This book guides the readers through Brentano's life and works, investigating into the inherent complexity of both his view of mental life and the related methodology.

Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance Liliana Albertazzi. the sort I have in mind. What I am speaking of is the mandatory correlations between attributes of visual space (those of, e.g., surfaces, shape, distance, direction) and  ...

Experimental phenomenology is the study of appearances in subjective awareness. Its methods and results challenge quite a few aspects of the current debate on consciousness. A robust theoretical framework for understanding consciousness is pending: current empirical research waves on what a phenomenon of consciousness properly is, not least because the question is still open on the observables to be measured and how to measure them. I shall present the basics of experimental phenomenology and discuss the current development of experimental phenomenology, (...) its main features, and the many misunderstandings that have obstructed a fair understanding and evaluation of its otherwise enlightening outcomes. (shrink)

Quite a few cognitive scientists are working towards a naturalisation of phenomenology. Looking more closely at the relevant literature, however, the 'naturalising phenomenology' proposals show the presence of different conceptions, assumptions, and formalisms, further differentiated by different philosophical and/or scientific concerns. This paper shows that the original Husserlian stance is deeper, clearer and more advanced than most supposed contemporary improvements. The recent achievements of experimental phenomenology show how to 'naturalise' phenomenology without destroying the guiding assumptions of phenomenology. The requirements grounding (...) the scientific explanation of subjective experience are discussed, such as the nature of the stimuli, their variables, and their manipulation by properly phenomenological methods. (shrink)

This book presents an historical and conceptual reconstruction of the theories developed by Meinong and a group of philosophers and experimental psychologists in Graz at the turn of the 19th century. Adhering closely to original texts, the contributors explore Meinong's roots in the school of Brentano, complex theories such as the theory of intentional reference and direct reference, and ways of developing philosophy which are closely bound up with the sciences, particularly psychology. Providing a faithful reconstruction of both Meinong's contributions (...) to science and the school that arose from his thought, this book shows how the theories of the Graz school raise the possibility of engaging in the scientific metaphysics and ontology that for so long have been considered off limits. (shrink)

The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology - perhaps the most impor tant schism in twentieth-century philosophy - resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen. (...) The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the 'map' of Brent ani sm. The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive inter est in the theoretical complexity of Brentano' s thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration. We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory es says followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano's thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays re construct the reasons for the 'invisibility', so to speak, of Brentano and set out of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then ex the essential features amines six of Brentano's most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians. (shrink)

Anticipation plays an essential role in the perception of the empirical reality. Music, because of its purely dynamical nature, is a privileged environment for the study of anticipation processes. In this chapter, we firstly discuss the current viewpoint on anticipation in music perception and the meaning of anticipation structures in general. Then we present a descriptive study of how melodies are experienced inside the psychic present, analyzing a series of musical excerpts alongside selected pictorial analogues. Focusing on the dynamic patterns (...) shared by auditory and visual modalities, we discuss the nature of perceptual continua and their boundaries in the subjective space-time. (shrink)

The apparent dichotomy between qualitative versus quantitative dimensions in science intersects with the domain of several disciplines, as well as different research fields within one and the same discipline. The perception of qualitative as “poor quantitative,” however, is methodologically unsustainable, because there are perfectly rigorous ways to conduct qualitative research. A somehow different question is whether a science of qualities per se is possible: that is, whether a science of appearances can be devised, what its observables are, and its methodological (...) implications. The article deals with this last issue, and especially from the point of view of experimental phenomenology. The weakness of the current approach to perception is discussed, and an alternative view that goes beyond veridicalism is presented. The analysis tackles crucial issues such as color and spatial appearances, the qualitative dimension of perceived depth, and the role of visual meaningful gestalten as information tools for the survival of living beings in the environment. If developed, a science of the qualitative dimensions of appearances may contribute to revising the ecological theory of perception by making its natural semantics more explicit. (shrink)

Un enjeu majeur pour les recherches actuelles dans les sciences de la vision consiste à mettre au point une approche dépendante de l’observateur – une science des apparences visuelles située au-delà de leur véridicité. L’espace dont nous faisons l’expérience subjective est en réalité hautement « illusoire», et les éléments de base du champ visuel sont des structures qualitatives, contextuelles et relationnelles, et non des indices métriques et dépendants du stimulus. Sur la base de nombreux résultats disponibles dans la littérature traitant (...) de la manière dont fonctionnent les divers constituants de l’espace (formes, surfaces, etc.), l’article décrit les éléments qualitatifs de base d’un tel espace et pose la question de la « géométrie» des apparences visuelles. Il formule enfin un ensemble de propositions pour d’éventuelles recherches poursuivant l’examen de l’espace visuel d’un point de vue expérimental. (shrink)

