by presenting a broad and comprehensive picture of Berkeley's works in their historical context. The contributors are some of the finest international experts in the field. The editors hope that this collection will show George Berkeley as he was: a wide-ranging, widely influential and courageous philosophical innovator. This volume has been published to celebrate the 300th anniversary of George Berkeley's Principles. (shrink)