This book explores a range of traditional and contemporary metaphysical themes that figure in the writings of E. J. Lowe, whose powerful and influential work was still developing at the time of his death in 2015. Leading philosophers present new essays on topics to do with ontology, necessity, existence, and mental causation.

In his defence of the identity theory, Professor Smart has attempted to show that reports of mental states are strictly topic-neutral. If this were the case then it would follow that there is nothing logically wrong with the claim that the mind is the brain or that mental states are really nothing but brain states. Some phillosophers have argued that a fundamental objection to any form of materialism is that the latter makes an obvious logical blunder in identifying the mental (...) with the physical. This is the view that dualism is enshrined in our language. If this is true then of course statements such as ‘the mind is actually nothing but the brain’ and ‘mental states are really nothing but physical processes’ would be quite unacceptable on strictly logical grounds. Smart's claim that talk about mental states is topic-neutral, however, appears to exempt materialism from such objections. The question is, does it? That is to say, are sensation reports and the like topic-neutral in the required sense? Are they analogous in principle to statements of the form ‘someone is in the room’? Smart's point is that expressions such as ‘someone phoned: it was the doctor’ are logically similar to those of the form ‘I am having a red after-image: it is a brain process.’ ‘Someone’ is not logically equivalent to ‘the doctor’ , but it may, of course, be true that the doctor is the someone who phoned. Does this analogy hold and is it correct to say that sensation reports and mentalistic expressions in general are topic-neutral, that they refer only to experienced ‘somethings’? Smart's claim runs as follows: When a person says, ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’, he is saying something like this: ‘ There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, that is, when I really see an orange’. Notice that the italicised words, namely ‘there is something going on which is like what is going on when’, are all quasi logical or topic neutral words. This explains why the ancient Greek peasant's reports about his sensations can be neutral between dualistic metaphysics and my materialistic metaphysics. It explains how sensations can be brain processes and yet how a man who reports them need know nothing about brain processes. For he reports them only very abstractly as ‘something going on which is like what is going on when…’ Similarly, a person may say ‘someone is in the room’, thus reporting truly that the doctor is in the room, even though he has never heard of doctors. (shrink)

Einheit der Kirche und Einheit der Menschheit, by W. Pannenberg.--Die Menschheit, Israel und die Nationen in hebräischer Überlieferung, by M. Greenberg.--Die Einheit der Menschheit in biblischer Sicht, by C. Maurer.--Einheit und Entfremdung im Islam, by H. Askari.--Die Entdeckung Amerikas und das europäische Menschenbild, by L. González Rodríguez.--Der Einfluss des Kolonialismus auf das asiatische Verständnis vom Menschen, by J. G. Arapura.--Religiöser Pluralismus und die Suche nach menschlicher Gemeinschaft, by S. J. Samartha.--Vom konfuzianischen Edelmann zum neuen chinesischen "politischen Menschen", by D. A. (...) Robinson.--Die Revolution der Wissenschaft und die Einheit der Menschheit, by B. Towers.--Sprache und Kommunikation, by E. A. Nida.--Die Theologie der Tradition als Grundlage der Einheit, by N. A. Nissiotis. (shrink)

Introduction , Sophie Gibb 1. Mental Causation , John Heil 2. Physical Realization without Preemption , Sydney Shoemaker 3. Mental Causation in the Physical World , Peter Menzies 4. Mental Causation: Ontology and Patterns of Variation , Paul Noordhof 5. Causation is Macroscopic but not Irreducible , David Papineau 6. Substance Causation, Powers, and Human Agency , E. J. Lowe 7. Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics , Jonathan D. Jacobs and Timothy O’Connor 8. Mental Causation and Double Prevention (...) , Sophie Gibb 9. The Identity Theory as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem , David Robb 10. Continuant Causation, Fundamentality, and Freedom , Peter Simons 11. There is no Exclusion Problem , Steinvor Tholl Arnadottir and Tim Crane. (shrink)

