1. Bd. Einleitung, Text und Übersetzung -- 2. Bd. Kommentar.

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

Traditionally one associates scepticism with the position that nothing is, or can be, known for certain. Hence it was only natural that for a long time one should have approached the ancient sceptics with the assumption that they were the first to try to establish or to defend the view that nothing is, or can be, known for certain, especially since there is abundant evidence which would have seemed to bear out the correctness of this approach. After all, extensive arguments (...) to the effect that there is no certain knowledge or that things are unknowable play a central role in our ancient sources on scepticism. And thus Hegel, Brandis, Zeller, and their successors were naturally led to take these arguments at face value and to assume that the sceptics were trying to show that nothing can be known. Closer consideration of the matter, though, shows that it cannot have been the position of the major exponents of ancient scepticism, whether Academic or Pyrrhonean, that nothing is, or can be, known. And this for the simple reason that the major ancient sceptics were not concerned to establish or to defend any position, let alone the position that nothing is, or can be, known. In fact, they went out of their way to point out that, though they produced arguments for it, they did not actually take the position that nothing can be known (cf. S.E., PH 1. 200–1). (shrink)

Where does the notion of free will come from? How and when did it develop, and what did that development involve? In Michael Frede's radically new account of the history of this idea, the notion of a free will emerged from powerful assumptions about the relation between divine providence, correctness of individual choice, and self-enslavement due to incorrect choice. Anchoring his discussion in Stoicism, Frede begins with Aristotle--who, he argues, had no notion of a free will--and ends (...) with Augustine. Frede shows that Augustine, far from originating the idea, derived most of his thinking about it from the Stoicism developed by Epictetus. (shrink)

"This volume presents stimulating and provocative work on how the history of philosophy is done and how it should be done, by Michael Frede, a pre-eminent figure in ancient philosophy until his early death in 2007. His Nellie Wallace lectures are published here accompanied by three related articles."--Publisher.

These five essays began a debate about the nature and scope of ancient scepticism which has transformed our understanding of what scepticism originally was. Together they provide a vigorous and highly stimulating introduction to the thought of the original sceptics, and shed new light on its relation to sceptical arguments in modern philosophy.

This book, a collection of specially written essays by leading international scholars, reexamines ancient ideas of reason and rationality. The application of changing notions of rationality down the ages has led to consistent misinterpretation of standard ancient philosophical texts: the distinguished contributors here redress the balance, clarifying how the great thinkers of antiquity themselves conceived of rationality.

Distinguished experts from a range of disciplines with a common interest in late antiquity probe the apparent paradox of pagan monotheism and reach a better understanding of the historical roots of Christianity.

A distinguished group of scholars of ancient philosophy here presents a systematic study of the twelfth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Book Lambda, which can be regarded as a self-standing treatise on substance, has been attracting particular attention in recent years, and was chosen as the focus of the fourteenth Symposium Aristotelicum, from which this volume is derived.

In describing the Stoic principles, the manuscript tradition of DL 7.134 preserves readings which variously call them σώµατα, ‘bodies’, or ἀσώµατα, ‘incorporeals’; but the Suida quotes this passage with ἀσωµάτους, ‘incorporeal’. This paper shows that the Suida has the best reading. This is not the only, or the clearest, case where the Suida can correct our text: another example considered here concerns DL 7.74.

This paper elucidates Aristotle’s conception of thinking in two stages. First, the paper examines the passages in which Aristotle criticizes his Presocratic predecessors for failing to understand what thinking is. The examination shows that Aristotle took his earlier predecessors to assimilate thinking to being sensible and both to perceiving , largely because they do not realize that thinking has a distinctive feature which makes it radically different from both being sensible and perceiving. Second, the paper examines the passages in which (...) Aristotle explains what the distinctive feature of thinking is. It is shown that the distinctive feature of thinking is that it is discriminative of intelligible features, and these are unchanging items of reality inaccessible to senses, called ‘forms’ or ‘universals’. The upshot of the paper is that Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, does not believe that we are born with the ability to think, but rather that we acquire it in the course of our cognitive development. (shrink)

This paper investigates Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy in Met. A.3-10. To appreciate it as a guide to our understanding of the beginnings of philosophy, it is crucial to see that this account relies on the preceding account of wisdom understood as theoretical knowledge of things in terms of their principles and causes. Since there is a highest form of wisdom, which involves knowledge of the ultimate principles of what there is, there is also a philosophy which aims (...) at this sort of knowledge, that is philosophy in the primary sense of the word, i.e. metaphysics. Aristotle’s account in Met. A 3-10, the paper claims, is an introduction into such philosophy. The primary aim of the account is to show that philosophy is indeed a matter of explaining things in terms of principles or causes, of which there are exactly four types. Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy is thus a story of the progressive discovery of these four types of explanation, starting with Thales’ use of explanation in terms of matter. The crucial development in this story comes with the insight that reality is not exhausted by the sensible world, more specifically that there are immaterial substances which make the sensible world intelligible, which necessitated explanation in terms of form and purpose. (shrink)

This paper investigates Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy in Met. A.3-10. To appreciate it as a guide to our understanding of the beginnings of philosophy, it is crucial to see that this account relies on the preceding account of wisdom understood as theoretical knowledge of things in terms of their principles and causes. Since there is a highest form of wisdom, which involves knowledge of the ultimate principles of what there is, there is also a philosophy which aims (...) at this sort of knowledge, that is philosophy in the primary sense of the word, i.e. metaphysics. Aristotle’s account in Met. A 3-10, the paper claims, is an introduction into such philosophy. The primary aim of the account is to show that philosophy is indeed a matter of explaining things in terms of principles or causes, of which there are exactly four types. Aristotle’s account of the origins of philosophy is thus a story of the progressive discovery of these four types of explanation, starting with Thales’ use of explanation in terms of matter. The crucial development in this story comes with the insight that reality is not exhausted by the sensible world, more specifically that there are immaterial substances which make the sensible world intelligible, which necessitated explanation in terms of form and purpose. (shrink)