In response to recent debates on the need to abandon the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) to facilitate vital-organ transplantation, I claim that, through a detailed philosophical analysis of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the DDR, some acts that seem to violate DDR in fact do not, thus DDR can be upheld. The paper consists of two parts. First, standard apparatuses of the philosophy of language, such as sense, referent, truth condition, and definite description are employed to show (...) that there exists an internally consistent and coherent interpretation of UDDA which resolves the Reduction Problem and the Ambiguity Problem that allegedly threaten the UDDA framework, and as a corollary, the practice of Donation after the Circulatory Determination of Death (DCDD) does not violate DDR. Second, an interpretation of the DDR, termed ‘No Hastening Death Rule’ (NHDR), is formulated so that, given that autonomy and non-maleficence principles are observed, the waiting time for organ procurement can be further shortened without DDR being violated. (shrink)

The truth table method, natural deduction, and the truth tree method, the three validity proving methods standardly taught in an introductory logic course, are too clumsy for the battlefield of real-life. The “short truth table” test is handy at times, but it stumbles at many other times. In this paper, we set up a general method that can beat all the methods mentioned above in a contest of speed. Furthermore, the procedure can be step-by-step paraphrased in a natural language, so (...) that, unlike the other methods, a real-life logical problem can be analyzed and explained in a real-life language too. (shrink)

A Leibnizian semantics proposed by Becker in 1952 for the modal operators has recently been reviewed in Copeland’s paper The Genesis of Possible World Semantics (Copeland in J Philos Logic 31:99–137, 2002 ), with a remark that “neither the binary relation nor the idea of proving completeness was present in Becker’s work”. In light of Frege’s celebrated Sense-Determines-Reference principle, we find, however, that it is Becker’s semantics, rather than Kripke’s semantics, that has captured the true spirit of Frege’s semantic program. (...) Furthermore, for Kripke’s possible world semantics to fit in Frege’s framework of senses , worlds and referents , it will have to be thoroughly reformulated. By introducing the notion of a hi-world into the picture, we manage to keep the key ingredients of Becker’s semantics intact, while at the same time solve a fatal problem that used to shadow Becker’s original semantics—it had not been able to make sense of inhomogeneous modality. The resulting generalized Beckerian semantics provides, in effect, a Beckerian analysis of the Kripkean possible worlds. It reveals the subtle hierarchical internal structure of a Kripkean world that has not been discovered before. (shrink)

It is commonly held that killing is morally wrong and that the killers need to be punished, and in marginal cases where killing seems justifiable, we are advised to resort to the ethics of killing for general guidance. It is also commonly held that the notion of killing per se is accountable in terms of ‘causing death’, which is a metaphysical (or even physical) issue, having nothing to do with ethics. However, this dichotomy – between the ethics of killing and (...) the metaphysic of killing – is questionable and we claim that the notion of killing itself presumes a social norm, which generally involves ethical considerations. This explains why there has been much debate concerning the distinction between killing and letting die. According to the account of killing that shall be proposed in this article, the distinction is based on a social norm rather than a metaphysical reality. Likewise, there is no metaphysical ground for an active-killing/passive-killing distinction. With the help of a value-time diagram that captures a key feature of a genuine act of killing, six classic scenarios in the ethics of killing are analyzed within the same framework. The prominent feature of this approach is that no physical action is an act of killing before the imposition of a social norm. (shrink)

In Lowe (1995), instead of endorsing a Stalnaker/Lewis-style account of counterfactuals, E. J. Lowe claims that a variation of C. I. Lewis’s strict implication alone captures the essence of everyday conditionals and avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. However, Lowe’s approach fails to account for the validity of simple and straightforward arguments such as ‘if 2=3 then 2+1=3+1’, and Heylen & Horsten (2006) even claims that no variation of strict implication can successfully describe the logical behavior of natural language conditionals. (...) By incorporating the German logician O. Becker’s modal intuition with the insight of Ramsey’s Test, we show that there does exist a unified, strict-conditional based account of everyday conditionals, which withstands all attacks previously raised against truth-conditional accounts of conditionals. Furthermore, a subtle distinction between autistic and realistic readings of the indexical ‘I’ involved in a conditional helps us resolve a recent debate concerning the Thomason conditionals. (shrink)

