A common philosophical view holds that moral assessments of people will depend entirely upon their possession or not of a sufficiently good will or character1—arguably, indeed, the moral assessment...

1 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London, 1968), Chapter 9; 'A Causal Theory of Knowledge' by Alvin I. Goldman, The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LXIV, No. 12, June 22, 1967. A striking parallelism would appear to exist between 'the causal theory of knowledge' and the orthodox Stoic doctrine regarding the kataleptike phantasia . See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248 (reprinted in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta , edited by H. F. A. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1921, (...) Volume I, page 18, 59C): 'An apprehensive appearance is one which has been stamped and sealed by the actual, and in accordance with the actual thing itself, in such a way that it would not be produced by what is not (the) actual' (I am indebted for the wording of this somewhat controversial translation to my colleague Mr. M. B. Wallace). See the discussion and additional ref. (shrink)

A largely deontological conscience will probably optimize consequences. But Bernard Williams objects to the, if one therefore embraces indirect consequentialism, of. Admittedly the strategy is painful, and a counsel of imperfection at best. But it need not be psychologically impossible, inconsistent, or even self-deceptive, given ethical cognitivism.

When can one say that a new theory is truer than the old one it contradicts, even though neither is absolutely true? We are primarily concerned with the case in which the conflicting theories offer answers to the same questions, and so we do not introduce considerations of "logical width". We propose that part of the new theory is truer than part of the old one when the former part gets right whatever the latter-part got right while the former does (...) not make any new mistakes. Pragmatic considerations will determine the relative importance of whatever new mistakes the new theory does make as a whole. To avoid artificial counterexamples, we restrict the parts compared to those that are "convex". A "convex" theory is one that holds in all cases intermediate between any two cases in which it holds. (shrink)

SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...) distinction is drawn in terms of what would extinguish the disposition. The resultant concept of cognitive synonymy is then used to clarify the difference between trivial and non‐trivial necessary truth, and explain how logical deduction by tautological steps can lead to new knowledge.RésuméLe noeud de I'argumentation de Quine contre la synonymie— et donc pour une version de pragmatisme et indépendamment contre le mentalisme — réside dans le défi lancéà la partie adverse d'expliquer en termes de comportement la différence entre d'une part la disposition à utiliser deux prédicats de façon »interchangeable« parce qu'on les »tcroit« habituellement coextensifs, et d'autre part la disposition à le faire parce que l'un et l'autre »signifiant« la même chose. Puisque la synonymie est prise dans un sens comportemental, cette distinction doit se manifester par une différence de comportement, mais n'est pas nécessairement totalement explicable sans recourir au mental. La distinction est faite en considérant ce qui supprimerait la disposition à les utiliser de façon interchangeable. Le concept de “lsynonymie cognitive” qui se dégage de cette analyse est ensuite utilisé pour clarifier la différence entre des várités nécessaires triviales et non triviales et pour expliquer comment une deduction logique par pas tautologiques peut conduire à des connaissances nouvelles.ZusammenfassungDer entscheidende Punkt in Quines Argument gegen die Synonymitrtt— und damit für eine bestimmte Version des Pragmatismus und unabhängig davon gegen den Mentalismus — ist seine Aufforderung, den verhaltensmässigen Unterschied zu erklaen zwischen einerseits der Disposition, zwei Prädikate in austauschbarer Weise zu verwenden, weil man sie gewohnheitsmässig für Koextensiv hält, und andererseits der Disposition, dies zu tun, weil sie gleiche »Bedeutung« haben. Da die Synonymitlit behaviouristisch gelehrt und gelernt wird, muss die zur Diskussion stehende Unterscheidung verhaltensmässig einen Unterschied ausmachen, welcher jedoch nicht notwendigerweise ganz in nicht‐mentalistischer Termen erklärbar ist. Die Unterscheidung wird in Termen formuliert die die Disposition aufheben warden. Der Begriff der kognitiven Synonyrnitlft. der daraus resultiert, wird dann verwendet, urn den Unterschied zwischen trivialen und nicht‐trivialen notwendigen Wahrheiten zu erläutern und um zu erkläen, wie eine logische Deduktion durch tautologische Schritte zu neuem Wissen führen kann. (shrink)

Les philosophes parlent de «l’effet que cela fait» d’avoir une expérience particulière, sans tenir compte des variations sémantiques de la phrase. La «vision aveugle» manque de détails.

Résumé La croyance que l'on est (ou pas) dans un état de douleur est singulière en ceci qu'elle semble pouvoir être qualifiée d'infaillibilité ou d'incorrigibilité logique, de même que le cogito. Mais comment se peut-il que l'existence d'une croyance (vraie) et l'existence du fait qui est l'objet de cette croyance puisssent constituer la même existence? Je propose ici une réponse à cette question. Parfois, une croyance peut être un désir.

