This book, first published in 1987, investigates what distinguishes the part of human behaviour that is action from the part that is not. The distinction was clearly drawn by Socrates, and developed by Aristotle and the medievals, but key elements of their work became obscured in modern philosophy, and were not fully recovered when, under Wittgenstein’s influence, the theory of action was revived in analytical philosophy. This study aims to recover those elements, and to analyse them in terms of a (...) defensible semantics on Fregean lines. Among its conclusions: that actions are bodily or mental events that are causally explained by their doers’ propositional attitudes, especially by their choices or fully specific intentions; that choice cannot be reduced to desire and belief, and hence that the traditional concept of will as intellectual appetite must be revived. (shrink)

A major voice in late twentieth-century philosophy, Alan Donagan is distinguished for his theories on the history of philosophy and the nature of morality. The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan, volumes 1 and 2, collect 28 of Donagan's most important and best-known essays on historical understanding and ethics from 1957 to 1991. Volume 2 addresses issues in the philosophy of action and moral theory. With papers on Kant, von Wright, Sellars, and Chisholm, this volume also covers a (...) range of questions in applied ethics--from the morality of Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to ethical questions in medicine and law. (shrink)

Joseph Boyle raises important questions about the place of the double-effect exception in absolutist moral theories. His own absolutist theory (held by many, but not all, Catholic moralists), which derives from the principles that fundamental human goods may not be intentionally violated, cannot dispense with such exceptions, although he rightly rejects some widely held views about what they are. By contrast, Kantian absolutist theory, which derives from the principle that lawful freedom must not be violated, has a corollary – that (...) it is a duty, where possible, to coerce those who try to violate lawful freedom – which makes superfluous many of the double-effect exceptions Boyle allows. Other implications of the two theories are contrasted. Inter alia , it is argued that, in Boyle's theory, that a violation of a fundamental human good can be viewed as a cost proportionate to a benefit obtained, cannot yield a double-effect exception to the prohibition of intentionally violating that good, because paying a cost cannot be unintentional. Keywords: cost-benefit analysis, double effect, intention, side effect CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

With papers on Kant, von Wright, Sellars, and Chisholm, this volume also covers a range of questions in applied ethics—from the morality of Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to ethical questions in medicine ...

The fundamental causal concept in Chisholm's theory of agency is that of causally contributing to, a generic concept covering both event-causal contributors (members of sets of nonredundant jointly sufficient conditions) and agent-causal contributors (not members of sets of jointly sufficient conditions). Chisholm's elucidation of agent-causation is explored and defended against objections. It is then argued that Chisholm's ontology, in particular in its treatment of the concept of an evert, generates difficulties for his theory of agency oi which two are explored: (...) (i) that it is hard to reconcile with Chisholm's own apparent analysis of the distinction between intentional and unintentional actions; and (ii) that it entails that every causal contributing has an infinite set of causal contributors, which is in conflict with the principle that any set of nonredundant conditions that are jointly sufficient for the occurrence of an event are so by the nature of things, and not by virtue of some further event. (shrink)

Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics appears to defend a revised utilitarianism against both egoism and intuitionism, while conceding that the practical results of enlightened egoism largely coincide with those of utilitarianism, and that the utilitarian greatest happiness principle can be justified only as a fundamental intuition. It is true that Sidgwick was distressed by the description of his treatment of intuitional morality as ‘mere hostile criticism from the outside', and protested that that morality ‘is my own … as much as it (...) is any man's; it is, as I say, the “Morality of Common Sense”, which I only attempt to represent so far as I share it’. However, he could not well have denied that, in The Methods of Ethics, the endorsement tentatively accorded to intuitional morality as a system is in the end withdrawn. Ultimately it is concluded that utilitarianism can define and correct what intuitional morality is vague or mistaken about, and can complete what common sense does not venture to treat at all. (shrink)

The fundamental causal concept in Chisholm's theory of agency is that of causally contributing to, a generic concept covering both event-causal contributors and agent-causal contributors. Chisholm's elucidation of agent-causation is explored and defended against objections. It is then argued that Chisholm's ontology, in particular in its treatment of the concept of an evert, generates difficulties for his theory of agency oi which two are explored: that it is hard to reconcile with Chisholm's own apparent analysis of the distinction between intentional (...) and unintentional actions; and that it entails that every causal contributing has an infinite set of causal contributors, which is in conflict with the principle that any set of nonredundant conditions that are jointly sufficient for the occurrence of an event are so by the nature of things, and not by virtue of some further event. (shrink)

