This volume brings together papers by some of the leading figures working on virtue-theoretic accounts in both ethics and epistemology. A collection of cutting edge articles by leading figures in the field of virtue theory including Guy Axtell, Julia Driver, Antony Duff and Miranda Fricker. The first book to combine papers on both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Deals with key topics in recent epistemological and ethical debate.

Packed with examples pulled straight from recent headlines, ENGINEERING ETHICS, Sixth Edition, helps engineers understand the importance of their conduct as professionals as well as reflect on how their actions can affect the health, safety and welfare of the public and the environment. Numerous case studies give readers plenty of hands-on experience grappling with modern-day ethical dilemmas, while the book's proven and structured method for analysis walks readers step by step through ethical problem-solving techniques. It also offers practical application of (...) the Engineering Code of Ethics and thorough coverage of critical moral reasoning, effective organizational communication, sustainability and economic development, risk management, ethical responsibilities, globalized standards for engineering and emerging challenges relating to evolving technology. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version. (shrink)

Although Hume’s theory of the passions has been vigorously criticized by contemporary philosophers, Hume’s immediate successors are seldom credited with serious criticisms of that theory. In fact, insofar as their views are considered at all, they typically are summarily dismissed. Alasdair MacIntyre’s treatment is a good illustration.

Although the participants in the initial situation of justice in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice choose principles of justice only, their choices have implications for other moral concerns. The only check on the self-interest of the participants is that there be unanimous acceptance of the principles. But, since animals are not participants, it is possible that principles will be adopted which confiict with what Rawls calls“duties of compassion and humanity” toward animals. This is a consequence of the initial situation’s assumption (...) that principles of justice can be determined independently of other moral considerations. We question this assumption, and show that satisfactory modifications of Rawls’ initial situation undermine its contractarian basis and require the rejection of exclusively self-interested participants. (shrink)

Although the participants in the initial situation of justice in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice choose principles of justice only, their choices have implications for other moral concerns. The only check on the self-interest of the participants is that there be unanimous acceptance of the principles. But, since animals are not participants, it is possible that principles will be adopted which confiict with what Rawls calls“duties of compassion and humanity” toward animals. This is a consequence of the initial situation’s assumption (...) that principles of justice can be determined independently of other moral considerations. We question this assumption, and show that satisfactory modifications of Rawls’ initial situation undermine its contractarian basis and require the rejection of exclusively self-interested participants. (shrink)

This paper explores ways in which service-learning programs can enhance ethics education in engineering. Service-learning programs combine volunteer work and academic study. The National Society for Professional Engineers (NSPE) and American Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE) codes of ethics explicitly encourage engineers to seek opportunities, beyond their work-related responsibilities, to serve their communities. Examples of how this can be encouraged as a part of the educational experiences of engineering students are explored. Calvin: How good do you have to be to (...) qualify as good? I haven’t killed anybody. See, that’s good, right? I haven’t committed any felonics. I didn’t start any wars. I don’t practice cannibalism. Wouldn’t you say I should get lots of presents? (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the concept of bribery, and to do this in a way that reveals its underlying normative features. Bribery, like lying is not a value neutral concept. It has a negative connotation and is regarded by most as generally, although not necessarily universally, wrong. At the very least, those who resort to bribery bear a burden of justification for what they do. This is no small point, as no such burden must be borne (...) for the vast majority of human activities, such as engaging in conversation or taking a walk, which normally do not. As Sissela Bok says of lying, we might say that a negative moral weight attaches to every act of bribery; it may be possible to counter this negative weight in some instances, but not without an argument.1 Why should a negative moral weight be attached to every act of bribery? It might be thought that, even if most instances of bribery are morally objectionable, the concept of bribery itself is morally neutral.2 However, enticing people to violate what they take to be their positional duties does seem to call for some sort of moral justification. This seems to be so even in extreme cases, for example, when bribing a Nazi guard to allow concentration camp prisoners to escape. The ready availability of a moral justification in such circumstances does not eliminate the need for one. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of the conditions of moral agency typically are confined to various aspects of the age-old free will-determinism controversy. Important as the issues raised in the controversy are, they will not be my concern. Instead, I will try to show that, quite apart from whether moral agents must have “free will,” they must meet two other conditions. First, moral agents must have a minimal understanding of the moral concepts applicable to them. I will refer to this as “moral understanding.” (...) Second, they must have some tendency to experience moral sentiments. Examples of moral sentiments are feelings of guilt, remorse, shame, and resentment, as well as genuine concern to treat others with fellow-feeling and due regard for their interests and well-being. I will try to show that these two conditions are not independent of one another, in that the first condition cannot be satisfied unless the second is as well. (shrink)

