In this 2002 book, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti examines the most intractable problems which toleration encounters and argues that what is really at stake is not religious or moral disagreement but the unequal status of different social groups. Liberal theories of toleration fail to grasp this and consequently come up with normative solutions that are inadequate when confronted with controversial cases. Galeotti proposes, as an alternative, toleration as recognition, which addresses the problem of according equal respect to (...) groups as well as equal liberty to individuals. She offers an interpretation that is both a revision and an expansion of liberal theory, in which toleration constitutes an important component not only of a theory of justice, but also of the politics of identity. Her study will appeal to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and law. (shrink)

If political fake news is a serious concern for democratic politics, no less worrisome is scientific news with patently distorted content. Prima facie, scientific misinformation partially escapes the definition of fake news provided by empirical and philosophical analysis, mainly patterned after political disinformation. Most notably, we aim to show that people are often unaware not only of disseminating, but also of producing false or misleading information. However, by leveraging the philosophical and psychological literature, we advance some reasons for keeping scientific (...) misinformation under the same umbrella, broadening the definition of fake news in order to account for it as well. In concluding, we shall advance some ideas on how to reform scientific communication, which may help to address the issue of scientific misinformation. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a critical map of toleration as it is displayed in contemporary democracy. It does so by presenting three conceptions of toleration to which current practices of toleration can be traced, and, precisely, these are the standard notion, the political conception based on the neutrality principle, and toleration as recognition. The author argues that the latter is the appropriate conception to address the politically relevant issues of toleration arising in pluralistic democracy, while the first is adequate (...) only for social relations. In order to illustrate this argument, she presents a case of a contested and never solved request for a place of worship by the Muslims of Vercelli which represents an example of a very restricted and minimal interpretation of the standard notion, labeled ‘disrespectful tolerance’. The case is meant to show that unacceptable forms of toleration are still practised, and that the standard notion, here interpreted in the most minimal and negative way, is inappropriate for democratic politics. (shrink)

Self-deception, that is the distortion of reality against the available evidence and according to one's wishes, represents a distinctive component in the wide realm of political deception. It has received relatively little attention but is well worth examining for its explanatory and normative dimensions. In this book Anna Elisabetta Galeotti shows how self-deception can explain political occurrences where public deception intertwines with political failure - from bad decisions based on false beliefs, through the self-serving nature of those (...) beliefs, to the deception of the public as a by-product of a leader's self-deception. Her discussion uses close analysis of three well-known case studies: John F. Kennedy and the Cuba Crisis, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and George W. Bush and the weapons of mass destruction. Her book will appeal to a range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and international relations. (shrink)

In this essay, I reconstruct tolerance as a moral virtue, by critically analysing its definition, circumstances, justification and limits. I argues that, despite its paradoxical appearance, tolerance qualifies as a virtue, by means of a restriction of its proper object to differences that are chosen. Since this excludes the most important and divisive differences of contemporary pluralism from the scope of the virtue of tolerance, the moral model of toleration cannot constitute the micro-foundation of the corresponding political practice. However, if (...) the political ideal of toleration must be founded on independent political reasons of justice, the moral model can bridge the gap between private morality and public reason, providing citizens with moral motives to supplement the political obligation to neutrality. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the discussion between supporters of the intentional account of SD and supporters of the causal account. Between these two options the author argues that SD is the unintentional outcome of intentional steps taken by the agent. More precisely, she argues that SD is a complex mixture of things that we do and that happen to us; the outcome is however unintended by the subject, though it fulfils some of his practical, though short-term, goals. In (...) her account, SD is produced after a fashion similar to those beneficial social phenomena which serve some collective purpose, are the product of human action, but not of human design, such as money, language and many social conventions; and similarly SD can be accounted by invisible hand explanation. The paper will critically analyze both the intentional and the causal accounts, and then present the invisible hand explanation which avoids the most puzzling aspect of the intentional view, while keeping the distinctiveness of SD in the realm of motivated irrationality. A brief discussion of the issue of responsibility for SD will conclude the paper. (shrink)

The paper questions the view that the alleged lack of autonomy displayed by certain practices and cultural behavior may constitute a sound justification for limiting toleration of those practices. Not only is the concept of autonomy open to endless controversy, but it also entails a conflict with liberal public morality and often nurtures double standards. To this end, the paper first examines the assumptions and basis of the lack-of-autonomy approach; this analysis perforce leads the author to unravel the notion of (...) autonomy and its rival conceptions. Second, it will be argued that liberal and democratic politics, though indebted to the value of personal autonomy in a fashion, requires only a purely political principle of autonomy. It is also contended that if comprehensive notions of autonomy are used instead of a purely political conception, unacceptable consequences for the public morality of liberal democracy may follow. Finally, the point will be illustrated with some examples drawn from multicultural politics. (shrink)

