In this two-part essay I develop a theory of natural signs. Since even primordial signs signify values, in the first part I develop the theory’s valuative aspect. Goods are as primary in nature as facts are, and together facts and values generate semeiosis in all life without excess extrapolation from human psychology. To ward off over-extrapolating on values, I defend a major discontinuity between man and nature on the goods of ethics. In the essay’s second part I develop the semeiotic (...) dimensions of the negative feedback model of purposive systems. I provide tests for the truth and falsity of the primitive representations in these systems. I account for the holism of representational systems and their non-extensionality, and I define functions. I solve this important definitional problem by inverting the usual mode of thinking: Functions do not explain signs; signs explain functions. Finally I defend this theory’s way of understanding the continuity between human beings and the rest of living nature against several criticisms. (shrink)

‘Ifs’ come washed or unwashed. The washed ifs are embedded in precise theories: the constantly strict implication of deductive inference, the variably strict implication of ‘nearness’ conditionals, and statements of conditional probability. By a nearness conditional I mean the common part of Stalnaker's and D. Lewis's theory of counterfactual conditionals, which depends on a notion that possible worlds are more or less near to each other, as a measure of their over-all similarity to each other.

According to philosophical naturalism, the main anti-naturalism in philosophy derives from Kant and depends on transcendental arguments, which are invalid or polemically toothless. Many of naturalism's characteristic features follow from this repudiation of Kantian method. Anti-naturalists should be aware that the rationale for naturalism depends on this attack on their own position. There remains for philosophy a distinctively philosophical role that depends on the indexical element in our thought, the role of elaborating a scientific worldview.

This essay develops a theory of natural signs in order to show how evolutionary theory breathes new life into teleology. An argument to the contrary presented by Richard Taylor is refuted. The essay defends the view that the concept of negative feedback explicates purposiveness and that symbiotic evolution explains the occurrence of naturally adapted feedback systems. But evolution itself is not a teleological process, nor is it a negative feedback system. There is an exploration of the nature of the dissatisfaction (...) we feel with an evolutionary account of purposiveness from which the fortuitous cannot be eliminated. (shrink)

In this two-part essay I develop a theory of natural signs. Since even primordial signs signify values, in the first part I develop the theory’s valuative aspect. Goods are as primary in nature as facts are, and together facts and values generate semeiosis in all life without excess extrapolation from human psychology. To ward off over-extrapolating on values, I defend a major discontinuity between man and nature on the goods of ethics. In the essay’s second part I develop the semeiotic (...) dimensions of the negative feedback model of purposive systems. I provide tests for the truth and falsity of the primitive representations in these systems. I account for the holism of representational systems and their non-extensionality, and I define functions. I solve this important definitional problem by inverting the usual mode of thinking: Functions do not explain signs; signs explain functions. Finally I defend this theory’s way of understanding the continuity between human beings and the rest of living nature against several criticisms. (shrink)

This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...

‘Ifs’ come washed or unwashed. The washed ifs are embedded in precise theories: the constantly strict implication of deductive inference, the variably strict implication of ‘nearness’ conditionals, and statements of conditional probability. By a nearness conditional I mean the common part of Stalnaker's and D. Lewis's theory of counterfactual conditionals, which depends on a notion that possible worlds are more or less near to each other, as a measure of their over-all similarity to each other.

The author argues for a purely naturalistic underpinning of the linguistic practice of reporting one's introspections. In doing so he avoids any commitments about the ontological status of entities referred to in introspective reports. He also presents evidence of the inadequacy of peripheralistic behaviorism as a naturalistic underpinning of introspective reports. The paper includes (a) a definition of 'introspection' and criticism of alternative definitions, (b) a classification scheme that sorts introspections into six different types, and (c) a presentation of evidence (...) that the reporting of certain of these is based on such fundamental psychological phenomena as stimulus generalization, and possibly also conditioning to covert mediating responses. (shrink)

A valid logical form is exhibited which underlies many arguments for logical, precognitive, and causal fatalism. The tools of modal and metrical tense logic are employed. And the logic of subjunctive conditionals is employed to display for the first time the valid variant of this form which underlies the most plausible causal fatalisms. Eleven arguments from ancient, medieval, and modern authors are shown to have variants of this valid form.The truth of the premises is examined, especially the premise that the (...) past is necessary. This is made precise and defended as Ockham and Montague suggest, and this defence's implicit logic of the interrelations of time, modality, and counterfactual dependence is explored, A novel argument is given to refute the ancient view that unchangeable truth of a tensed sentence is proof of its necessity. Logical fatalism is shown to be not falsifiable independently of the falsity of causal fatalism. (shrink)

According to philosophical naturalism, the main anti-naturalism in philosophy derives from Kant and depends on transcendental arguments, which are invalid or polemically toothless. Many of naturalism's characteristic features follow from this repudiation of Kantian method. Anti-naturalists should be aware that the rationale for naturalism depends on this attack on their own position. There remains for philosophy a distinctively philosophical role that depends on the indexical element in our thought, the role of elaborating a scientific worldview.

Arthur E. Lean’s irreverent and con­troversial essays represent the distillation of many ideas about education—ideas developed during most of a lifetime spent in and about schools. In the second edition of this popular work, to which he has added eight new essays, he presents his latest observations on current ele­ments and programs in education—such as the grading system, academic rank, the teaching process, assessment of edu­cational progress—concluding that many of them are not only unnecessary but actually harmful to the (...) very process which they are supposed to serve. Covering a broad spectrum of current issues in its criticism of American edu­cation at all levels, _And Merely Teach _is a book to be read by veteran educator, beginning teacher, and lay citizen alike. Though critical of the teaching profes­sion, Arthur Lean also offers constructive suggestions in the form of practical solu­tions that are urgently needed to save our ailing educational system. (shrink)