Translated text is chapt. 7, pt. 2 of Kirisutokyō no benshō.

As Hegel suggests, there is no philosophy apart from the history of philosophy. Each philosophy represents the spirit peculiar to its own period. Heidegger, too, holds that every philosophy is the sound of Being, and the history of philosophy is the history of Being. This is true for the Kyoto School philosophy of modern Japan represented by Kitaro Nishida, Hajime Tanabe, and Tetsuro Watsuji, who made to endeavor to construct a new synthesis of Western and Eastern philosophy in the critical, (...) confrontational, and creative ways in the given historical contexts. In particular, Tanabe attempts at the dialectical unification of Christianity and Buddhism in the last resort from the standpoint of Absolute Nothingness. As, in Whitehead’s conception of process, actuality is composed of the past objective being as the given data and the present subjective act of becoming, so it might be highly significant to analyze the constitutive elements of Tanabe’s system of thought from the historical and comparative contexts. (shrink)

In this collection on the Kyoto School of Philosophy, the author offers the reader Tanabe's religious philosophy, but also, and for the first time, his ...

Hajime Tanabe (1885-1962), the Kyoto- School philosopher of modern Japan, attempts to interpret Aristotle's ontology as being involved in the logic of self-identical being without self-negative conversion in action from his own dialectical perspective. For Tanabe, the eternal essence or Form is to be mediated by the dynamic character of matter, i.e., the temporality pertinent to the changing movement. For Aristotle, however, the essence or pure activity as the principle of being is devoid of such a dynamic mediation, but is (...) rather regarded as the past being, i.e., what it should be originally and eternally. In other words, for Aristotle, evil and matter are the lacks of goodness and the eternal Form that are identical with the essence of the individual substance. Evil is to be self-negatively mediated to goodness in free action through conversion in Tanabe's perspective. Movement pertaining to matter is not simply an incompletion of pure activity, but is rather self-negatively converted into the activity as the transcendent principle of the dialectical unification of time and eternity, matter and Form, evil and Goodness. The individual existence has freedom to unify the self-contradistinctive opposed moments, i.e., subjective action and objective being in a way of mutually negating conversion. The difference between Tanabe and Aristotle lies in that for Tanabe practice is relevant to the future, whereas for Aristotle contemplation is concerned with eternity as invariable and imperishable being since the past. While Aristotle's logic is confined to the self-identity of being in contemplation, Tanabe's logic is structured by the triadic elements of individuality, species as the relative universal, and genus as the absolute universal in terms of the negative conversion in action. (shrink)

Hajime Tanabe (1885-1962), the Kyoto- School philosopher of modern Japan, attempts to interpret Aristotle's ontology as being involved in the logic of self-identical being without self-negative conversion in action from his own dialectical perspective. For Tanabe, the eternal essence or Form is to be mediated by the dynamic character of matter, i.e., the temporality pertinent to the changing movement. For Aristotle, however, the essence or pure activity as the principle of being is devoid of such a dynamic mediation, but is (...) rather regarded as the past being, i.e., what it should be originally and eternally. In other words, for Aristotle, evil and matter are the lacks of goodness and the eternal Form that are identical with the essence of the individual substance. Evil is to be self-negatively mediated to goodness in free action through conversion in Tanabe's perspective. Movement pertaining to matter is not simply an incompletion of pure activity, but is rather self-negatively converted into the activity as the transcendent principle of the dialectical unification of time and eternity, matter and Form, evil and Goodness. The individual existence has freedom to unify the self-contradistinctive opposed moments, i.e., subjective action and objective being in a way of mutually negating conversion. The difference between Tanabe and Aristotle lies in that for Tanabe practice is relevant to the future, whereas for Aristotle contemplation is concerned with eternity as invariable and imperishable being since the past. While Aristotle's logic is confined to the self-identity of being in contemplation, Tanabe's logic is structured by the triadic elements of individuality, species as the relative universal, and genus as the absolute universal in terms of the negative conversion in action. (shrink)

