In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Russell's letter of 16 May 1960 by Albert Shalom EDITORIAL NOTE To illustrate a list ofrecent acquisitions in Russell (Summer 1981), we printed in facsimile Russell's letter of 16 May 1960 to Professor Albert Shalom concerning the interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus. The correspondence between Russell and Shalom began when Shalom wrote on I May 1960 asking whether Russell had the (...) time and inclination to read a translation of a lecture which Shalom had given the previous December in Paris. The paper was entitled "The Metaphysical Thinking Underlying Wittgenstein's Tractatus". Shalom had received "different and even contradictory appraisals" of his paper, and he very much wanted to have Russell's opinion of it. Close to the age ofninety, Russell was entering a hectic period in his life in which he worked assiduouslyfor the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. He had published three books in 1959 and had produced prefaces and introductions for other people. As usual, he was besieged with mail including numerous requests to read unsolicited manuscripts sent to him quite regularly. Yet he had managed to answer correspondence in a very personal way. In November 1959, he had been involved in a controversy regarding the refusal ofthe editor of Mind to review Ernest Gellner's Words and Things, a book which attacked the then prevalent philosophy of linguistic analysis and for which Russell had written the introduction. In the early months of1960, he took time out from his usual writing on the nuclear threat to reply to several articles devoted to his theory of descriptions and his ethical theory in the journal Philosophy. Russell's reply (4 May 1960) to Shalom's first letter states: "Thank you for your letter ofMay I. I shall be interested to see your paper on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, but, as I am very busy, it may be some time before I can read it carefully." On 8 May Shalom wrote back in appreciation enclosing his paper and an offprint of an article, "Qu'est-ce qu'un concept?", Revue internationale dephilosophie, 50 (1959): I-IS. The main objection raised against his paper, Shalom admitted, was that Wittgenstein was not concerned with problems of epistemology at the time of his writing the Tractatus. Nonetheless, Shalom felt that the "picture theory" of reality implies an epistemology, and he was unable to see a fallacy in his paper: "Perhaps the fact that I'm not a logician has something to do with the matter. Ifyou could enlighten me on this point I should be most grateful to you." 45 28th April 1982. 46 Russell winter 1982-83 Russell's letter of 16 May followed. On 25 May Shalom challenged Russell's interpretation. Far /rom underestimating the notion of structure, Shalom claimed that he had emphasized the notion as the key to understanding the Tractatus. "In fact, my main point is that Wittgenstein's analyses of various concepts are unintelligible unless understood as arguments in terms of the dominating idea ofstructure or form. And that is what I understand as a metaphysical argument." Shalom went on to say that his interest in any philosopher was to try to discover the chief concepts employed in the philosopher's analysis and to examine the manner in which the analysis was performed. For this reason, the later Wittgenstein was not devoid ofinterest. In a postscript, he asked Russell whether he would be in London in July ofthat year, and ifso, whether a meeting was possible. Russell replied on 18June as follows: "Thank you for your letter ofMay 25. I am sorry that at present my time and thought are so occupied with matters very remote from those with whichyour letter deals that I cannot offeryou a reasoned reply. Unfortunately, I do not expect to be in London in July so that I am afraid a meeting will hardly be possible." On 14 Shalom requested the return of his paper, and Russell complied on 19 July. Shalom is now Professor ofPhilosophy at McMaster. We invited him to comment on his exchange with Russell, particularly Russell's letter of16 May 1960. His comments take the form ofa further (and no doubtfinal) letter in the exchange.-Carl... (shrink)

To single out "time" or "temporality" as the most important concept within a philosophical framework attempting to delineate "reality" immediately raises the question of how to situate temporality itself. I will distinguish only two ways of situating time, because they both appear to be simple and straightforward, and because they establish a sufficient framework for the incipient theory I propose briefly elaborating. On the one hand, temporality can certainly be situated in terms of cosmological and biological evolution. And on the (...) other hand, it is certainly the case that temporality has been situated in terms of the evolution of mind or of the development of consciousness. It is of interest to note that these two ways of situating time are analogous to the two sides of what is frequently called "the body/mind problem," and they seem to carry analogous implications. (shrink)

THE fundamental metaphysical problem concerning any and all organisms capable of subjective experience is the problem of explaining the source and nature of subjectivity itself. Not many solutions have been proposed, but it is important to recognize from the start that every solution which has been proposed has depended on a framework consisting of relatively few fundamental concepts and that it is these fundamental concepts which have served to define both the problem and the solution proposed.