John Heil's new book (Heil 2003) is remarkable in many ways. In a concise, lucid and accessible manner, it develops a complete system of ontology with many strikingly original features and then applies that ontology to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, with illuminating results. Although Heil acknowledges his intellectual debts to C. B. Martin (p. viii), he is unduly modest about his own contribution to the development and application of this novel metaphysical system. A full (...) examination of the position that Heil defends would require a book in itself, so I shall limit myself to discussing some of its central themes and to explaining a few doubts that I have concerning some aspects of it. (shrink)

John Heil's new book (Heil 2003) is remarkable in many ways. In a concise, lucid and accessible manner, it develops a complete system of ontology with many strikingly original features and then applies that ontology to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, with illuminating results. Although Heil acknowledges his intellectual debts to C. B. Martin (p. viii), he is unduly modest about his own contribution to the development and application of this novel metaphysical system. A full (...) examination of the position that Heil defends would require a book in itself, so I shall limit myself to discussing some of its central themes and to explaining a few doubts that I have concerning some aspects of it. (shrink)

John Heil’s new book is remarkable in many ways. In a concise, lucid and accessible manner, it develops a complete system of ontology with many strikingly original features and then applies that ontology to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, with illuminating results. Although Heil acknowledges his intellectual debts to C. B. Martin, he is unduly modest about his own contribution to the development and application of this novel metaphysical system. A full examination of the position that (...) Heil defends would require a book in itself, so I shall limit myself to discussing some of its central themes and to explaining a few doubts that I have concerning some aspects of it. (shrink)

Heidegger was rector of Freiburg University from April 21, 1933, until sometime in March 1934. Soon after becoming rector, he joined the Nazi Party and devoted much energy and personal initiative to the implementation of Nazi programs in his university. A documentary record of this year is collected in Guido Schneeberger's Nachlese zu Heidegger. Of Schneeberger's 217 documents, 41 contain actual texts by Heidegger or reports of things he said. Thus there is room for useful editing. In the present "translation," (...) Runes unsuccessfully undertakes this task. He retains just 17 of the Schneeberger documents; eight of these contain words by Heidegger. Or perhaps one should say words by Runes, for the mutilated translation does even less credit to Heidegger than the brown clichés that pervade the original. No page is free from such mistranslations as "outdated" for "vollendet," "the State" for "die Stätte," "adherence to tradition" for "Wille zum Wesen," "kiss good-bye" for "einbüßen," "old people's home" for "Elternhaus." In eight different places the word "Hitler" has been inserted. On page 22, e.g., Runes has added his own "Heil Hitler" to Heidegger's signature. Thus, though many of the general facts can be gleaned from this book, it is not reliable as far as detail is concerned. And of course it shares with the original Schneeberger documentation the limitation of giving no hint as to Heidegger's Nazi activities, if any, after early 1934.—J. B. B. (shrink)

(1975). The History of Salvation in Dr. A. A. van Ruler's Theology An Introduction to his Theology on the Occasion of the Publication of his “Theological Works”. Bijdragen: Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 391-419.

Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...) advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick. (shrink)

Metaphysics is definitely back on the agenda of contemporary philosophy. It is a metaphysics in the full traditional sense, seeking to provide the means to gain knowledge that covers being as a whole, not just parts of it (such as the metaphysics of mind, the metaphysics of values, etc.). Oxford University Press published three books in 2011 and 2012 each of which spells out that ambition. The present review sums up the main topics covered in these books and offers some (...) comments. (shrink)

The first thing to note about the present work is that it is divided into twenty short chapters, all of which contain numbered sections averaging two to three pages in length. This organization adds to the concision and clarity of the book and works well with Heil’s attempt to present ideas in an unpretentious manner. The dust jacket tells us that the book is written in an accessible, nontechnical style that is intended for nonspecialists as well as seasoned metaphysicians. (...) But despite the organization and flow of bite-sized nuggets, I doubt anyone with less than graduate training in analytical philosophy will understand the problems and issues. A brief survey of the contemporary philosophers who get the most discussion should confirm the point. This includes: C. B. Martin, D. M. Armstrong, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Sidney Shoemaker, E. J. Lowe, Donald Davidson, Saul Kripke, and Hilary Putnam. (shrink)

Metaphysics can be understood as the branch of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality. In this textbook for students new to the topic, John Heil covers the key concepts in an original, jargon-free way.

