Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...) and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly. (shrink)

I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...) can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non-inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)

I argue that, in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion, one does not violate a rational requirement of any sort. Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence. Accordingly, my argument is that there is nothing incoherent in any way about experiencing a recalcitrant emotion. One becomes incoherent only if one allows the emotion to influence one's reasoning and/or action, in which case one violates the ‘consistency principle’ and/or the ‘enkratic principle’. From the standpoint of rationality, (...) it would even be counterproductive to put subjects under the obligation that their emotional experiences and their evaluative judgements must always fit together. When we nevertheless intuitively sense that the subject is irrational in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion this is in cases in which the emotion challenges the subject's agential identity. However, emotions can, but need not, challenge one's agential identity, and, furthermore, perceptions can do so as well. In any case, challenges of this kind do not involve the violation of a rational requirement. (shrink)

Almost all contemporary philosophers on the subject agree that emotions play an indispensable role in the justification (as opposed to the mere causation) of other mental states and actions. However, how this role is to be understood is still an open question. At the core of the debate is the phenomenon of conflict without contradiction: why is it that an emotion need not be revised in the light of better judgment and knowledge? Conflict without contradiction has been explained either by (...) difference in content between emotion and judgment, or by a difference in the respective attitude towards content. I argue that conflict without contradiction is due to both differences, where difference in content is prior to difference in attitude. (shrink)

Wenn es in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts so etwas wie die "arme Verwandtschaft" unter den philosophischen Themen gab, so waren das die Gefühle. Zwar hatten sich Klassiker wie Platon, Aristoteles, Spinoza, Descartes und Hume eingehend mit ihnen befaßt, aber seit Kant, der sie als "Gegner der Vernunft" abtat, wurde den Gefühlen in der Philosophie nur noch wenig Beachtung geschenkt. Erst seit den 1960er Jahren rückten sie wieder in den Fokus des Interesses, und zwar aufgrund der Einsicht, daß Gefühle (...) kognitive mentale Zustände sind, die dazu dienen können, andere Zustände und Handlungen rational zu machen. Strittig ist indes, von welcher Art emotionale Kognitionen sind. Der Band versammelt in historisch-systematischen Einzelstudien die wichtigsten Positionen in der Philosophie der Gefühle und eignet sich gleichermaßen als umfassende Einführung in die Thematik wie auch als Seminarvorlage. (shrink)

Können unsere Gefühle uns Gründe dafür liefern, etwas für wahr zu halten und zu tun? Verfügen wir über bestimmte Werte und moralische Überzeugungen vielleicht sogar nur kraft unserer Gefühle? Entgegen der philosophischen Tradition, in der die Gefühle überwiegend als irrational und subjektiv abgetan wurden, zielt der vorliegende Sammelband auf den Nachweis, dass die Gefühle einen integralen und unverzichtbaren Bestandteil rationalen Urteilens und Handelns bilden. Neben der Darstellung verschiedener Facetten moderner kognitivistischer Gefühlsphilosophie kommt dabei auch die Psychologie zu Wort.

This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.

In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality. One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from (...) this stronger claim. (shrink)

The author argues for a Collingwoodian claim: if an emotion is expressed in art, it is not a content which exists prior to, and independent of, its expression. Artistic emotion expressions rather clarify and complete emotions. The autor backs up this claim by Musil’s Lewinian theory of emotion which displays significant parallels to recent Enactivist Theories of Emotion: it states that embodiment in action is necessary in any case in order for nonspecific dispositions to emotions to shape and consolidate into (...) specific fully fledged, genuine emotions. Two ways of shaping and consolidating are distinguished. One way is to categorise emotions in terms of their so-called “formal objects” by associating nonspecific dispositions to emotions via action with specific paradigm scenarios. Another way is to put these categories to the test by expressing exemplary individual experiences which go beyond the existing repertoire of paradigm scenarios. Art, when it expresses emotions, shapes and consolidates in the second way. Art challenges the existing system of emotion types which is at the same time to challenge the corresponding system of evaluations and values. The presented argument draws upon the notions of expressing developed by Dorit Bar-On and Philipp J. Koch. (shrink)