Un enjeu majeur pour les recherches actuelles dans les sciences de la vision consiste à mettre au point une approche dépendante de l’observateur – une science des apparences visuelles située au-delà de leur véridicité. L’espace dont nous faisons l’expérience subjective est en réalité hautement « illusoire», et les éléments de base du champ visuel sont des structures qualitatives, contextuelles et relationnelles, et non des indices métriques et dépendants du stimulus. Sur la base de nombreux résultats disponibles dans la littérature traitant (...) de la manière dont fonctionnent les divers constituants de l’espace, l’article décrit les éléments qualitatifs de base d’un tel espace et pose la question de la « géométrie» des apparences visuelles. Il formule enfin un ensemble de propositions pour d’éventuelles recherches poursuivant l’examen de l’espace visuel d’un point de vue expérimental. (shrink)

Following a previous article published in Biological Theory, in this study we present a mathematical theory for a science of qualities as directly perceived by living organisms, and based on morphological patterns. We address a range of qualitative phenomena as observables of a psychological system seen as an impredicative system. The starting point of our study is the notion that perceptual phenomena are projections of underlying invariants, objects that remain unchanged when transformations of a certain class under consideration are applied. (...) The study develops with the observables, the entailed total order and metric, whence the algebra and the geometry of such a science, presenting a formal phenomenological model for phenomena that are not rigidly Euclidean. We show how non-Euclidean perception can have many useful Euclidean formalizations, as well as locally-homeomorphic-to-Euclidean-space models. The mathematical models we provide are tested on the basis of results from experimental psychology, in particular from the field of color, time, and space perception. (shrink)

The paper presents color as a case study for the analysis of phenomena that pertain to several levels of reality and are typically framed by different sciences and disciplines. Color, in fact, is studied by physics, biology, phenomenology and aesthetics, among others. Our thesis is that color is a different entity for each level of reality, and that for this reason color generates different observables in the epistemologies of the different sciences. By analysing color as a paradigmatic case of an (...) entity naturally spreading over different levels of reality, the paper raises the question as to whether making explicit the usually implicit ontological assumptions embedded within the different observables exploited by the different sciences may eventually clarify some of the difficulties of developing a comprehensive theory of color. (shrink)

The essay underlines the complementarity between theory and experimentation as a characteristic feature of the Meinong-school. In particular, it deals with the nucleus of a theory of presentation implicit in the theory of production. In fact, on the basis of Benussi's experimental results, I distinguish between presentation and representation, relatively to the various phases of the moment-now as the qualitative primitive of cognition. This result has various consequences which shed light on the act-side: it shows that the production relation relates (...) to the act and not to the produced object, clarifying some difficulties concerning the nature of ideal objects in Meinong's ontology; that the psychological act grantes the objects of knowing on the basis of cognitive determinants which are assimilative determinants and determinants of connection. These cognitive aspects of the act are indeed forms of completions of the known objects. Endly, the essay deals with the a-modal development of Benussi's theory of the cognitive aspects of the act as performed by the Italian Gestaltist Gaetano Kanizsa. (shrink)

It is difficult to find agreement on what constitutes perceiving.at Rovereto, Italy. The term is used in a wide array of domains ranging from psychology to physiology to aesthetics, and over time it has also acquired diverse connotations within various disciplines. Current perceptual science, however, even when it deals with qualitative aspects of experience, for example phenomena of lightness and colour, almost exclusively explains them in terms of primary qualities or stimuli quantitatively understood. The fact that science treats qualitative experiences (...) in terms of stimuli is important, because almost nothing of phenomenal perception as such is quantitative in nature. The paper argues for a qualitative science of perceiving, its methodology, its laws, and its possible developments. (shrink)

The essay underlines the complementarity between theory and experimentation as a characteristic feature of the Meinong-school. In particular, it deals with the nucleus of a theory of presentation implicit in the theory of production. In fact, on the basis of Benussi's experimental results, I distinguish between presentation and representation, relatively to the various phases of the moment-now as the qualitative primitive of cognition. This result has various consequences which shed light on the act-side: it shows that the production relation relates (...) to the act and not to the produced object, clarifying some difficulties concerning the nature of ideal objects in Meinong's ontology; that the psychological act grantes the objects of knowing on the basis of cognitive determinants which are assimilative determinants and determinants of connection. These cognitive aspects of the act are indeed forms of completions of the known objects. Endly, the essay deals with the a-modal development of Benussi's theory of the cognitive aspects of the act as performed by the Italian Gestaltist Gaetano Kanizsa. (shrink)

The paper presents analysis of form in different domains. It draws on the commonalities and their potential unified classifications based on how forms subjectively appear in perception—as opposed to their standard specification in Euclidean geometry or other objective quantitative methods. The paper provides an overview aiming to offer elements for thought for researchers in various fields.