In ‘What Makes Killing Wrong?’ Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller make the bold claim that killing in itself is not wrong, what is wrong is totally-disabling. In ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ Giubilini and Minerva argue for allowing infanticide. Both papers challenge the stigma commonly associated with killing, and emphasize that killing is not wrong at some margins of life. In this paper, we first generalize the above claims to the thesis that there is nothing morally wrong with killing per (...) se, so long as it is instant and unannounced. Then, from the perspective of social evolution, we explain why people refrain from killing others, the general guideline being that it is unadvisable to kill someone with whom you associate a Second Person Perspective (SPP). Finally, drawing from a seminal paper of Press and Dyson on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we stress that an SPP without an SP (Second Person), or the other way around, can both lead to unwelcome results. (shrink)

In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Dummett argues at length that Geach has been wrong in taking the sense of a predicate to be a function that sends the sense of a proper name to that of a sentence, and claims that it should instead be a means to determine the referent of the predicate, as is suggested by Frege’s sense-determines-reference (SDR) principle. This disagreement between Dummett and Geach calls for a serious investigation into two of Frege’s sense-related principles, namely (...) the Compositionality thesis and the SDR thesis. By making precise both theses in terms of supervenience, we pin down a preferable sense of compositionality for senses, and resolve the debate in question. (shrink)

With the advancement of bio-science and bio-technology come nasty new bioethical dilemmas, and some bioethicists have resorted to metaphysics, in particular, the notion of personal identity, to resolve them. I claim, however, that metaphysical accounts of personal identity at present are incapable of withstanding the impact of bioethical dilemmas. Bioethical issues such as criteria of death, brain transplantation, and dementia with/without advance directives invite us to deconstruct three shaky metaphysical notions concerning personal identity so that we can tackle ethical problems (...) more freely and properly. Furthermore, policy makers are advised to be more concerned with a norm or contract that guarantees the long-term welfare of a society of individuals rather than with the pinning down of the identity of a person at the margin of life. In this way, the public can be relieved of a guilt that has been unduly haunting them — when their loved ones were in many ways gone already. (shrink)

In his famous argument for the unreality of time, McTaggart claims that i) being past, being present, and being future are incompatible properties of an event, yet ii) every event admits all these three properties. In this paper, I examine two key concepts involved in the formulation of i) and ii), namely that of “validity” and that of “contradiction”, and for each concept I distinguish a static version and a dynamic version of it. I then arrive at three different ways (...) of formulating McTaggart’s claims that avoid the notorious McTaggart’s Paradox. So long as we demand that McTaggart make clear use/mention and token/type distinctions in his claims, we shall find that it is indeed very difficult for him to get a genuine contradiction from i) and ii). (shrink)

Concerning the versions of the Tenseless Theory of Time, the Old Btheory has two: the Date-analysis version and the Token-reflexive version, while the New B-theory has three: the Date-analysis, the Token-reflexive and the Sentence-type versions. Each of these five versions of the B-theory has received serious attacks from the A-theorists, some of whom even claim that the tenseless theory “though still widely held, is a theory in retreat” (Craig 1996), and that “if Quentin Smith (1993) delivered the mortal blow to (...) the New B-Theory of Language then Laurie Paul (1997) has written its obituary” (Craig 1999). In this paper, by making more precise some key notions involved in the formulation of a tenseless theory – in particular, two notions of truth conditions, two notions of meaning and two notions of translation are distinguished – I have come up with a single B-thesis for the B-theory. When charitably interpreted, the two versions of the old theory and the three versions of the new theory can all be regarded as special ways of presenting the same B-thesis, and the various A-attacks raised against these versions can then be resolved in a systematic way. (shrink)

In this paper, we claim that Jesus’ command “Love your enemies” is compatible with the fact that (1) for a group of Cooperators and Defectors repeatedly playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with each other, Defection will be the dominant strategy, and (2) the Tit-For-Tat strategy, a variant of the Eye-For-Eye principle that Jesus refuted in his Sermon on the Mount, had won Robert Axelrod’s tournaments of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the 1980s. By incorporating relevant biblical commands into an informed (...) cooperative strategy, we find that it itself is a strong contender in a secular world of social evolution. (shrink)

