IBERTARIANS hold that we have such duties as: not to directly and significantly harm others or their property, to keep agreements, to refrain from lying and certain other sorts of deception, and to compensate those whom we wrong. They also hold that we have a duty not to interfere with the liberty of others as long as they are fulfilling these duties. This duty of non-interference, they have thought, has protected the privacy of the home, and hence parental autonomy, for (...) it insures that others have no authority over or responsibility for (except in extreme circumstances) how parents raise or treat their children. (Why parental autonomy has been held to be protected by this duty of non—in_terference should be clear enough: for if (as is surely plausible) the main effect of that duty is to secure for adults the liberty (within limits) to live their private lives as they choose, then, on the natural assumption that the matter of how to raise one`s children falls within the domain of the private lives of adults, intervention by others, and in particular by the state, for the purpose of ensuring that children get raised in one way rather than another, would be impermissible.) More specifically to our purposes now, libertarians have supposed that the duty of non-interference leaves intact parents` perogative to decide if, and in what way, their children are to be educated. That this is crucial both to the degree and to the point of parental autonomy is clear enough. For it goes both to the matter of keeping out of the private home those who would provide education for children (if such is the wish of the parents), and to the matter of parents` entitlement to instill in their children the values that they (the parents) wish their children to have. Libertarians, however, have not had very much specific to say about the moral status of children. Are children owned by their parents? Do they have all the rights and duties that normal adults have'? Or is their status somewhere in between these extremes? Given that libertarians haven't said, there are different possible ways of extending traditional libertarian theory so as to cover children.. (shrink)

In a ‘Letter from Washington’ in The New Yorker, Elizabeth Drew reported some speculation regarding the mental processes of Ronald Reagan. In Drew’s words:The curious process Drew describes is clearly important in many ways -historically, politically, and perhaps legally. We contend that there is even some epistemological significance to Reagan’s method for the fixation of belief. We shall argue, in particular, that some of those curiously insulated beliefs which Reagan possesses qualify as knowledge under at least one leading causal reliabilist (...) theory of knowledge- that presented by F. Dretske in Knowledge and the Flow of Information. But, as we detail the structure of such beliefs, what is probably evident already will emerge quite clearly, viz., that these beliefs do not amount to knowledge. (shrink)

Suppose that in the Meditations Descartes thinks he needs to prove that his clear and distinct perceptions are true. There can be little doubt that if he does think he needs to do this, he thinks that the way to do it is to prove that ‘a non-deceiving God exists’ is true. Now suppose that Descartes does come up with such a proof. Presumably he clearly and distinctly perceives both the premisses and that ‘a non-deceiving God exists’ follows from them. (...) But that will not suffice to prove that ‘a non-deceiving God exists’ is true. For, if there is a problem about whether clear and distinct perceptions are true, then in advance of settling it, there is a problem about whether what is proved merely on the basis of clear and distinct perceptions is true. (shrink)

We become ill in ways our parents and grandparents did not, with diseases unheard of and treatments undreamed of generations ago. This text tells the story of the modern experience of illness, linking ideas of illness, health, and postmodernism.

Child liberationism holds that children are entitled to more freedom from interference than we currently acknowledge socially or legally. It holds, for example, that "the law [should] grant and guarantee to the young the freedom that it now grants to adults to make certain kinds of choices, do certain kinds of things, and accept certain kinds of responsibilities. This means in turn that the law [should] take action against anyone who interferes with young people's rights to do such things".1 Call (...) an agent minimally rational just in case he/she is capable of basic means-ends reasoning and of basic reflection on his/her beliefs and desires. No plausible form of child liberationism advocates full freedom from interference (i.e., as much as normal adults) for children that are not yet minimally rational. Some child liberationists do, however, advocate full freedom from interference for all minimally rational children -- typically those over age 5, say. Call this position radical child libera tionism . Other child liberationists only advocate full freedom from interference for older children -- typically those over age 12, say. Call this position moderate child libera tionism .2 For the sake of argument we shall grant that even young minimally rational children (e.g., 5 year olds) have full rights of non-interference. We shall argue that there are nonetheless a wide range of paternalistic practices regarding such children that are legitimate. In short, even granting the radical child liberationist thesis that young children have the same formal rights to freedom as competent adults, it does not follow that young children should enjoy the same effective freedom. Indeed, there are good reasons for holding that they should enjoy less freedom. Or so we shall.. (shrink)

Science and the End of Ethics examines some of the most important positive and negative implications that science has for ethics. Addressing the negative implications first, author Stephen Morris discusses how contemporary science provides significant challenges to moral realism. One threat against moral realism comes from evolutionary theory, which suggests that our moral beliefs are unconnected to any facts that would make them true. Ironically, many of the same areas of science (e.g. evolutionary biology, neuroscience, psychology) that present difficulties (...) for moral realism point to a new ethical approach that focuses on achieving some of the key practical goals shared by ethicists. Chief among these is how to increase amicable behavior among people. (shrink)