Davidson's account of mental causation initiated in “Mental Events” forms a backdrop to much subsequent discussion of the topic. Davidson is commonly taken to defend token identity – token mental events are identical with token physical events – but type diversity – mental types “supervene on,” but are not reducible to or identical with physical types, where types are understood as properties. Mental events are physical events, but one and the same event can have a physical property and, by virtue (...) of having this property, have a mental property as well. There are two salient difficulties with this account. (1) It gives rise to the problem of “causal relevance”: granted that a mental event can cause a physical event, could it do so by virtue of being mental, by virtue of its possession of a mental property? (2) The view thus described is not Davidson's. This chapter discusses Davidson actual account and shows that, whatever its flaws, they are not what they are commonly thought to be. (shrink)

Medizinethik wie auch Pflegeethik werden allgemein als Disziplinen verstanden, die das Handeln von Menschen auf die Geltung seiner Ziele, Motivationen und Resultate hin untersucht. Ausgangspunkt solcher Formen der Ethik bildet die zum Problem gewordene Situation, in der vermeintlich eindeutige Grundziele, wie zum Beispiel Lebensverlängerung einerseits und Leidensverminderung andererseits, miteinander in Konflikt geraten. Es stellen sich dann Fragen, deren praxisanleitende Beantwortungen von einer Pflegeethik gefordert werden. In der theoretisch fundierten Beantwortung dieser Fragen jedoch entfernen sich Medizin- und Pflegeethik von dem, was (...) Menschen tun und erleiden. Mit Hilfe der seinsgeschichtlichen Hermeneutik Heideggers und des amerikanischen Pragmatismus, vertreten durch John Dewey und Richard Rorty, entwickeln die Autoren eine Methode, die - jenseits sogenannter Grundfragen einer medizinischen Ethik - alltägliche Krisen des heutigen klinischen Miteinanders im Spannungsfeld technischer Medizin und individueller Situation lösungsorientiert neu verstehen lässt. Jene werden - derart als Fragen von Mitgefühl und Selbstbestimmung neu verstanden - zu Chancen einer verantwortungsvollen klinischen Praxis. Die Krankenpflege bildet dabei als neu belebter metaphorischer Fundus den poietischen Horizont dieser Praxis, deren methodischer Vollzug von der Ausbildung bis zum beruflichen Handeln ärztlichen und pflegenden Klinikpersonals reicht. Die kulturellen, sprachlichen, rechtlichen und institutionellen Bedingungen des Handelns in Kliniken werden auf den Prüfstand gestellt und neu bewertet. Schließlich wird die Methode eines Klinischen Pragmatismus, als neue Ethik der Pflege, anhand von einschlägigen Fallbeispielen aus der Praxis beispielhaft angewandt. (shrink)

The book develops a philosophical foundation to the field of management education using the work of Martin Heidegger as a guiding philosophy. It asks the questions ‘what is a corporation?’ and ‘what is corporate management?’ These two questions are foundational for management thought in general and management ethics in particular. Most other academic fields are in some way defined and guided by a philosophical discourse. This philosophical discourse is largely missing in the field of management thought and education. Without this (...) foundation it can never be clear what actually belongs into a certain academic discipline and what does not. It also therefore lacks a sound and well articulated ontological foundation critical for developing approaches to ethical management. This book seeks to fill this gap and consequently represents an interdisciplinary effort between the academic field of management/business administration and philosophy, which is vital for business ethics. Intended as required reading for an elective on philosophy of management that is offered annually at the Wits Business School / University of the Witwatersrand / Johannesburg. The structure of the course will be largely based on the structure of the book. (shrink)

Worries about mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how a mental substance (thought to be immaterial) could interact with a material substance, a body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental qua mental cause (...) what it does? After looking at the traditional Problem of Interaction, we survey various versions of the property-based problem and look at proposed solutions to them. (shrink)

This work is the second part of a critical textual edition that is devoted to an extraordinarily rich collection of manuscripts with equally remarkable historical significance dating from late Christian antiquity.