If to be is to be the value of a bound variable, then the acknowledgment and denial of the existence of chairs amounts to a serious disagreement about the range of a quantifier. However, by resorting to the intrinsic hierarchical structure of hi-world semantics, we find that the varying of domains from worlds to worlds can actually be accommodated within a unified framework. With the introduction of a universal domain D of hi-individuals and an existence predicate E that serves as (...) a realization operator, a new semantics for quantified modal logic is proposed. It allows individual variables to range over individuals in different levels of a hi-world, and is indifferent to the ontological debate about the existence of chairs. (shrink)

Common sense has that killing someone amounts to causing the death of someone. This makes killing a physical, biological, or, at best, metaphysical issue, and, as a consequence, the ethics of killing can be dealt with independently of the non-ethical issue of who the killer is. However, in this paper, we show that this is not the case. A physical/biological definition of death plus a metaphysical definition of causation does not exhaust the meaning of killing. Rather, the notion of killing (...) per se generally presumes a notion of default, which often involves ethical considerations. (shrink)

It is generally believed that, for a one-off Prisoner’s Dilemma game, it is logical to defect. However, both players cooperating is apparently a better choice than both defecting, hence the dilemma. In this paper, by resorting to Ramsey’s Test, Kripke’s possible world semantics, and Stalnaker/Lewis-style account of conditionals, I show that the first horn of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is an unsound argument. It originates from failing to differentiate between a possible world and a possible set of possible worlds and failing (...) to observe that the set of accessible possible worlds associated with a possible world in general varies from conditional to conditional. This phenomenon can also be illustrated in terms of the recently developed hi-world semantics. Moreover, a meta-argument is constructed to establish the non-existence of a logical argument for defection. (shrink)

This study aimed to develop cross-domain deep learning courses of artificial intelligence in vocational senior high schools and explore its impact on students’ learning effects. It initially adopted a literature review to develop a cross-domain SPOC-AIoT Course with SPOC and the Double Diamond 4D model in vocational senior high schools. Afterward, it adopted participatory action research and a questionnaire survey and conducted analyses on the various aspects of the technology acceptance model by SmartPLS. Further, this study explored the impact on (...) the effects of deep learning and knowledge-ability learning of artificial intelligence after 16 weeks of course teaching among 36 Grade I students from the electrical and electronic group of a vocational senior high school. This study revealed that the four stages of the SPOC-AIoT Teaching Mode of the Double Diamond 4D model may effectively guide students to learn AIoT knowledge and skills. Based on the technology acceptance model, the analysis of learning and participation in SmartPLS indicated that this model conformed to the academic fitness requirements of the overall model. After learning with the SPOC-AIoT Teaching Mode, the learning effects of students in AIoT have been significantly improved to a positive aspect. Finally, some suggestions were put forward to promote the development of the SPOC-AIoT Teaching Mode Course in the future. (shrink)

Evidence suggests divergent thinking is the cognitive basis of creative thoughts. Neuroimaging literature using resting-state functional connectivity has revealed network reorganizations during divergent thinking. Recent studies have revealed the changes of network organizations when performing creativity tasks, but such brain reconfigurations may be prolonged after task and be modulated by the trait of creativity. To investigate the dynamic reconfiguration, 40 young participants were recruited to perform consecutive Alternative Uses Tasks for divergent thinking and two resting-state scans were used for mapping (...) the brain reorganizations after AUT. We split participants into high- and low-creative groups based on creative achievement questionnaire and targeted on reconfigurations of the two brain networks: default-mode network and the network seeded at the left inferior frontal gyrus because the between-group difference of AUT-induced brain activation located at the left IFG. The changes of post-AUT RSFCs indicated the prolonged effect of divergent thinking. More specifically, the alterations of RSFCIFG−AG and RSFCIFG−IPL in the high-creative group had positive relationship with their AUT performances, but not found in the low-creative group. Furthermore, the RSFC changes of DMN did not present significant relationships with AUT performances. The findings not only confirmed the possibility of brain dynamic reconfiguration following divergent thinking, but also suggested the distinct IFGN reconfiguration between individuals with different creativity levels. (shrink)

