The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for ‘positive’ emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as ‘irrational’ or born of ‘ignorance’ seems ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to (...) present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests. (shrink)

Current literature suggests that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can affect consumers’ attitudes towards an organization and is regarded as a driver for reputation-building and fostering sustained consumer patronage. Although prior research has addressed the direct influence of CSR on consumer responses, this research examined the mediating influence of consumer’s perceived organizational motives within an NGO setting. Given the heightened public attention surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, data were collected from consumers of the Games to assess their perceptions of the (...) International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) socially responsible initiatives. We hypothesized that consumers of the Games were likely to cognitively elaborate on CSR messages by way of three specific attribution effects derived from the literature. The results show that, contingent on CSR awareness, consumers responded positively to social efforts judged to be values-driven and stakeholder-driven; and a negative response was seen for efforts judged to be strategic. These attribution effects influenced various types of patronage and perceived organizational reputation. (shrink)

Current literature suggests that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can affect consumers' attitudes towards an organization and is regarded as a driver for reputation-building and fostering sustained consumer patronage. Although prior research has addressed the direct influence of CSR on consumer responses, this research examined the mediating influence of consumer's perceived organizational motives within an NGO setting.Given the heightened public attention surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, data were collected from consumers of the Games to assess their perceptions of the International (...) Olympic Committee's (IOC) socially responsible initiatives. We hypothesized that consumers of the Games were likely to cognitively elaborate on CSR messages by way of three specific attribution effects derived from the literature. The results show that, contingent on CSR awareness, consumers responded positively to social efforts judged to be values-driven and stakeholder-driven; and a negative response was seen for efforts judged to be strategic. These attribution effects influenced various types of patronage and perceived organizational reputation. (shrink)

This article draws upon clinical experience of GPs working in a deprived area of the North East of England to examine the potential contribution of Universal Basic Income to health by mitigating ‘patient-side barriers’ among three cohorts experiencing distinct forms of ‘precariousness’: 1) long-term unemployed welfare recipients with low levels of education (lumpenprecariat); 2) workers on short-term/zero-hours contracts with low levels of education (‘lower’ precariat); 3) workers on short-term/zero-hours contracts with relatively high levels of education (‘upper’ precariat). We argue that (...) any benefits must be accompanied by robust institutions capable of promoting health. (shrink)

In some views, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the “simple” application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and (...) make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help. (shrink)

1 Adaptationism is a research strategy that seeks to identify adaptations and the specific selective forces that drove their evolution in past environments. Since the mid-1970s, paleontologist Stephen J. Gould and geneticist Richard Lewontin have been critical of adaptationism, especially as applied toward understanding human behavior and cognition. Perhaps the most prominent criticism they made was that adaptationist explanations were analogous to Rudyard Kipling's Just So Stories. Since storytelling is an inherent part of science, the criticism refers to the acceptance (...) of stories without sufficient empirical evidence. In particular, Gould, Lewontin, and their colleagues argue that adaptationists often use inappropriate evidentiary standards for identifying adaptations and their functions, and that they often fail to consider alternative hypotheses to adaptation. Playing prominently in both of these criticisms are the concepts of constraint, spandrel, and exaptation. In this article we discuss the standards of evidence that could be used to identify adaptations and when and how they may be appropriately used. Moreover, building an empirical case that certain features of a trait are best explained by exaptation, spandrel, or constraint requires demonstrating that the trait's features cannot be better accounted for by adaptationist hypotheses. Thus, we argue that the testing of alternatives requires the consideration, testing, and systematic rejection of adaptationist hypotheses. Where possible, we illustrate our points with examples taken from human behavior and cognition. Key Words: adaptation; ADHD; brain allometry; constraint; epistemology; evolutionary psychology; exaptation; female orgasm ; optimization; special design; waist-hip ratio. Footnotes1 The authors contributed equally to this paper. Order of authorship was determined alphabetically. Correspondence may be addressed to any of the authors. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is reason to distinguish between moral responsibility and blameworthiness and, in particular, that we can acknowledge that a person is responsible for the negative outcomes of their behavior without this necessarily informing our judgments about the person’s blameworthiness. This general theme is elaborated in the context of a discussion of some of Björn Petersson’s work on collective moral responsibility.