Brentano's Descriptive Psychology marks a breakthrough into clarification of internal time, made possible by using his doctrine of intentionality (and modality) of consciousness. Husserl's version of descriptive psychology, a pure phenomenological psychology, according to its author tries to overcome Brentano's (naturalistic) description of internal experience by explicitly considering the intentional content of mental events, and the different categories of objects as objects of a possible consciousness. Husserl's investigations on internal time are an example of a quite specific sort of genetic (...) inquiry, complementary to the descriptive one. Meinong, when discussing the relation of representation and perception of time, differentiates between the time as given in a representation (act time), in different sorts of (Meinongian) objects (object time), and in contents (content time). These questions of a Brentanist temporality problem are reconsidered and brought to a Husserlian conclusion. (shrink)

I pragmatisti -- De Sarlo e la sua scuola -- Benussi e la psicologia della Gestalt -- Presenze -- Inediti.

The essay underlines the complementarity between theory and experimentation as a characteristic feature of the Meinong-school. In particular, it deals with the nucleus of a theory of presentation implicit in the theory of production. In fact, on the basis of Benussi's experimental results, I distinguish between presentation and representation, relatively to the various phases of the moment-now as the qualitative primitive of cognition. This result has various consequences which shed light on the act-side: it shows that the production relation relates (...) to the act and not to the produced object, clarifying some difficulties concerning the nature of ideal objects in Meinong's ontology; that the psychological act grantes the objects of knowing on the basis of cognitive determinants which are assimilative determinants and determinants of connection. These cognitive aspects of the act are indeed forms of completions of the known objects. Endly, the essay deals with the a-modal development of Benussi's theory of the cognitive aspects of the act as performed by the Italian Gestaltist Gaetano Kanizsa. (shrink)

This study analyzes shells of marine gastropods of a zoological museum and the Latin epithets expressing perceptual and connotative attributes that they have received in the standard, Linnaean nomenclature. Making use of the Osgood semantic differential, we presented the subjects with digital 3-D reproductions of the shell specimens to be subjectively evaluated according to 17 pairs of attributes. The results show that, overall, the subjective evaluations given by the subjects are consistent, which suggests that an intersubjective characterization of the shells (...) as wholes according to their qualitative and morphological traits is possible and scientifically explicable. This may apply to other biological items as well. The results also show that the epithets given to the shells by taxonomists do not always reflect the perceptual evaluation of the general population, being a product of the well-known ambiguity in taxonomic categorization and naming. (shrink)

The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation between phenomenal space (...) and colour appearances. (shrink)

Twentieth Century philosophical thought has expressed itself for the most part through two great Movements: the phenomenological and the analytical. Each movement originated in reaction against idealistic—or at least antirealistic—views of "the world". And each has collapsed back into an idealism not different in effect from that which it initially rejected. Both movements began with an appeal to meanings or concepts, regarded as objective realities capable of entering the flow of experience without loss of their objective status or of their (...) power to reveal to us an objective world as it would be if there were no subjective apprehensions of it. Both movements ended with a surrender of the objectivity of meanings and concepts in this strong sense, coming to treat them as at most more-or-less shareable components of a somehow communalized experience, but in any case incapable of revealing how things are irrespective of actual human experience. For the old Egocentric Predicament, with its "ideas" etc., is substituted a Lingocentric or Histrocentric Predicament of "language" and its elements. Hilary Putnam speaks for the current consensus: 'Internal realism says that we don't know what we are talking about when we talk about "things in themselves"' ( The Many Faces of Realism , p. 36). (shrink)

In this article I try to emphasise the following three main points: 1. Brentano's metaphysics is not speculative; it is instead a programme for scientific research. 2. Some components of his metaphysics, especially those relating to the problem of perceptive continua -- and many aspects of it developed experimentally by his pupils -- are today discussed not only by philosophy but also by the cognitive sciences, more or less accurately, more or less consciously. 3. Some areas of the cognitive sciences (...) express the need for a scientifically -- even neurophysiologically -- founded theory of intentionality. (shrink)

The contribution deals with some key problems of cognitive science, whose plurality transcends the boundaries of the disciplines drawn by classical epistemology. In particular, it addresses the issues of mental images, spaces of representation, and the architecture of cognitive processes in vision theory. The thesis presented is that a proper treatment of vision within psychophysics entails an analysis of a series of interconnected spaces, objects and methodologies, from psychophysics to the many virtual realities of representation.

This chapter analyses the micro-genesis of anticipation in awareness and shows how the internal determinants of anticipation construe our perception of empirical reality. Rooted in the psychic present, anticipation occurs in very short durations. Anticipation develops in phases allowing temporal and spatial displacements, and it includes an internal model of itself. Examples are given from visual, acoustic and motion perception, showing the anticipatory structure of awareness in subjective space-time. Finally, anticipation in perception throws light on the deep roots of semantics.