What makes Book Lambda the most important book of Metaphysics is to mention the fundamental substance of being. Therefore, Book Lambda is a book that has been regarded as valuable and has been studied extensively. Arabic translations of this book were in high demand in the Islamic world. We have also considered Arabic metaphysical translations, especially the translation of Book Lambda. The translation you will read is a commentary of the ninth chapter of Book Lambda by Themistius. The Greek (...) original commentary of Lambda was lost, and after the Arabic translation, it was transferred to Latin and Hebrew. However, later parts of the Arabic text were also lost. In this chapter, Themistius comments on the part in which Aristotle discusses the difficulties on the nature of divine intellect and tries to prove that the object of reason, the act of thinking and the object of thinking are the same things. (shrink)

La Metaphysique d'Aristote culmine dans le livre Lambda (XII). Il resume les livres precedents, puis se lance dans une fantastique description de Dieu, Premier moteur immobile de l'univers et Penser se pensant soi-meme. Le premier a nous en avoir laisse un commentaire est Themistius, au IVe siecle. Entre lui et l'epoque d'Averroes, d'Albert le Grand, de Thomas d'Aquin, rien ne nous est reste sur Lambda. Themistius paraphrase le texte et y mele de tres importantes digressions. L'original grec est (...) perdu. De la traduction arabe, nous n'avons que des fragments. Mais elle avait ete integralement traduite en hebreu. C'est a partir de ces deux sources que Remi Brague propose ici une traduction litterale, avec une introduction et des notes explicatives. (shrink)

Themistius ran his philosophical school in Constantinople in the middle of the fourth century A.D. His paraphrases of Aristotle's writings are unlike the elaborate commentaries produced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, or the later Neoplatonists Simplicius and Philoponus. His aim was to provide a clear and independent restatement of Aristotle's text which would be accessible as an elementary exegesis. But he also discusses important philosophical problems, reports and disagrees with other commentaries including the lost commentary of Porphyry, and offers interpretations (...) of Plato. Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's On the Soul is his most important and influential work. It is also the first extant commentary on this work of Aristotle to survive from antiquity. A rival to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, it represents one of the main interpretations of Aristotle's theory of the intellect, which was debated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It continues to be an important text for the reconstruction of Aristotle's philosophical psychology today. (shrink)

In posteriora Aristotelis. In Physica. In libros De anima.--Pseudo-Themistius (Sophonias). In De memoria et reminiscentia. In De somno et vigilia. In De insomniis. In De divinatione per somnium.

In Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s _Metaphysics_ 12, Yoav Meyrav offers a new critical edition and study of the Hebrew text and the Arabic fragments of Themistius’ 4th century paraphrase, whose original Greek is lost.

This article sheds new light on Themistius’ argument in what is philosophically the most original section of his extant work, namely On Aristotle's On the Soul 100.16–109.3: here, Themistius offers a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's ‘agent’ intellect and its ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ counterparts. A solution to two textual difficulties at 101.36–102.2 is proposed, supported by the Arabic translation. This allows us to see that Themistius engages at length with a Platonizing reading of the enigmatic final lines of (...) De anima III.5, where Aristotle explains ‘why we do not remember’. This Platonizing reading can be safely identified with the one developed in a fragmentary text extant only in Arabic under the title Porphyry's treatise On the soul. While Themistius rejects this reading, he turns out to be heavily influenced by the author's interpretation of the ‘agent’, ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ intellect. These findings offer us a new glimpse into Themistius’ philosophical programme: he is searching for an alternative to both the austere Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the all too Platonizing reading of Aristotle adopted by thinkers such as Porphyry. (shrink)

Themistius's (ca. 317–ca. 388 C.E.) paraphrase of the De Anima is an influential and important work; however, it is not now regarded as profound or original and thereby suffers from neglect. I argue that Themistius is misunderstood on the matter of Aristotle's productive and potential intellects. It is commonly held that Themistius gives to the productive intellect the role of illuminating images in order to produce universal thoughts in the potential intellect with epistemic certainty. I argue that (...) Themistius's productive intellect does not transform images to reveal the forms contained therein, but gives to the potential intellect the ability, first, to organize our sense-experiences in the course of acquiring rudimentary universal concepts and, then, to discover the forms of things by ordinary discursive thinking. (shrink)

L’auteur met en évidence la façon dont Thémistius, dans sa paraphrase, réorganise les parties du texte des lignes 71a17-b8 des Seconds Analytiques. Par une analyse détaillée du propos d’Aristote dans ces lignes, il montre que la réorganisation proposée par Thémistius est fidèle à l’esprit du texte aristotélicien, et s’appuie vraisemblablement sur des indices externes dont disposait le paraphraste.