We define the Scott complexity of a countable structure to be the least complexity of a Scott sentence for that structure. This is a finer notion of complexity than Scott rank: it distinguishes between whether the simplest Scott sentence is $\Sigma _{\alpha }$, $\Pi _{\alpha }$, or $\mathrm {d-}\Sigma _{\alpha }$. We give a complete classification of the possible Scott complexities, including an example of a structure whose simplest Scott sentence is $\Sigma _{\lambda + 1}$ for $\lambda $ a limit (...) ordinal. This answers a question left open by A. Miller.We also construct examples of computable structures of high Scott rank with Scott complexities $\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$ and $\mathrm {d-}\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$. There are three other possible Scott complexities for a computable structure of high Scott rank: $\Pi _{\omega _1^{CK}}$, $\Pi _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$, $\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$. Examples of these were already known. Our examples are computable structures of Scott rank $\omega _1^{CK}+1$ which, after naming finitely many constants, have Scott rank $\omega _1^{CK}$. The existence of such structures was an open question. (shrink)

The modern synthesis in evolutionary biology is taken to be that period in which a consensus developed among biologists about the major causes of evolution, a consensus that informed research in evolutionary biology for at least a half century. As such, it is a particularly fruitful period to consider when reflecting on the meaning and role of chance in evolutionary explanation. Biologists of this period make reference to “chance” and loose cognates of “chance,” such as: “random,” “contingent,” “accidental,” “haphazard,” or (...) “stochastic.” Of course, what an author might mean by “chance” in any specific context varies. -/- In the following, we first offer a historiographical note on the synthesis. Second, we introduce five ways in which synthesis authors spoke about chance. We do not take these to be an exhaustive taxonomy of all possible ways in which chance meaningfully figures in explanations in evolutionary biology. These are simply five common uses of the term by biologists at this period. They will serve to organize our summary of the collected references to chance and the analysis and discussion of the following questions: • What did synthesis authors understand by chance? • How did these authors see chance operating in evolution? • Did their appeals to chance increase or decrease over time during the synthesis? That is, was there a “hardening” of the synthesis, as Gould claimed (1983)? (shrink)

A problem is a multivalued function from a set of instances to a set of solutions. We consider only instances and solutions coded by sets of integers. A problem admits preservation of some computability-theoretic weakness property if every computable instance of the problem admits a solution relative to which the property holds. For example, cone avoidance is the ability, given a noncomputable set A and a computable instance of a problem ${\mathsf {P}}$, to find a solution relative to which A (...) is still noncomputable.In this article, we compare relativized versions of computability-theoretic notions of preservation which have been studied in reverse mathematics, and prove that the ones which were not already separated by natural statements in the literature actually coincide. In particular, we prove that it is equivalent to admit avoidance of one cone, of $\omega $ cones, of one hyperimmunity or of one non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definition. We also prove that the hierarchies of preservation of hyperimmunity and non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definitions coincide. On the other hand, none of these notions coincide in a nonrelativized setting. (shrink)

1 Evidence-based policy requires researchers to provide the answers to ecological questions that are of interest to policy makers. To find out what those questions are in the UK, representatives from 28 organizations involved in policy, together with scientists from 10 academic institutions, were asked to generate a list of questions from their organizations. 2 During a 2-day workshop the initial list of 1003 questions generated from consulting at least 654 policy makers and academics was used as a basis for (...) generating a short list of 100 questions of significant policy relevance. Short-listing was decided on the basis of the preferences of the representatives from the policy-led organizations. 3 The areas covered included most major issues of environmental concern in the UK, including agriculture, marine fisheries, climate change, ecosystem function and land management. 4 The most striking outcome was the preference for general questions rather than narrow ones. The reason is that policy is driven by broad issues rather than specific ones. In contrast, scientists are frequently best equipped to answer specific questions. This means that it may be necessary to extract the underpinning specific question before researchers can proceed. 5 Synthesis and applications. Greater communication between policy makers and scientists is required in order to ensure that applied ecologists are dealing with issues in a way that can feed into policy. It is particularly important that applied ecologists emphasize the generic value of their work wherever possible. (shrink)

Lipman nous plonge par une histoire à la fois réaliste et merveilleuse dans les questions les plus actuelles une éducation appropriée à l'action, des relations positives avec la nature et les animaux, la solidarité dans les épreuves, la reconnaissance de l'autre, le dialogue des générations, la préservation de l'imagination et de la créativ...

