The theory of descriptions occupies a very prominent place in Russell's system of logic and indeed in his system of philosophy. Since the publication of the now classical paper “On Denoting” in Mind for 1905 the theory had been incorporated into Principia Mathematica , the first volume of which appeared in 1910. In 1918 Russell discussed descriptions in his lectures on the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, which subsequently were published in The Monist for 1919. A very lucid exposition of the (...) main tenets of the doctrine is to be found in the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy dating from the same year. Epistemological aspects of the theory of descriptions are examined in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description“, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1910–11, and also in Chapter V of The Problems of Philosophy, first published in 1912. (shrink)

An attempt is made in the present essay to accommodate various senses of the notion of existence and ofthat of non-existence within the framework of logic. With this aim in view a system of Lesniewski's Ontology, referred to as System S, is outlined. Equipped with appropriate definitions and illustrated with a selection of theses it offers a logical theory of existence and non-existence. The usefulness of the theory is then tested by interpreting in its terms some of the principal notions (...) and assertions of Meinong's ontology. A few brief comments on the notion of 'possible object' and on 'semantics' of fiction conclude the essay. (shrink)

An attempt is made in the present essay to accommodate various senses of the notion of existence and ofthat of non-existence within the framework of logic. With this aim in view a system of Lesniewski's Ontology, referred to as System S, is outlined. Equipped with appropriate definitions and illustrated with a selection of theses it offers a logical theory of existence and non-existence. The usefulness of the theory is then tested by interpreting in its terms some of the principal notions (...) and assertions of Meinong's ontology. A few brief comments on the notion of 'possible object' and on 'semantics' of fiction conclude the essay. (shrink)

An attempt is made in the present essay to accommodate various senses of the notion of existence and ofthat of non-existence within the framework of logic. With this aim in view a system of Lesniewski's Ontology, referred to as System S, is outlined. Equipped with appropriate definitions and illustrated with a selection of theses it offers a logical theory of existence and non-existence. The usefulness of the theory is then tested by interpreting in its terms some of the principal notions (...) and assertions of Meinong's ontology. A few brief comments on the notion of 'possible object' and on 'semantics' of fiction conclude the essay. (shrink)

According to the author, no body of theories deserves to be called philosophy unless some of these theories and problems fall within the province of metphysics. No problems deserves the name of metaphysics unless some of them add up to constitute ontology. The author presents the reistic version of the science of being as the union of Protothetic, Ontology, Mereology and Chronology. The next possible step in the construction of the reistic ontology will be Stereology (a kind of reistic geometry).

As the author sees it, Tadeusz Kotarbiński's reism is an ontology with semantical ramifications. Contrary to Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's view the reist is not commited to any particular categorially determined language; he has to use, and is at liberty to do so, the language of whoever happens to be his opponent always provide that it is a categorially determined language. Contrary to Ajdukiewicz's opinion, the positive ontological thesis of resim (i.e. the thesis that for all a and b, if a is (...) a b, then a is bulky and lasting) is not a tautology; it is a denial of the thesis held by unicategorial Platonism. Contrary to Ajdukiewicz's insistence, the negative ontological thesis of reism (i.e. the thesis that there are no properties, there are no relations, there are no events, etc.) consists of propositions which, in the light of multicategorial idealization of ordinary language, are meaningful and syntactically well constructed. They deny equally meaningful and syntactically well constructed assertions of multicategorial Platonism. (shrink)