This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Stochastic Algorithms: Foundations and Applications, SAGA 2005, held in Moscow, Russia in October 2005. The 14 revised full papers presented together with 5 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected for inclusion in the book. The contributed papers included in this volume cover both theoretical as well as applied aspects of stochastic computations whith a special focus on new algorithmic ideas involving stochastic decisions and the design and evaluation (...) of stochastic algorithms within realistic scenarios. (shrink)

Taken together with my previous articles [77], [80] devoted to the history of finite random sums and to Laplace's theory of errors, this paper sheds sufficient light on the whole work of Laplace in probability. Laplace's theory of probability is subdivided into theory of probability proper, limit theorems and mathematical statistics (not yet distinguished as a separate entity). I maintain that in its very design Laplace's theory of probability is a discipline pertaining to natural science rather than to mathematics. I (...) maintain also the idea that the so-called Laplacian determinism was no hindrance to applications of his theory of probability to natural science and that one of his utterances in this connection could have well been made by Maxwell's contemporaries. Two possible reasons why the theory of probability stagnated after Laplace's work are singled out: the absence of new fields of application and, also, the insufficient level of mathematical abstraction used by Laplace. For all his achievements, I reach the general conclusion that he did not originate the theory of probability as it is now known. (shrink)

The results of education in the conditions of collective creative interaction are discussed. The results of research of the self-image, an image of the senior companion, images of the good and the bad man in consciousness of children and adult, present and former members of the children’s organization working by a technique of collective creative education are presented.

We analyze the rather unusual properties of some exact solutions in 2D dilaton gravity for which infinite quantum stresses on the Killing horizon can be compatible with regularity of the geometry. In particular, the Boulware state can support a regular horizon. We show that such solutions are contained in some well-known exactly solvable models (for example, RST). Formally, they appear to account for an additional coefficient B in the solutions (for the same Lagrangian which contains also “traditional” solutions) that gives (...) rise to the deviation of temperature T from its Hawking value T H . The Lorentzian geometry, which is a self-consistent solution of the semiclassical field equations, in such models, is smooth even at B≠0 and there is no need to put B=0 (T=T H ) to smooth it out. We show how the presence of B≠0 affects the structure of spacetime. In contrast to “usual” black holes, full fledged thermodynamic interpretation, including definite value of entropy, can be ascribed (for a rather wide class of models) to extremal horizons, not to nonextreme ones. We find also new exact solutions for “usual” black holes (with T=T H ). The properties under discussion arise in the weak-coupling regime of the effective constant of dilaton-gravity interaction. Extension of features, traced in 2D models, to 4D dilaton gravity leads, for some special models, to exceptional nonextreme black holes having no own thermal properties. (shrink)

This work is designed to answer both sceptical attacks on knowledge and epistemological relativism implied in the sceptic’s position. Rather than following the traditional path of developing a foundations picture along either rationalist or empiricist lines, Harrison turns to the resources of pure reason alone to repel the sceptic’s attacks and to find that about which we can be certain. Since the sceptic’s arguments "have been produced by reason, it is important if reason is going to be considered trustworthy that (...) they can also be answered by reason." Harrison’s thesis is that by reason alone "standards that judgments have to match up to if they are going to be thought of as judgments about the world" can be found. Such standards can be produced by an "inquiry into the essential conditions of our world being a comprehensible world.". (shrink)

While Hirst provides valuable insights into the thought of Bernard and of Durkheim, especially The Rules of Sociological Method, he does not attempt a full explanation of either man's thought. His goal is broader than that. Hirst's purpose in this book is "... to question and to challenge the dominant conceptions of epistemology in sociology.".

In this work Pollock attempts to recast the epistemological enterprise. Traditional epistemology has been centered on the search for truth conditions. It has been assumed that unless these are found the sceptic’s attack on knowledge claims cannot be conclusively answered. Pollock contends that traditional epistemologists have been barking up the wrong tree. The problem of epistemology is not to prove the trustworthiness of the justification condition. The proper task of epistemologists is to reveal the logical connection between the source of (...) our knowledge and the knowledge the source provides. This is to be done through an analysis of the meaning of statements, and the meaning of a statement is determined by the "justification conditions of it and its denial." Epistemological issues, such as perception, other minds, historical knowledge, a priori knowledge, amount to "nothing more than describing the justification conditions for statements in the different areas of knowledge." But, then what is meant by "justification conditions"? (shrink)

In the past 300 years philosophy has been preoccupied with the problem of knowledge. Since Descartes, traditional, prescientific culture has eroded under the sceptical attack and has been replaced by a new culture characterized by an unprecedented growth in scientific knowledge and its powerful models of explanation. Gellner seeks to understand "the differences between its two shores, the nature of the reasons and causes which explain or justify our firm location on one side of it." His concern is with relativism, (...) not only how to state the problem, but also how to find norms independent of any belief system which would codify or justify one system rather than another one. What this comes to is the legitimation of belief, the search for and use of final norms which are legitimate prior to any specific information about the world and serve as the final court of appeal for all study. This he claims is the central problem of the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

This work is designed to answer both sceptical attacks on knowledge and epistemological relativism implied in the sceptic’s position. Rather than following the traditional path of developing a foundations picture along either rationalist or empiricist lines, Harrison turns to the resources of pure reason alone to repel the sceptic’s attacks and to find that about which we can be certain. Since the sceptic’s arguments "have been produced by reason, it is important if reason is going to be considered trustworthy that (...) they can also be answered by reason." Harrison’s thesis is that by reason alone "standards that judgments have to match up to if they are going to be thought of as judgments about the world" can be found. Such standards can be produced by an "inquiry into the essential conditions of our world being a comprehensible world.". (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to lay to rest "fruitless controversy over mind and body" by developing a comprehensive theory of mind. The theory Matson argues for is mind-body identity. In developing his position he takes a hard materialist line: "... if sensations are brain processes then they cannot be... anything else." Yet, he asks, "What is the sentience? Why is there any such phenomenon? What difference does it make?" Rejecting dualism, he steers his materialist identity theory between two (...) mires: epiphenomenalism and behaviorism. His contention is that while sensations are brain processes, man is a sentient being and that sentience makes a difference. The difference sentience makes allows us to say that man is not a machine and is free. (shrink)