In his Epistula , Saint Augustine seems to suggest an epistemic position that is antithetical to an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. However, I think it can be shown that even if evidentialism is taken to be the preferred method of epistemic justification, an epistemic position that incorporates a faith which is grounded in the truth and produces knowledge is epistemologically justified. Evidentialist objections to such a faith-grounded position founder on principles that even the staunchest defenders of an evidentialist theory (...) of justification, Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, deem to be epistemically justified. Hence, if I am right, there is no compelling argument from an evidentialist perspective that a “faith in things not yet understood” is inconsistent with a fundamentally evidentialist theory of justification. (shrink)

Using Geach’s Principle of the Relativity of Identity, the doctrine of the trinity is defended against charges of inconsistency put forward by David Wiggins and Richard Cartwright.

In “Causality and Determination,” Anscombe rejects the two received opinions on the nature of causality in the modern philosophical tradition. She rejects the Humean conception of universal generalization based on the constant conjunction in experience of cause and effect, and she also rejects the notion that causality entails a necessary connection between cause and effect. As an alternative, she suggests that the core notion of causality is one of the derivativeness of the effect from the cause. Her consideration of causality (...) ranges generally over all types of causality, but I believe that the most significant implication of her position is in application to the causality of human action. In this paper, I will articulate what I take to be that position. (shrink)

In “Causality and Determination,” Anscombe rejects the two received opinions on the nature of causality in the modern philosophical tradition. She rejects the Humean conception of universal generalization based on the constant conjunction in experience of cause and effect, and she also rejects the notion that causality entails a necessary connection between cause and effect. As an alternative, she suggests that the core notion of causality is one of the derivativeness of the effect from the cause. Her consideration of causality (...) ranges generally over all types of causality, but I believe that the most significant implication of her position is in application to the causality of human action. In this paper, I will articulate what I take to be that position. (shrink)

Catholic moral philosophy requires an absolute prohibition against the direct killing of innocents. In this paper I consider some examples of justified actionswhich involve the killing of innocent persons and will present them as cases about which I am confident many others will share the same intuitions. I willthen try to show what conditions apply in such cases that justify those intuitions. I will argue that their justification is in accordance with a modified version of theFinnis, Grisez, Boyle interpretation of (...) the doctrine of double effect; it defends their interpretation of what is direct versus indirect in cases of double effect, and meets the proportionality condition in a way suggested by Philippa Foot regarding the virtues of justice and charity. (shrink)

Catholic moral philosophy requires an absolute prohibition against the direct killing of innocents. In this paper I consider some examples of justified actionswhich involve the killing of innocent persons and will present them as cases about which I am confident many others will share the same intuitions. I willthen try to show what conditions apply in such cases that justify those intuitions. I will argue that their justification is in accordance with a modified version of theFinnis, Grisez, Boyle interpretation of (...) the doctrine of double effect; it defends their interpretation of what is direct versus indirect in cases of double effect, and meets the proportionality condition in a way suggested by Philippa Foot regarding the virtues of justice and charity. (shrink)