The fundamental causal concept in Chisholm's theory of agency is that of causally contributing to, a generic concept covering both event-causal contributors (members of sets of nonredundant jointly sufficient conditions) and agent-causal contributors (not members of sets of jointly sufficient conditions). Chisholm's elucidation of agent-causation is explored and defended against objections. It is then argued that Chisholm's ontology, in particular in its treatment of the concept of an evert, generates difficulties for his theory of agency oi which two are explored: (...) (i) that it is hard to reconcile with Chisholm's own apparent analysis of the distinction between intentional and unintentional actions; and (ii) that it entails that every causal contributing has an infinite set of causal contributors, which is in conflict with the principle that any set of nonredundant conditions that are jointly sufficient for the occurrence of an event are so by the nature of things, and not by virtue of some further event. (shrink)

This book contains the collected papers of Alan Donagan on topics in the philosophy of religion. Donagan was respected as a leading figure in American moral philosophy. His untimely death in 1991 prevented him from collecting his philosophical reflections on religion, particularly Christianity, and its relation to ethics and other concerns. This collection, therefore, constitutes the fullest expression of Donagan's thought on Christianity and ethics, in which it is possible to discern the outlines of a coherent, overarching (...) theory. Editor Anthony Perovich has supplied a useful introduction, which brings Donagan's work into focus and brings out the unifying themes in the essays. (shrink)

I. Professor Leo Gershoy’s paper, “Some Problems of a Working Historian,” and the discussions of it by Professors R. B. Brandt and Ernest Nagel, show that the stale philosophical question, ‘What is historical explanation?’ may be refreshed by investigating what historians do when they offer an alternative to an explanation that has become generally accepted. Gershoy’s paper is a philosophical study of his own work as an historian: in particular, of his challenge, in Bertrand Barère: A Reluctant Terrorist, to the (...) analysis of the political conduct of Bertrand Barère, one of the leaders of the great French Revolution, by which Macaulay supported this celebrated invective. (shrink)

The article goes into hare's attempt to refute objections to his account of morality which seemingly allows for the nazis' judgment to exterminate the jews. The author suggests that hare's defense rests on his demonstrating that if the principles of universalizability and prescriptivism are granted and their implications imaginatively grasped, Then "nobody but a madman" could hold that all jews ought to be exterminated. He argues that this defense rests on sociological and biological absurdities. (staff).

The author discusses the criticisms of margaret macdonald and martin shearn. He also uses ryle's distinction between grammatical and logical subjects, Which sums up the discussion of whether or not existence is a predicate. (staff).

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States contains the following words: “No person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In laying down this restriction on what government may do, the Constitution creates a legal right: the right to be free from coercion by any organ of government to testify against oneself – to incriminate oneself.

William K. Frankena has himself authoritatively and engagingly narrated the itinerarium of his mind from youthful cognitivism in ethics, as a beginner ‘of Calvinistic background and Hegelian sympathies’ who contrived to combine ‘naturalism about “good” with intuitionism about “ought” ’, to his mature noncognitivist rationalism as a major philosopher of sophisticated analytic technique and Calvinist sympathies. A number of his characteristic earlier opinions were elaborated in response to the writings of G. E. Moore; and this body of work as a (...) young man contains the seeds of his later development. Yet the past thirty years have radically altered the perspective from which Moore and his influence are now viewed. What changes does our altered perspective on Moore make to our understanding of Frankena? (shrink)

Inasmuch as a good many of the Australian philosophers one would like to see included are not represented, and some of the contributors are no longer teaching in Australia, the title of this volume is somewhat misleading. It contains an introduction by Alan Donagan and the following original essays: J. Passmore, "Russell and Bradley"; L. Goddard, "The Existence of Universals"; B. Ellis, "An Epistemological Concept of Truth"; P. Herbst, "Fact, Form, and Intentionality"; M. Deutscher, "A Causal Account of Inferring"; (...) D. M. Armstrong, "Colour-Realism and the Argument from Microscopes"; K. Campbell, "Colours"; C. B. Martin, "People"; M. C. Bradley, "Two Arguments Against the Identity Thesis"; D. H. Monro, "Mill's Third Howler"; G. Schlesinger, "The Passage of Time." Though the essays are original and admirable, there does not seem to be anything distinctively Australian, rather than American or British, about their contents. Perhaps the most enlightening fact about them is that neither the Andersonian tradition of Sydney nor the Wittgensteinian tradition of Melbourne which dominated the Australian philosophical scene in the early 1950's is pre-eminent any longer, or even in evidence.--A. B. M. (shrink)