In this comment we take up two points made by Douglas Hollan in his article “Emerging Issues in the Cross-Cultural Study of Empathy,” and discuss their possible philosophical implications. Hollan‘s concept of complex empathy may give rise to the idea that we can learn about other people’s beliefs via empathy, which is something we do not believe is possible. Furthermore, Hollan’s description of possible negative effects of empathy, such as manipulations of a person on the basis of knowledge about their (...) emotions, might pose a problem for proponents of care ethics, who generally start from the assumption that empathy fosters altruistic behavior. (shrink)

This study examined whether worktime control buffered the impact of worktime demands on work-family interference (WFI), using data from 2,377 workers from various sectors of industry in The Netherlands. We distinguished among three types of worktime demands: time spent on work according to one's contract (contractual hours), the number of hours spent on overtime work (overtime hours), and the number of hours spent on commuting (commuting hours). Regarding worktime control, a distinction was made between having control over days off and (...) vacations (leave control) and having control over starting and finishing times (flextime). These three worktime demands were expected to have separate as well as joint effects on WFI, whereas worktime control should buffer these adverse effects of worktime demands on WFI. Stepwise regression analyses showed that working high numbers of contractual and overtime hours was indeed associated with high WFI. Further, worktime control indeed made a difference in terms of WFI: whereas leave control contributed directly to lower WFI, flextime buffered the adverse effects of long contractual workhours. Our results suggest that very long working days should be prevented, and that worktime control may be a powerful tool to help workers maintaining a good work-family balance. (shrink)

Following decades of silence about the involvement of doctors, medical researchers and other health professionals in the Holocaust and other National Socialist (Nazi) crimes, scholars in recent years have produced a growing body of research that reveals the pervasive extent of that complicity. This interdisciplinary collection of studies presents documentation of the critical role medicine played in realizing the policies of Hitler's regime. It traces the history of Nazi medicine from its roots in the racial theories of the 1920s, through (...) its manifestations during the Nazi period, on to legacies and continuities from the postwar years to the present. (shrink)

Ce volume envisage l'amour en tant qu'objet polymorphe : Eros, Philia, Agapé, mais aussi Storgé. Les mots grecs rendent compte, du large spectre amoureux : amour romantique, amour sexuel, amour de soi, de l'autre, pour l'autre... des catégories qui placent les manifestations du sentiment amoureux dans un espace de contraintes et de possibilités qui relève du social et du discursif. Les travaux qui sont ici réunis s'attachent ainsi à interroger des genres artistiques et discursifs dans lesquels s'ancre l'amour, ils abordent (...) la littérature et le cinéma, mais aussi l'histoire, l'histoire des idées, la sociologie l'ethnologie ou la psychologie. Ces recherches mettent en avant que l'amour constitue une manière d'appréhender et d'expliquer le monde puisqu'on peut lire à travers lui les rapports qui définissent nos sociétés et qui le définissent à leur tour. (shrink)

BackgroundWhereas the majority of bereaved persons recover from their grief without professional assistance, a minority develops pathological grief reactions. Etiological models postulate that dysfunctional cognitions may perpetuate such reactions. The Grief Cognitions Questionnaire assesses thoughts after bereavement in nine interrelated domains. A short form with four domains is often used. However, an evaluation of the psychometric properties of the GCQ-SF and its utility compared to the GCQ is lacking and these instruments have not been validated in German.MethodGerman bereaved persons responded (...) to an online survey containing the GCQ, measures of grief severity, grief rumination, symptoms of depression and anxiety, and optimism and pessimism. 585 participants were included. Item analyses and confirmatory factor analyses were conducted. Correlations between the GCQ and GCQ-SF and grief rumination, optimism and pessimism assessed construct validity. Criterion-related validity was assessed by comparing whether the correlation of the GCQ with grief severity was higher than with anxious and depressive symptoms. Logistic regression and receiver-operator characteristics compared the questionnaires on their ability to predict probable prolonged grief ‘caseness’.ResultsInternal consistencies for both questionnaires were identical and excellent. Confirmatory factor analyses obtained a satisfactory fit for models with nine and four correlated subscales and respective higher-order factor models. The GCQ and the GCQ-SF correlated higher with grief severity than with other measures of psychopathology. The logistic regression showed a significant association between the GCQ-SF and prolonged grief ‘caseness’. Of the remaining subscales of the GCQ, only one subscale contributed to the prediction. The ROC analyses showed nearly identical areas under the curve.ConclusionThe translated GCQ and GCQ-SF demonstrated very good psychometric properties. The correlations with grief severity highlight the questionnaires’ clinical relevance. The questionnaires possessed identical diagnostic specificity and sensitivity. Whenever a timesaving assessment of the most typical grief-specific cognitions is important, the GCQ-SF represents an alternative to the GCQ. The original GCQ may still be superior when a more detailed description of a bereaved person’s cognitions is desirable. (shrink)