In our target article, we discussed the standards of evidence that could be used to identify adaptations, and argued that building an empirical case that certain features of a trait are best explained by exaptation, spandrel, or constraint requires the consideration, testing, and rejection of adaptationist hypotheses. We are grateful to the 31 commentators for their thoughtful insights. They raised important issues, including the meaning of “exaptation”; whether Gould and Lewontin's critique of adaptationism was primarily epistemological or ontological; the necessity, (...) sufficiency, or utility of design evidence, phylogenetic analyses, homology, and molecular genetics in distinguishing exaptations from adaptations; whether adaptationists accept adaptationist hypotheses too quickly; and the real utility of adaptationism to human behavioral science. We organize our response along the major points of the target article, in some situations defending our original claims and in others modifying them. While debate on these issues will undoubtedly continue, we are cautiously optimistic that the main points of the target article (as modified by our response) will help move the debate in a positive direction. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Proponents of the ‘Threshold View’ have held that to believe a proposition is to be sufficiently confident of the proposition’s truth, but that there is no sharp cutoff between degrees of confidence that constitute belief and degrees of confidence that do not. Brian Weatherson has objected that no plausible account of vagueness can support this view. In this paper, I reply to Weatherson’s objection. Along the way, I identify a way in which one might hope to maintain the Threshold (...) View without a fuzzy threshold, and I reformulate the Threshold View to accommodate fuzzy thresholds without begging substantive questions about vagueness. -/- RÉSUMÉ : D’après la «théorie du seuil», croire une proposition, c’est être suffisamment sûr de la vérité de cette proposition, bien qu’il n’y ait pas de limite nette entre les degrés de certitude qui constituent une croyance et ceux qui n’en constituent pas une. Pour Brian Weatherson, cette thèse ne peut être appuyée sur aucune théorie plausible du vague. Dans cet article, je réponds à Weatherson et propose une reformulation de la théorie du seuil qui contient des seuils flous sans engager des présupposés controversables en théorie du vague. J’identifie également une façon de conserver la théorie sans avoir un seuil flou. (shrink)

© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Genetic studies have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with the risk of prostate cancer. It remains unclear whether such genetic variants are associated with disease aggressiveness. The NCI-SPORE Genetics Working Group retrospectively collected clinicopathologic information and genotype data for 36 SNPs which at the time had been validated to be associated with PC risk from 25,674 cases with PC. Cases were grouped according to race, Gleason score and aggressiveness. Statistical analyses were used to compare the frequency (...) of the SNPs between different disease cohorts. After adjusting for multiple testing, only PC-risk SNP rs2735839 was significantly and inversely associated with aggressive and high-grade disease in European men. Similar associations with aggressive and high-grade disease were documented in African-American subjects. The G allele of rs2735839 was associated with disease aggressiveness even at low PSA levels in both European and African-American men. Our results provide further support that a PC-risk SNP rs2735839 near the KLK3 gene on chromosome 19q13 may be associated with aggressive and high-grade PC. Future prospectively designed, case-case GWAS are needed to identify additional SNPs associated with PC aggressiveness. (shrink)

On Dan Zahavi’s Husserlian account of the subject, the self-temporalization of subjectivity presupposes what he calls an “immediate impressional self-manifestation.” It follows from this view that self-awareness is an inherent power of the one who will be subject, rather than a product of sociality introduced into life from without. In this paper, I argue against Zahavi’s position by going over the development of Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, examining the positions Husserl takes and the reasons that he comes to these positions. (...) Once we reach Husserl’s ultimate account, it becomes evident that Zahavi’s position is untenable. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉJe soulève des questions concernant l'approche volontariste défendue par Chakravartty à l’égard des positions : supposant que nous reconnaissons une hiérarchie des positions, la position volontariste peut être à la fois vraie et trompeuse en ce qui concerne la viabilité pratique de certains débats dans le domaine de la philosophie des sciences, en particulier le débat sur le réalisme scientifique ou sur la façon de «naturaliser» la métaphysique.

