L’auteur part de la distinction générale entre les droits de l’homme, les droits fondamentaux et les droits civiques. Etant donné que cette séparation terminologique n’est pas appliquée dans les traités européens, il note qu’une différenciation stricte entre les droits de l’homme, les droits fondamentaux et les droits civiques n’est pas indispensable, ni cohérente. C’est pourquoi il se tourne vers les valeurs communes en analysant et en évaluant la normalisation législative des droits de l’homme dans l’Union européenne : le Traité sur (...) l’Union européenne, la Charte des droits fondamentaux, ainsi que d’autres prescriptions et pratiques des institutions européennes. La paix, qui est le principal objectif de l’unification européenne, peut se maintenir surtout grâce à la liberté et le respect des droits fondamentaux et des droits de l’homme. Le pilier le plus important de la construction d’une identité européenne commune est la prise de conscience des valeurs européennes communes, des droits fondamentaux et des droits de l’homme qui marquent l’espace culturel européen de manière spécifique et qui constituent l’âme de l’Europe. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 188-193.

This book explores both the possibilities and limits of arguments from human nature in the context of human rights. Can the concept of human nature provide a basis for understanding fundamental rights? Is it plausible to justify the claim to universal validity of human rights by reference to human nature? Or does the idea of human rights in its modern, post-1945 manifestation go, in essence, beyond human nature? The essays in this volume introduce naturalistic positions and their concomitant critiques. They (...) address the role that human nature both actually does and potentially may play in forming a foundation for and acting as an exemplification of fundamental rights. Beyond that, they give attention to the challenges caused by Life Sciences. Human nature itself is subject to transformation and transgression in an unprecedented manner. The essays reflect on issues such as reproduction, species manipulation, corporeal autonomy and enhancement. Contributors are jurists, philosophers and political scientists from Germany, Switzerland, Turkey, Poland and Japan. (shrink)

While companies are increasingly convinced of the relevance of CSR, many are still struggling to define their responsibility. Part of the answer to this question can be found in the dual approach towards CSR. The authors unravel the concept of CSR into two components: responsibility and responsiveness. Regarding the firm's responsiveness towards society, companies can adopt two positions. They might adopt an inside‐out approach towards CSR and emphasise their own ambitions. Alternatively, they can approach stakeholders from an outside‐in perspective, wherein (...) stakeholder claims dominate. The authors argue that both perspectives are inadequate with regard to complex societal issues. Therefore, a third approach towards societal interaction is proposed. This is characterised by a process of collective sensemaking, aimed at understanding the issue and defining responsibilities. (shrink)

While companies are increasingly convinced of the relevance of CSR, many are still struggling to define their responsibility. Part of the answer to this question can be found in the dual approach towards CSR. The authors unravel the concept of CSR into two components: responsibility and responsiveness. Regarding the firm's responsiveness towards society, companies can adopt two positions. They might adopt an inside‐out approach towards CSR and emphasise their own ambitions. Alternatively, they can approach stakeholders from an outside‐in perspective, wherein (...) stakeholder claims dominate. The authors argue that both perspectives are inadequate with regard to complex societal issues. Therefore, a third approach towards societal interaction is proposed. This is characterised by a process of collective sensemaking, aimed at understanding the issue and defining responsibilities. (shrink)

Multi-stakeholder initiatives have been praised as vehicles for tackling complex sustainability issues, but their success relies on the reconciliation of stakeholders’ divergent perspectives. We yet lack a thorough understanding of the micro-level mechanisms by which stakeholders can deal with these differences. To develop such understanding, we examine what frames—i.e., mental schemata for making sense of the world—members of MSIs use during their discussions on sustainability questions and how these frames are deliberated through social interactions. Whilst prior framing research has focussed (...) on between-frame conflicts, we offer a different perspective by examining how and under what conditions actors use shared frames to tackle ‘within-frame conflicts’ on views that stand in the way of joint decisions. Observations of a deliberative environmental valuation workshop and interviews in an MSI on the protection of peatlands—ecosystems that contribute to carbon retention on a global scale—demonstrated how the application and deliberation of shared frames during micro-level interactions resulted in increased salience, elaboration, and adjustment of shared frames. We interpret our findings to identify characteristics of deliberation mechanisms in the case of within-frame conflicts where shared frames dominate the discussions, and to delineate conditions for such dominance. Our findings contribute to an understanding of collaborations in MSIs and other organisational settings by demonstrating the utility of shared frames for dealing with conflicting views and suggesting how shared frames can be activated, fostered and strengthened. (shrink)

