In Anselm's Discovery , Professor Hartshorne makes the rather startling and counterintuitive claim that ‘…there is indeed no issue between theism and pantheism. We all exist in the divine being, as St Paul said.’ 1 Classical or orthodox theists, it seems eminently fair to say, can be expected to recoil from any such suggestion with more than a little indignation. First of all, it might well be objected that Hartshorne - as a ‘process theist’ - is not a classical theist, (...) and, consequently, while there may be no issue between pantheism and his brand of theism, such is simply not the case in so far as classical theism is concerned. According to the latter - in contradistinction, of course, to Hartshorne's ‘neoclassical theism’ - immutability is an ‘essential’ property of God; as such, it would be a conceptual error to ascribe any contingent states to God at all. Now as is well known by philosophers of religion, Hartshorne regards this immutability doctrine of classical theism as a serious ‘logical blunder’ , one which - in so far as it reflects the ‘Greek bias’ which has always identified perfection with the absolutely unchangeable - is profoundly distortive of the biblical concept of Deity. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clear up the long-standing veritable mountain of misinterpretation, perpetuated from critic to critic, concerning the admittedly problematic concept of self-authenticating religious experience. While it may well be the case, as many have argued, that a sort of ‘experience’ about which one could not be mistaken is simply a logically impossible state of affairs, this cannot be known to be the case so long as what is under attack is a bogus concept, obviously absurd, (...) having nothing whatsoever to do with the correct interpretation of ‘self-authentication’. Hence, my mission herein is essentially that of philosophical analysis or clarification of meaning. Only upon suitable clarification of this concept will we be in a position to consider the question of its possible application, i.e. whether or not there could be an instantiation of such experience. I might point out that my central concern is somewhat more explicatory than historical, though I believe that the account developed in this paper is essentially congenial with the intent of those who have been proponents of the view that there can be self-authenticating religious experience. Let us begin, then, by turning to some representative criticism of the concept in question. (shrink)

I am grateful to Philip Quinn for his thorough and penetrating critique of my paper on classical theism and pantheism. He has given me much to think about, and it would be philosophically remiss of me not to acknowledge that – in the light of his remarks – the argument which I employed in defence of the thesis that classical theism implies a version of pantheism might well benefit from some amendment. However, the purpose of this brief counter-rejoinder is to (...) establish that the nexus of my argument has emerged from his commentary in reasonably robust health, i.e., to demonstrate that if the argument of my former paper is to be rejected, it will take something more than Professor Quinn's critique to make that clear. Very concisely, then, my response is as follows: At a preliminary point, Professor Quinn claims that my argument ‘merits careful scrutiny’ because, if it succeeds, ‘something shockingly at variance with received views’ will have been established . I find this to be somewhat odd. For it seems clear that St Paul was a ‘classical theist’, indeed a very special one in so far as the shaping of Christian theism is concerned. And while his famous and oftcited dictum that God is the One in Whom ‘we live, move, and have our being’ may be such that it is permissible to construe it in ways which do not imply any version of pantheism, it clearly seems unjustified to maintain that pantheistic doctrines are ‘shockingly at variance’ with that most intriguing statement of St Paul's. (shrink)

In "anselm's discovery", professor hartshorne argues that there is 'no issue' between theism and pantheism. classical or orthodox theists, it seems eminently fair to say, can be expected to recoil from such a claim with more than a little indignation. what i attempt to establish, however, is that hartshorne is correct. in short, i argue that the doctrine of 'god's-constant-conservation-of-all-things' (clearly an essential or integral doctrine of classical theism) entails that the 'spatiotemporal' matrix has the property of being included within (...) the being of god "essentially". if this is so, however, classical theism shows itself to be incoherent insofar as god would not then be immutable (an essential property of god, according to classical theism). (shrink)

In a recent and most compelling paper, Professor Edward Madden has argued, in effect, that it is high time for the removal of the Hume-colored glasses on causality through which too many philosophers have been seeing “nomic” necessity for too long. Rather, it is Madden’s contention that the Humean view on causality contains far more “ontological looseness” than is justified and needs to be supplanted by a view of causality as “natural necessity that carries with it an internal warrant of (...) inductive inference”. However, while there can be little doubt that the view proposed by Madden is ontologically “tighter” than the Humean view, he makes it clear at the outset that his correction of Hume is not to be identified “with the familiar entailment view of causality”. Now this, I believe, raises a very interesting point, namely, while Madden says that his view is not to be identified with the entailment position, he never gets down to telling us precisely how it differs from the latter. In this regard, then, it shall be my contention that there is no substantive difference whatsoever between Madden’s view and the entailment view. Hence, while I agree with virtually everything Madden has said on causality and agree with it largely because I do take it to be a much needed and cogent correction of the Humean position, I hope to show that, ironically enough, the view for which Madden argues necessarily commits him to the very entailment view he is so obviously anxious to avoid. That is, I am convinced that the view proposed and defended by Madden is—from start to finish—identical with the view that the causal relation is a relation of entailment. (shrink)

In a recent and most compelling paper, Professor Edward Madden has argued, in effect, that it is high time for the removal of the Hume-colored glasses on causality through which too many philosophers have been seeing “nomic” necessity for too long. Rather, it is Madden’s contention that the Humean view on causality contains far more “ontological looseness” than is justified and needs to be supplanted by a view of causality as “natural necessity that carries with it an internal warrant of (...) inductive inference”. However, while there can be little doubt that the view proposed by Madden is ontologically “tighter” than the Humean view, he makes it clear at the outset that his correction of Hume is not to be identified “with the familiar entailment view of causality”. Now this, I believe, raises a very interesting point, namely, while Madden says that his view is not to be identified with the entailment position, he never gets down to telling us precisely how it differs from the latter. In this regard, then, it shall be my contention that there is no substantive difference whatsoever between Madden’s view and the entailment view. Hence, while I agree with virtually everything Madden has said on causality and agree with it largely because I do take it to be a much needed and cogent correction of the Humean position, I hope to show that, ironically enough, the view for which Madden argues necessarily commits him to the very entailment view he is so obviously anxious to avoid. That is, I am convinced that the view proposed and defended by Madden is—from start to finish—identical with the view that the causal relation is a relation of entailment. (shrink)

Regardless of one’s philosophical sympathies, Professor Brand Blanshard is surely to be respected for the acuity with which he has resisted the onslaught of the “analytic” movement in America. As pointed out by Professor Bruce Aune, “For the past sixty years, the emphasis of Anglo-Saxon philosophy has been analytical rather than speculative. Mr. Blanshard has persistently opposed this emphasis….” Predictably, Aune goes on to convey his opposition to Blanshard’s speculative aim, indicating that he remains “unmoved by the doctrine of internal (...) relations.” Surely this is a very curious and interesting point; exactly what do the critics of Professor Blanshard mean by their assessment of the doctrine of internal relations as speculative rather than analytic? Do they mean to suggest that he reaches his systematic conclusions without an intensive analysis of concepts? While Blanshard’s aim is admittedly the speculative one of a totally coherent and intelligible world-picture, this does not mean that the justification for those conclusions supportive of his speculative aim is one which is unmindful of the demands of logical analysis. Let us, then, reexamine Blanshard’s doctrine of internal relations, as he himself has done in a recent paper, with an eye to determining whether it is fundamentally opposed, as suggested by Aune, to the emphasis of logical analysis. (shrink)