I think that the epistemological theory presented by Plantinga would be more plausible if it were amended in a way that would be consistent with the no-foundations view suggested above. We have considered in detail his conception of basic beliefs in Section II above, and noted that his conception of basicality was obscure. For Plantinga, beliefs are basic only under certain conditions, and this is an obscure notion of basicality because unlike basic beliefs in a more traditional foundationalist theory, there (...) is no incorrigibility at the foundation, with no suitable substitute. Consequently, a foundationalist like Plantinga is faced with the same problem he thinks is inherent in coherentism; namely, how warrant for the noetic structure is guaranteed.In fact, it is unclear how Plantinga's version of foundationalism differs significantly from Williams' no-foundations view. If the noetic structure is potentially unlimited in the way that I have suggested, one could have a temporally local foundationalism which is consistent with Williams' no-foundations view, for all of Williams' arguments attack the notion of ultimate warrant for the noetic structure. And if, at a given time, a person takes certain beliefs in their noetic structure as basic contingent upon subsequent assessment of those beliefs, we have something very much like Plantinga's foundationalism. Such beliefs would be ‘basic’ in the sense of being non-inferentially credible, but this would not entail their functioning as grounds for the noetic structure as a whole, for the element lacking in this no-foundations view is the certain sort of experience which Plantinga thinks is necessary as a ground of the basic belief. But given the problems discussed above concerning criteria for basicality and the consequent problems concerning the identification of what sorts of experience function as a suitable ground, it is unclear in what way Plantinga's position is preferable.Plantinga's fundamental objection to a coherence view of justification was that there is no way of accounting for ultimate warrant for a noetic structure. But in reference to his own theory, Plantinga states that:The justification-conferring conditions mentioned above must be seen as conferring prima facie rather than ultima facie, or all-things-considered justification. This justification can be overridden. (“Reason”, 83)If, however, basic beliefs are merely prima facie justified and can be overridden, then there is no accounting for ultimate warrant in theological foundationalism either. Basic beliefs in a foundationalist position are supposed to serve the function of providing an end to the process of justification, but they do not serve this function in Plantinga's system. In defending the no-foundations view of justification, Williams recognizes that some beliefs are in fact accepted as non-inferentially credible or that some beliefs happen to be reliable (86, 94). If this is all that basic beliefs amount to, i.e. beliefs that are prima facie credible yet still defeasible, then theological foundationalism may as well scrap any hope of supplying adequate grounds for a noetic structure. Although more recent developments of foundationalism and coherentism, e.g. Laurence BonJour's The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) and William P. Alston's Epistemic Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), contain refinements of the two theories which, ultimately, need to be considered in order to resolve the problems I raise here for theological foundationalism, I do not think these refinements significantly affect the arguments I present in this paper. In any case, I am considering these modifications in a work in progress. (shrink)

Animal rights and vegetarianism for ethical reasons are positions gaining in influence in contemporary American culture. Although I think that certain rights for animals are consistent with and even entailed by the Catholic understanding of morality, vegetarianism is not. There is a plausible argument for an omnivorous diet from a Rawlsian original position. It is in direct contradiction to the Rawlsian-influenced ethical vegetarianism espoused by Mark Rowlands. Vegetarianism is not the moral high ground: ethical vegetarianism is in fact contrary to (...) a position on animals that is fundamentally pro-life. (shrink)

Evidentialism is generally taken to be a position which is not friendly to a religious epistemology. However, in this paper, I will argue for a religious epistemology which is compatible with fundamental tenets of an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. It is a position which entails both a “will to believe” which goes beyond the standard evidentialist principles governing the appropriate doxastic attitude towards a proposition, but nonetheless satisfies epistemic principles at the basis of an evidentialist position on justification. If (...) my argument is successful, a proponent of a conception of religious faith may be able to have her cake and eat it too: namely, she may be able to fundamentally accept both the evidentialist demand that epistemically rational belief fit, or be supported by evidence as well as the position that rational faith is willing belief beyond what one’s evidence strictly demands. (shrink)

In his Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, Hilary Kornblith presents an argument for the justification of induction that is bold, brilliant, and plausible, but radically incomplete. In the development of this position, Kornblith relies heavily on the philosophical work of Richard Boyd as well as on some empirical psychological studies. As Kornblith sees it, the philosophical position entailed by his proposed solution to the problem is a thoroughgoing, realistic, scientific materialism. I will argue that (...) the brand of realism that Kornblith’s solution to the problem of induction presupposes is inexplicable within the context of the non-reductive materialism that he espouses. Although Kornblith provides us with valuable elements for a solution to the problem of induction, it needs to be supplemented with something like a renovated Aristotelian notion of form in order for the solution to be plausible. (shrink)

In his Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, Hilary Kornblith presents an argument for the justification of induction that is bold, brilliant, and plausible, but radically incomplete. In the development of this position, Kornblith relies heavily on the philosophical work of Richard Boyd as well as on some empirical psychological studies. As Kornblith sees it, the philosophical position entailed by his proposed solution to the problem is a thoroughgoing, realistic, scientific materialism. I will argue that (...) the brand of realism that Kornblith’s solution to the problem of induction presupposes is inexplicable within the context of the non-reductive materialism that he espouses. Although Kornblith provides us with valuable elements for a solution to the problem of induction, it needs to be supplemented with something like a renovated Aristotelian notion of form in order for the solution to be plausible. (shrink)

