Jay Coen Gilbert, co-founder of B Lab, discusses his vision for a “new economy” where business is a “force for good.” In this interview, Coen Gilbert provides an overview of how B Lab’s various initiatives—Certified B Corporations, the B Impact Assessment, B Analytics, GIIRS, and Benefit Corporations—function interdependently to accelerate a culture shift to redefine success in business. Coen Gilbert then focuses on the role of benefit corporations in this larger movement. The benefit corporation is a new (...) legal form of business that requires a corporate purpose dedicated to “general public benefit” and the delivery of demonstrable “material positive impact on society and the environment.” Novel fiduciary and reporting requirements differentiate the benefit corporation from the traditional corporation founded on shareholder primacy. Coen Gilbert explains how the benefit corporation is better suited to create long-term shareholder value as well as sustainable value for society, the environment, and other stakeholders. He addresses critiques of and challenges to the benefit corporation as an agent of change for business. (shrink)

This article investigates the connections between the logics of being wrong, introduced in Steinsvold (2011, Notre Dame J. Form. Log., 52, 245–253), and factive ignorance, presented in Kubyshkina and Petrolo (2021, Synthese, 198, 5917–5928). The first part of the paper provides a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of factive ignorance that corrects errors in Kubyshkina and Petrolo (2021, Synthese, 198, 5917–5928) and resolves questions about the expressivity of the language. In the second half, it is shown that the (...) relationship between the two logics suggests an alternative axiomatization for the logic of factive ignorance, the adequacy of which is easily proved via straightforward translations. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the logics of essence and accident and attempt to ascertain the extent to which those logics are genuinely formalizing the concepts in which we are interested. We suggest that they are not completely successful as they stand. We diagnose some of the problems and make a suggestion for improvement. We also discuss some issues concerning definability in the formal language.

This article outlines a semantic approach to the logics of unknown truths, and the logic of false beliefs, using neighborhood structures, giving results on soundness, completeness, and expressivity. Relational semantics for the logics of unknown truths are also addressed, specically the conditions under which sound axiomatizations of these logics might be obtained from their normal counterparts, and the relationship between refexive insensitive logics and logics containing the provability operator as the primary modal operator.

This paper develops sequent calculi for several classical modal logics. Utilizing a polymodal translation of the standard modal language, we are able to establish a base system for the minimal classical modal logic E from which we generate extensions in a modular manner. Our systems admit contraction and cut admissibility, and allow a systematic proof-search procedure of formal derivations.

We present two-dimensional tableau systems for the actuality, fixedly, and up-arrow operators. All systems are proved sound and complete with respect to a two-dimensional semantics. In addition, a decision procedure for the actuality logics is discussed.

We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of the logic of , as well as a two-dimensional semantics with respect to which our logics are sound and complete. Our completeness results are quite general, pertaining to all such actuality logics that extend a normal and canonical modal basis. We also show that our logics have the strong finite model property and permit straightforward first-order extensions.

The information contained within the linear sequence of bases (the genome) must be faithfully replicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place over the course of evolution. Recently, it has become clear that additional information important for genetic regulation is contained within the chromatin proteins associated with DNA (the epigenome). Epigenetic information also must be faithfully duplicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place during the course of development (...) to achieve differentiation while maintaining identity within cell lineages. Both the genome and the epigenome are synthesized at the replication fork, so the events occurring during S‐phase provide a critical window of opportunity for eliciting change or maintaining existing genetic states. Cells discriminate between different states of chromatin through the activities of proteins that selectively modify the structure of chromatin. Several recent studies report the localization of certain chromatin modifying proteins to replication forks at specific times during S‐phase. Since transcriptionally active and inactive chromosome domains generally replicate at different times during S‐phase, this spatiotemporal regulation of chromatin assembly proteins may be an integral part of epigenetic inheritance. BioEssays 25:647–656, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

(1999). Sponsorship, academic independence and critical engagement: A forum on shell, the Ogoni dispute and the royal geographical society (with the institute of British geographers) Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 219-228.

. Sponsorship, Academic Independence and Critical Engagement: a Forum on Shell, the Ogoni Dispute and the Royal Geographical Society Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 219-257.

The Mexican Reforma is often considered a classic example of the power struggles that occurred between church and state throughout the nineteenth century. However, since in this case both sides claimed to be Catholic, the most important battles in Mexico were actually intra ecclesiam. Ultimately, it was a fight over access to the sacraments that drove Mexico into civil war, transforming both the Church and society in the process. The current debate in the United States over allowing public figures who (...) violate Church teaching to receive Holy Communion should be considered within the context of the Mexican experience. (shrink)

