In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)

It has been maintained, by both philosophers and modern scientists, that the two domains of discourse of science and of philosophy are disjoint Though admitting that many physicists subscribed to metaphysical principles, it was claimed - by Duhem and Reichenbach among others - that the scientist's philosophical convictions play, or should play, no role in his scientific work. The present paper attempts to refute this separatist view by showing that Einstein's metaphysical realism - coupled with his Platonistic panmathematicism - played (...) a crucial role in his construction of the Relativity Programme and in his criticism of Quantum Mechanics. The article also shows that although Einstein was neither a strict Humean nor a strict Machian, his phenomenalist interpretation of the empirical basis proved to be an antidote against both conventionalist scepticism and Neurath's coherence theory of truth. /// Tanto filósofos como cientistas têm defendido a ideia de que os domínios discursivos da Ciência e da Filosofia seguem caminhos separados. Mesmo admitindo que muitos cientistas subscreveram princípios metafísicos, a ideia tem sido defendida - por Duhem e Reichenbach, entre outros - de que as convicções filosóficas do cientista não desempenham, ou deveriam não desempenhar, qualquer papel no seu trabalho científico. O objectivo do presente artigo é refutar esta visão separatista das coisas mostrando de que modo o realismo metafísico de Einstein - associado ao seu panmatematicismo platónico - desempenhou um papel crucial na sua construção do Programa da Relatividade e nas suas críticas à Mecânica Quântica. O artigo mostra igualmente que embora Einstein não fosse nem um Humeano estrito nem um estrito Macheano, a sua interpretação fenomenalista da base empírica demonstrou ser um antídoto quer contra o cepticismo convencionalista quer contra a teoria da coerência da verdade de Neurath. (shrink)

Structural Realism (SSR), as embodied in the Ramsey-sentence H of a theory H, is defended against the view that H reduces to a trivial statement about the cardinally of the domain of H, a view which arises from ignoring the central role of observation within science. Putnam's theses are examined and shown to support rather than undermine SSR. Finally: in view of its synthetic character, applied mathematics must enter into the formulation of H and hence to be shown axiomatisable; this (...) is done in the Appendix, which is the most important part of the paper. (shrink)

It has been maintained, by bothphilosophers and modern scjentists, that the twa domains of discourse of science and of philosophy are disjoint. Though admitting that many physicists subscribed to metaphysical principies, it was claimed - by Duhem and Reichenbach among others - that the scientist's philosophical convictions play, or shouldplay, no role in his scientiflc work. The presentpaper attempts lo refute this separatist view by showing that Einstein 's metaphysical realism - caupied with his Platonistic panmathematicism - played a crucial (...) role in his construction of the Relativity Programme and in his criticism of Quantum Mechanics (EPRparadox). The article also shows that although Einstein was neither a strict Humean nor a strict Machian, his phenomenalist interpretation of the empirical basis proved ta be an antidote against bath conventianalist scepticism and Neurath's coherence theory of (scientific) truth. (shrink)

In this paper I try to explain why Lakatos’s conventionalist view must be replaced by a phenomenological conception of the empirical basis; for only in this way can one make sense of the theses that the hard core of an RP can be shielded against refutations; that this metaphysical hard core can be turned into a set of guidelines or, alternatively, into a set of heuristic metaprinciples governing the development of an RP; and that a distinction can legitimately be made (...) between novel predictions and facts to which a theory might have been adjusted post hoc. Two basic metaprinciples are finally examined: the Correspondence Principle and various symmetry requirements; both of these heuristic devices illustrate the fundamental role which, according to Lakatos, mathematics plays in the progress of empirical science. (shrink)

Despite the periodic table having been discovered by chemists half a century before the discovery of electronic structure, modern designs are invariably based on physicists’ definition of periods. This table is a chemists’ table, reverting to the phenomenal periods that led to the table’s discovery. In doing so, the position of hydrogen is clarified.

The ideas of R. G. Nazirov on the fact that relationship of F. M. Dostoevsky with his contemporary writers and thinkers was ‘silent collaboration‘ are elaborated in the article. It is shown that the attitude of Dostoevsky brothers’ journal ‘Vremya‘ to Tolstoy’s educational activity and creative work in the beginning of the 1860’s is the example of such ‘silent collaboration‘. The first comprehensive analysis of any and all references to Tolstoy presented in the journal ‘Vremya‘ was carried out: A. U. (...) Poretskiy’s note on the journal ‘Yasnaya Polyana‘, special anonymous article about Tolstoy’s journal, ‘Zhurnal’naya zametka‘ by Dostoevsky, articles by I. G. Dolgomest’ev ‘Nekotorye pedagogicheskie i nauchnye tendentsii‘ and ‘Skazanie o ’Durakovoi pleshi‘’, a series of articles by A. A. Crigoriev about Tolstoy’s stories and the article by Ya. P. Polonsky about ‘Kazaki‘. It is proved that Tolstoy, first of all, attracted Dostoevsky as a talented and indigenous educator, while his creative work was considered rather ambiguous within the journal. The current research is based on the set of literary methods including biographical, comparative, historico-literary, and intertextual. (shrink)

This article, in the example of the subject of shukr (gratitude), proposes a ‘perspective’ for the instructor who determines the processes of bringing a subject into the learning environment. This perspective is related to the encounter with the knowledge of the subject to be taught. It points to the approach of the instructor to the information he/she will refer to about the subject he/she will teach while preparing in the mental plan. The content of the subject, the objectives, the methods, (...) techniques, and resources to be used to present the subject, and how the output will be measured and evaluated are largely determined by this perspective. In a way, the proposed perspective involves monitoring the change and transformation of life and the contextualization of religious knowledge by paying attention to the methodological functioning. Thus, the way the subject of gratitude presented in the Qur’an and hadith narrations aims to provide the teacher with a ‘perspective’ on what kind of content to prepare. This is a suggestion for the instructor to reveal that while managing the process of religiously understanding/interpreting life as it flows by, the instructor should not ignore the ways in which knowledge appears in the Qur’an and hadith narrations. For example, the first meaning of the word shukr (gratitude) in the Qur’an is “faith in Allah.” However, traditionally, shukr (gratitude) is not taught within the subject area of faith. In this context, the article follows the suggestion that referring to the method and source of the knowledge to be taught can provide the instructor with a holistic and in-depth ‘perspective.’. (shrink)