This paper will provide a preliminary and indirect contribution to the debate between multiculturalism and interculturalism by focusing on a dimension of diversity which is usually overlooked and calls for specific interventions and social engagement. Instead of considering diversity from the point of view of doctrinal incompatibility, this paper suggests to start from the frictions in daily interactions between the society’s majority and minority groups. In this case, at stake there are conventions and social norms that are instruments of social (...) cooperation rather than conceptions of the good or comprehensive doctrines. The merging of social norms and the redesigning of social cooperation is complicated and insidious in its own way. The analysis will first illustrate what social standards are, and explain why they are so crucial in social interactions, and, second, will connect social standards with a specific virtue, civility. Civility, will be argued, is put under stress by the upsetting of social standards by newcomers. Finally, various solutions to the conflicts produced by the encounter of different social standards will be considered both on the institutional side and on the social relations side. (shrink)

Traditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing (...) how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence. (shrink)

The author outlines a conception of toleration as recognition of differences which she argues to be more adequate than current liberal views in order to face issues arising from contemporary pluralism. The liberal conception of toleration as freedom from government's interference in certain areas is appropriate if pluralism is conceived of as a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good. By contrast, if pluralism is understood as the plurality of groups and cultures, asymmetrically situated in democratic society, then the issues (...) underlying toleration are seen as the contested claim of minorities for asserting their different identity in the public space. Public toleration of differences is thus viewed as a symbolic public gesture of inclusion of the different identities and their bearers into democratic citizenship on an equal footing as members of minority groups. The argument supporting public toleration is so founded on reason of justice. (shrink)

In this article the author intends to provide general normative guidelines which ought to inform policies concerning the most controversial multicultural claims for a liberal democracy. In order to do that, she proposes a general reconsideration of the struggle of cultures and identities which makes up the stuff of multiculturalism. She suggests that instead of focusing on the issue of compatibility, the adequate viewpoint from which considering multicultural claims should be justice and, within justice, the principle of equal respect (ER). (...) The reference to ER is widespread in the literature on multiculturalism, but it does not specify what should be the object of ER: persons and their dignity, or cultures/religions/identities and their members? The alternative is then examined and the author argues in favour of an interpretation of ER for persons which considers persons as they are, given their identities and differences. Finally, the author provides a typology of multicultural claims, ranked on a scale of different levels of disrespect, which consequently require different kinds of response. As a result, one is invited to reflect on the how beside the what, on the procedures and attitudes beside the benefits and measures, and not only for the pragmatic reasons of finding a relatively easy way out, but also for principled reasons of justice. (shrink)

The chapters in this book deal with different, though related, topics concerning the tense relationship between democracy and diversity. On the one hand, social diversity represents an opportunity, widening the horizon of social options and perspectives of innovation, but, on the other hand, it creates problems for the social cohesion and peaceful coexistence of many groups, be they majority or minority. The chapters depart from the intrinsic connection between democracy and diversity – and the unavoidable challenges that pluralism poses to (...) decision-making procedures – investigating, from different perspectives, how the normative requirement of fully respecting agents’ reflexive agency impacts the revision of democratic decision-making procedures and the way in which institutions react to citizens’ justice-based claims. (shrink)

Rainer Forst's Toleration in Conflict is a significant contribution to the important topic of toleration. Its critical survey of various arguments for and around toleration is thorough and rigorous. However, although Forst's argument for the respect concept of toleration is persuasive, the claim that this is a tolerant theory of toleration located at a higher level than other arguments is perhaps less so.

