The biblical injunction to love one's neighbour has long been regarded as a central pillar of morality. It is taken to be an ideal which gives direction to our moral aspirations, even though most of us find it difficult to live up to, owing to our selfish natures. But the difficulties I wish to raise are of a logical kind, as distinct from those depending on personal character. They fall under three headings: the first concerns the scope of ‘my neighbour’, (...) the second the injunction to love, and the third the idea of loving oneself. The first will probably be the most familiar. (shrink)

What is philosophy about and what are its methods? _Philosophy and Ordinary Language_ is a defence of the view that philosophy is largely about questions of language, which to a large extent means _ordinary_ language. Some people argue that if philosophy is about ordinary language, then it is necessarily less deep and difficult than it is usually taken to be but Oswald Hanfling shows us that this isn't true. Hanfling, a leading expert in the development of analytic philosophy, (...) covers a wide range of topics, including scepticism and the definition of knowledge, free will, empiricism, folk psychology, ordinary versus artificial logic, and philosophy versus science. Drawing on philosophers such as Austin, Wittgenstein, and Quine, this book explores the nature of ordinary language in philosophy. (shrink)

Public health emergencies invariably entail difficult decisions among medical and emergency first responders about how to allocate essential, scarce resources. To the extent that these critical choices can profoundly impact community and individual health outcomes, achieving consistency in how these decisions are executed is valuable. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, however, public and private sector allocation plans and decisions have followed uncertain paths. Lacking empirical evidence and national input, various entities and actors have proffered multifarious approaches on (...) how best to allocate scarce resources to protect the public's health. Though beneficial in some jurisdictions, these approaches fail to clarify how the type and amount of care delivered in major emergencies might be curtailed. This is due, in part, to a lack of meaningful guidance on shifting standards of care in major emergencies. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's later writings generate a great deal of controversy and debate, as do the implications of his ideas for such topics as consciousness, knowledge, language and the arts. Oswald Hanfling addresses a widespeard tendency to ascribe to Wittgenstein views that go beyond those he actually held. Separate chapters deal with important topics such as the private language argument, rule-following, the problem of other minds, and the ascription of scepticism to Wittgenstein. Describing Wittgenstein as a 'humanist' thinker, he contrasts his (...) views on language, art humanity and philosophy itself with those of scientifically minded philosophers. He argues that 'the human form of life' calls for a kind of understanding that cfannot be achieved by the methods of emirical science; that consiousness, for example, cannot properly be regarded as a property of the bran; and that the resulting 'problem of consoiusness is an illusion. Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life is essential reading for anyone interested in Wittgenstein's approach to what it means to be human. It will be invaluable to all Wittgenstein scholars, and all who are interested in the philosophy of mind, language and aesthetics. (shrink)

The question I set myself in ‘Loving my neighbour, loving myself’ was whether the injunction to love one's neighbour as oneself makes sense. I said explicitly that I was concerned with ‘love’ in the modern English sense and not with ancient words whose meaning might differ from that of the modern word. Nevertheless two critics think my argument fails because I do not consider other meanings of ‘love’ that have been or might be invoked in understanding the injunction. According to (...) them, the injunction is not, or was not, meant in the ordinary modern sense of ‘love’, and they quote various authorities to this effect. (shrink)

The following beliefs can be ascribed to Hume on the basis of his writings: There is no more to our idea of cause and effect than constant conjunction and a resulting habit of mind. There is more to it than that, namely the interaction of bodies. Behind the constant conjunctions, including the interactions of bodies, there are ‘secret’ causes, not knowable by man. The principle of causality is true. Our belief in the principle arises from experience. There is no justification (...) for believing in the principle. It is obvious that there are inconsistencies between these beliefs. is contradicted by and , and appears to contradict . and are consistent, but cannot be asserted consistently together with . There is apparently a contradiction between and , although the question arises whether ‘arising from experience’ is to be regarded as a justification. In the next section I shall offer support for ascribing these beliefs to Hume and in sections III-V I shall try to say why Hume wanted to hold all of them in one way or another and how they fit together in the context of his philosophy. What I shall say will I be broadly in line with Passmore's views about the diversity of Hume's intentions and Kemp Smith's thesis about Hume's primary interest in ethics. (shrink)

Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which we have tangled up in an absurd way; but to do that, it must make movements which are just as complicated as the knots. 1 A claim to know can be contradicted in various ways. Which of them does the sceptic have in mind when he denies that we can know—for example, that the sun will rise tomorrow? Does he mean, perhaps, that the proposition is false—that the sun will not rise tomorrow? (...) The sceptic is in no position to make such a claim. Does he mean that no one can feel certain of the proposition? No; the fact that people feel certain of it is not in dispute. The sceptic's argument is essentially about justification. He claims that we do not have the right to feel certain, nor, therefore, to claim to know. But how can he arrive at this conclusion? (shrink)

In his article ‘Healthy Scepticism’, James Franklin gives an admirable survey of thirteen kinds of attempts to refute what he calls ‘symmetry arguments for scepticism’, finding all of them inadequate. The symmetry argument that he proposes to test is given as follows: Firstly, it is possible that what we perceive is entirely an illusion created by a deceitful demon. Second, there is no reason to prefer the realist hypothesis to this one.

The view that ‘ought’ cannot be deduced from ‘is’, credited to Hume as a major insight into the nature of morality, is surprisingly easy to refute. What they are doing is evil. Therefore, they ought not to do it. Here we have a case of deducing ‘ought’ from ‘is’. The conclusion follows, because ‘ought not’ is analytic to ‘evil’. ‘Ah, but that's just what is wrong with the example: the premise is not a pure “is”; it contains an “ought”, though (...) this does not appear explicitly.’ This is true, of course; the inference would not be valid otherwise. Still, the example shows that the is/ought principle will not do as it stands. (shrink)

This book is a compact, accessible treatment of the main ideas advanced by the positivists, including Schlick, Carnap, Ayer, and the early Wittgenstein. Oswald Hanfling discusses such ideas as the 'verification principle' ('the meaning of this statement is the method of its verification') and the 'elimination of metaphysics, ' an attempt to show that metaphysical statements, for example about God, are unverifiable and therefore meaningless.

The book exposes common misunderstandings about Wittgenstein, and examines in detail the celebrated 'private language' argument.

This volume contains surveys of the main issues in philosophical aesthetics, as discussed by thinkers from ancient Greece to modern times.

Asked about Wittgenstein's contribution to aesthetics, one might think first of all of his discussion of ‘family resemblance’ concepts, in which he argued that the various instances of games, for example, need not have any feature or set of features in common, in virtue of which they are all called games; the concept of a game can function perfectly well without any such set of conditions. This insight was soon applied to the much debated quest for a definition of the (...) word ‘art’, and it was claimed that here too the various instances of art were related by way of family resemblance, so that it was futile to look for a condition or set of conditions, which works of art, and only works of art, had in common. Wittgenstein himself did not extend his argument to the concept of art. Although he was deeply interested in the arts, especially music, he wrote very little on aesthetics, his most sustained treatment of the topic being available for us only in the form of notes taken of a set of his lectures on aesthetics. (shrink)

Life and Meaning surveys a variety of Philosophical answers to the question, 'What makes life worth living?' By collecting readings from a wide range of philosophical history it gives the various perspectives on the value and meaning of life. Aspects of life which appear to make it meaningless 9death, suffering, randomness) are seen in the light of their long and varied history in philosophical literature and are subjected to careful scrutiny. The texts chosen here pose these and related issues and (...) offer various responses. By careful selection and helpful editorial introduction Life and Meaning gives essential texts which provide the background to contemporary enquiries. Is self-realization a coherent ideal? Does it mean being true to our original nature (Rousseau) or to our potential as 'rational animals' (Aristotle)? Should we live according to our desires and in pursuit of happiness (Mill)? Should we appeal to a nature or 'essence' be rejected as bad faith? (shrink)

Oswald Hanfling; II*—What is Wrong with the Paradigm Case Argument?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 21–38, http.

"Why should we care about having true beliefs? And why do demonstrably false beliefs persist and spread despite consequences for the people who hold them? Philosophers of science Cailin O’Connor and James Weatherall argue that social factors, rather than individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the spread and persistence of false belief. It might seem that there’s an obvious reason that true beliefs matter: false beliefs will hurt you. But if that’s right, then why is it irrelevant to many (...) people whether they believe true things or not? In an age riven by "fake news," "alternative facts," and disputes over the validity of everything from climate change to the size of inauguration crowds, the authors argue that social factors, not individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the persistence of false belief and that we must know how those social forces work in order to fight misinformation effectively."–Publisher’s description. (shrink)