Bu makalede Spinoza’nın dil eleştirisinin ve çözümlemesinin tartışılması amaçlanmaktadır. Bilindiği gibi, Spinoza, İbranice hakkında yarım kalmış bir dilbilgisi kitabı kaleme almış olsa da, bugün dil felsefesi diye adlandırılan alanda bir yapıt vermiş değildir. Bununla birlikte, dil konusunun, anlama yetisinin düzeltilmesinin önemli ayaklarından biri olması ölçüsünde, Spinoza açısından, felsefi uslamlama için bir propedötik işlevi gördüğü söylenebilir. Hatta Spinoza’ya göre, kendisinden önce gelen bazı filozofların doğanın ortak düzenini ve zorunlu nedenselliğini kavrayamamış olmasının nedeni, tam da fikirlerin ve şeylerin bağlantı ve düzenlerini izlemek (...) yerine, doğayı açıklamak için dilsel kategorilere başvurmalarıdır. İşte bu yüzden, felsefenin ilk adımlarından biri dilin bedensel-imgelemsel doğasının aydınlatılması olmalıdır. Böylelikle dilin felsefi amaçlar doğrultusunda, yani upuygun fikirlerin iletilmesi için kullanmasına zemin hazırlanacaktır. Bu yazıda, Spinoza’nın geliştirdiği dil kuramının, dil olgusunun psikolojik-bilişsel açıdan çözümlemesi kadar, kendine-gönderimli kavramsal bir dilin geometrik düzende kurulmasını da içerdiği ileri sürülecektir. (shrink)

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

After explaining the well-known two-envelope paradox by indicating the fallacy involved, we consider the two-envelope problem of evaluating the factual information provided to us in the form of the value contained by the envelope chosen first. We try to provide a synthesis of contributions from economy, psychology, logic, probability theory (in the form of Bayesian statistics), mathematical statistics (in the form of a decision-theoretic approach) and game theory. We conclude that the two-envelope problem does not allow a satisfactory solution. An (...) interpretation is made for statistical science at large. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

This article proposes a method for philological provenance research that allows us to examine the transfer of »oral literatures« from colonised areas to Europe. This transfer has received little scholarly attention but is present in contemporary postcolonial narratives. It was substantial not only in consolidating the poetics of the historical avant-gardes and informing literary and linguistic theory, but also in sustaining a market for gift-books still flourishing today. To disrupt these exclusively Western cycles of exploitation, we propose to return the (...) authority of interpretation as a possibility of restitution. (shrink)

Der Verfasser geht von der allgemeinen Unterscheidung zwischen Menschenrechten, Grundrechten und Bürgerrechten aus. Da diese Trennung terminologisch in den relevanten Europäischen Verträgen nicht vorgenommen wird, bemerkt er, dass eine strenge Trennung zwischen Menschen-, Grund- und Bürgerrechten nicht unbedingt notwendig und mitunter auch nicht sinnvoll ist. Daher orientiert er sich an den wichtigsten gemeinsamen Werten bei der gründlichen Analyse und Bewertung der gesetzlichen Normierung der Menschenrechte in der Europäischen Union: im Unionsvertrag, in der Charta der Grundrechte, in anderen Akten sowie in (...) der Praxis der europäischen Institutionen. Der Friede als Grundziel der europäischen Einigung kann vor allem durch die Freiheit und die Beachtung der Grundund Menschenrechte stabilisiert werden. Die wichtigste Grundlage für die Bildung einer gemeinsamen europäischen Identität ist das Sichbesinnen auf die gemeinsamen europäischen Werte und auf die Grund- und Menschenrechte, die den europäischen Kulturraum so besonders prägen und Europa eine Seele geben. (shrink)