The umbrella-term ‘executive functions’ includes various domain-general, goal-directed cognitive abilities responsible for behavioral self-regulation. The influential unity and diversity model of EF posits the existence of three correlated yet separable executive domains: inhibition, shifting and updating. These domains may be influenced by factors such as socioeconomic status and culture, possibly due to the way EF tasks are devised and to biased choice of stimuli, focusing on first-world testees. Here, we propose a FREE test battery that includes two open-access tasks for (...) each of the three abovementioned executive domains to allow latent variables to be obtained. The tasks were selected from those that have been shown to be representative of each domain, that are not copyrighted and do not require special hardware/software to be administered. These tasks were adapted for use in populations with varying SES/schooling levels by simplifying tasks/instructions and using easily recognized stimuli such as pictures. Items are answered verbally and tasks are self-paced to minimize interference from individual differences in psychomotor and perceptual speed, to better isolate executive from other cognitive abilities. We tested these tasks on 146 early adolescents of both sexes and varying SES, because this is the age group in which the executive domains of interest become distinguishable and in order to confirm that SES effects were minimized. Performance was determined by Rate Correct Scores, which consider speed-accuracy trade-offs. Scores were sensitive to the expected improvement in performance with age and rarely/inconsistently affected by sex and SES, as expected, with no floor or ceiling effects, or skewed distribution, thus suggesting their adequacy for diverse populations in these respects. Using structural equation modeling, evidence based on internal structure was obtained by replicating the three correlated-factor solution proposed by the authors of the model. We conclude that the FREE test battery, which is open access and described in detail, holds promise as a tool for research that can be adapted for a wide range of populations, as well as altered and/or complemented in coming studies. (shrink)

A contrarian scientist wrestles with the big questions that modern physics raises, and what physics says about the human condition Not only can we not currently explain the origin of the universe, it is questionable we will ever be able to explain it. The notion that there are universes within particles, or that particles are conscious, is ascientific, as is the hypothesis that our universe is a computer simulation. On the other hand, the idea that the universe itself is conscious (...) is difficult to rule out entirely. According to Sabine Hossenfelder, it is not a coincidence that quantum entanglement and vacuum energy have become the go-to explanations of alternative healers, or that people believe their deceased grandmother is still alive because of quantum mechanics. Science and religion have the same roots, and they still tackle some of the same questions: Where do we come from? Where do we go to? How much can we know? The area of science that is closest to answering these questions is physics. Over the last century, physicists have learned a lot about which spiritual ideas are still compatible with the laws of nature. Not always, though, have they stayed on the scientific side of the debate. In this lively, thought-provoking book, Hossenfelder takes on the biggest questions in physics: Does the past still exist? Do particles think? Was the universe made for us? Has physics ruled out free will? Will we ever have a theory of everything? She lays out how far physicists are on the way to answering these questions, where the current limits are, and what questions might well remain unanswerable forever. Her book offers a no-nonsense yet entertaining take on some of the toughest riddles in existence, and will give the reader a solid grasp on what we know-and what we don't know. (shrink)

Explores the intersection between the philosophy of Simone Weil from Paris, France, and the fiction of Flannery O'Connor from the Southern state of Georgia, USA.