While previous authors have broadly examined the motivations and outcomes of the philanthropic activities of organizations, the present study extends Miska et al.’s rationalistic approach to examine the degree to which managerial philanthropic decision-making behaviour is dominated by morality. This study also tackles the question of whether this relationship is moderated by the strength of the geographical proximity and amount of the donation within an agency framework. To probe the radical agency problem and the effect of intervention, an alternative heuristic (...) scenario is also developed to provide evidence that managers under the same moral level show significant differences in donation intention under a variety of agency conditions. The results indicate a significant difference between the existence and non-existence of agency problems in charitable decision-making by managers high in idealism and relativism; however, at the same time, philanthropic behaviour is intertwined with various dilemma-related contexts. These findings bridge the gap in the literature on ethics and corporate social responsibility, and challenge current thinking on corporate governance mechanisms in this area by offering researchers and practitioners an integrated model that responds to a strong sceptical bias or a high premium placed on morality. (shrink)

The skill model of wisdom argues that practical wisdom can be best understood in terms of practical skill or expertise, and the model is thought to have the characteristic of focusing on how wise people think rather than how wise people feel. However, from the perspective of Kunzmann and Glück, “it is time for an ‘emotional revolution’ in wisdom research, which will contribute to a more balanced view on wisdom that considers emotional factors and processes as equally typical of wisdom (...) as are cognitive and reflective factors” (Kunzmann U, Gluck J [2019] Wisdom and emotion. In: Sternberg R, Gluck J (eds) The cambridge handbook of wisdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 575–601). Kunzmann and Glück’s appeal for this emotional revolution is significant and intriguing because the inclusion of an explanation of the role of emotion in wisdom can contribute to developing the skill model of wisdom into a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the intricate relation between wisdom and emotions. In this paper, I shall propose and develop a skill account of the emotions of the wise to serve as a supplement to the skill model of wisdom. According to this account, first, at the critical level, having emotions and emotional competence as elements is not essential to wisdom; second, at the theoretical level, a wise person feels an emotion E if and only if E is strategically rational for the wise person; and third, at the metatheoretical level, the primary aim of the skill account is to explain why wise people feel in a particular way rather than to describe how wise people feel. (shrink)

What is wisdom? What does a wise person know? Can a wise person know how to act and live well without knowing the whys and wherefores of his own action? How is wisdom acquired? This Element addresses questions regarding the nature and acquisition of wisdom by developing and defending a skill theory of wisdom. Specifically, this theory argues that if a person S is wise, then (i) S knows that overall attitude success contributes to or constitutes well-being; (ii) S knows (...) what the best means to achieve well-being are; (iii) S is reliably successful at acting and living well (in light of what S knows); and (iv) S knows why she is successful at acting and living well. The first three sections of this Element develop this theory, and the final two sections defend this theory against two objections to the effect that there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers have contributed to the development of the skill model of wisdom, according to which practical wisdom is practical skill. However, the model appears to be limited in its explanatory power, since there are asymmetries between wisdom and skill: A person with practical wisdom can and should deliberate about the end being pursued; by contrast, a person with a particular practical skill cannot deliberate about the end of the skill, and even if she can, she is not required to (...) do so. In this paper, I undermine these widely held asymmetries by elucidating the unnoticed nature of skill. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 3, Page 606-622, May 2022.

This study is based on the situation of Taiwan listed companies as derivative financial products from 2015 to 2017, analyzing the relationship between the hedging of derivative financial products and characteristics of enterprises and the factors that affect the hedging decision-making of companies. It is found that even after the announcement of Taiwan’s No. 34 and No. 36 bulletins, there are still some problems that are needed to improve in the disclosure of derivative financial product investment information by Taiwan’s listed (...) companies, at least in the disclosure of the reasons for this conduct which is still insufficient. In this study, two-stage regression analysis method is applied to empirical analysis, and it is found that hedging activities are related to corporate characteristics, such as expected financial crisis costs, corporate size, equity issues, growth investment opportunities, and information asymmetry. In the investment of derivative financial products, enterprises should evaluate their own financial characteristics as a reference for the risk avoidance decision. At the same time, it is necessary to investigate different natures of hedging tools used in appropriate risk categories, so as to fully achieve the hedging effect and maximize the hedging benefits. This study also found that companies with higher growth investment opportunities, larger size, and higher financial crisis costs will tend to use derivative financial products for hedging. As for the impact of other industries, it is found that the electronic and electrical machinery industries are more active than other industries in hedging behaviors of undertaking derivative financial products’ transaction. (shrink)