The author starts with general differentiation between human, fundamental and civil rights. Considering that such distinction in terms isn’t supported in European conventions, he remarks that strict distinction between human, fundamental and civil rights isn’t unconditionally obligatory, and therefore meaningful. That’s why he focuses on common values through his thorough analysis and evaluation of legal standardization of human rights in the European Union: The treaty on European Union, Charter of fundamental rights, other documents and practises of European institutions. Peace, being (...) the basic aim of European unification, can remain stabile through ,,in the first line”, freedom and respect of fundamental and human rights. The most important foundation for developing common European identity is awareness of common European values and fundamental and human rights, which mark the European cultural space in a particular way and provide Europe with the spirit. (shrink)

Autor polazi od općeg razlikovanje između ljudskih, temeljnih i građanskih prava. Budući da takvo terminološko odvajanje nije provedeno u europskim ugovorima, primjećuje kako strogo razlučivanje između ljudskih, temeljnih i građanskih prava nije bezuvjetno nužno, a time ni smisleno. Stoga se orijentira na zajedničke vrednote pri temeljitoj analizi i vrednovanju zakonskoga normiranja ljudskih prava u Europskoj Uniji: Ugovora o Europskoj Uniji, Povelje o temeljnim pravima, drugih propisa i prakse europskih institucija. Mir kao osnovni cilj europskoga ujedinjenja može se stabilizirati prije svega (...) pomoću slobode i poštivanja temeljnih i ljudskih prava. Najvažnija je osnova za izgradnju zajedničkoga europskog identiteta osvješćivanje zajedničkih europskih vrednota te temeljnih i ljudskih prava koja europski kulturni prostor obilježuju na poseban način, a Europi daju dušu. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

The embodied approach of human cognition suggests that concepts are deeply dependent upon and constrained by an agent's physical body's characteristics, such as performed body movements. In this study, we attempted to broaden previous research on emotional priming, investigating the interaction of emotions and visual exploration. We used the joystick-based approach-avoidance task to influence the emotional states of participants, and subsequently, we presented pictures of news web pages on a computer screen and measured participant's eye movements. As a result, the (...) number of fixations on images increased, the total dwell time increased, and the average saccade length from outside of the images toward the images decreased after the bodily congruent priming phase. The combination of these effects suggests increased attention to web pages' image content after the participants performed bodily congruent actions in the priming phase. Thus, congruent bodily interaction with images in the priming phase fosters visual interaction in the subsequent exploration phase. (shrink)

Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very (...) little evidence for moral integrity—motivation to actually be moral. The lack of truly moral motivation may, in turn, be linked to a lack of truly moral emotion, at least in response to violation of certain moral standards. (shrink)

forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (ed.s), The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press. Presents a concept-grounding account of modal knowledge.

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

Philosophers of biology typically pose questions about individuation by asking “what is an individual?” For example, we ask, “what is an individual species”, “what is an individual organism”, and “what is an individual gene?” In the first part of this chapter, I present my account of the gene concept and how it is used in investigative practices in order to motivate a more pragmatic approach. Instead of asking “what is a gene?”, I ask: “how do biologists individuate genes?”, “for what (...) purposes?”, and “do their practices of individuating genes serve these purposes?" In the second part of this chapter, I propose that we use this approach when analyzing concepts of organisms and biological individuals. Following philosophical pragmatism, I argue that we should abstain from attempts to situate individuation of Darwinian individuals or of holobionts in a philosophy of nature. Instead, we should analyze practices of individuating organisms in terms of three-place relations between the world, ideas, and human purposes and actions. I conclude with three lessons: an ontological, an epistemological, and a meta-philosophical lesson, which I suggest, apply to philosophy of science generally and to philosophy and metaphysics at large. (shrink)

In this critique, Martha Nussbaum argues that our dominant theories of development have given us policies that ignore our most basic human needs for dignity and self-respect.