Presenting an engaging critique of current criminal justice practice in the UK and USA, this book introduces central questions of criminal law theory. It develops a forceful argument that the prevailing justifications for punishment are misguided, and have resulted in the systematic infliction of unnecessary human misery.

This leading anthology contains legal cases and essays written by the best scholars in legal philosophy, representing all major points of view on central topics in philosophy of law. This classic text is distinguished by its clarity, readability, balance of topics, balance of substantive positions on controversial questions, topical relevance, imaginative use of cases and stories, and the inclusion of only lightly-edited or untouched classics. This revision is marked by inclusion of many articles relevant to womens issues and a greater (...) emphasis on concrete legal problems. (shrink)

Each of the essays included in this volume illuminates an aspect of law, reflecting an unorthodox perception of jurisprudence which combines interests in philosophy, legal theory, criminology, legal history, political and constitutional theory and the history of ideas. This work will broaden the jurisprudential scope of practitioners' professional concerns, but help academics enhance their knowledge of the wealth of information for their own studies.

Presenting an engaging critique of current criminal justice practice in the UK and USA, this book introduces central questions of criminal law theory. It develops a forceful argument that the prevailing justifications for punishment are misguided, and have resulted in the systematic infliction of unnecessary human misery.

In their important book, Causation in the Law, H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honore argue that causation in the law is based on causation outside the law, that the causal principles the courts rely on to determine legal responsibility are based on distinctions exercised in ordinary causal judgments. A distinction that particularly concerns them is one that divides factors that are necessary or sine qua non for an effect into those that count as causes for purposes of legal responsibility (...) and those that do not. Hart and Honore claim that this distinction is often one of fact rather than of legal policy, and that the factual basis is to be found in the ordinary distinction we draw between causes and 'mere conditions'. If this claim is correct, we may hope to illuminate the legal distinction by articulating the principles behind the ordinary one. This is a challenging task since, as in the case of most cognitive skills, we are far better at making particular judgments than we are at stating the general principles that underlie them. Hart and Honore devote the first part of their book to this difficult task. We have, then, two large projects. One is to articulate our ordinary notion of causation, especially the distinction between cause and mere condition. This is the project of constructing an 'ordinary model'. The other is to argue for what we may call the 'shared concept claim', the claim that the concept of legal cause is based on the ordinary notion of causation, that 'causal judgments, though the law may have to systematize them, are not specifically legal. They appeal to a notion which is part of everyday life' (1985, p. lv; all references to follow are from this edition). This essay will focus on Hart and Honore's ordinary model, rather than on their shared concept claim. In my judgment, Hart and Honore's case for some version of the shared concept claim is strong, so they are right to maintain that a better understanding of our ordinary notion of.. (shrink)

Contemporary criminal justice systems are extraordinarily unfair. Focusing on Hyman Gross’s Crimes and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique, however, I identify ways in which scholarly criticisms of these criminal justice systems tend to miss their target. In particular, I argue against the assumption that in order to criticize these criminal justice systems we need to cast doubt on the very practice of blaming people and on the notion of desert, or that we need to reject wholesale retributive rationales (...) for punishment. Quite the contrary: an important reason why contemporary criminal justice systems are unfair is that they punish many people undeservedly. (shrink)

John Hyman explores central problems in philosophy of action and the theory of knowledge, and connects these areas of enquiry in a new way. His approach to the dimensions of human action culminates in an original analysis of the relation between knowledge and rational behaviour, which provides the foundation for a new theory of knowledge itself.

This collection of thirty yoga and mindfulness tools will help support those in recovery from addiction of all kinds. Thirty accessible, pointed teachings offer inspiration, comfort, and solidarity in the moment, helping us cultivate a powerful and purposeful life in recovery, and to create a new design for living. Each chapter focuses on a quality-such as vigilance, acceptance, accountability, among others-and delves into how to manifest it in your recovery journey. Brian Hyman, a yoga teacher and recovery activist, understands (...) deeply what people need to maintain sobriety and strengthen recovery-and knows that those who struggle with addiction also often need support with other mental health challenges, like obsession, anxiety, depression. He uses yogic philosophy, mindfulness teachings, personal anecdotes, and secular wisdom to illuminate each quality and the role it plays in helping us create the life we want. The practices--which include inquiry questions, meditations, awareness exercises, breathing practices, yoga nidra, among others--will quiet the mind in difficult moments, support us as we establish meaningful relationships, and reinforce the power that recovery offers us. Hyman offers resources and additional reading suggestions in the back matter. Based on Hyman's popular online course, this book is essential reading for people of all ages in recovery-along with their family members and friends, and anyone in a health care profession who works with those struggling with addiction of any kind. Hyman includes a list of recovery organizations and a reading list in the back matter. (shrink)

A novel Kabbalistic synthesis on the nature of consciousness.