Anti-intellectualists in epistemology argue for the thesis that knowing-how is not a species of knowing-that, and most of them tend to avoid any use of the notion “knowing-that” in their explanation of intelligent action on pain of inconsistency. Intellectualists tend to disprove anti-intellectualism by showing that the residues of knowing-that remain in the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. Outside the field of epistemology, some philosophers who try to highlight the nature of their explanation of intelligent action in certain fields, such (...) as ethics, tend to classify themselves as intellectualist simply because they appeal to the notion of knowing-that in their explanation. In a word, the idea of knowing-that is harmful to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action, whether from an insider or outsider perspective. In this paper, I argue that these tendencies are unjustified because they are based on an unclear conception of anti-intellectualism. I shall use Gilbert Ryle’s anti-intellectualism as a paradigm with which to describe anti-intellectualism and to illustrate why the notion of knowing-that is not harmful to but is, on the contrary, beneficial to the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. If my explication of Ryle’s anti-intellectualism is correct, then most anti-intellectualists in the literature blindly worry about the notion of knowing-that, most intellectualists fire into the wrong flock, and some philosophers outside epistemology mischaracterize their own position. (shrink)

In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn (...) from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn. (shrink)

Human excellences such as intelligence, morality, and consciousness are investigated by philosophers as well as artificial intelligence researchers. One excellence that has not been widely discussed by AI researchers is practical wisdom, the highest human excellence, or the highest, seventh, stage in Dreyfus’s model of skill acquisition. In this paper, I explain why artificial wisdom matters and how artificial wisdom is possible (in principle and in practice) by responding to two philosophical challenges to building artificial wisdom systems. The result is (...) a conceptual framework that guides future research on creating artificial wisdom. (shrink)

Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, second, by introducing and elaborating (...) the concept of hybrid knowing-how, which entails a combination of a ground-level ability and a meta-level perspective on that ability. The stance I wish to advocate is that the epistemology of knowing-how is a normative discipline whose main task is to study the nature and value of human practical intelligence required to do things in a particular manner. (shrink)

What is the nature and structure of phronesis or practical wisdom? According to the view widely held by philosophers and psychologists, a person S is wise if and only if S knows how to live well. Given this view of practical wisdom, the guiding question is this: What exactly is “knowing how to live well”? It seems that no one has a clear idea of how to answer this simple but fundamental question. This paper explores knowing how to live well (...) (or “life know-how”) by showing how its nature and structure can be understood through contemporary epistemology of knowledge-how. I will achieve this by doing the following. In Section I, I highlight the two as-yet unanswered “integration questions” about life know-how. In Section II, I explain why the epistemology of knowledge-how has good potential to address the integration questions. In Sections III and IV, I construct two positions—intellectualism and anti-intellectualism—for the epistemology of life know-how and show how they address the two integration questions. In Section V, I show how the epistemology of life know-how established in the previous sections can be used in the philosophy of wisdom and the psychology of wisdom. (shrink)

How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practical technê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, in conclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.

Only problems that cannot be solved without representational changes can be regarded as pure insight problems; others are classified as pseudo-insight problems. Existing studies using neuroimaging...

Recently virtue ethicists, such as Julia Annas and Matt Stichter, in order to explain what a moral virtue is and how it is acquired, suggest modeling virtue on practical expertise. However, a challenging issue arises when considering the nature of practical expertise especially about whether expertise requires articulacy, that is, whether an expert in a skill is required to possess an ability to articulate the principles underlying the skill. With regard to this issue, Annas advocates the articulacy requirement, while Stichter (...) denies. Stichter raises two objections to Annas’s requirement: first, Annas provides no argument for the requirement; second, there exist counterexamples in which there are experts who cannot articulate what and why they did in skilled performance. In this paper I shall show that Annas did provide an argument and can respond to the counterexamples; however, her argument and response are not convincing. Instead, I construct a new argument for the articulacy requirement by which I call the argument from success-conduciveness. The main idea involved in this new argument, i.e., articulacy is success-conducive, supports further that ethical expertise requires articulacy due to the seriousness of morality. (shrink)

The financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic have caused many enterprises to suffer great losses. Thus, companies have to take measures such as pays cut, furloughs, or layoffs, which caused dissatisfaction among employees and triggered labor disputes. Therefore, this study explores the service-oriented organizational citizenship behavior based on the decomposed theory of planned behavior in order to understand the behavioral intentions of employees through their mental states, job attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. This study conducted questionnaire (...) surveys for employees in different industries, collected 281 valid questionnaires, and applied Structural Equation Model for the analysis. The results show: employees believe organizational justice in the organization is important, and when they feel treated fairly, their job attitudes and beliefs are enhanced. Employees’ job attitudes and beliefs support service-oriented organizational citizenship behavior, in other words, they have positive job attitudes and beliefs and will actively provide better service to customers. When employees are treated reasonably and fairly by the organization and have positive job attitudes and perceived behavior control, their spontaneous service-oriented organizational citizenship behavior is stimulated, thus increasing organizational development. (shrink)

One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how view in which knowledge of (...) the rules of language is a kind of practical knowledge, like an agent’s non-propositional knowledge of counting. In this paper I argue, first, that Hanna misunderstands Dummett’s conception of knowledge of linguistic rules, and, second, that Dummett’s considerations of practical knowledge of language pose a problem for Hanna’s knowledge-how view. At the end of the paper, I briefly sketch an account of practical knowledge of language that meets the requirements set by Dummett. (shrink)

According to Dreyfusian anti-intellectualism, know-how or expertise cannot be explained in terms of know-that and its cognates but only in terms of intuition. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus do not exclude know-that and its cognates in explaining skilled action. However, they think that know-that and its cognates (such as calculative deliberation and perspectival deliberation) only operate either below or above the level of expertise. In agreement with some critics of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, in this paper, I argue that know-that and (...) its cognates are constitutive of rather than external to know-how and expertise. However, unlike those critics, who argue for this point only from a phenomenological point of view, my argument adopts a (telic) normative point of view. (shrink)

Tennis champion Maria Sharapova has a habit of grunting when she plays on the court. Assume that she also has a habit of hitting the ball in a certain way in a certain situation. The habit of on-court grunting might be bad, but can the habit of hitting the ball in a certain way in a certain situation be classified as intelligent? The fundamental questions here are as follows: What is habit? What is the relation between habit and skill? Is (...) there such a thing as intelligent habit? In this paper I expound the nature of habit by developing and defending a Rylean conception of habit, according to which an acquired disposition is a habit if and only if the manifestation of the disposition is repeated, automatic, and uniform. One implication of this conception is that there is no such thing as intelligent habit. A practical application in athletic expertise is that sport coaches can help athletes go beyond repeated, automatic, and uniform dispositions in sport. (shrink)

According to the universality thesis, the epistemic properties referred to by the English epistemic verb “know” contained in the expressions of the form “S knows that p” or “S knows how to φ‎” are shared by the translations of the epistemic verb in all other languages such as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and so on. Some doubt that there is reason to think the universality thesis is true because little or nothing is shown about the meanings and uses of the (...) epistemic terms in languages other than English. Critics of the universality thesis find counterevidence to the thesis; that is, the evidence demonstrates that translations of the epistemic verb “know” are used differently in some languages from the way “know” is used in English. In this chapter, the authors examine the effectiveness of such counterevidence. (shrink)

Epistemology of language, a branch of both epistemology and the philosophy of language, asks what knowledge of language consists in. In this paper, I argue that such an inquiry is a pointless enterprise due to its being based upon the incorrect assumption that linguistic competence requires knowledge of language. However, I do not think the phenomenon of knowledge of language is trivial. I propose a virtue-theoretic account of linguistic competence, and then explain the phenomenon from a virtue-semantic point of view.

In this paper, I propose a virtue-theoretic approach to semantics, according to which the study of linguistic competence in particular, and the study of meaning and language in general, should focus on a speaker's interpretative virtues, such as charity and interpretability, rather than the speaker's knowledge of rules. The first part of the paper proffers an argument for shifting to virtue semantics, and the second part outlines the nature of such virtue semantics.

This paper aims at addressing how the question of Chinese female sexuality is questioned and challenged by the Chinese woman writer Geling Yan’s novella“White Snake” (1999). By adopting a similar title to the famous traditional Chinese monster story that narrates a white serpent transformed herself into a pretty lady to pursue and experience human love, Geling Yan’s novella carries the mimicry of the theme by portraying her protagonist as a serpent-embodying woman whose sexual power was deemed abnormal and monstrous. This (...) imprisoned woman as a monstrous other, though sinuously gazed, desired and mocked, her monstrous sexuality, not as the un-human, but as the conflation where the social and cultural anxiety encounters the fear of desire and the difference, is given the chance to be re-initiated, re-directed and unleashed into another heterogeneous state and territory of the unsaid and unnamed behind the traditional cultural prison house. (shrink)

