Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical scenarios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought experiments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experiment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I introduce (...) the basic analytical tool that allows us to differentiate an experimental core from an attached argumentation. The last section is reserved for discussion. I address several possible questions concerning adequacy of minimalistic definition and analysis. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to the (...) theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabó Gendler based on the reconstruction of famous Galileo's Pisa experiment. I show that her reconstruction is simplistic and that more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assessment of the epistemic power of general argument. I propose such a reconstruction and demonstrate that general version of Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the particular one. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, Galileo's thought experiment is reducible to a straightforward argument without particular premises. (shrink)

Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear conception about (...) new meta-knowledge obtained by thought experimenting. I compare some interpretations of this position and present reasons for favorizing one of them. Conceptualism considers thought experiments as instruments for cleaning our conceptual systems. I argue that this position is in fact not about epistemic value of thought experiments, but about one specific usage of experimental result. (shrink)

The text focuses on Lem’s rejection of the Chinese Room, a prominent challenge to the sufficiency of the Turing test. After outlining Lem’s relationship to the Turing test, it offers an exposition of two of Lem’s thought experiments, the Gramophone and the Jigsaw, whose critique is directly related to the critique of the Chinese Room. The text shows that Lem’s key argument is to point out the computational naivety of the machines that feature in these experiments. The text concludes by (...) presenting some of Lem’s views on the nature of machine consciousness. (shrink)

[Functionalism, Zombies and the Absence of a Mental Dictionary].

Text porovnává přesvědčovací strategie využité ve velmi podobných politicky angažovaných videoklipech The Great Schlep a Přemluv bábu. Ukazuje, že přestože se klip Přemluv bábu od své americké předlohy zásadně neliší v obecné struktuře, deklarovaném cíli či motivické výbavě, v jiných persvazivně významných ohledech se původnímu klipu vzdaluje. Rozdíly jsou patrné zejména v odlišné konstrukci publika, v jiném situování mluvčích a v topickém výběru vyjádřeném jinými stylistickými prostředky.

In the review of 100 myšlenkových experimentů ve filozofii (2013) Jakub Mácha raises several questions concerning our approach to thought experiment analysis. We address all of his remarks; particularly, we answer three questions: Which type of imagination do we use in our definition of thought experiments? How is the cognitive aim of thought experiments related to their cognitive value? Is the analysis of Plato’s Cave proposed in our book appropriate?

Audiozáznam přednášky proslovené ve Filozofické jednotě na Katedře filozofie dne 26. března 2012.V přednášce se pokouším o velmi základní rozlišení tří funkcí, jež mohou myšlenkové experimenty plnit. Nejprve nabízím liberální definici myšlenkového experimentu, podle níž nejde nutně o výjimečné, nereálné, teoreticky zajímavé, bizarní, imaginární scénáře, nýbrž o celkem běžné představování si situace s kognitivním cílem. Snažím se ukázat, že navzdory své šíři je tato definice přiměřeným zachycením všech podstatných vlastností útvarů, jež intuitivně mezi myšlenkové experimenty počítáme. Stručně se poté věnuji (...) prvnímu významu myšlenkových experimentů: imaginární příklady jsou názornou pomůckou při posilování již získaných přesvědčení. Jejich první význam je didaktický. Druhý možný význam myšlenkových experimentů je předmětem vyhraněných diskusí zejména v posledním dvacetiletí: imaginární příklady jsou zdrojem zdůvodnění. Jejich druhý význam je tedy epistemický. Zatímco je však první, didaktický význam zcela nekontroverzní, epistemický význam myšlenkových experimentů je předmětem mnoha odmítnutí. Myšlenkové experimenty jsou tak často odkázány pouze do role názorných pomůcek bez další hodnoty. Snažím se ukázat, že existuje ještě třetí význam myšlenkových experimentů, význam dialektický. Vhodně použitý myšlenkový experiment může v kritické diskusi sloužit jako „přenašeč důkazního břemene”, tj. dokáže vyvolat argumentační tlak na protistranu. Imaginární scénář může za jistých okolností fungovat jako legitimní argument, aniž bychom však nutně museli předpokládat silný epistemický význam myšlenkových experimentů. Myšlenkové experimenty tak mohou být víc než jen líbivé ornamenty, zároveň ale nejsme zavázáni k obhajobě problematické epistemické teze.klíčová slova: myšlenkový experiment, epistemologie, důkazní břemeno. (shrink)

This chapter outlines an embodied conception of noise. From an enactive and ecological perspective noise is an inevitable complement to the richness of bodily sensitivities and complex actions. The world around us, the universe, is replete, full of inexhaustible texture available to be explored at every scale at which we are capable, or can become capable, of making distinctions. Drawing on work in ecological psychology I suggest that noise is our experience of that encompassing fullness, and can be encountered in (...) a number of different ways depending on the organisation of our bodies and activities at different scales across a given period. While that fullness can be overwhelming, and create challenges for us to distinguish and coordinate effectively with the particular aspects of the world most relevant to our present concerns - noise can be intrusive and disruptive - I argue that there are significant positive aspects to the phenomenon. Noise is an inherent part of the rich messiness of the world as discussed in recent enactive work, which provides both robustness to developmental processes as well as opportunities for action that support adaptive agency. In a noisy, messy world there are always more options available to explore. (shrink)

Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...) approach, particularly the enactive conceptions of life and bodies. Following the lead of others, I argue that enactive cognitive science can benefit from a deeper reading and integration with extant work on the complexity and multiplicity of the living body within feminist philosophy and feminist science studies. (shrink)

Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...) cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action, an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower— social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed. (shrink)

Die Beiträge zur Altertumskunde enthalten Monographien, Sammelbände, Editionen, Übersetzungen und Kommentare zu Themen aus den Bereichen Klassische, Mittel- und Neulateinische Philologie, Alte Geschichte, Archäologie, Antike Philosophie sowie Nachwirken der Antike bis in die Neuzeit. Dadurch leistet die Reihe einen umfassenden Beitrag zur Erschließung klassischer Literatur und zur Forschung im gesamten Gebiet der Altertumswissenschaften.

The world of Jedi is very different from our own, that their awareness of the universe is more encompassing, richer. The Jedi call that mystical aspect of reality they perceive the Force. Jedi younglings and padawans must put their body to new uses, perform new tasks, and learn new skills in physical activities that have profound effects on the way they see the world around them. What the Jedi say more than anything else about the Force is that it flows. (...) Jedi who are able to coordinate their actions with that flow can work with the full potency of the universal relationship between all things. Jedi do not need a special Force‐organ to perceive the Force. The Force is not something Jedi just see, or hear, or taste, or touch, but rather it is something they experience on its own terms, probably using their whole body to do it. (shrink)

Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A \in {D_{2}}}$$\end{document} iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}$$\end{document}, where (–)• is a translation of discussive formulae from Ford into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D2 iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm D}_{2} = (...) \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}$$\end{document}. In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (†): have the same theses beginning with ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\diamond}$$\end{document}’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D2. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D2 is equivalent to having the property (†). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (†). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D2. (shrink)

Enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science both claim a “mutuality” between agents and their environments – that they have a complementary nature and should be addressed as a single whole system. Despite this apparent agreement, each offers criticisms of the other on precisely this point – enactivists claiming that ecological psychologists over-emphasise the environment, while the complementary criticism, of agent-centred constructivism, is levelled by ecological psychologists at enactivists. In this paper I suggest that underlying the confusion between the two (...) approaches is the complexity of agency, which comes in different forms, at different scales or levels of analysis. Cognitive science has not theorised the relationship between these different forms in a sufficiently disciplined manner, and a task therefore remains of finding a way to map the complex territory of agency. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Gödel–Dummett logic and Łukasiewicz one are two main many-valued logics used by the fuzzy logic community. Our goal is a quantitative comparison of these two. In this paper, we will mostly consider the 3-valued Gödel–Dummett logic as well as the 3-valued Łukasiewicz one. We shall concentrate on their implicational-negation fragments which are limited to formulas formed with a fixed finite number of variables. First, we investigate the proportion of the number of true formulas of a certain length n (...) to the number of all formulas of such length built with exactly one variable. Then, we investigate such proportion for satisfiable formulas. Second, we generalise our investigation on formulas written with $ k\ge 1 $ k ≥ 1 variables. The primary goal of the paper is the research on the asymptotic behaviour of these fractions when the length n tends to infinity. If such limits exists, they are real numbers between 0 and 1, which are called the density of truth or the density of SAT. To compare the density of truth and the density of satisfiable formulas for both fragments of 3-valued Gödel–Dummett's and Łukasiewicz's logics we use the powerful theory of analytic combinatorics. This paper is a natural continuation of the previous brief conference note by Kostrzycka and Zaionc (2020) as well as enriched with some previous results from Kostrzycka and Zaionc (2003). In the conference note we computed analytically the density of truth and the density of SAT (with a determined precision) for 3-valued Łukasiewicz's logic restricted to a language with only one variable. In Kostrzycka and Zaionc (2003) we computed the same values for exactly the same fragment of the 3-valued Gödel–Dummett logic. This paper answers the more general questions of the existence of density of truth and density of SAT for both many-valued logics with an arbitrary finite number of variables. Therefore this paper gives an an interesting picture of two main families of finite-valued fuzzy logics problems treated quantitatively. This picture is taken from the perspective of classical logic. It shows that unexpectedly there is quantitatively a little distance between these two approaches. (shrink)

The subject of the book is a reconsideration of the internalistic model of composition of the Platonic type, and its application in the ontology of quantum theory. Nonseparability is at the centre of quantum ontology. Quantum wholes are atemporal wholes governed by internalistic logic, requiring a relativization of fundamental notions of mechanics.

Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological evidence is offered which undermines this point of view and an alternative account of modality from the enactive approach to understanding cognition is suggested. Under this view, a perceptual modality is a stable form of perception which is structured not just by the biological sensitivities of the agent, but by their goals and the set of skills or expertise which (...) they are deploying at a given time. Such a view suggests that there is no such thing as an experience that is purely visual, auditory, or otherwise modal and that our attempts to understand consciousness and the mind must be conducted within a framework that provides an account of embodied, goal-directed adaptive coping with the world. (shrink)

Dotyczy: przestrzeń, czas, ciało, kognitywistyka, fenomenologia.

The book deals with distorted humanities and social sciences and examines alternatives. The topic is analysed in a way that is ground-breaking in its global comparison of research in Central Europe, Latin America, China, Russia, Africa and India.