In this paper the authors deal with the story of Saman Abbas, an 18-year-old girl of Pakistani origin, who disappeared in Italy and was killed by her family after she refused an arranged marriage. The case raised a public debate between right-wing parties, who accused the left-wing parties of being culpably blind to the danger of Islam and too tolerant towards illiberal cultures, and left-wing politicians who responded equating Saman’s murder with the domestic killing of Italian women. We argue that (...) neither position does justice to Saman’s story. We hold that Saman’s case is an example of intersectional oppression where gender oppression is intertwined with the immigrant’s oppression in a Western democracy. Thus, we counter the dilemma posed by Susan Okin, namely that there is an inherent conflict between the rights of minority cultures and the rights of women. In order to rebut Okin’s position, we rehearse multicultural positions concerning the protection of minority cultures, on the one side, and feminist positions regarding the promotion of autonomous choice, on the other. Our conclusion is that (a) multiculturalism cannot be identified with cultural rights, and (b) that what are autonomous choices and what are, instead, adaptive is difficult to ascertain and, especially, difficult to apply in politics. Structural oppression is instead the key normative notion for addressing equality among genders and among citizens at large. The intersectional oppression suffered by women like Saman cannot be addressed by a restriction of toleration for immigrant cultures or simply by security measures. To prevent more cases like Saman’s in the future, the immigrant oppression should be taken seriously as well. In the context of fairer terms of inclusion, conditions of reciprocal trust between minority and majority may develop and the deconstruction of the patriarchal view of family can start. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the two types of self-deception, usually labeled straight and twisted self-deception. In straight cases the self-deceptive belief coincides with the subject’s desire. In twisted cases, by contrast, the self-deceptive belief opposes the subject’s desire as in the example of Othello’s conviction of Desdemona’s infidelity. Are both these contrasting types of deceptive beliefs cases of SD? The argument of this paper shall answer this question in the positive, yet in different way from the unitary explanation of straight and (...) twisted SD proposed by Alfred Mele. The causal account of SD claims to provide a unitary and simple explanation for both straight and twisted SD, and considers such a unitary explanation as a specific virtue of the causal view. Within the same causal model, the difference between straight and twisted self-deception is explained by a difference in the motivational state that in twisted cases is dominated by emotions. The paper will critically examine this claim, and advance an alternative explanation based on a different view of self-deception where emotions play a role alongside wishes both in straight and in twisted case. (shrink)

Humans are social animals that rely on different ways to interact with each other. The COVID-19 pandemic strongly changed our communication strategies. Because of the importance of direct contact for our species, we predict that immediately after the forced social isolation, people were more prone to engage in direct rather than in virtual interactions, thus showing a lower mimicry response in the use of smartphones. In a non-longitudinal study, we collected behavioral data under naturalistic contexts and directly compared the data (...) of the mimicry response gathered immediately following the Italian lockdown (May–September 2020) with those gathered one year later (May–October 2021). Contrary to our expectations, the mimicry response in the use of smartphones was higher immediately after the lockdown than a year later. Probably the large use of these devices during the lockdown translated into a greater sensitivity to be affected by others’ smartphone manipulation. Indeed, social isolation modified, at least in the short term, the ways we interact with others by making us more prone to engage in “virtual” social interactions. The bright side of the coin unveiled by our findings is that the effect seems to diminish over time. The large behavioral dataset analyzed here (1,608 events; 248 people) also revealed that the mimicry response in the use of smartphones was higher between familiar subjects than between strangers. In this view, mimicry in manipulating smartphones can be considered an example of joint action that fosters behavioral synchrony between individuals that, in the long-term, can translate into the formation of social bonding. (shrink)

ICTs, personal data, digital rights, the GDPR, data privacy, online security… these terms, and the concepts behind them, are increasingly common in our lives. Some of us may be familiar with them, but others are less aware of the growing role of ICTs and data in our lives - and the potential risks this creates. These risks are even more pronounced for vulnerable groups in society. People can be vulnerable in different, often overlapping, ways, which place them at a disadvantage (...) to the majority of citizens; Table 3 in this guide presents some of the many forms and causes of vulnerability. As a result, vulnerable people need greater support to navigate the digital world, and to ensure that they are able to exercise their rights. This guide explains where such support can be found, and also answers the following questions: - What are the main ethical and legal issues around ICTs for vulnerable citizens? - Who is vulnerable in Europe? - How do issues around ICTs affect vulnerable people in particular? This guide is a resource for members of vulnerable groups, people who work with vulnerable groups, and citizens more broadly. It is also useful for data controllers1 who collect data about vulnerable citizens. While focused on citizens in Europe, it may be of interest to people in other parts of the world. It forms part of the Citizens’ Information Pack produced by the PANELFIT project, and is available in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. You are welcome to translate this guide into other languages. Please send us a link to online versions in other languages, so that we can add them to the project website. (shrink)

Recent studies reported the development of psychological distress symptoms in patients who recovered from COVID-19. However, evidence is still scarce and new data are needed to define the exact risk and protective factors that can explain the variability in symptoms manifestation. In this study, we enrolled 257 patients who recovered from COVID-19 and we evaluated the levels of psychological distress through the Symptoms Checklist-90-R scale. Data concerning illness-related variables were collected from medical records, while the presence of subjective cognitive difficulties, (...) both before and after the illness, as well as the level of the cognitive reserve, were assessed over a clinical interview. Results revealed that being female and reporting the presence of subjective cognitive difficulties after COVID-19 were associated with higher levels of psychological distress. At the same time, being admitted to the hospital and having a high CR were protective factors. Adding new information to this emerging research field, our results highlight the importance of a complete psychological and cognitive assessment in patients with COVID-19. (shrink)