The Problems, which occupy pp. 859-967 of the Berlin Aristotle, have probably been less read and studied than any other treatise in the Aristotelian Corpus; they contain, however, a vast quantity of interesting information on a great variety of subjects, and an enquiry into their composition may be not without interest.

While translating the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems for the Oxford translation of Aristotle, I have frequently found it necessary to refer to the Fragments of Theophrastus , which are obviously the source of many of the Problems, in particular in books II., V., XX., XXIV., and XXVI. The condition of the text of both the Problems and the Fragments of Theophrastus leaves much to be desired, but considerable improvements are possible in those passages where the compiler of the Problems is adapting or (...) copying from Theophrastus. (shrink)

ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL is a unique attempt to examine the novel afresh, rejecting the traditional methods of classification by chronology or subject-matter. Forster pares down the novel to its essential elements as he sees them: story, people, plot, fantasy, prophecy, pattern and rhythm. He illustrates each aspect with examples from their greatest exponents, not hesitating as he does so to pass controversial judgement on the works of, among others, Sir Walter Scott, Charles Dickens and Henry James. Full of (...) Forster's renowned wit and perceptiveness, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL offers a rare insight into the art of fiction from one of our greatest novelists. 'His is a book to encourage dreaming.' Virginia Woolf. (shrink)

We consider the relation between versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and König’s Infinity Lemma, in the absence of the axiom of choice.

We consider the relation between versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and König’s Infinity Lemma, in the absence of the axiom of choice.

Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light (...) on the theoretical virtues of parsimoniousness, unification, and non ad hocness, on the dispute about Bayesianism, and on empiricism and scientific realism. * Both of us gratefully acknowledge support from the Graduate School at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and NSF grant DIR-8822278 (M.F.) and NSF grant SBE-9212294 (E.S.). Special thanks go to A. W. F. Edwards.William Harper. Martin Leckey. Brian Skyrms, and especially Peter Turney for helpful comments on an earlier draft. (shrink)

The simple question, what is empirical success? turns out to have a surprisingly complicated answer. We need to distinguish between meritorious fit and ‘fudged fit', which is akin to the distinction between prediction and accommodation. The final proposal is that empirical success emerges in a theory dependent way from the agreement of independent measurements of theoretically postulated quantities. Implications for realism and Bayesianism are discussed. ‡This paper was written when I was a visiting fellow at the Center for Philosophy of (...) Science at the University of Pittsburgh; I thank everyone for their support. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The second edition of this exceptional anthology provides an introduction to a wide variety of views on human nature. Drawing from diverse cultures over three millennia, Leslie Stevenson has chosen selections ranging from ancient religious texts to contemporary theories based on evolutionary science. An ideal companion to the editor's recent book, Ten Theories of Human Nature, 3/e (OUP, 1998), this interdisciplinary reader can also be used independently. The Study of Human Nature, 2/e offers substantial selections illustrating the ten perspectives discussed (...) in Ten Theories of Human Nature, 3/e--The Bible, Hinduism, Confucianism, Plato, Kant, Marx, Freud, Sartre, B.F. Skinner's behaviorism, and Konrad Lorenz's ethological diagnosis of human aggression. The Islamic tradition is represented by a selection from the 20th-century Iranian philosopher Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari. The 17th- and 18th-century philosophers Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, and Kant are also represented. Selections from Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and Nancy Holmstrom discuss alleged differences between women and men, and a paper by Henry Bracken deals with racial issues. Examples from E.O. Wilson's sociobiology and his critics are also included, together with material from Chomsky and from recent evolutionary psychology. This new edition includes more substantial selections from the Hindu, Confucian, and Christian traditions and provides more accessible extracts from Marx, Sartre, and Lorenz. An excellent reader for introductory courses in philosophy, religious studies, human nature, and intellectual history, The Study of Human Nature, 2/e, is also an essential resource for anyone interested in ancient, modern, and contemporary perspectives on human nature. (shrink)

A epistemologia de Charles Sanders Peirce parece paradoxal quando comparada a de Rudolf Carnap e W.V. Quine. Como Carnap, mas diferentemente de Quine, Peirce considera que o conhecimento científico reside em princípios lógicos que devem se sustentar para que o discurso sobre o verdadeiro e o falso tenha sentido. Ele também compartilha a visão de Carnap de que esses princípios são anteriores à, e independentes das constatações nas ciências naturais, uma visão que Quine notoriamente rejeita. Todavia, como Quine, mas diferentemente (...) de Carnap, Peirce insiste que não há conhecimento além daquele que é obtido por meio de testes empíricos, que as verdades da lógica estão epistemologicamente a par das verdades descobertas nas ciências naturais, e que nos revelam algo sobre como as coisas são, em vez de carecerem de conteúdo fatual, como Carnap afirma. Um ar de paradoxo emerge no comprometimento simultâneo de Peirce às visões comumente consideradas próprias das teorias epistemológicas incompatíveis. A análise desse paradoxo pela comparação da concepção de conhecimento de Peirce ao de Quine e Carnap nos ajuda a apreciar melhor sua importância na tradição filosófica e na profundeza e originalidade de suas razões. (shrink)

Puzzle solving in normal science involves a process of accommodation—auxiliary assumptions are changed, and parameter values are adjusted so as to eliminate the known discrepancies with the data. Accommodation is often contrasted with prediction. Predictions happen when one achieves a good fit with novel data without accommodation. So, what exactly is the distinction, and why is it important? The distinction, as I understand it, is relative to a model M and a data set D, where M is a set of (...) equations with adjustable parameters (i. e., M is a family of equations with no free parameters). Definition: Model M predicts data D if and only if either (a) all members of M fit D well, or (b) a particular predictive hypothesis is selected from M by fitting M to other data, and the fitted model fits D well. M merely accommodates D if and only if (i) M does not predict D, and (ii) the predictive hypothesis selected from M using other data does not fit D well. There will be cases in which a model M neither predicts nor accommodates D. These are the cases in which we are willing to say that data falsifies the model. So, the distinction between prediction and accommodation applies only when there is no falsification. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later works often implies commitment to a doctrine of the autonomy or arbitrariness of grammar. This chapter discusses the conception of grammar that is presupposed in this doctrine and then explains the doctrine itself. The chapter also explains a sense in which grammar is not autonomous or arbitrary for Wittgenstein and discusses some possible criticisms of the doctrine. It should be noted at the outset that this whole area of exegetical concern is one in which the (...) fairly widespread conception in the secondary literature that the later Wittgenstein is a complete “quietist” in philosophy ‐ i.e., someone who advances no positive doctrines of his own, although encouraged by some of his own statements, seems impossible to sustain. Wittgenstein's doctrine of the autonomy or arbitrariness of grammar presupposes a highly distinctive conception of grammar, one which at least prima facie has little to do with our everyday conception of grammar. (shrink)