Tanabe Hajime, another pole of the so-called Kyoto-School of Philosophy of modern Japan, attempts to construct a dialectical, triadic logic of genus, species and individual as a creative synthesis between Eastern and Western philosophy. Although the formal pattern of his method is influenced by the Hegelian dialectic, the way of his thinking is rather prevailed by Kantian dualism. This makes a sharp contrast to his mentor Nishida Kitaro, whose logic of Topos or Place qua Absolute Nothingness is criticized as all-embracing (...) and static in character by him. The difference between them might be parallel to that of Greek and Latin theology concerning the Trinity. Tanabe never presupposes any preexistent entity as the primordial One in the eternal dimension, but rather maintains the individuality as the free subjective agent in the field of history. The dichotomy between the universal and the individual is overcome in and through the mediation of the third term— the species — as the negatively self-realized, specific form of the genus. The species, however, turns out to be the self-estrangement, when it loses the perpetually negative mediation of the free subjective activity of the individual. (shrink)

Tanabe Hajime, the Kyoto School philosopher of modern Japan, proposes a new idea of the relationship between religion and politics in terms of the triadic logic of species that is motivated by the religious moment of repentance. Even the state existence has the inherently radical evil as in the case of the individual person, due to its duality of the species level of being. This means that the state existence is on the way of actualization of the genus like universality, (...) while always involving in the regression into the past substrative being which prevents it from realizing its own universality. In other words, the state existence is not absolute as such but rather a balanced being between ideality and reality, absolute and relative. This entails that politics is in need of perpetual reformation in connection with the religious act of repentance for sin and evil deeply lurked in human beings from time immemorial. Tanabe’s Logic of Species as the dialectic elucidates the negative mediation of politics and religion from the metanoetic perspective and sheds a new light on the relation of world religion and politics today. (shrink)

The historical origins of the Kyoto School of Philosophy of modern Japan, represented by Kitaro Nishida and Hajime Tanabe, may be derived from both the ancient Chinese idea of Change and the ancient Indian Upanishadic idea of the mutual identity of Brahman and Atman. The ancient Chinese idea of Change signifies change as well as non-change, and even their dialectical unification. Both origins are structured by the self-identity of the opposed in logic, and these historical prototypes have been developed into (...) the various forms of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist philosophy. The notion of Nothingness or Emptiness rather than Being has been set up as the fundamental principle. The principle of Nothingness as ultimate reality has been connected with the logic of self-identity of theopposed, and this is evident in Nishida’s concept of the self-identity in absolute contradistinction that is equivalent to the Place of Absolute Nothingness. Even though Nishida’s idea of Place is directly and explicitly influenced by the ancient Greek idea of Topos, it has indirectly and implicitly been affected by the traditional agricultural society as well, in which the land is regarded as the self-identical substratum despite the cyclic time of the four-seasons change. The ancient Chinese idea of Change also reflects the agricultural society in which the cyclic time plays an important role on the basis of the unchanging self-identical land as the underlying substratum. Nishida succeeds in establishing the new logical expression of Eastern traditional thought, deeply hidden in consciousness, in relation toWestern philosophy. The uniqueness of Nishida’s idea of Place may have its main source in the traditional agricultural background, and in this sense his way of thinking may be rural in character. On the other hand, Tanabe, though following Nishida at first, turns to making criticism of the mentor with the establishment of the triadic logic of species as the dialectic, which is characterized by the perpetual self-negating conversion in action. In contrast to Nishida, Tanabe represents the urban type of thinking, which is in pursuit of transforming in life. While Nishida’s idea of Absolute Nothingness has an affinity with the ancient Chinese philosopher Laotzu’s idea of Nothingness from and into which every entity comes and goes, Tanabe’s concept of Absolute Nothingness as the principle ofconversion is more closed to the Buddhist idea of sunyata, i.e., Emptiness, which is devoid of any substance in itself. As regards evil, the difference between them is obvious in that for Nishida evil and time or history disappear into the ultimate horizon or place of Nothingness with the tendency toward a kind of monism of goodness, whereas for Tanabe evil copes with goodness and retains its own status throughout, never being reduced to the opposed. Even if so, both of them, however, fail to construct a philosophy of history from the epochal or durational viewpoint, compared to Heidegger and Jaspers. (shrink)