Eros and Illness explores the place of desire in illness. We urgently need such an exploration because illness is no longer simply a natural feature of the human condition. Most people fall ill, but illness now falls under the supervision of biomedicine, a science-based, state-regulated system dominated by the new molecular gaze. The use of a person's distinctive genetic data to guide treatment and to forestall disease--called "personalized medicine"-- reflects how the molecular gaze can produce valuable advances in biomedical healthcare. (...) What does this indispensable super-vision, however, tend to overlook? Eros and Illness proposes that biomedicine ignores, in clinical practice and in bench science, the powerful role of desire in illness. Desire, always double-edged, requires attention because it can do both great harm and great good. Patients, caregivers, family members, and physicians, as they recognize the role of desire, gain access to a power that can make the passage through illness much less onerous and far more healing: truly "personalized. (shrink)

This work examines the concept of the "philosophical life" by looking at Socrates and his relationships to his interlocutors.

Although the concept of HAPPINESS plays a central role in ethics, contemporary philosophers have generally given little attention to providing a robust account of what this concept entails. In a recent paper, Dan Haybron sets out to accomplish two main tasks: the first is to underscore the importance of conducting philosophical inquiry into the concept of HAPPINESS; the second is to defend a particular account of happiness—which he calls the ‘emotional state conception of happiness’—while pointing out weaknesses in the primary (...) competing accounts of happiness, including the hedonistic account. I argue against his claim that the emotional state conception of happiness is superior to the hedonistic conception of happiness. In the course of defending the hedonistic account of happiness against Haybron's attacks, I provide my own explanation for why the study of happiness is important to ethics. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Problem of Induction: Hume's Problem The Regularity Theory of Causation Hume and Cognitive Science Hume and Naturalized Epistemology Hume as anti‐Metaphysician References Further Reading.

A who's who of Sartre scholars contribute to a collection of multidisciplinary perspectives from sociology, religion, and bioethics, on a hitherto neglected area of Sartre's philosophy.

This chapter contains section titled: The ‘Essence’ of a Philosophical Prejudice One Philosophical Task or Two? Techniques for Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices.

In this chapter, the author's unplanned venture into public philosophy began in the mid‐to‐late 1980s, just as Ronald Reagan was insisting that a certain famous wall be torn down. Various European thinkers and political philosophers in America, along with a few people working in the author's own tradition, like Robert Nozick and Peter Singer, had already begun to work in the nascent movement of “applied philosophy,” and in a public way. The author's early work in philosophy had been solidly within (...) the analytical tradition, with a special interest in religion, focused mainly on metaphysics and, secondarily, epistemological issues. Public philosophy can be rekindled in our time by any number of means and across a wide variety of topics. Many of the philosophers who had the biggest public impact in their own time and into our own have been good storytellers, and some have used the power of humor well. (shrink)

The original accounts of twenty-four experiments that created modern physics, retaining the original illustrations where possible.

This work stresses the illogical manner in which mathematics has developed, the question of applied mathematics as against 'pure' mathematics, and the challenges to the consistency of mathematics' logical structure that have occurred in the twentieth century.

Background: There is growing interest in credentialing hospital ethicists. Consult volume is being incorporated into credentialing criteria, although few data supporting this approach are available...

This volume represents the efforts of oneof Americas leading philosophers to do just that.

Believing Philosophy introduces Christians to philosophy and the tools it offers believers, helping them understand, articulate, and defend their faith in an age of unbelief.

On American Freedom critiques the value of freedom as it is now manifest in America's political, economic, and cultural life in light of a more robust value of freedom coordinated around human dignity and civic participation. Drawing from historic sources as diverse as James Madison, Adam Smith, and Catherine Beecher - as well as from contemporary sources like George W. Bush and Bob Dylan - the book paints a bleak picture of this most cherished American value. At the same time, (...) On American Freedom outlines a reform initiative that will secure a more preferred value of freedom by simply by reconfiguring the federal system to include reorganized and empowered city-states capable of serving as sites for a fuller form of freedom than Americans now enjoy. (shrink)

A Green Beret's profound spiritual transformation from PTSD to awakening and from military warrior to spiritual warrior.

Morris N. Eagle explores the understanding and role of subjective experience in the disciplines of psychology, psychoanalysis, and philosophy of mind. Elaborating how different understandings of subjective experience give rise to very different theories of the nature of the mind, Eagle then explains how these shape clinical practices. In particular, Eagle addresses the strong tendency in the disciplines concerned with the nature of the mind to overlook the centrality of subjective experience in one's life, to view it with suspicion, (...) and to reduce it to neural processes. Describing examples of research in which subjective experience is a central variable, Eagle provides an outline of a model in which the dichotomy of conscious and unconscious is supplemented by subjective experience as a continuum. This book is essential reading for psychoanalysts, psychoanalytic psychotherapists, psychologists and anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the importance of theories of the mind to therapeutic practice. (shrink)