According to Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, and Dan Zahavi (2011), the account of current developments in "phenomenological clinical neuroscience" offered by Aaron Mishara (2007) is "not only confusing but highly inaccurate." Their critique is harsh, but I can find nothing to disagree with. Mishara's distinction between "neo-phenomenology" and "existential phenomenology" does not apply to current work in the field; I do not recognize the two camps he describes. Neither do I find it helpful to distinguish two separate historical traditions in (...) phenomenological psychiatry. As for allegedly conflicting phenomenological claims, Sass, Parnas, and Zahavi rightly point out that an emphasis on involuntary hyperreflexivity is .. (shrink)

Matthew Taylor | : Contrary to critics and advocates of contractarianism alike, I argue that mutual advantage contractarianism entails rights and protections for animals. In section one I outline the criteria that must be met in order for an individual to qualify for moral rights on the contractarian view. I then introduce an alternative form of ‘rights,’ which I call ‘protectorate status,’ from which an individual can receive protections indirectly. In section two I suggest guidelines for assigning animal rights based (...) on two ways of categorizing animals. On the basis of the categorization according to benefit derived, I argue that animals used for companionship, security, hunting assistance, transportation, entertainment, medical service, nourishment, or clothing will tend to qualify for basic rights against starvation, predation, and disease. On the basis of the categorization according to species, I argue that, on top of the basic rights above, dogs tend to qualify for rights against abuse, and against frivolous medical experimentation, as well as further negotiated rights. Cows have the basic rights against starvation, predation, and disease, but squirrels and bears have no rights. In section three I argue that some animals qualify for protectorate status, which would establish various protections for different animals, but would also generally prohibit cruelty towards animals. | : Contrairement à certains critiques ou défenseurs du contractualisme, j’affirme que le contractualisme à avantages réciproques peut assurer droits et protections aux animaux. Dans la première section, je décris les critères que, d’un point de vue contractualiste, un individu doit satisfaire pour pouvoir bénéficier de droits moraux. J’introduis ensuite une autre forme de « droits », que j’appelle « protectorat », qui permet à un individu de bénéficier indirectement de certaines protections. Dans la deuxième section, je propose des directives pour accorder des droits aux animaux en fonction d’un double mode de catégorisation. La première catégorisation serait établie d’après les avantages procurés par l’animal; ainsi les animaux de compagnie, de garde, de chasse, de transport, de divertissement, ou assurant des services de santé, d’alimentation ou d’habillement devraient se voir accorder des droits fondamentaux contre la famine, la prédation et la maladie. Selon la seconde catégorisation, établie d’après l’espèce, les chiens devraient bénéficier de droits les protégeant des mauvais traitements et des expérimentations médicales inutiles, ainsi que d’autres droits négociés. Les vaches jouissent ainsi des droits fondamentaux qui les protègent de la famine, de la prédation et de la maladie, mais les écureuils et les ours n’ont pas de droits. Dans la troisième section, j’explique que certains animaux devraient bénéficier d’un statut de protectorat, qui accorderait des protections diverses à différents animaux, mais qui défendrait de façon générale toute cruauté envers les animaux. (shrink)