Although Hume’s theory of the passions has been vigorously criticized by contemporary philosophers, Hume’s immediate successors are seldom credited with serious criticisms of that theory. In fact, insofar as their views are considered at all, they typically are summarily dismissed. Alasdair MacIntyre’s treatment is a good illustration.

Adam Smith and Thomas Reid follow Joseph Butler's lead in discussing the moral significance of resentment in great detail. David Hume does not. For Smith and Reid, resentment reveals shortcomings in Hume's attempt to ground justice solely in terms of self-interest and public utility. This can be seen most clearly in Reid's critique of Hume's response to the sensible knave. Reid argues that Hume's appeal to our integrity can have force only if Hume concedes that there are elements of justice (...) that are grounded in neither self-interest nor public utility. (shrink)

In contrast to The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics counsels not trying to “get to the bottom of things” in our efforts to reach “some results of value for practical guidance and life.” For Sidgwick, both practical and theoretical ethics should start from the Morality of Common Sense. Although he retained his utilitarian outlook in Practical Ethics, this paper suggests that the Morality of Common Sense has the resources to hold its own against utilitarian revision.

In contrast to The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics counsels not trying to “get to the bottom of things” in our efforts to reach “some results of value for practical guidance and life.” For Sidgwick, both practical and theoretical ethics should start from the Morality of Common Sense. Although he retained his utilitarian outlook in Practical Ethics, this paper suggests that the Morality of Common Sense has the resources to hold its own against utilitarian revision.

Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen’s Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2009) explores efforts to develop machines that, not only can be employed for good or bad ends, but which themselves can be held morally accountable for what they do— artificial moral agents (AMAs). This essay is a critical response to Wallach and Allen’s conjectures. Although Wallach and Allen do not suggest that we are close to being able to create full-fledged AMAs, they do talk seriously (...) about making incremental progress in the direction of creating them (even if we never fully succeed). However, there are important questions about the moral development of AMAs that Moral Machines does not address. Given the responsibilities entrusted to human moral agents, we take questions about their moral development very seriously. In the case of children, the hope is that eventually they will develop into full-fledged moral agents. How might we expect this to go with less than fully formed AMAs? Will there be a comparable story of moral development and moral education that we can tell? (shrink)

Western Michigan University’s Center for the Study of Ethics in Society has always had a “generalist” approach—that is to say, an interdisciplinary orientation toward studying a broad range of ethical issues. This article explains how the center’s “generalist” orientation developed and why it is desirable for promoting public reflection about ethical issues. It focuses on these dimensions: valuing an across-the-curriculum approach to promote understanding of complex ethical issues; adopting a broad, rather than narrow focus, when it comes to ethics; committing (...) to practical ethics, which bridges theory and practice to shed light on issues of practical relevance to all; and decentering philosophy as the arbiter for what counts as “doing ethics.” The article ends with a look at challenges concerning stable funding and administrative support for a center that does not fit neatly into a single academic unit or specialty and shares some lessons learned. (shrink)

This collection examines how greed should be understood and appraised. Roundly condemned by virtually all religions, greed receives mixed appraisals in the domains of business and economics. The volume examines these mixed appraisals and how they fare in light of their implications for greed in our everyday world. Greed in children is uniformly criticized by parents, other adults, and even children’s peers. However, in adulthood, greed is commended by some as essential to profit-seeking in business and for offering the greatest (...) promise in promoting economic prosperity for everyone. Those who advocate a more permissive position on greed in the adult world typically concede that some constraints on greed are needed. However, the supporting literature offers little analysis of what greed is. It offers little clarification of what sorts of constraints on greed are needed. Nor is careful attention given to difficulties children might have in making a transition without moral loss from regarding greed as inappropriate to its later qualified acceptance. Through a secular approach, this book attempts to make significant inroads in remedying these shortcomings. (shrink)