The prominence of judgment data in contemporary linguistics is crucially tied to Chomsky's mentalist reconception of the field. Judgment data are meta‐linguistic judgments – judgments about specific linguistic items, construed broadly to include language‐like items (e.g. ungrammatical strings). A judgment of unacceptability provides stronger evidence of ungrammaticality – insofar as reasonable alternative explanations can be ruled out (pragmatic oddity, processing difficulties, memory constraints, lexical awkwardness, etc.). The use of judgment data has never been without critics. The objections have taken various (...) forms. Earlier objections tended to deem judgments problematic as evidence per se, not just in linguistics but more generally. Later objections contend that the use of judgment data is problematic more specifically in the linguistic domain, in some cases on account of how they are in fact typically gathered or because of an over‐reliance on them over other sources of evidence. Judgment data, no matter how collected, have a definite future in linguistics. (shrink)

Linguistic intuitions are a central source of evidence across a variety of linguistic domains. They have also long been a source of controversy. This chapter aims to illuminate the etiology and evidential status of at least some linguistic intuitions by relating them to error signals of the sort posited by accounts of on-line monitoring of speech production and comprehension. The suggestion is framed as a novel reply to Michael Devitt’s claim that linguistic intuitions are theory-laden “central systems” responses, rather than (...) endorsed outputs of a modularized language faculty (the “Voice of Competence”). Along the way, it is argued that linguistic intuitions may not constitute a natural kind with a common etiology; and that, for a range of cases, the process by which intuitions used in linguistics are generated amounts to little more than comprehension. (shrink)

Emotion regulation has the odd distinction of being a wildly popular construct whose scientific existence is in considerable doubt. In this article, we discuss the confusion about whether emotion generation and emotion regulation can and should be distinguished from one another. We describe a continuum of perspectives on emotion, and highlight how different (often mutually incompatible) perspectives on emotion lead to different views about whether emotion generation and emotion regulation can be usefully distinguished. We argue that making differences in perspective (...) explicit serves the function of allowing researchers with different theoretical commitments to collaborate productively despite seemingly insurmountable differences in terminology and methods. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental distinctions in the field of emotion is the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation. This distinction fits comfortably with folk theories, which view emotions as passions that arise unbidden and then must be controlled. But is it really helpful to distinguish between emotion generation and emotion regulation? In this article, we begin by offering working definitions of emotion generation and emotion regulation. We argue that in some circumstances, the distinction between emotion generation and emotion (...) regulation is indeed useful. We point both to citation patterns, which indicate that researchers from across a number of sub-areas within psychology are making this distinction, and to empirical studies, which indicate the utility of this distinction in many different research contexts. We then consider five ways in which the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation can be problematic. We suggest that it is time to move beyond debates about whether this distinction is useful to a more specific consideration of when and in what ways this distinction is useful, and in this spirit, we offer recommendations for future research. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental distinctions in the field of emotion is the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation. This distinction fits comfortably with folk theories, which view emotions as passions that arise unbidden and then must be controlled. But is it really helpful to distinguish between emotion generation and emotion regulation? In this article, we begin by offering working definitions of emotion generation and emotion regulation. We argue that in some circumstances, the distinction between emotion generation and emotion (...) regulation is indeed useful. We point both to citation patterns, which indicate that researchers from across a number of sub-areas within psychology are making this distinction, and to empirical studies, which indicate the utility of this distinction in many different research contexts. We then consider five ways in which the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation can be problematic. We suggest that it is time to move beyond debates about whether this distinction is useful to a more specific consideration of when and in what ways this distinction is useful, and in this spirit, we offer recommendations for future research. (shrink)

Discusses reasoning and clear thinking, including such aspects as the nature of facts, language and reasoning, false analogies, and prejudice.

The assumption in current U.S. mainstream medicine is that birthing requires hospitalization. In fact, while the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists supports the right of every birthing person to make a medically informed decision about their delivery, they do not recommend home birth owing to data indicating greater neonatal morbidity and mortality. In this article, we examine the evidence surrounding home birth in the United States and its current limitations, as well as the ethical considerations around birth setting.

The eminent and award-winning historian Robert A. Gross presents his long-awaited, immersive journey through Concord in the age of Emerson and Thoreau.

Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct (...) and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman's own solution to his new riddle of induction turns on the degree to which predicates are entrenched in our use of language. However, this solution requires that judgements concerning the degree to which a predicate is entrenched can be made independently of any canon of perceptible similarity. I argue that this requirement cannot be met. The riddle itself depends upon the claim that since ‘green’ can be defined positionally in terms of ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ are (...) symmetrically related to ‘green’ and ‘blue’, and positionality is therefore ‘an entirely relative matter’. However, in order to establish that positionality is an entirely relative matter, we would need to provide a non‐positional definition of ‘grue’, rather than a positional definition of ‘green’. We therefore need to decide whether ‘grue’ can be defined ostensively by means of a single sample, as ‘green’ can. I argue that any attempt to provide such a definition is bound to fail, and hence the new riddle of induction does not reveal that ‘the roots of inductive validity are to be found in our use of language’. (shrink)