Résumé Le bouddhisme ne semble pas avoir été intéressé, au début, aux questions concernant l’existence et la nature de dieu, les considérant sans importance pour la question de l’affranchissement de la souffrance terrestre qui est au cœur de la sotériologie bouddhiste. Plus tard, la pensée bouddhiste a considéré le théisme incompatible avec la doctrine bouddhiste. Mais, en même temps, le bouddhisme a développé une dimension de dévotion ayant des ressemblances avec la foi théiste. Conscients d’un héritage religieux différent, les penseurs (...) bouddhistes ont cependant accueilli, dans des temps plus rapprochés, le dialogue avec les religions monothéistes, mettant l’accent sur des préoccupations éthiques communes, tout en maintenant le point de vue non théiste du bouddhisme traditionnel. (shrink)

L’article affirme que le « problème de la conscience », dans sa formulation la plus répandue, est fondé sur une interprétation erronée de la structure de l’expérience. Le contraste entre « ma perspective subjective » et « le monde partagé dans lequel j’adopte cette perspective » fait partie de mon expérience. Néanmoins, les descriptions de l’expérience sur lesquelles est fondé le problème de la conscience n’ont tendance qu’à l’accentuer, négligeant étrangement le fait que l’expérience implique le sens d’appartenance au monde (...) dans lequel on occupe une perspective subjective contingente. L’étape suivante de la formulation de ce problème consiste à réfléchir sur ce comment cette abstraction peut être intégrée dans un monde décrit scientifiquement. . Je soutiens que le monde décrit prend scientifiquement lui-même pour acquis le sens de la réalité partagée basée sur l’expérience. Par conséquent, le problème de la conscience implique de soustraire A de B, de nier B puis d’essayer d’insérer A dans C, tandis que C présuppose des aspects de B. Le problème de cette forme est symptomatique d’une importante confusion phénoménologique. Il n’est donc pas étonnant que la conscience demeure un mystère. (shrink)

Empathy, and its role in human-human and human-animal relationships has been discussed at length in recent years. Empathy for plants has received little to no attention. In this essay I briefly examine existing theory about human-plant empathy, primarily Marder’s account of a projective empathy. I use contemporary scholarship by Dan Zahavi, as well as phenomenological accounts of empathy, to query this understanding of empathy and to lay the conceptual groundwork for developing an account of empathy for plants in line with (...) Max Scheler’s embodied empathy. In doing so, I sketch an account of the basis for human-plant empathy, including the gestures and behaviors that an empathy for plants may pay particular heed to. The essay concludes by outlining how such an empathy for plants may be developed. (shrink)

In this article we discuss the question of whether a robotic carer could every really care. We argue that care is largely a matter of expressive and performative states rather than internal cognitive or emotional ones. We address the question of "authenticity" in caring and care work.

Matthew Kramer has recently proposed a distinction between norms that are free-floating and those that are not. The distinction, he argued, enables us to distinguish between norms that can be incorporated into the law and those that cannot. In this essay I argue that his distinction is based on several theoretical errors, and that even if it were successful, it is unclear why his distinction is relevant for the question of the boundaries between law and morality. I also provide many (...) examples from actual legal systems of legal norms that do not correspond to Kramer’s distinction. I conclude the essay by suggesting that Kramer’s argument exemplifies a prevalent problem in contemporary legal philosophy, in which much work is often based on simplistic models of law and uses them to develop ‘conceptual’ arguments for what closer attention to the facts shows are empirical questions. As a result many current jurisprudential debates are not helpful for understanding legal phenomena. Recognizing this point is important for reorienting legal philosophy towards other questions which would be more helpful for illuminating its subject-matter. (shrink)

What is the relationship between perception and mental imagery? I aim to eliminate an answer that I call perceptualism about mental imagery. Strong perceptualism, defended by Bence Nanay, predictive processing theorists, and several others, claims that imagery is a kind of perceptual state. Weak perceptualism, defended by M. G. F. Martin and Matthew Soteriou, claims that mental imagery is a representation of a perceptual state, a view sometimes called The Dependency Thesis. Strong perceptualism is to be rejected since it misclassifies (...) imagery disorders and abnormalities as perceptual disorders and abnormalities. Weak Perceptualism is to be rejected since it gets wrong the aim and accuracy conditions of a whole class of mental imagery–projected mental imagery–and relies on an impoverished concept of perceptual states, ignoring certain of their structural features. Whatever the relationship between perception and imagery, the perceptualist has it wrong. (shrink)

Die Beiträge des Bandes untersuchen Tillichs Verständnis von 'Reformation' und 'Revolution' vor dem Hintergrund seines Gesamtwerks in einer problemgeschichtlichen Perspektive. Diskutiert werden die verschiedenen Facetten und Bezüge seiner Reformations- und Revolutionsdeutung ebenso wie Perspektiven, die sich für gegenwärtige Debatten ergeben. Auf diese Weise erschließt der Band ein Themenfeld, welches bislang kaum untersucht wurde.