I have just completed participation in the second year of a philosophy for children program at the Ransom Public Library in Plainwell, Michigan. Both years have been sponsored by the Michigan Council for the Humanities, which has awarded the library two grants to run the program. Director of the program is Jan Park, lead librarian. It was my pleasure to meet with different groups of 4th and 5th graders during this time to discuss Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery and related materials.

Flying several miles above ground for several thousand miles gives one pause for reflection. "Don't worry about the world coming to an end today, sir," says one of the children in Peanuts. "It's already tomorrow in Australia." Enroute to Taipei, I suspected that travelling halfway around the world to participate in the 3rd International Conference Philosophy for Children would stand me on my head. I was right. I knew before I left that half of today in Taipei is somehow concurrent (...) with half of yesterday in Kalamazoo. So my head was already spinning a bit as my plane traversed time zone after time zone, making today earlier and earlier until, suddenly--it was tomorrow. (shrink)

This paper discusses the growing prominence of character education and the role moral philosophy can play here. It examines the place of inquiry in character education, and the ways in which moral philosophy can help young people to develop the virtue of reasonableness. Reasonableness, as herein described, takes into account the views and feelings of others, the willingness to allow one’s views to be scrutinized by others, and the acceptance of some degree of uncertainty about whether one’s views are necessarily (...) right. The paper illustrates ways in which philosophical exploration about morality can help children to cultivate reasonableness. (shrink)

THE LAND OF CURIOSITY has evolved over the past several years as a result of discussions I have had with groups of 4th, 5th, and 6th graders. It all began many years ago in my daughter's 4th grade class. I wanted the group with whom I met once a week to think about rules. So I wrote a little episode about The Basic Rule. The responses to this episode were used as a basis for another episode, this one dealing with (...) The Golden Rule. Responses to that episode led to yet another one on rules. (shrink)

For some time now I have been puzzling over what we really have in mind when we say that the schools should be doing a better job of helping students develop their critical thinking abilities. Although most educators agree that something should be done, there is no consensus on how to go about it. I suspect that this is partly because there is no consensus on what critical thinking is. I offer no definition. But I do have some reflections that, (...) I hope, will contribute to our understanding of critical thinking. (shrink)

We rely on doctors, accountants, engineers, and other professionals to be committed to the basic values of their professions and to exercise their ex­pertise in competent, reliable ways, even when no one is watching them do their work. That is, we expect them to have professional integrity. Children obviously do not yet have professional integrity, even if someday they will become professionals. Nevertheless, the moral development of children who will become professionals plays an important role in the eventual emergence of (...) their professional integrity. We will discuss both what this integrity involves and how the basic moral development of children contributes to its emergence in professional life. (shrink)

We rely on doctors, accountants, engineers, and other professionals to be committed to the basic values of their professions and to exercise their ex­pertise in competent, reliable ways, even when no one is watching them do their work. That is, we expect them to have professional integrity. Children obviously do not yet have professional integrity, even if someday they will become professionals. Nevertheless, the moral development of children who will become professionals plays an important role in the eventual emergence of (...) their professional integrity. We will discuss both what this integrity involves and how the basic moral development of children contributes to its emergence in professional life. (shrink)

Although national surveys consistently show that an overwhelming majority of adults in the United States would like to see some sort of moral education in the schools, it is not clear how much real agreement this indicates. "Whose morality are we talking about?" one might ask. The significance of this question is apparent when we consider the moral diversity among those who ask it. This is not merely a diversity among moral beliefs. This is bound to be present to some (...) degree in any large group of reflective people. Many societies are multicultural. As Amy Gutmann puts it, these societies contain within their borders "many cultures that interact in some significant way with each other." Thus, a multicultural society will, in part, be characterized by different traditions and practices, some of which may reflect fundamental moral and religious differences. (shrink)