Evidentialism is generally taken to be a position which is not friendly to a religious epistemology. However, in this paper, I will argue for a religious epistemology which is compatible with fundamental tenets of an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. It is a position which entails both a “will to believe” which goes beyond the standard evidentialist principles governing the appropriate doxastic attitude towards a proposition, but nonetheless satisfies epistemic principles at the basis of an evidentialist position on justification. If (...) my argument is successful, a proponent of a conception of religious faith may be able to have her cake and eat it too: namely, she may be able to fundamentally accept both the evidentialist demand that epistemically rational belief fit, or be supported by evidence as well as the position that rational faith is willing belief beyond what one’s evidence strictly demands. (shrink)

Evidentialism is generally taken to be a position which is not friendly to a religious epistemology. However, in this paper, I will argue for a religious epistemology which is compatible with fundamental tenets of an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. It is a position which entails both a “will to believe” which goes beyond the standard evidentialist principles governing the appropriate doxastic attitude towards a proposition, but nonetheless satisfies epistemic principles at the basis of an evidentialist position on justification. If (...) my argument is successful, a proponent of a conception of religious faith may be able to have her cake and eat it too: namely, she may be able to fundamentally accept both the evidentialist demand that epistemically rational belief fit, or be supported by evidence as well as the position that rational faith is willing belief beyond what one’s evidence strictly demands. (shrink)

It would be very desirable to have an account of the relation between mind and world that sustained the integrity of each. In this paper, we will argue that a theory of cognition which is broadly Thomistic can do just that. Many commentators recognize that cognitio is Aquinas’s basic epistemic concept, and that it designates knowledge in the broadest and most basic sense, as distinguished from scientia, or knowledge in the paradigmatic sense. There are several important consequences of this distinction (...) which are relevant to a proper understanding of the way in which a theory of knowledge which is in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition approaches the issue of the relation between the mind and the world. First and foremost, knowledge cannot be construed as a univocal concept in the A/t context. There are different senses of knowledge and we should not expect there to be a theory which supplies necessary and sufficient conditions for “S knows that p” that satisfies all the different senses of knowledge. It is perplexing that the contemporary discussion seems to miss this point, for the same sort of systematic ambiguity of the term ‘knowledge’ seems to hold in English. Second, the A/t theory of knowledge is not an epistemological theory in the modern sense, if by “epistemological” we mean one which is clearly demarcated from a metaphysical, psychological, or even semantical theory. The A/t theory is a metaphysics of knowledge. Third, a Thomistic theory of knowledge begins with a theory of cognition which provides the grounds of knowledge across the board, including even that of scientia. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the objections to both doxastic volitionism and doxastic voluntarism fail. Objections to doxastic volitionism and doxastic voluntarism assume a generic notion of belief, a notion which covers both beliefs about things which we know or think we know or are evident to us, as well as beliefs which have some degree of credence but are not clearly evident to the subject. The generic notion of belief includes both sorts of beliefs, but the position against (...) doxastic volitionism is supported only by appeal to beliefs about things which are evident or that we think we know. However, by showing that beliefs which we think we know to be true are not voluntary, the objections leaves open the question whether belief as such is voluntary. Contrary to the opponents of doxastic volitionism, I will show that if what we are after is a generic notion of belief, it ought to be construed as holding true; and if this is what constitutes belief as such, the arguments against doxastic volitionism for faith beliefs fail. The strongest argument against doxastic voluntarism is an evidentialist argument concerning the ethics of belief. That argument is basically that even if choosing belief is psychologically possible, evidentialism rules it out as epistemically irresponsible. In the last section of this article, I will argue that if religious belief is constituted by true propositions of the faith, the evidentialist objection to doxastic voluntarism fails. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Robert Anderson criticizes my position in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 2004, whereinI argued for the justification of certain kinds of actions even though they involve the killing of innocents. He does not adequately assess the salient features of thekinds of cases I was defending, and he ignores my use of Philippa Foot’s distinction between the demands of justice and charity in characterizing the morally relevant principles involved in such cases. (...) I argued that the actions involving the killing of the innocent as a side effect in such cases is not the kind of killing which justice prohibits because in such cases there is both no one who is killed unjustly and yet there are lives which charity clearly demands that we save. In this paper, I respond to Anderson’s criticism of my 2004 paper. (shrink)

