This collection of germinal work in the field by Anthony Weston presents his pragmatic environmental philosophy, calling for reconstruction and imagination rather than deconstruction and analysis. It is a philosopher's invitation to environmental ethics in an unexpectedly inviting and down-to-earth key. On the pragmatic view advanced here, environmental values are thoroughly natural—what else could they be?—and are open-ended and in flux. Rather than passing judgment on the world as it is, we are called to rediscover and remake the (...) world as it might be. We require an environmental etiquette more than a formal ethic; an etiquette whose development must be an ongoing process; and a process in turn that is genuinely multicentric, challenging us to negotiate our place among the exuberant variety of living and other forms. (shrink)

In this essay I propose an environmental ethic in the pragmatic vein. I begin by suggesting that the contemporary debate in environmental ethics is forced into a familiar but highly restrictive set of distinctions and problems by the traditional notion of intrinsic value, particularly by its demands that intrinsic values be self-sufficient, abstract, and justified in special ways. I criticize this notion and develop an alternativewhich stresses the interdependent structure of values, a structure which at once roots them deeply in (...) our selves and at the same time opens them to critical challenge and change. Finally, I apply this alternative view back to environmental ethics. It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed. (shrink)

In this essay I propose an environmental ethic in the pragmatic vein. I begin by suggesting that the contemporary debate in environmental ethics is forced into a familiar but highly restrictive set of distinctions and problems by the traditional notion of intrinsic value, particularly by its demands that intrinsic values be self-sufficient, abstract, and justified in special ways. I criticize this notion and develop an alternativewhich stresses the interdependent structure of values, a structure which at once roots them deeply in (...) our selves and at the same time opens them to critical challenge and change. Finally, I apply this alternative view back to environmental ethics. It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed. (shrink)

Short Arguments: Some General Rules Arguments begin by marshaling reasons and organizing them in a clear and fair way. Chapter I offers general rules for ...

Taking a refreshingly hands-on approach to introductory ethics, A 21st Century Ethical Toolbox provides students with a set of tools to help them understand and make a constructive difference in real-life moral controversies. Thoroughly optimistic, it invites students to approach ethical issues with a reconstructive intent, making room for more and better options than the traditional "pro" and "con" positions that have grown up around tough problems like abortion and animal rights. Ideal for introductory and applied ethics courses, this unique (...) text does not treat ethics as a purely academic, historical, or theoretical subject, but as a wide-ranging and ongoing set of challenges that calls for multiple and interwoven kinds of intelligence. It covers the skills that are most vital to making real progress in ethics, including paying careful attention to the values at stake on all sides of an issue; looking for creative opportunities within difficult problems; critical-thinking skills such as defining key terms and making sure to judge similar cases alike; and learning how to engage in constructive dialogue. Instructors can readily use the experiential and applied activities inspired by this "toolbox" of practical skills to design an interactive and collaborative ethics course. Students can carry these essential skills directly from this book into such projects as campaigning for environmental awareness and staffing local homeless shelters. In addition to his own discussion, Weston includes gripping and provocative short selections from essayists, activists, and philosophers, and also cites his own students. Extensive "Exercises and Notes" sections end each chapter, and a detailed appendix offers instructors advice on how to use the Toolbox in the classroom. (shrink)

Teaching philosophy of education offers us a chance to apply the familiar Socratic dialectic to ourselves. But it is very seldom taught in this spirit, if taught at all. Perhaps we fear that such a course would be impossibly self‐referential. This paper argues, however, that precisely this kind of self‐reference could be its strength. I outline a course of this sort, based upon a number of iterations I have taught over the past few years. A range of different classroom styles (...) are enacted and examined for their hidden assumptions about teaching, learning, and knowledge. (shrink)

"A Workbook for Arguments" builds on Anthony Weston's "Rulebook for Arguments" to provide a complete textbook for a course in critical thinking or informal logic. "Workbook" includes: The entire text of "Rulebook," supplemented with extensive further explanations and exercises. Homework exercises adapted from a wide range of arguments from newspapers, philosophical texts, literature, movies, videos, and other sources. Practical advice to help students succeed when applying the "Rulebook's" rules to the examples in the homework exercises. Suggestions for further (...) practice, outlining activities that students can do by themselves or with classmates to improve their skills. Detailed instructions for in-class activities and take-home assignments designed to engage students. An appendix on mapping arguments, giving students a solid introduction to this vital skill in constructing complex and multi-step arguments and evaluating them. Model answers to odd-numbered problems, including commentaries on the strengths and weaknesses of selected sample answers and further discussion of some of the substantive intellectual, philosophical, or ethical issues they raise. (shrink)

Contemporary nonanthropocentic environmental ethics is profoundly shaped by the very anthropocentrism that it tries to transcend. New values only slowly struggle free of old contexts. Recognizing this struggle, however, opens a space for—indeed, necessitates—alternative models for contemporary environmental ethics. Rather than trying to unify or fine-tune our theories, we require more pluralistic andexploratory methods. We cannot reach theoretical finality; we can only co-evolve an ethic with transformed practices.