Catholic thinkers generally agree that artificial womb technology (AWT) would be permissible in cases of partial ectogenesis to assist severely premature infants, but there is substantially more debate concerning whether AWT could be used to save frozen embryos, which are the result of in vitro fertilization (IVF). In many cases, these embryos have been abandoned and left in a permanently cryogenic state, which is an affront to their human dignity. While AWT would allow people to adopt these embryos and give (...) them an opportunity to develop, it gives rise to serious concerns over the possibility of scandal and the potential for cooperation in evil. Therefore, the author argues that even though AWT may one day represent a solution to this tragedy, it is currently not a morally licit answer, given the widespread use and approval of IVF in our culture. (shrink)

Théorie économique élaborée dans les années 1960, l'hypothèse d'instabilité financière postule que le système capitaliste est instable par essence : toute phase d'équilibre apparent ne fait qu'encourager les acteurs du marché à prendre davantage de risques, qui provoquent de nouvelles crises. Décriée à l'époque, cette analyse est aujourd'hui considérée comme l'une des plus à même d'expliquer la crise actuelle. Elle offre une première approche passionnante d’une oeuvre dense, jusqu’à présent méconnue en France.

In 12 narratives, medical workers from Afghanistan, Darfur, Gaza, Iraq, Israel, Myanmar, and Ukraine describe the day-to-day challenges of providing quality medical care in austere conflict zones. Faced with severe shortages of supplies, overwhelmed by sick and injured civilians and soldiers, and subject to constant attacks on medical personnel and facilities, the contributors to this collection confront difficult dilemmas of justice, medical impartiality, neutrality, burnout, and moral injury as they struggle to fulfill their duties as medical professionals, military officers, and (...) conscientious citizens. (shrink)

If rhetoric is the art of speaking, who is listening? In Being-Moved, Daniel M. Gross provides an answer, showing when and where the art of speaking parted ways with the art of listening-and what happens when they intersect once again. Much in the history of rhetoric must be rethought along the way. And much of this rethinking pivots around Martin Heidegger's early lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric, where his famous topic, Being, gives way to being-moved. The results, Gross goes (...) on to show, are profound. Listening to the gods, listening to the world around us, and even listening to one another in the classroom-all of these experiences become different when rhetoric is reoriented from the voice to the ear. (shrink)

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...) general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action. There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference between actions and events, at least not in general terms, because it has no need to. Perhaps it sounds a little odd to say that some events are performed; but if we balked at describing, say, the abdication of Edward VIII as one of the politically significant events in Britain in 1936, it could not be for metaphysical reasons. And since actions, like events, are datable — though often, as we shall see, only imprecisely — actions are said to take place and to occur. But an important class of actions consist in moving something; indeed, according to many philosophers, every action consists in moving something. And when we consider actions of this sort from a theoretical point of view it becomes imperative to distinguish between actions and events. Or so we shall argue. (shrink)

The goal of military medicine is to conserve the fighting force necessary to prosecute just wars. Just wars are defensive or humanitarian. A defensive war protects one's people or nation. A humanitarian war rescues a foreign, persecuted people or nation from grave human rights abuse. To provide medical care during armed conflict, military medical ethics supplements civilian medical ethics with two principles: military-medical necessity and broad beneficence. Military-medical necessity designates the medical means required to pursue national self-defense or humanitarian intervention. (...) While clinical-medical necessity directs care to satisfy urgent medical needs, military-medical necessity utilizes medical care to satisfy the just aims of war. Military medicine may therefore attend the lightly wounded before the critically wounded or use medical care to win hearts and minds. The underlying principle is broad, not narrow, beneficence. The latter addresses private interests, while broad beneficence responds to the collective welfare of the political community. (shrink)

The sublime evokes our awe, our terror, and our wonder. Applied first in ancient Greece to the heights of literary expression, in the 18th-century the sublime was extended to nature and to the sciences, enterprises that viewed the natural world as a manifestation of God's goodness, power, and wisdom. In The Scientific Sublime, Alan Gross reveals the modern-day sublime in popular science. He shows how the great popular scientists of our time--Richard Feynman, Stephen Hawking, Steven Weinberg, Brian Greene, Lisa (...) Randall, Rachel Carson, Stephen Jay Gould, Steven Pinker, Richard Dawkins, and E. O. Wilson--evoke the sublime in response to fundamental questions: How did the universe begin? How did life? How did language? These authors maintain a tradition initiated by Joseph Addison, Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith, towering 18th-century figures who adapted the literary sublime first to nature, then to science--though with one crucial difference: religion has been replaced wholly by science. In a final chapter, Gross explores science's attack on religion, an assault that attempts to sweep permanently under the rug two questions science cannot answer: What is the meaning of life? What is the meaning of the good life? (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)