Was Thomas Aquinas the first major Western philosopher to distinguish systematically between things it would be contradictory to deny and other things? He certainly was willing to give his authority to the proposition that whatever is logically impossible ‘does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence’. In the later Middle Ages, scholastic philosophers came virtually to equate achievable by divine power and free of contradiction free of contradiction and not achievable by divine power ).

RÉSUMÉ: De manière générale, les désirs sont aux intérêts ce que les croyances sont aux vérités. Étant admis que ce qui est conforme à vos intérêts est ce que vous désireriez, tout compte fait, si vous étiez en possession d'une information telle au sujet de ses effets potentiels qu'aucune information additionnelle sur ces effets ne modifierait vos désirs, la conclusion selon laquelle vous désirez déjà, tout compte fait, favoriser vos intérêts peut être tirée moyennant certaines suppositions plausibles en philosophie de (...) l'esprit. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: De manière générale, les désirs sont aux intérêts ce que les croyances sont aux vérités. Étant admis que ce qui est conforme à vos intérêts est ce que vous désireriez, tout compte fait, si vous étiez en possession d'une information telle au sujet de ses effets potentiels qu'aucune information additionnelle sur ces effets ne modifierait vos désirs, la conclusion selon laquelle vous désirez déjà, tout compte fait, favoriser vos intérêts peut être tirée moyennant certaines suppositions plausibles en philosophie de (...) l'esprit. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉLes qualia n'existent pas. La différence phénoménologique entre voir et imaginer, c'est que les propositions auxquelles l'expérient commence à croire dans le premier cas sont uniquement considérées dans le second. Nous pouvons savoir «quel effet cela fait d’être une chauve-souris» en sachant que leur faculté d’écholocation les informe non-inférentiellement des formes, grandeurs, et distances directionnelles des surfaces à proximité. Toutefois, les termes désignant les qualités secondes (comme les couleurs) sont les noms des propriétés-types qu'ils désignent, et dérivent causalement d'un «baptême» (...) verbal; les expérients ne peuvent donc connaître le caractère des expériences de couleur sans étudier la physiologie du cerveau. (shrink)

Abstract Nominalists, denying the reality of anything over and above concreta, are committed to a reductive account of any law of nature, explaining its necessity?the fact that it not only holds for all actual instances, but would hold for any additional ones?in, for example, epistemic terms (its likelihood/certainty of holding beyond the already observed instances). Nominalists argue that the world would be no different without irreducible modalities. ?Modal realists? often object that this parallels a common phenomenalist argument against believing in (...) a mind?independent external world. However, phenomenalism without translatability into sensory language is incoherent, though any such translation is impossible. The ?as if philosophy is untenable as well. But it is quite possible to formulate inductive methodology's imperatives in non?modal terms. Modal realism purports to give a reason against inductive scepticism, but does not go beyond saying that there is one. (shrink)

Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.

Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.

Not everything that it's ‘possible’ FOR you to do is something it's ‘possible’ THAT you will do. The compatibilist freedom formula ‘absence of impediments’ must embrace external and internal – including psychological – impediments. Desires are impediments only when they impede, owing to motivational conflict. But other impediments, external or internal, require merely the potential to impede.

Propositions are essentially without form.

An exploratory discussion. Call a desire “finitisic” if some conceivable eventuality would fulfil it completely (so that no conceivable eventuality would fulfil it more). That flexibility of behaviour distinguishing the animate from the mindless is accounted for fundamentally by supposing ultimate motivation all infinitistic and outweighable. Decision-making by the counterpoise of such motivation contrasts with algorithmic thinking; and this suggests a non-computational view of mentation, a compatibilist understanding of creative imagination, and (with some additional conceptions) a possible definitional avenue for (...) breaking the circle of intentionality. (shrink)

The object here is to develop a moral argument against theism. By “theism” is meant the worship of a omnipotent, all righteous God. An attitude of worship, it may be assumed, would not be an attitude of worship if it did not preclude all doubt as to the worthiness of the object of worship. At any rate, it is only this attitude whose castigation as immoral is meant to be argued for here.There are, of course, as many theisms as there (...) are theistic religions, sects, cults, denominations et cetera. let M be the moral code of one such theism. It is immaterial here whether the moral code M is or is not dogmatically spelled out in the theistic religion in question. The present argument will follow equally well if the believers claim nothing more than an imperfect, incomplete, and uncertain knowledge of M. (shrink)