We might begin by trying to unsettle the apparently natural inferences that are supposed to lead us so ineluctably to recognize something called “intrinsic value”.

An ethics-based epistemology is necessary for environmental philosophy—a sharply different approach from the epistemology-based ethics that the field has inherited, mostly implicitly, from mainstream ethics. In this paper, we try to uncover this inherited epistemology and point toward an alternative. In section two, we outline a general contrast between an ethics-based epistemology and an epistemology-based ethics. In section three, we examine the relationship between ethics and epistemology in an ethics-based epistemology, drawing extensively on examples from indigenous cultures. We briefly explore (...) several striking implications of an ethics-based epistemology in sections four and five. (shrink)

An ethics-based epistemology is necessary for environmental philosophy—a sharply different approach from the epistemology-based ethics that the field has inherited, mostly implicitly, from mainstream ethics. In this paper, we try to uncover this inherited epistemology and point toward an alternative. In section two, we outline a general contrast between an ethics-based epistemology and an epistemology-based ethics. In section three, we examine the relationship between ethics and epistemology in an ethics-based epistemology, drawing extensively on examples from indigenous cultures. We briefly explore (...) several striking implications of an ethics-based epistemology in sections four and five. (shrink)

In Toward Better Problems, Anthony Weston develops a pragmatic approach to the pressing moral issues of our time.

Disvaluing nature—a cognitive act—usually leads quickly to devaluing it too: to real-world exploitation and destruction. Worse, in fact, nature in its devalued state can then be held up as an excuse and justification for the initial disvaluation. In this way, dismissal and destruction perpetuate themselves. I call this process “self-validating reduction.” It is crucial to recognize the cycle of self-validating reduction, both in general and specifically as it applies to nature, if we are to have any chance of reversing it.

Disvaluing nature—a cognitive act—usually leads quickly to devaluing it too: to real-world exploitation and destruction. Worse, in fact, nature in its devalued state can then be held up as an excuse and justification for the initial disvaluation. In this way, dismissal and destruction perpetuate themselves. I call this process “self-validating reduction.” It is crucial to recognize the cycle of self-validating reduction, both in general and specifically as it applies to nature, if we are to have any chance of reversing it.

A Practical Companion to Ethics, Fourth Edition, is a concise and accessible introduction to the basic attitudes and skills that make ethics work, like thinking for oneself, creative and integrative problem-solving, and keeping an open mind. This unique volume illuminates the broad kinds of practical intelligence required in moral judgment, complementing the narrower theoretical considerations that often dominate ethics courses. The optimistic tone and brisk pace of the narrative provide an entertaining and intelligent guide to "everyday" morality. The fourth edition (...) features a new chapter on ethical theories; significantly revised and expanded chapters on conflicts of value and creative problem- solving in ethics; and a new concluding chapter on "Making a Difference, " which explains how students can incorporate ethical thinking and practice into their daily lives. (shrink)

Contemporary nonanthropocentic environmental ethics is profoundly shaped by the very anthropocentrism that it tries to transcend. New values only slowly struggle free of old contexts. Recognizing this struggle, however, opens a space for—indeed, necessitates—alternative models for contemporary environmental ethics. Rather than trying to unify or fine-tune our theories, we require more pluralistic andexploratory methods. We cannot reach theoretical finality; we can only co-evolve an ethic with transformed practices.