This paper reconstructs the account of concept formation developed in the 4th Century A.D. by Themistius in the most ancient extant commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Themistius’ account can be contrasted with two widespread modern interpretations of Aristotle. Unlike psychological empiricists, Themistius ascribes an active role in concept formation to our innate capacity of understanding. Unlike intuitionists, he would not be satisfied by saying that νοῦς “intuits” or “spots” concepts. Rather, the question is what makes our νοῦς (...) capable of “finding” and “recognizing” concepts in experience, and this can only be an understanding prior to all experience. Themistius seems to be responding here to Platonist arguments against Aristotle’s epistemology: postulating a “potential νοῦς” is not enough, for one can apply Meno’s dilemma to it and ask how it can recognize that it has found what it was looking for. But, contrary to the judgment of some modern scholars, Themistius never embraced the theory of recollection either. He argued that both empiricism and Platonist innatism are wrong and developed a middle path marked by a strong interdependence between the perceptive and the rational capacity. This holds for all rational learning, and concept formation is its first stage: to form a concept means to learn something genuinely new, but also to recognize it as falling, e. g., under one of the ten categories. While being presented as a mere “paraphrasis” of Aristotle’s words, Themistius’ account is a well-advised and original response to the epistemological debates of his time. (shrink)

This article defines Themistius’ exegesis of the human intellect as a prodromic noetics, that is, a psychology in which the former psychological function is naturally predisposed, as a matter, to the action of the latter one, which acts as a form. This doctrine, which I claim to stem from Plato’s Timaeus, makes sense of hylomorphism by allowing separate psychological functions both to combine to non-separate ones and to unify cognitive functions and their cognitive objects. At the same time, Themistian (...) exegesis aims at defining the self, which is identified with the active intellect, since this intellect is the ultimate form of this successive prodromic interaction. Concluding remarks are intended to give weight to the thesis that Themistius’ noetics is an original attempt to recognize and reject two other extreme positions: the one which implies that actual intellect is not human but divine, as Alexander of Aphrodisias claimed; the other advanced by Zeno the Stoic, who held that the lower functions of the human soul are defined as perversions of the higher one. (shrink)

Although Themistius does not develop a theodicy, his observations on evil are fairly consistent. Both in his paraphrases of Aristotle and in his speeches, he argues that since God is the intelligent and powerful cause of all good things in the universe, evil is due to the στέρησις in matter and to the ἄνοιι of human beings. Despite some (Neo-)Platonic and Stoic influences, Themistius defends a basically Peripatetic world-view, in which evil is minimized.

A thirteenth-century manuscript attributes a short fragment of a speech Pros Basilea to the fourth-century orator Themistius. Its editors argue that the piece is authentic and was addressed to Theodosius I. In fact, style and vocabulary, geographical references, and the way the divinity of the emperor is highlighted, strongly argue against its authenticity. The fragment must be dated much later than the fourth century: this article suggests a date in the reign of Justinian.

Über die Datierung der vierten Rede des Themistius sowie ihr zeitliches Verhältnis zur dritten Rede besteht in der Forschung keine Einigkeit. Verschiedene Termine zwischen dem Winter 355/356 und dem Winter 358/359 sind dabei vorgeschlagen worden. An der nunmehr fast einhundert Jahre alten Diskussion fällt auf, daß die jeweils ins Feld geführten Argumente nahezu ausschließlich auf den Text der Rede bezogen sind. Weitgehend unbeachtet geblieben ist hingegen der Zusammenhang der Datierungsfrage von or. 4 mit der Antiochiareise des Themistius im (...) Jahre 356 und den hierzu gehörigen Libaniusbriefen, darunter insbesondere ep. 551. Im Folgenden soll daher versucht werden, anhand der Frage, wo sich Themistius zwischen dem Sommer 356 und dem Sommer 357 aufgehalten hat, Licht in die Datierungsproblematik zu bringen. (shrink)

Aquinas puts forward two different, and conflicting, interpretations of Themistius’s account of the intellect. In his earlier interpretation of Themistius, Aquinas understands him to hold the position that both the possible and agent intellect are separate and incorruptible, existing apart from individual human souls but shared in by individual souls in the process of knowing. In De unitate intellectus contra averroistas, however, Aquinas radically departs from this reading, hailing Themistius as a genuine interpreter of the Peripatetic position, (...) while decrying Averroes’s perversion of both Themistius and Aristotle. This paper examines these competing interpretations of Themistius’s account of the intellect in his Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, focusing on two issues central to its interpretation: the nature of intellect insofar as it is separate, impassive, and unmixed, and whether the productive intellect is one or many. (shrink)

Aquinas puts forward two different, and conflicting, interpretations of Themistius’s account of the intellect. In his earlier interpretation of Themistius, Aquinas understands him to hold the position that both the possible and agent intellect are separate and incorruptible, existing apart from individual human souls but shared in by individual souls in the process of knowing. In De unitate intellectus contra averroistas, however, Aquinas radically departs from this reading, hailing Themistius as a genuine interpreter of the Peripatetic position, (...) while decrying Averroes’s perversion of both Themistius and Aristotle. This paper examines these competing interpretations of Themistius’s account of the intellect in his Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, focusing on two issues central to its interpretation: (1) the nature of intellect insofar as it is separate, impassive, and unmixed, and (2) whether the productive intellect is one or many. (shrink)

Julian’s Letter to Themistius is one of our most valuable sources for understanding Julian’s political thought. More specifically, it is perhaps our most valuable source for investigating the extent to which Julian’s approach to governance was or was not influenced by his philosophical commitments. Here I focus on this question and argue that, understood in its proper intellectual context, the Letter provides us with good reason for thinking that Julian’s political philosophy (and the programme that he implemented as emperor) (...) was profoundly influenced by the Platonist tradition. While Julian does distance himself both from the philosopher-king of the Republic and the lawgiver of the Laws, this should not be taken as a wholesale rejection of the possibility of an applied Platonist political philosophy. A standard Platonist doctrine by Julian’s time distinguished between not two but three levels of political reform: the divine ideal of the Republic, the second-best state of the Laws, and a third state, arising from reform. A careful reading of the Letter provides support for the idea that Julian aimed at the latter. (shrink)