Results for 'Kahneman, D'

986 found
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  1. Tversky, eds.D. Kahneman & P. Slovic - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
  2. P. Slovic, and A. Tversky.D. Kahneman - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
  3. P. & Tversky, A.D. Slovic Kahneman - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
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  4. Predictive utility.D. Kahneman & J. Snell - 1990 - In L. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research. Guilford Press. pp. 66--100.
  5. Human engineering of decisions.D. Kahneman - 1980 - In Melvin Kranzberg (ed.), Ethics in an Age of Pervasive Technology. Westview Press.
     
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  6.  19
    Philosophical arguments, psychological experiments, and the problem of consistency.D. Kahneman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):253-254.
  7.  29
    Rethinking Rationality: From Bleak Implications to Darwinian Modules.Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Patrice D. Tremoulet - 1999 - In Kepa Korta, Ernest Sosa & Xabier Arrazola (eds.), Cognition, Agency and Rationality. Springer Verlag. pp. 21-62.
    There is a venerable philosophical tradition that views human beings as intrinsically rational, though even the most ardent defender of this view would admit that under certain circumstances people’s decisions and thought processes can be very irrational indeed. When people are extremely tired, or drunk, or in the grip of rage, they sometimes reason and act in ways that no account of rationality would condone. About thirty years ago, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and a number of other psychologists began reporting (...)
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  8. Debiasing/Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A.B. Fischhoff - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
  9. For Those Condemned to Study Past: Heuristics and Biases In Hindsight [w:] Kahneman D., Slovic P., Tversky A.B. Frischhoff - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  10. Debiasing. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky, eds.B. Fischsoff - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
  11. Whose is the fallacy? A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1980 - Cognition 8 (March):89-92.
  12.  88
    Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    In the international bestseller, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman, the renowned psychologist and winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, takes us on a groundbreaking tour of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think. System 1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. The impact of overconfidence on corporate strategies, the difficulties of predicting what will make us happy in the future, the profound effect of cognitive (...)
  13. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
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  14. Attention and Effort.Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Prentice-Hall.
  15. .Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
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  16.  22
    Choices, Values, and Frames.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as (...)
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  17. On the psychology of prediction.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.
    Considers that intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic-representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness was supported in a series of studies with both naive and sophisticated university students. The ranking of outcomes by likelihood coincided with the ranking by (...)
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  18. Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.
     
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  19. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  20. Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller - 1986 - Psychological Review 93 (2):136-153.
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  21. A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.Daniel Kahneman - 2003 - American Psychologist 58 (9):697.
     
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  22.  56
    On the reality of cognitive illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.
  23. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
  24. Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology.Daniel Kahneman, Edward Diener & Norbert Schwarz (eds.) - 1999 - Russell Sage Foundation.
    The nature of well-being is one of the most enduring and elusive subjects of human inquiry. Well-Being draws upon the latest scientific research to transform our understanding of this ancient question. With contributions from leading authorities in psychology, social psychology, and neuroscience, this volume presents the definitive account of current scientific efforts to understand human pleasure and pain, contentment and despair. The distinguished contributors to this volume combine a rigorous analysis of human sensations, emotions, and moods with a broad assessment (...)
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  25. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 49-81.
    The first section introduces a distinction between 2 families of cognitive operations, called System 1 and System 2. The second section presents an attribute-substitution model of heuristic judgment, which elaborates and extends earlier treatments of the topic. The third section introduces a research design for studying attribute substitution. The fourth section discusses the controversy over the representativeness heuristic. The last section situates representativeness within a broad family of prototype heuristics, in which properties of a prototypical exemplar dominate global judgments concerning (...)
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  26.  35
    Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment.Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman (eds.) - 2002 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This book, first published in 2002, examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted (...)
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  27. A model of heuristic judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 267--293.
    The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples. The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned (...)
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  28. Valuing public goods: the purchase of moral satisfaction.Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch - forthcoming - Environmental Values.
  29.  20
    Time-intensity reciprocity under various conditions of adaptation and backward masking.Daniel Kahneman - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (4):543.
  30. Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds.Daniel Kahneman - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
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  31.  68
    Variants of uncertainty.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):143-157.
  32. On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1979 - Cognition 7 (December):409-11.
  33. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Cognitive Psychology 5 (2):207-232.
  34. Critical duration for the resolution of form: Centrally or peripherally determined?Daniel Kahneman, Joel Norman & Michael Kubovy - 1967 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 73 (3):323.
  35.  59
    On the study of statistical intuitions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):123-141.
  36. The Psychology of Preferences.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Scientific American 246:160–173.
  37.  7
    International Differences in Well Being.Ed Diener, Daniel Kahneman & John Helliwell - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This book draws together the latest work from scholars around the world using subjective well-being data to understand and compare well-being across countries and cultures. Starting from many different vantage points, the authors reached a consensus that many measures of subjective well-being, ranging from life evaluations through emotional states, based on memories and current evaluations, merit broader collection and analysis. Using data from the Gallup World Poll, the World Values Survey, and other internationally comparable surveys, the authors document wide divergences (...)
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  38.  73
    New challenges to the rationality assumption.Daniel Kahneman - 1997 - Legal Theory 3 (2):105-124.
    In contrast to logical criteria of rationality, which can be assessed entirely by reference to the system of preferences, substantive criteria of rational choice refer to an independent evaluation of the outcomes of decisions. One of these substantive criteria is the experienced hedonic utility of outcomes. Research indicates that people are myopic in their decisions, may lack skill in predicting their future tastes, and can be led to erroneous choices by fallible memory and incorrect evaluation of past experiences. Theoretical and (...)
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  39.  38
    Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.
  40.  76
    Living, and thinking about it: Two perspectives on life.Daniel Kahneman & Jason Riis - 2005 - In Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis & Barry Keverne (eds.), The Science of Well-Being. Oxford University Press. pp. 285--304.
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  41.  34
    Reaction time in focused and in divided attention.Anat Ninio & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 103 (3):394.
  42. A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...)
  43.  78
    A psychological point of view: Violations of rational rules as a diagnostic of mental processes.Daniel Kahneman - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):681-683.
    The target article focuses exclusively on System 2 and on reasoning rationality: the ability to reach valid conclusions from available information, as in the Wason task. The decision-theoretic concept of coherence rationality requires beliefs to be consistent, even when they are assessed one at a time. Judgment heuristics belong to System 1, and help explain the incoherence of intuitive beliefs.
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  44.  54
    Pupillary, heart rate, and skin resistance changes during a mental task.Daniel Kahneman, Bernard Tursky, David Shapiro & Andrew Crider - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (1p1):164.
  45.  43
    Can irrationality be intelligently discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
  46.  30
    Incentive effects and pupillary changes in association learning.Daniel Kahneman & W. Scott Peavler - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (2p1):312.
  47.  25
    The time-intensity relation in visual perception as a function of observer's task.Daniel Kahneman & Joel Norman - 1964 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (3):215.
  48. Probabilistic reasoning.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1993 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 43--68.
     
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  49. Amos Tversky, eds. 1982.Daniel Kahneman & Paul Slovic - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
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  50. Living, and thinking about it: two perspectives on life.Daniel Kahneman & Riis & Jason - 2005 - In Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis & Barry Keverne (eds.), The Science of Well-Being. Oxford University Press.
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