The familiar “centrisms” in environmental ethics aim to make ethics progressively more inclusive by expanding a single circle of moral consideration I propose a radically different kind of geometry. Multicentrism envisions a world of irreducibly diverse and multiple centers of being and value—not one single circle, of whatever size or growth rate, but many circles, partly overlapping, each with its own center. Moral consideration necessarily becomes plural and ongoing, and moral action takes place within an open-ended context of negotiation and (...) covenant. Much critical and constructive work, both in environmental ethics proper and in many related fields, is already multicentric in spirit. It needs to be drawn together into an explicit, alternative environmental-ethical “platform.”. (shrink)

James Lovelock’s “Gaia hypothesis”-the suggestion that life on Earth functions in essential ways as one organism, as a single living entity-is extraordinarily suggestive for environmental philosophy. What exactly it suggests, however, is not yet so clear. Although many of Lovelock’s own ethical conclusions are rather distressing for environmental ethics, there are other possible approaches to the Gaia Hypothesis. Ethical philosophers might take Gaia to be analogous to a “person” and thus to have the same sorts of values that more familiar (...) sorts of persons have. Deep ecologists might find in the Gaia hypothesis a means by which to transform and reunderstand our concrete experience of the world. This essay canvasses some of the strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities of each approach. (shrink)

James Lovelock’s “Gaia hypothesis”-the suggestion that life on Earth functions in essential ways as one organism, as a single living entity-is extraordinarily suggestive for environmental philosophy. What exactly it suggests, however, is not yet so clear. Although many of Lovelock’s own ethical conclusions are rather distressing for environmental ethics, there are other possible approaches to the Gaia Hypothesis. Ethical philosophers might take Gaia to be analogous to a “person” and thus to have the same sorts of values that more familiar (...) sorts of persons have. Deep ecologists might find in the Gaia hypothesis a means by which to transform and reunderstand our concrete experience of the world. This essay canvasses some of the strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities of each approach. (shrink)

The familiar “centrisms” in environmental ethics aim to make ethics progressively more inclusive by expanding a single circle of moral consideration I propose a radically different kind of geometry. Multicentrism envisions a world of irreducibly diverse and multiple centers of being and value—not one single circle, of whatever size or growth rate, but many circles, partly overlapping, each with its own center. Moral consideration necessarily becomes plural and ongoing, and moral action takes place within an open-ended context of negotiation and (...) covenant. Much critical and constructive work, both in environmental ethics proper and in many related fields, is already multicentric in spirit. It needs to be drawn together into an explicit, alternative environmental-ethical “platform.”. (shrink)

Tom Birch has decisively transformed the so-called “considerability” question by arguing that all things must be “considerable” from the start in “the root sense” if we are to determine what further kinds of value they may have. Spelling out this kind of “root” or “deep” consideration proves to be difficult, however, especially in light of post-Kantian conceptions of mind. Such consideration may also ask of the world too ready a kind of self-revelation. This paper proposes another, complementary version of universal (...) consideration: as a kind of practical invitation, as a way of creating the space within which a response can emerge or an exchange coevolve. I conclude by locating this vision within a picture of ethics as a whole that brings what I call its “originary” stage, rather than its formal stage, into focus. (shrink)

This book is a brief introduction or invitation to the rapidly growing field of environmental philosophy or ethics. Each chapter presents the particular view of its author, yet, the chapters are complementary, exploring key topics from several perspectives. A postscript presents a bibliographical guide to each of the chapters as well as practical steps we may take in confronting current and future environmental issues. It is intended for undergraduate students and for the general reader.

Tom Birch has decisively transformed the so-called “considerability” question by arguing that all things must be “considerable” from the start in “the root sense” if we are to determine what further kinds of value they may have. Spelling out this kind of “root” or “deep” consideration proves to be difficult, however, especially in light of post-Kantian conceptions of mind. Such consideration may also ask of the world too ready a kind of self-revelation. This paper proposes another, complementary version of universal (...) consideration: as a kind of practical invitation, as a way of creating the space within which a response can emerge or an exchange coevolve. I conclude by locating this vision within a picture of ethics as a whole that brings what I call its “originary” stage, rather than its formal stage, into focus. (shrink)

"A Workbook for Arguments" builds on Anthony Weston’s "A Rulebook for Arguments" to provide a complete textbook for a course in critical thinking or informal logic. The second edition adds: Updated and improved homework exercises—nearly one third are new—to ensure that the examples continue to resonate with students. Increased coverage of scientific reasoning, demonstrating how scientific reasoning dovetails with critical thinking more generally Two new activities in which students analyze arguments in their original form, as provided in brief (...) selections from the original texts. This edition continues to include The entire text of "Rulebook," supplemented with extensive explanations and exercises. Homework exercises adapted from a wide range of arguments in a wide variety of sources. Practical advice to help students succeed. Model answers to odd-numbered problems, including commentaries on the strengths and weaknesses of selected sample answers and further discussion of some of the substantive intellectual, philosophical, or ethical issues they raise. Detailed instructions for in-class activities and take-home assignments. An appendix on mapping arguments, giving students a solid introduction to this vital skill in constructing complex and multi-step arguments and evaluating them. (shrink)

(2013). As Paradigms Turn: What it Might Mean to be Green. Ethics, Policy & Environment: Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 159-161. doi: 10.1080/21550085.2013.801201.