This paper deals with the function of metonymy in A Song of the Sad Coffee Shop (1996), a novel by Taiwan’s woman writer Shao-lin Chu (b. 1966). For my reading of the novel’s narrative, I should like to appropriate a Jakobsonian understanding of metaphoric and metonymic functions. This approach will hopefully help in analyzing the significance of the protagonist’s quest for identification in her trip to Madagascar, in which the juxtaposition of places of similar geographical features works to construct a (...) contiguity between them, and goes on to achieve a rapprochement of mind and body in the practice and process of philosophical cultivation. The protagonist’s trip, as a quest for home and identity, through the metonymic power of identification and localization, finally calls into question the fixity of the concept of home and homeland, the expedition itself turning into a mysterious journey of self-cultivation and home-coming. (shrink)

This paper deals with the function of metonymy in A Song of the Sad Coffee Shop (1996), a novel by Taiwan’s woman writer Shao-lin Chu (b. 1966). For my reading of the novel’s narrative, I should like to appropriate a Jakobsonian understanding of metaphoric and metonymic functions. This approach will hopefully help in analyzing the significance of the protagonist’s quest for identification in her trip to Madagascar, in which the juxtaposition of places of similar geographical features works to construct a (...) contiguity between them, and goes on to achieve a rapprochement of mind and body in the practice and process of philosophical cultivation. The protagonist’s trip, as a quest for home and identity, through the metonymic power of identification and localization, finally calls into question the fixity of the concept of home and homeland, the expedition itself turning into a mysterious journey of self-cultivation and home-coming. (shrink)

This paper deals with the function of metonymy in A Song of the Sad Coffee Shop (1996), a novel by Taiwan’s woman writer Shao-lin Chu (b. 1966). For my reading of the novel’s narrative, I should like to appropriate a Jakobsonian understanding of metaphoric and metonymic functions. This approach will hopefully help in analyzing the significance of the protagonist’s quest for identification in her trip to Madagascar, in which the juxtaposition of places of similar geographical features works to construct a (...) contiguity between them, and goes on to achieve a rapprochement of mind and body in the practice and process of philosophical cultivation. The protagonist’s trip, as a quest for home and identity, through the metonymic power of identification and localization, finally calls into question the fixity of the concept of home and homeland, the expedition itself turning into a mysterious journey of self-cultivation and home-coming. (shrink)

Regulative virtue epistemology argues that intellectual virtues can adjust and guide one’s epistemic actions as well as improve on the quality of the epistemic actions. For regulative virtue epistemologists, intellectual virtues can be cultivated to a higher degree; when the quality of intellectual virtue is better, the resulting quality of epistemic action is better. The intellectual virtues that regulative epistemologists talk about are character virtues (such as intellectual courage and open-mindedness) rather than faculty virtues (such as sight and hearing), since (...) they don’t think that faculty virtues could be cultivated. This article refers to Xunzi’s philosophy, explaining how a regulative faculty-based virtue epistemology is possible. If this explanation works, on the one hand, a new branch of contemporary virtue epistemology is shown, and, on the other hand, a clear theoretical framework of Xunzi’s epistemology is constructed. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to generalize Quine's epistemology, to show that what Quine refutes for traditional epistemology is not only Cartesian foundationalism and Carnapian reductionism, but also any epistemological program if it takes atomic verificationist semantics or supernaturalism, which are rooted in the linguistic/factual distinction of individual sentences, as its underlying system. Thus, we will see that the range of naturalization in the Quinean sense is not as narrow as his critics think. Second, to normalize Quine's (...) epistemology, to explain in what sense Quinean naturalized epistemology is normative. The reason I maintain that critics miss the point of Quinean naturalized epistemology is that they do not appreciate the close connection between Quine's naturalistic approach and his holistic approach to epistemology. To show this I shall reconstruct Quine's argument for naturalizing epistemology within his systematic philosophy, and focus specifically on his holism and its applications, on which Quine relies both in arguing against traditional epistemology, and in supporting his theses of underdetermination of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation. This is the key to understanding the scope and the normativity of Quine's epistemology. In the conclusion I will point out what the genuine problems are for Quinean naturalized epistemology. (shrink)