Most land plants associate with mycorrhizal fungi that can connect roots of neighboring plants in common mycelial networks (CMNs). Recent evidence shows that CMNs transfer warning signals of pathogen and aphid attack between plants. However, we do not know how defence‐related signaling via CMNs operates or how ubiquitous it is. Nor do we know what the ecological relevance and fitness consequences are, particularly from the perspective of the mycorrhizal fungus. Here, we focus on the potential fitness benefits for mycorrhizal fungi (...) and outline hypothetical scenarios in which signal transfer via CMNs is modulated in order to acquire the most benefit for the fungus (i.e. acquisition of carbon) for minimal cost. We speculate that the signal may be quantitative and may elicit plant defence responses on different levels depending on the distance the signal is transferred. Finally, we discuss the possibility of practical applications of this phenomenon for crop protection. (shrink)

Dispositional forgiveness is positively associated with many facets of wellbeing and has protective implications against depression and anxiety in adolescents. However, little work has been done to examine neurobiological aspects of forgiveness as they relate to clinical symptoms. In order to better understand the neural mechanisms supporting the protective role of forgiveness in adolescents, the current study examined the middle frontal gyrus, which comprises the majority of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and is associated with cognitive regulation, and its relationship to (...) forgiveness and clinical symptoms in a sample of healthy adolescents. In this cross-sectional study, larger MFG volume was significantly associated with higher self-reported dispositional forgiveness scores and lower levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms. Forgiveness mediated the relationship between MFG volume and both depressive and anxiety symptom levels. The mediating role of forgiveness in the relationship between MFG volume and clinical symptoms suggests that one way that cognitive regulation strategies supported by this brain region may improve adolescent mental health is via increasing a capacity for forgiveness. The present study highlights the relevance of forgiveness to neurobiology and their relevance to emotional health in adolescents. Future longitudinal studies should focus on the predictive quality of the relationship between forgiveness, brain volume and clinical symptoms and the effects of forgiveness interventions on these relationships. (shrink)

Some hold that proper names and indexicals are “Kaplan rigid”: they designate their designata even in worlds where the designata don’t exist. An argument they give for this is based on the analogy between time and modality. It is shown how this argument gains forcefulness at the expense of carefulness. Then the argument is criticized as forming a part of an inconsistent philosophical framework, the one with which David Kaplan and others operate. An alternative account of a certain class (...) of negative existentials is developed, one which eliminates both the inconsistency and the need for Kaplan rigidity. After all, mustn’t whatever is referred to exist? (shrink)

The paper interprets Kant’s neglected argument at FOUNDATIONS 401 as consisting of these two premises and conclusion: (1) It follows from consequentialism that in a natural paradise people would not be obligated to be morally good. (2) But this is absurd; one ought to be morally good no matter what. Therefore, consequentialism is false. It is shown that this argument is a powerful one, mainly by showing that independent grounds support (2) and that (1) may survive a number of strong (...) possible objections. One that it does not appear to survive, though, is that the paradise envisioned is not logically possible. (shrink)

Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which (...) the view is incorrect, as well as seemingly correct (e.g., the case of a Modus Ponens wherein the major premise is implicit). -/- . (shrink)

Joseph Almog says concerning “a certain locus where Quine doesn’t exist…qua evaluation locus, we take to it [singular] propositions involving Quine [as a constituent] which we have generated in our generation locus.” This seems to be either murder, or worse, self-contradiction. It presumes that certain designators designate their designata even at loci where the designata do not exist, i.e., the designators have “Kaplan rigidity.” Against this view, this paper argues that negative existentials such as “Quine does not exist” are true (...) only at ordered couples of loci (times or possible worlds) < l, l’ > such that the constituents of the truthmaker are the designatum itself from l and whatever corresponds to “does not exist” from l’. (shrink)

On Gilbert’s multi-modal theory of argumentation, the “logical” is but one among many modes of argument, including the emotional, the visceral (physical), and the kisceral (intuitive). Yet, I argue that, properly understood, the logical is not one mode among many. Rather, it is better understood as the _uber-mode_ of argument. What Gilbert calls the “logical mode” of argument—a linear, orderly, highly verbalizable, way of arguing—is made possible only to the extent that the logic of some space of reasons (...) has been articulated. The “anti-logical” penchant of multi-modal argumentation is not found at the object-level—in its countenancing “non-logical” modes of argument, but at the meta-level—in its resistance, as a mistaken embracing of the “logical” mode, to using the logics governing the different modes to self-regulate the course of our arguings. (shrink)

This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.

t is now well accepted that defined architectural compartments within the cell nucleus can regulate the transcriptional activity of chromosomal domains within their vicinity. However, it is generally unclear how these compartments are formed. The nuclear periphery has received a great deal of attention as a repressive compartment that is implicated in many cellular functions during development and disease. The inner nuclear membrane, the nuclear lamina, and associated proteins compose the nuclear periphery and together they interact with proximal chromatin creating (...) a repressive environment. A new study by Harr et al. identifies specific protein–DNA interactions and epigenetic states necessary to re‐position chromatin to the nuclear periphery in a cell‐type specific manner. Here, we review concepts in gene positioning within the nucleus and current accepted models of dynamic gene repositioning within the nucleus during differentiation. This study highlights that myriad pathways lead to nuclear organization. (shrink)