Creativity for Critical Thinkers is a how-to book in creative thinking, specifically orientated towards college courses in critical thinking and with a strong appeal to the general reader as well. It offers a vital but often overlooked set of thinking skills: multiplying options, brainstorming, lateral thinking, reframing problems, and many others. These skills are reinforced by applications and exercises covering a wide range of topics, from the annoyance of everyday life to the largest issues on the world stage.

This book offers a uniquely constructive set of tools for engaging complex and controversial ethical problems. Covering such practical methods as diversifying options, lateral thinking, reframing problems, approaching conflicts as creative opportunities, and many others, it shows how to find "room to move" inside even the most challenging ethical problems, and thereby discover new and productive ways to deal with them. The book features numerous exercises and applications that consider a wide range of familiar ethical issues--including the moral status of (...) animals, the death penalty, poverty, drug use, and many others--and ends with some of the toughest: abortion, assisted suicide, and environmental ethics. An ideal supplement for any general ethics course, Creative Problem-Solving in Ethics can also be used in more specific "applied" courses like bioethics, business ethics, and social ethics, as well as in critical thinking courses that emphasize ethics. In addition, it provides a concise and engaging introduction to creative thinking for workshop participants and general readers. From the very beginning of the book, readers will discover that creative thinking can offer imaginative and promising alternatives to seemingly intractable ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

Consider the odd fact—later I will try to show how very odd it is—that the only popular views about the morality of abortion are also the most extreme. Philosophical views are no exception; indeed I will argue that this extremism has deeply philosophical roots. It follows directly from the insistence on “drawing a line” dividing persons from non persons. We can't, so the usual arguments go, draw such a line anywhere except at the very beginning or the very end of (...) fetal development. But on the practical level, as most of us know first-hand, that extremism remains problematic: it yields a factious and clumsy casuistry. It is equally difficult—and, surely, equally inhumane—to believe that a conceptus two days old is the moral equivalent of a fully functioning human being and that a fetus just prior to birth is the moral equivalent of a tumor. The division between persons and non persons, however, is linked in turn with certain others. Not only may the possibility of dividing any concept's denotation from its neighbors' seem to be at stake here; the division between persons and non persons depends more particularly—so I will argue—on the contemporary division in moral theory between moral reasons and other kinds of reasons, and in particular on the division between the moral and the self-interested “points of view.” That division in turn I trace back, in part, to the Hobbesian picture of the social world, on which the most fundamental division of all runs between persons and other persons. So one division points beyond itself to others. The critic is launched on a kind of odyssey through the theoretical presuppositions of applied ethics. (shrink)

Consider the odd fact—later I will try to show how very odd it is—that the only popular views about the morality of abortion are also the most extreme. Philosophical views are no exception; indeed I will argue that this extremism has deeply philosophical roots. It follows directly from the insistence on “drawing a line” dividing persons from non persons. We can't, so the usual arguments go, draw such a line anywhere except at the very beginning or the very end of (...) fetal development. But on the practical level, as most of us know first-hand, that extremism remains problematic: it yields a factious and clumsy casuistry. It is equally difficult—and, surely, equally inhumane—to believe that a conceptus two days old is the moral equivalent of a fully functioning human being and that a fetus just prior to birth is the moral equivalent of a tumor. The division between persons and non persons, however, is linked in turn with certain others. Not only may the possibility of dividing any concept's denotation from its neighbors' seem to be at stake here; the division between persons and non persons depends more particularly—so I will argue—on the contemporary division in moral theory between moral reasons and other kinds of reasons, and in particular on the division between the moral and the self-interested “points of view.” That division in turn I trace back, in part, to the Hobbesian picture of the social world, on which the most fundamental division of all runs between persons and other persons. So one division points beyond itself to others. The critic is launched on a kind of odyssey through the theoretical presuppositions of applied ethics. (shrink)

It is a pleasure and honor to continue this philosophical exchange in Ethics, Policy & Environment. Many thanks to Eric Katz, Christopher Preston, and Karen Warren, whose commentaries appear here;...