IF THE OBJECT OF AN INQUIRY is a constituent of the physical world, such as a physical force or a chemical substance, it is not incumbent on the inquirer to raise the prior question of the basis and nature of inquiry itself. This is as true of the bodily functions of organisms endowed with subjective capacities as it is of the physical world within which the organism finds itself. But this situation no longer holds when the object of inquiry involves (...) the nature of subjectivity itself, and not simply the elements and processes of the spatio-temporal world from which subjects have emerged. Two centuries of research in the physical sciences have led to the conclusion that the physical universe is a process of cosmological and biological evolution which stretches back for billions of years prior to the appearance on this planet of any sort of subject, nonhuman or human. The supposition that an inference of this sort can be "theory-laden" to the point of invalidating the evolutionary inference itself will not be taken seriously here. Exactly how evolution is to be understood is certainly a problem, and is in fact one of the problems with which we are here concerned. But the essential premise, the fundamentally important point, is that organisms capable of subjective experience did emerge in the course of that evolution. It follows that if we are to attempt the analysis of a concept which does not refer simply to the physical world itself but both to that world and to the manner of conceiving it, then it is necessary to begin by situating subjectivity relatively to the evolutionary process. (shrink)

The fundamental conceptual framework of this attempt to demonstrate not only the "plausibility" of personal immortality but also its actual nature, is the body/mind distinction taken as ontologically ultimate. That is also, in my view, its fatal weakness: there is not the slightest indication of how "mind" or the varieties of subjective experience have come to be "attached," either at the moment of conception or later, to what Marsh calls "the organic self." Therefore his interpretation of "the mental"--in particular, memories--is (...) essentially in terms of the presupposition of a self-existent mental realm. And consequently, his interpretation of survival is something like that of a quasi-solipsistic, faded and pastel-colored mode of existence, something like Hume's conception of "ideas" as "faded sense impressions." For instance, there will be none of the strong "feelings" of the physical realm, but a "gentle feeling," a sort of "cosmic consciousness". (shrink)

The greater part of this book is a careful analysis and defense of H. von Helmholtz's theory of perception. But this analysis is also meant to justify a more basic thesis, which can be seen as the central point of the work as a whole. This central thesis is the assertion of the need to return to a plausible form of epistemological realism after the long and misguided history of mind-dominated philosophy--that is to say, of Cartesian rationalism, subjective and objective (...) idealism, phenomenology, and linguistic philosophy. The function of the long subtitle is to suggest a link between the naive realism of Aristotelian epistemology and what Meyering calls Helmholtz's "hypothetical realism.". (shrink)

This work is not addressed to philosophers but to neurological psychologists whose primary concern is the correlation of subjective experience and neurophysiological processes. However, for those philosophers who are concerned with the body-mind problem, the present reviewer would hold this book to be of the first importance: not because the author has fully worked out a theory of that apparently unitary entity called "the person"--she has not--but because she has given solid grounds for dismissing as irrelevant all abstract theoretical models (...) which are not directly and explicitly concerned with actual brain processes and their subjectively experienced correlates. Behaviorism she refers to as "the theory of empty organism", and computer models she refers to as a matter of indulging in "a double analogy, from man to machine, and from machine to man". The result is that the author is in fact dealing directly with "the person"--she uses the word frequently, and means by it that specific entity which is the human entity--and is constantly describing the actual correlations between experience and cerebral "circuits.". (shrink)

ALBERT SHALOM PROPOSES that a framework for understanding mind and personal identity more adequate than either idealistic or traditional materialistic frameworks can be found in a quasi-materialist theory. In The Body/mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity he criticizes most formulations of the materialist thesis, yet maintains that the physical has in a sense to be taken as ontologically primary. His is a dialectical concept of matter: a concept related to two types of time, linear and (...) what he calls "quasi-nonlinear time." The formulations of the notions of time and of the physical develop through his criticisms and what he calls "the elaboration of those basic conditions without which it would be impossible, in my view, to even conceive of an ultimately convincing theory of what we call 'the person'." The elaboration turns out to imply physicalism, but an ontologically opaque physicalism. This opacity is based on an analysis of physical existence per se as incomprehensible. (shrink)

This book is about the ethical issues that clinicians encounter as they care for patients and is written to assist those who serve on hospital ethics committees as they deliberate about appropriate action in difficult ethical cases.