Le but de cet article est double. Il s’agit d’abord d’introduire un nouveau corpus de français oral numérisé, accessible sans restriction sur le web. CFPP2000 (Corpus du français parlé parisien des années 2000), qui comporte actuellement 500 000 mots alignés à l’oral au tour de parole, est constitué par un ensemble d’interviews conversationnelles sur les quartiers de Paris d’une à deux heures qui ont été réalisées en dyades ou le plus souvent en triades. L’article envisage l’influence pour la constitution du (...) corpus du but que nous nous étions fixé au départ, faciliter l’étude de la variation à l’oral pour le français parisien « commun ». Il aborde le choix des informateurs qui découle de cet objectif, les conduites d’entretien qui ont été adoptées. Il envisage ce qu’apporte la transcription d’entretiens relativement longs qui permet d’atténuer l’opposition entre analyse quantitative et analyse qualitative, ainsi que les précautions à prendre dans l’interprétation des résultats. Dans un deuxième temps, l’article présente les métadonnées, les concordanciers et les outils statistiques qui viennent enrichir le corpus et mentionne quelques travaux qu’il a permis de mener, tantôt en syntaxe de l’oral, tantôt autour de problèmes de variation morphologique. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est double. Il s’agit d’abord d’introduire un nouveau corpus de français oral numérisé, accessible sans restriction sur le web. CFPP2000 (Corpus du français parlé parisien des années 2000), qui comporte actuellement 500 000 mots alignés à l’oral au tour de parole, est constitué par un ensemble d’interviews conversationnelles sur les quartiers de Paris d’une à deux heures qui ont été réalisées en dyades ou le plus souvent en triades. L’article envisage l’influence pour la constitution du (...) corpus du but que nous nous étions fixé au départ, faciliter l’étude de la variation à l’oral pour le français parisien « commun ». Il aborde le choix des informateurs qui découle de cet objectif, les conduites d’entretien qui ont été adoptées. Il envisage ce qu’apporte la transcription d’entretiens relativement longs qui permet d’atténuer l’opposition entre analyse quantitative et analyse qualitative, ainsi que les précautions à prendre dans l’interprétation des résultats. Dans un deuxième temps, l’article présente les métadonnées, les concordanciers et les outils statistiques qui viennent enrichir le corpus et mentionne quelques travaux qu’il a permis de mener, tantôt en syntaxe de l’oral, tantôt autour de problèmes de variation morphologique. (shrink)

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...) view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public. They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks-related reasons. (shrink)

Les enfants peuvent apprendre à penser et " conceptualiser"s'ils sont mis dès leur plus jeune âge en situation de réfléchir et discuter des questions philosophiques. Matthew Lipman a développé une méthodologie, la " philosophie pour enfants ", qui a fait ses preuves dans le monde entier. Cet ouvrage, qui s'ouvre par un texte de Matthew Lipman, a pour objectif de confronter le modèle lipmanien à d'autres points de vue pour en dégager les points forts, tout en l'enrichissant de la recherche (...) actuelle en pédagogie menée par des auteurs aussi différents que Marie-France Daniel, Jacques Lévine, Michel Tozzi et Britt-Mari Barth, etc. Cet ouvrage s'adresse aux enseignants et étudiants des IUFM et Hautes Ecoles. Il intéressera également les chercheurs et étudiants en Sciences de l'éducation, de même que les étudiants en Philosophie. Il est destiné, plus largement, à toute personne amenée à travailler avec des enfants et à expérimenter de nouvelles formes d'apprentissage et à stimuler l'esprit critique et la réflexion. (shrink)