Double effect reasoning is central to Catholic moral theology. It is the principle which enables it to maintain absolute moral standards while effectively handling morally difficult choices which entail bringing about some evil as well as the good. DER has been focused on the way in which it applies to human agents and their relation to bringing about evil as well as the good. According to DER, only the good can be brought about intentionally; evil can only be brought about (...) as the side effect of the good. It will be argued that DER also applies to God’s choices. It is our best resource for understanding God’s relation to evil in the world He creates. (shrink)

The controversial Phoenix Hospital case demonstrates that there is significant disagreement in Catholic casuistry on what constitutes intention. Some hold that a causal closeness entails intention, while others deny that there is any necessary connection between causal closeness and intention. One of the strongest supporters of the causal closeness thesis was Elizabeth Anscombe. It will be argued, however, that her works on intention provide support for a position on certain types of cases, such as the Phoenix Hospital case and the (...) termination of an ectopic pregnancy, which contradict intentional killing. (shrink)

The controversial Phoenix Hospital case demonstrates that there is significant disagreement in Catholic casuistry on what constitutes intention. Some hold that a causal closeness entails intention, while others deny that there is any necessary connection between causal closeness and intention. One of the strongest supporters of the causal closeness thesis was Elizabeth Anscombe. It will be argued, however, that her works on intention provide support for a position on certain types of cases, such as the Phoenix Hospital case and the (...) termination of an ectopic pregnancy, which contradict intentional killing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Virtual GalleryCarlo Zei Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 2. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 3. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 4. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 5. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 6. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 7. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 8.Carlo Zei took (...) these photographs at Forte Belvedere in Florence, at the seaside at Forte dei Marmi, and in Prato. He is a PhD candidate in Comparative Literature at Cornell University and has published a few short works of fiction.Mario Ceroli’s sculptures are reproduced by kind permission of the artist.Copyright © 1997 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more than (...) one website. Paste the whole URL. http://archive.org/stream/RobertiAudi_The.Cambridge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy/Robert.Audi_The.Cambrid ge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy -/- The 2015 third edition will be available soon. Before you think of buying it read some reviews on Amazon and read reviews of its competition: For example, my review of the 2008 Oxford Companion to Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic,29:3,291-292. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340701300429 -/- Some of the entries have already been found to be flawed. For example, Tarski’s expression ‘materially adequate’ was misinterpreted in at least one article and it was misused in another where ‘materially correct’ should have been used. The discussion provides an opportunity to bring more flaws to light. -/- Acknowledgements: Each of these entries was presented at meetings of The Buffalo Logic Dictionary Project sponsored by The Buffalo Logic Colloquium. The members of the colloquium read drafts before the meetings and were generous with corrections, objections, and suggestions. Usually one 90-minute meeting was devoted to one entry although in some cases, for example, “axiomatic method”, took more than one meeting. Moreover, about half of the entries are rewrites of similarly named entries in the 1995 first edition. Besides the help received from people in Buffalo, help from elsewhere was received by email. We gratefully acknowledge the following: José Miguel Sagüillo, John Zeis, Stewart Shapiro, Davis Plache, Joseph Ernst, Richard Hull, Concha Martinez, Laura Arcila, James Gasser, Barry Smith, Randall Dipert, Stanley Ziewacz, Gerald Rising, Leonard Jacuzzo, George Boger, William Demopolous, David Hitchcock, John Dawson, Daniel Halpern, William Lawvere, John Kearns, Ky Herreid, Nicolas Goodman, William Parry, Charles Lambros, Harvey Friedman, George Weaver, Hughes Leblanc, James Munz, Herbert Bohnert, Robert Tragesser, David Levin, Sriram Nambiar, and others. -/- . (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.

For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.

Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...

What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...) But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to. (shrink)

Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...) normative requirements with reasons. (shrink)

This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin 's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.