This provocative study revives a classical idea about rationality by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in the philosophy of mind, ehtics, decision theory, and social choice theory.

Hurley’s is a difficult book to work through—partly because of its length and the complexity of its arguments, but also because each of the ten essays of which it is composed has a rather different starting point and focus, and because few of her arguments achieve real closure. Essay 2 discusses competing interpretations of Kant, essay 4 articulates nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness, essay 5 offers fresh interpretations of commissurotomy patients’ behavior, essay 6 develops an objection to Wittgenstein on rule (...) following, essay 8 attacks an alleged assumption of externalism, and chapter 10 explores the possibility of combining a “motor theory” and a “control theory” of perception. This is a very rich brew, and at least half the challenge this book presents consists in discerning its central argument and conclusion with enough precision to bring criticism to bear. (shrink)

S. L. Hurley; VIII*—Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 137–164, htt.

Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural (...) though unwarranted assumption of such a power may account for the intuitive appeal of the one-box response in Newcomb's Problem. (shrink)

Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies (...) these considerations to responsibility in particular. Theimpossibility of regressive choice or control is explained. It is arguedthat this impossibility does not support the claim that no one is everresponsible on either context-driven or theory-driven accounts of`responsibility'. (shrink)

What fundamental aim should be seen as animating egalitarian views of distributive justice? I want to challenge a certain answer to this question: namely, that the basic aim of egalitarianism is to neutralize the effects of luck on the distribution of goods in society. I shall also sketch part of a different answer, which I think does a better job of supporting egalitarianism.My arguments here are not presented in a way that is intended to win over those who have no (...) sympathy with egalitarianism to begin with; they move within the compass of egalitarian concern. Moreover, it is difficult, for familiar reasons, to separate the question of what the basic aim of egalitarianism is from the question of what it should be. If one aim does a better job of supporting egalitarian results than another, then, even if few egalitarians recognize this, it may be regarded as a stronger candidate for what the basic aim of egalitarianism is. As with other essentially contested concepts, a new conception does not change the subject. (shrink)

S. L. Hurley; II*—Conflict, Akrasia and Cognitivism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 23–50, https://doi.org/10.1.

S. L. Hurley; II*—Conflict, Akrasia and Cognitivism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 23–50, https://doi.org/10.1.

Perspective and reflection have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.

Justice, Luck, and Knowledge (JLK) contributes to recent developments in two areas, moral responsibility and distributive justice. Prominent luck‐neutralizing approaches to distributive justice, exemplified in work by Cohen and by Roemer, argue that justice requires equal distribution of goods for which people aren't responsible. Such views of justice haven't focused attention on responsibility itself. Meanwhile, responsibility has been illuminat‐ingly articulated in work including, and influenced by, Frankfurt's seminal essays. My book brings these separate lines of work, on justice and on (...) responsibility, into contact, examining how the new articulation of responsibility constrains the roles responsibility can play in distributive justice. Part I focuses on responsibility and its inverse correlate, luck; Part II assesses responsibility‐based approaches to justice in light of preceding arguments about responsibility. (See JLK, 4–5 on responsibility, reactive attitudes, and accountability.). (shrink)

Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

S. L. Hurley's ambitious work brings these two areas of lively debate into overdue contact with each other.

Brewer’s Perception and Reason argues, from familiar scenarios of duplicate environments and switching, that a subject’s perceptual experiences must provide reasons for her empirical beliefs. Only perceptual experience can tie reference down to a thing as opposed to its duplicate, and this tying down must be a matter of giving the subject reasons that she can recognize as such. Moreover, such reasons require conceptual contents.

S. L. Hurley; Myth Upon Myth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 253–260, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.

Why is neural activity in a particular area expressed as experience of red rather than green, or as visual experience rather than auditory? Indeed, why does it have any conscious expression at all? These familiar questions indicate the explanatory gap between neural activity and ‘what it’s like’-- qualities of conscious experience. The comparative explanatory gaps, intermodal and intramodal, can be separated from the absolute explanatory gap and associated zombie issues--why does neural activity have any conscious expression at all?. Here I (...) focus on comparative gaps: why is neural activity in a given area expressed as this type of experience rather than that type of experience? (shrink)

RÉSUMÉL'interprétation de la philosophie pratique de Donald Davidson proposée par Robert Myers représente correctement maints aspects fondamentaux de sa pensée. Myers soutient à juste titre que Davidson évite les incohérences entre la position internaliste, l'objectivité éthique et le modèle croyance-désir en modifiant des éléments centraux de ce modèle, et que l'alternative proposée par Davidson rend légitime l'extension des arguments de l'interprétation et de la triangulation dans la sphère pratique. Cependant, Myers s’égare à une bifurcation cruciale de la route interprétative. Davidson (...) suit G.E.M. Anscombe sur une voie différente, une voie qui considère les désirs individuels comme constitués en partie par des jugements évaluatifs. (shrink)

This monograph is set forth in three sections. The first presents Whitehead's "La théorie Relationniste De L'Espace" in the original French. With the exception of page numerals, this reproduction is an exact duplicate of the original printing. (See the Commentary, p.65, for references.) The second section consists of an English translation of this essay. Here the aim has been the faithful rendering of Whitehead's ideas—sometimes, perhaps, at the expense of rhetorical polish. The third section, the commentary, attempts to shed some (...) light on some of the philosophical and mathematical difficulties of the essay.My thanks are extended to Librairie Armand Colin for granting me permission to reproduce the French original. (shrink)

Robert Hurley | : Éphésiens 2 décrit l’offre de salut aux nations comme ayant été rendue possible « par le sang de Christ » et « par la croix du Christ ». La recherche actuelle tient pour acquis que le salut des nations dépend d’une troisième condition, à savoir leur incorporation dans la cité d’Israël. Une étude des lecteurs implicites et de l’auteur implicite de la lettre mène à une conclusion différente. Ce que Dieu accomplit dans le Christ a (...) été ordonné avant la fondation du monde et a préséance sur toute revendication juive au privilège découlant des « alliances de la promesse ». Dans le Christ, Dieu abolit la Loi et fonde une nouvelle communauté de justice et de vérité. Les saints d’Éphèse y rejoignent les saints d’ailleurs dans le monde pour s’opposer à l’esprit à l’oeuvre dans l’Empire romain et aux fils de la désobéissance qui sont ses fidèles soutiens et alliés. | : Ephesians 2 describes the offer of salvation to the nations as having been made possible “by the blood of Christ” and “through the cross of Christ”. In current research, a third condition for the salvation of the nations is believed to be present. Researchers have taken for granted that pagans must first be incorporated into the commonwealth of Israel before they can be saved. A study of the implied readers and implied author of the letter points to other conclusions. What God is doing in Christ was ordained before the foundations of the world and thus supersedes any Jewish claims of privilege flowing from the historical “covenants of promise”. In Christ, God abolishes the Law and founds a new commonwealth of justice and truth, in which the saints at Ephesus join the saints everywhere in their opposition to the spirit at work in the Roman Empire and its supporters. (shrink)