One of the most innovative and brilliant philosophers of his generation, but largely neglected until he was brought to public attention by Gilles Deleuze, Gilbert Simondon presents a challenge to nearly every category and method of traditional philosophy. Psychic and Collective Individuation is undoubtedly Simondon's most important work and its influence, clearly felt in Stiegler and DeLanda, has continued to grow. David Scott provides the first full introduction to this work, which will inspire as well as instruct philosophers (...) working in Continental thought, philosophy of science, social theory and political philosophy. (shrink)

Gilbert Harman’s famous principle of Clutter Avoidance commands that “one should not clutter one’s mind with trivialities". Many epistemologists have been inclined to accept Harman’s principle, or something like it. This is significant because the principle appears to have robust implications for our overall picture of epistemic normativity. Jane Friedman (2018) has recently argued that one potential implication is that there are no genuine purely evidential norms on belief revision. In this paper, we present some new objections to a (...) suitably formulated version of the clutter principle qua norm on belief revision. Moreover, we argue that the clutter principle is best understood as a norm on non-doxastic stages of inquiry. In our view, it is a norm of asking and considering questions rather than a norm of settling on an answer to a question by forming a belief. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION In my view, justice is entirely conventional; indeed, all of morality consists in conventions that are the result of continual tacit bargaining and adjustment. This is not to say social arrangements are just whenever they are in accordance with the principles of justice accepted in that society. We can use our own principles of justice in judging the institutions of another society, and we can appeal to some principles we accept in order to criticize other principles we accept. To (...) use David Hume's model of the relevant sort of convention, two people rowing a boat each continually adjusts his or her rate of rowing to the other so that they come to row at the same rate, a rate that is normally somewhere between the rate at which each would prefer to row. In the same way the basic principles of justice accepted by people of different powers and resources are the result of a continually changing compromise affecting such things as the relative importance attached to helping others as compared with the importance attached to not harming others. Hume's rowers provide an example of a “convention” that is normally completely tacit. There are other models in which the bargaining can be more explicit, for example when a seller comes to set prices that are acceptable to customers, when employers reach understandings with employees concerning wages, or when political groups influence legislation. I want eventually to consider the implications for moral reasoning and argument of the thesis that principles of justice are entirely the result of implicit bargaining and convention of this sort. (shrink)

This article will compare and contrast two very different accounts of convention: the game-theoretical account of Lewis in Convention, and the account initially proposed by Margaret Gilbert (the present author) in chapter six of On Social Facts, and further elaborated here. Gilbert’s account is not a variant of Lewis’s. It was arrived at in part as the result of a detailed critique of Lewis’s account in relation to a central everyday concept of a social convention. An account of (...) convention need not be judged by that standard. Perhaps it reveals the nature of an important phenomenon. Looked at in that light, these very different accounts are not incompatible. Indeed, neither should be ignored if one is seeking to understand the way in which human beings arrive at some degree of social order. (shrink)

A feature of David Lewis's account of conventions in his book "Convention" which has received admiring notices from philosophers is his use of the mathematical theory of games. In this paper I point out a number of serious flaws in Lewis's use of game theory. Lewis's basic claim is that conventions cover 'coordination problems'. I show that game-Theoretical analysis tends to establish that coordination problems in Lewis's sense need not underlie conventions.

The question whether and in what way languages and language use involve convention is addressed, With special reference to David Lewis's account of convention in general. Data are presented which show that Lewis has not captured the sense of 'convention' involved when we speak of adopting a linguistic convention. He has, In effect, attempted an account of social conventions. An alternative account of social convention and an account of linguistic convention are sketched.

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what (...) it takes to do so. This idea is developed into a full-fledged account, Rylean responsibilism, which understands know-how in terms of the normative guidance and responsible control of one's acts. Within the complex current debate about know-how, this view occupies a middle ground position between the intellectualist claim that know-how just is propositional or objectual knowledge and the anti-intellectualist claim that know-how just is ability. In genuine know-how, practical ability and guiding intellect are both necessary, but essentially intertwined. (shrink)

A number of authors, Including Thomas Schelling and David Lewis, have envisaged a model of the generation of action in coordination problems in which salience plays a crucial role. Empirical studies suggest that human subjects are likely to try for the salient combination of actions, a tendency leading to fortunate results. Does rationality dictate that one aim at the salient combination? Some have thought so, Thus proclaiming that salience is all that is needed to resolve coordination problems for agents (...) who are rational in the sense of game theory. I argue against this position; rational agents will not necessarily aim for the salient. It remains to explain how the salient comes to be chosen by human beings. Various possibilities are noted. One involves a mechanism invoked by Hume and Wittgenstein in other contexts: we may project an unreasoned compulsion onto reason, falsely believing that rationality dictates our choice of the salient. (shrink)

Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally accepted (...) personal principles. Commitments like those generated by agreements may be necessary for rational expectations to arise. Social conventions, construed as group principles (following the analysis in my book On Social Facts), would suffice for this task. (shrink)