Che 1-pu. Han'guk ŭi kaebyŏk -- 1. Kŭndae Han'guk konggongsŏng ŭi chŏn'gae wa t'aja waŭi yŏndae -- 2. Kŭndae Han'guk siminjŏk konggongsŏng ŭi sŏngnip -- 3. Taejonggyo pŏmt'unggusŭjuŭi wa pop'yŏnjuŭi -- Che 2-pu. Ilbon ŭi kaebyŏk -- 1. Kŭnse Ilbon sasang ŭi Sŏngin'gwan -- 2. Ilbon sinjonggyo ŭi kaebyŏk undong -- 3. Hyŏndae Ilbon ŭi saengmyŏng yŏngsŏng kwa ch'iyu yŏngsŏng -- Che 3-pu. Sirhak ŭi sigak -- 1. 19-segi sirhakcha ŭi Ilbon insik -- 2. Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi chonggyo hoet'ong sasang (...) -- 3. Han'guk, Ilbon, Chungguk e issŏsŏ 'Sinsirhangnon' pigyo -- Che 4-pu. Pigyo ŭi sigak -- 1. Ilbon esŏŭi T'oegye, Yulgok, Tasan yŏn'gu ŭi hŭrŭm -- 2. Ch'oe Han-gi wa Ilbon ŭi konggong sasangga pigyo yŏn'gu -- 3. Tongsŏyang konggongsŏng yŏn'gu wa Han'gukchŏk konggongsŏn. (shrink)

没後20年、いま必要な歴史に裏打ちされた予見力、現実政治に提言する率直さ、道義性と理想主義。.

Akama et al. [1] introduced a hierarchical classification of first-order formulas for a hierarchical prenex normal form theorem in semi-classical arithmetic. In this paper, we give a justification for the hierarchical classification in a general context of first-order theories. To this end, we first formalize the standard transformation procedure for prenex normalization. Then we show that the classes $$\textrm{E}_k$$ and $$\textrm{U}_k$$ introduced in [1] are exactly the classes induced by $$\Sigma _k$$ and $$\Pi _k$$ respectively via the transformation procedure in (...) any first-order theory. (shrink)

Akama et al. [1] systematically studied an arithmetical hierarchy of the law of excluded middle and related principles in the context of first-order arithmetic. In that paper, they first provide a prenex normal form theorem as a justification of their semi-classical principles restricted to prenex formulas. However, there are some errors in their proof. In this paper, we provide a simple counterexample of their prenex normal form theorem [1, Theorem 2.7], then modify it in an appropriate way which still serves (...) to largely justify the arithmetical hierarchy. In addition, we characterize a variety of prenex normal form theorems by logical principles in the arithmetical hierarchy. The characterization results reveal that our prenex normal form theorems are optimal. For the characterization results, we establish a new conservation theorem on semi-classical arithmetic. The theorem generalizes a well-known fact that classical arithmetic is $\Pi _2$ -conservative over intuitionistic arithmetic. (shrink)

専門的な予備知識は仮定せずに完全性定理や計算可能性から論じ、第一および第二不完全性定理、Rosserの定理、Hilbertのプログラム、G ̈odelの加速定理、算術の超準モデル、Kolmogorov複雑性などを紹介して、不完全性定理の数学的意義と、その根源にある哲学的問題を説く。.

Within a weak subsystem of second-order arithmetic , that is -conservative over , we reformulate Kreisel's proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and Boolos' proof of the First Incompleteness Theorem.

In this paper, I show that the availability of what some authors have called the weak reading and the strong reading of donkey sentences with relative clauses is systematically related to monotonicity properties of the determiner. The correlation is different from what has been observed in the literature in that it concerns not only right monotonicity, but also left monotonicity (persistence/antipersistence). I claim that the reading selected by a donkey sentence with a double monotone determiner is in fact the one (...) that validates inference based on the left monotonicity of the determiner. This accounts for the lack of strong reading in donkey sentences with MON determiners, which have been neglected in the literature. I consider the relevance of other natural forms of inference as well, but also suggest how monotonicity inference might play a central role in the actual process of interpretation. The formal theory is couched in dynamic predicate logic with generalized quantifiers. (shrink)