As the United States is currently prosecuting two wars, it is important to consider whether those wars, and the resulting noncombatantcasualties, can be morally justified. Such consideration can be initiated by considering some of Alan Donagan’s work in his book The Theory of Morality. In that book Donagan sets out to develop, as a philosophical system, that part of the common morality according to the Hebrew-Christian tradition, which does not depend on any theistic beliefs. According to that tradition (...) it is sometimes morally permissible to resort to war. This poses a problem because also part of the tradition is a near absolute prohibition on harming innocent people. Since innocent people die in war, there is a tension here.Donagan claims that this problem can be solved by assigning the blame for some such deaths to the aggressor, thereby permitting (some) resorts to war. This paper shows that this solution is inadequate; and defends a more plausible (and more traditional) justification for some innocent deaths. This justification is consistent with the system Donagan develops, and thus may have application in the consideration of the justification of the two wars currently being prosecuted by the United States. (shrink)

Alan Donagan, in The Theory of Morality, famously claims that the principles of “common morality” (i.e., the morality of the Judeo-Christian tradition) form a consistent system that can be derived from a single fundamental principle: It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature. In particular, I want to show that the prohibition contained in the fundamental principle is interpreted by appeal to prior convictions about particular sorts of cases, whether they (...) involve the violation of “respect” or not, and that this has unfavorable consequences for Donagan’s claim that the principles of common morality form a truly deductive system of morality. (shrink)

No contemporary attempt to develop a theory of morality in the Kantian tradition would be responsible if it ignored the Hegelian critique of Kantian ethics. At the center of that critique is the claim that the principles and maxims of pure practical reason are insufficiently specific to give definite answers to basic moral questions arising in everyday life. Pure practical reason is here understood as the exercise of that rational capacity which I share with all rational creatures in all times (...) and places. It thus abstracts from all aspects of my moral sensibility which derive from my own historical time and place in distinction from other cultures or societies. (shrink)

A major voice in late twentieth-century philosophy, Alan Donagan is distinguished for his theories on the history of philosophy and the nature of morality. The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan, volumes 1 and 2, collect 28 of Donagan's most important and best-known essays on historical understanding and ethics from 1957 to 1991. Volume 1 includes essays on Spinoza, Descartes, Bradley, Collingwood, Russell, Moore, and Popper, as well as two previously unpublished papers on the history of philosophy as (...) a discipline, and on Ryle and Wittgenstein's nature of philosophy. Linked by Donagan's commitment to the central importance of history for philosophy and his interest in problems of historical understanding, these essays represent the remarkable scope of Donagan's thought. (shrink)

A major voice in late twentieth-century philosophy, Alan Donagan is distinguished for his theories on the history of philosophy and the nature of morality. The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan, volumes 1 and 2, collect 28 of Donagan's most important and best-known essays on historical understanding and ethics from 1957 to 1991. Volume 2 addresses issues in the philosophy of action and moral theory. With papers on Kant, von Wright, Sellars, and Chisholm, this volume also covers a (...) range of questions in applied ethics—from the morality of Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to ethical questions in medicine and law. (shrink)

What is the relationship between contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy? This Ur-question forms the backdrop for the essays of Alan Donagan, the most important of which are included in the two volumes of his Philosophical Papers. Donagan, who died in 1991, was uniquely in a position to work out an adequate answer. His philosophical training and teaching career spanned the period from the logical empiricism of the 1940s to the "cognitive revolution" of the 1980s (...) and early 1990s, running intermediately through the heydays of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, ordinary language philosophy, conceptual analysis, post-empiricist naturalism, and modal metaphysics. His travels led him from Melbourne to Oxford and then on to the USA. There he taught successively at the University of Minnesota, Indiana University, the University of Illinois at Urbana, the University of Chicago, and finally at the California Institute of Technology. Donagan's philosophical research was similarly wide-ranging. He published many papers on topics in the philosophy of history, the history of philosophy, action theory, and ethics; and he produced four books: The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, The Theory of Morality, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action, and Spinoza. (shrink)