Abstract I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their role (...) of providing us with doxastic instructions guided by our epistemic aims. Understanding the nature of seemings allows us to underwrite recent epistemological work by Michael Huemer, and shows why he was right to claim that seemings are the source of all justification. I then look at some objections both to my arguments regarding the connection between seemings and justification, and to Huemer’s related “Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism”. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-21 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9830-2 Authors Matthew Skene, Syracuse University, 8330 E. Quincy Ave., I-307, Denver, CO 80237, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

One’s account of the meaning of ethical sentences should fit – roughly, as part to whole – with one’s account of the meaning of sentences in general. When we ask, though, where one widely discussed account of the meaning of ethical sentences fits with more general accounts of meaning, the answer is frustratingly unclear. The account I have in mind is the sort of metaethical expressivism inspired by Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare, and defended and worked out in more detail recently (...) by Blackburn, Gibbard, and others. So, my first aim (§1) in this paper is to pose this question about expressivism’s commitments in the theory of meaning and to characterize the answer I think is most natural, given the place expressivist accounts attempt to occupy metaethics. This involves appeal to an ideationalist account of meaning. Unfortunately for the expressivist, however, this answer generates a problem; it’s my second aim (§2) to articulate this problem. Then, my third aim (§3) is to argue that this problem doesn’t extend to the sort of account of the meaning of ethical claims that I favor, which is like expressivism in rejecting a representationalist order of semantic explanation but unlike expressivism in basing an alternative order of semantic explanation on inferential role rather than expressive function. (shrink)

Assertion is governed by an epistemic norm requiring knowledge. This idea has been hotly debated in recent years, garnering attention in epistemology, philosophy of language, and linguistics. This chapter presents and extends the main arguments in favor of the knowledge norm, from faulty conjunctions, several conversational patterns, judgments of permission, excuse, and blame, and from showing how. (Paired with a chapter by Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, "Knowledge is Not Our Norm of Assertion.").

This chapter contains sections titled: Categorical Prescriptiveness Uniformity as a Moral Matter Uniformity Contrasted with Neutrality The Overridingness of Moral Principles.

This paper explores some surprising effects of psychological trauma on memory and develops the puzzle of observer memory for trauma. Memory for trauma tends to have a third-person perspective, or observer perspective. But it appears observer memory, by having a novel visual point of view, tends to misrepresent the past. And many find it plausible that if a memory type tends to misrepresent, it cannot yield knowledge of, or justification for believing, details of past events. But it is also plausible (...) that, with respect to details of past trauma, observer memory can yield knowledge or justification. I argue for a novel set of views that offers a way out of the puzzle: observer memory does tend to misrepresent, but it still has epistemic power regarding details of the past, although with special limits; but observer memory for trauma has other epistemic powers too, in that it allows for a kind of self-awareness. (shrink)

What is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such interpersonal knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second-personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive within epistemology as well as socially. It assesses its theoretic value for several issues in moral psychology, epistemic injustice, and philosophy of mind. (...) And it offers an account of the complex content in play if interpersonal knowledge is to be understood in terms of its mental states and their functions. (shrink)

We regularly appeal to claims of the form it seems that p in defense of a claim p. When we do so, we typically take it seems that p to be a reason for thinking that p but also a reason that “gets at” a relevant body of facts and its support for p. Other things being equal, we should want to vindicate our ordinary beliefs on this matter. We should want to vindicate the claim that facts about things seeming (...) certain ways can be reasons to think that things are that way while at the same time being somehow derivative reasons, that is, reasons only because they “get at” support from a certain body of facts. However, on the dominant view of how things seem—subjectivism—it is hard to see how to secure this result. Subjectivism takes how things seem to be a matter of how things do or would seem to some relevant subject. What we need is a defensible, nonsubjectivist account of how things seem. I propose and defend an account according to which, roughly, it seems that p iff the body of facts in the relevant perspective supports that p. (shrink)