How do otherwise considerate human beings do cruel things and still live in peace with themselves? Drawing on his agentic theory, Dr. Bandura provides a definitive exposition of the psychosocial mechanism by which people selectively disengage their moral self-sanctions from their harmful conduct. They do so by sanctifying their harmful behavior as serving worthy causes; they absolve themselves of blame for the harm they cause by displacement and diffusion of responsibility; they minimize or deny the harmful effects of their actions; (...) and they dehumanize those they maltreat and blame them for bringing the suffering on themselves. Dr. Bandura's theory of moral disengagement is uniquely broad in scope. Theories of morality focus almost exclusively at the individual level. He insightfully extends the disengagement of morality to the social-system level through which large-scale inhumanities are perpetrated...Moral disengagement will transform your thinking about how otherwise considerate people can behave inhumanely and still feel good about themselves." -- Book jacket. (shrink)

Was Maimonides a radical philosopher who subtly argued for a naturalist world and who saw the obligation to keep the Torah's commandments as a social and moral obligation - or was he a conservative Jewish believer who only tried to formulate philosophical arguments in favour of a revealed religion? This question has been central to the interpretation of Maimonides from the 12th century until modern times. In the four chapters of this book, Shalom Sadik argues for a radical philosophical (...) interpretation of Maimonides. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to get to the bottom of an acute and perennial tension between our best scientific pictures of the fundamental physical structure of the world and our everyday empirical experience of it. The trouble is about the direction of time. The situation (very briefly) is that it is a consequence of almost every one of those fundamental scientific pictures--and that it is at the same time radically at odds with our common sense--that whatever can happen can (...) just as naturally happen backwards. Albert provides an unprecedentedly clear, lively, and systematic new account--in the context of a Newtonian-Mechanical picture of the world--of the ultimate origins of the statistical regularities we see around us, of the temporal irreversibility of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, of the asymmetries in our epistemic access to the past and the future, and of our conviction that by acting now we can affect the future but not the past. Then, in the final section of the book, he generalizes the Newtonian picture to the quantum-mechanical case and (most interestingly) suggests a very deep potential connection between the problem of the direction of time and the quantum-mechanical measurement problem. The book aims to be both an original contribution to the present scientific and philosophical understanding of these matters at the most advanced level, and something in the nature of an elementary textbook on the subject accessible to interested high-school students. Table of Contents: Preface 1. Time-Reversal Invariance 2. Thermodynamics 3. Statistical Mechanics 4. The Reversibility Objections and the Past-Hypothesis 5. The Scope of Thermodynamics 6. The Asymmetries of Knowledge and Intervention 7. Quantum Mechanics Appendix: Gedankenexperiments with Heat Engines Index Reviews of this book: The foundations of statistical mechanisms are often presented in physics textbooks in a rather obscure and confused way. By challenging common ways of thinking about this subject, Time and Chance can do quite a lot to improve this situation. --Jean Bricmont, Science Albert is perfecting a style of foundational analysis that is uniquely his own...It has a surgical precision...and it is ruthless with pretensions. The foundations of thermodynamics is a topic that has accumulated a good deal of dead wood; this is a fire that will burn and burn. --Simon W. Saunders, Oxford University As usual with Albert's work, the exposition is brisk and to the point, and exceptionally clear...The book will be an extremely valuable contribution to the literature on the subject of philosophical issues in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, a literature which has been thin on the ground but is now growing as it deserves to. --Lawrence Sklar, University of Michigan. (shrink)

Studies in Abraham Joshua Heschel's Oeuvre.

In medical ethics, business ethics, and some branches of political philosophy (multi-culturalism, issues of just allocation, and equitable distribution) the literature increasingly combines insights from ethics and the social sciences. Some authors in medical ethics even speak of a new phase in the history of ethics, hailing "empirical ethics" as a logical next step in the development of practical ethics after the turn to "applied ethics." The name empirical ethics is ill-chosen because of its associations with "descriptive ethics." Unlike descriptive (...) ethics, however, empirical ethics aims to be both descriptive and normative. The first question on which I focus is what kind of empirical research is used by empirical ethics and for which purposes. I argue that the ultimate aim of all empirical ethics is to improve the context-sensitivity of ethics. The second question is whether empirical ethics is essentially connected with specific positions in meta-ethics. I show that in some kinds of meta-ethical theories, which I categorize as broad contextualist theories, there is an intrinsic need for connecting normative ethics with empirical social research. But context-sensitivity is a goal that can be aimed for from any meta-ethical position. (shrink)