William James once replied to the critics of the new pragmatic philosophy with the caution not to be too sharp or logic-chopping but to evaluate pragmatism as a whole, and especially weigh it against its possible alternatives. This is fair advice indeed. All too often the opponents of pragmatism have seized upon one of its formulations and, oblivious of its context and surrounding qualifications, have proclaimed the absurdity of the whole enterprise. James himself admitted that some of his expressions were (...) infelicitous and misleading, but he believed that the intelligent and indulgent reader would grasp his meaning and not impute to him doctrines he never held. Indeed, the reader of James soon comes to realize that he cannot stop at any one formulation of pragmatism but must hurry on to the next in order to see it in a broader and fuller context. He is aware, then, that pragmatism in James’s view is not a doctrine or system but a method and spirit of philosophizing, or, as we would say today, a way of doing philosophy. It is this spirit and perspective that must be appreciated if one is to do justice to the pragmatism of William James. (shrink)

AT FIRST SIGHT IT WOULD SEEM INCONGRUOUS, even an oxymoron, to juxtapose the names of Charles Darwin and Thomas Aquinas. Darwin was a biologist of the nineteenth century whose theory of evolution demanded the mutability of natural species. Thomas Aquinas, the father of Thomism, was a theologian and philosopher of the thirteenth century who held that forms in themselves and the species they constitute are immutable. Six centuries separated Darwin and Aquinas, centuries that witnessed the decline of Thomism and scholasticism (...) in general, with Descartes’s rejection of substantial forms and the advent of English empiricism and the positivism of Auguste Comte. Living in an antischolastic environment and convinced of the mutability of species, it would seem unlikely that Darwin would have any connection with Aquinas. (shrink)

It is generally recognized that the content of a philosophy cannot be adequately understood apart from the form in which it is couched and the style of reasoning with which it is supported. Matter and form go together in a philosophy, as they do in all human creations and everywhere in nature. Thus, Werner Jaeger has shown the importance of form in the development of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Julius Stenzel has stressed the interrelation of dialectical method and content in the (...) philosophy of Plato. In the study of the philosophies of the Middle Ages the common scholastic method has long been the object of attention; but, with the exception of Thomism, their individual and special modes of procedure and styles of reasoning have largely been neglected. All too often they have been studied with an eye simply to their content, as “static systems of conceptions”, with little if any regard for their living form and method. (shrink)

SOME MODERN THOMISTS claiming to follow the lead of Thomas Aquinas, hold that the objects of the types of mathematics known in the thirteenth century, such as the arithmetic of whole numbers and Euclidean geometry, are real entities. In scholastic terms they are not beings of reason but real beings. In his once-popular scholastic manual, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Joseph Gredt maintains that, according to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the object of mathematics is real quantity, either discrete quantity in arithmetic or (...) continuous quantity in geometry. The mathematician considers the essence of quantity in abstraction from its relation to real existence in bodily substance. "When quantity is considered in this way," he writes, "it is not a being of reason but a real being. Nevertheless it is so abstractly considered that it leaves out of account both real and conceptual existence." Recent mathematicians, Gredt continues, extend their speculation to fictitious quantity, which has conceptual but not real being; for example, the fourth dimension, which by its essence positively excludes a relation to real existence. According to Gredt this is a special, transcendental mathematics essentially distinct from "real mathematics," and belonging to it only by reduction. (shrink)

After a survey of disagreements among Thomists on the nature of mathematical abstraction, the author cites Aquinas's text Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, I, d. 2, a.3 (a late text inserted in an older work). It assimilates the objects of mathematics to those of logic, thus admitting a remote foundation in reality but not the direct one of the concepts of the physical sciences.

It is generally recognized that the content of a philosophy cannot be adequately understood apart from the form in which it is couched and the style of reasoning with which it is supported. Matter and form go together in a philosophy, as they do in all human creations and everywhere in nature. Thus, Werner Jaeger has shown the importance of form in the development of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Julius Stenzel has stressed the interrelation of dialectical method and content in the (...) philosophy of Plato. In the study of the philosophies of the Middle Ages the common scholastic method has long been the object of attention; but, with the exception of Thomism, their individual and special modes of procedure and styles of reasoning have largely been neglected. All too often they have been studied with an eye simply to their content, as “static systems of conceptions”, with little if any regard for their living form and method. (shrink)

Durante la primera mitad del siglo XIII, las obras de Aristóteles sobre filosofía natural, metafísica, psicología y ética se tradujeron al latín, junto con sus comentarios árabes y griegos. En estos escritos, el mundo medieval tuvo que confrontarse con una visión filosófica y científica del universo, cuya naturaleza era altamente superior a cualquiera otra conocida hasta entonces. El efecto de este descubrimiento fue verdaderamente vigorizante y, cuando estas obras se difundieron en las universidades, tuvo lugar una profunda revolución en la (...) mente medieval. Los efectos de esa revolución aún se sienten en nuestro tiempo. (shrink)

It has recently been said that only since the 1930’s has the notion of Christian philosophy become “an object of explicit discussion.” No doubt the writer had in mind the lively controversy over the validity of the concept of Christian philosophy that came to a head in the historic conference on the subject sponsored by the Société française de philosophie in Paris in 1931. Contemporary discussions of the meaning and appropriateness of the notion often go back to the Parisian debate (...) and the abundant literature pro and con that grew out of it. We should not think, however, that before the dispute of the 1930’s there were no distinctly expressed differences of opinion about the meaning and validity of the term ‘Christian philosophy’. The recently published Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts makes it abundantly clear that already in the nineteenth century philosophers and theologians throughout Europe were discussing these topics and adopting opposing views about them. It is remarkable that one of the most outspoken and articulate protagonists in the discussion was an American, Orestes Brownson. But then, Brownson by any account was a remarkable—if somewhat neglected—man. The present essay concerns his views on Christian philosophy and between philosophy and theology, which he formulated in opposition to the European Rationalists and Traditionalists. (shrink)

This book, written by well-known students of Etienne Gilson and especially dedicated to Armand A. Maurer, helps inaugurate a long-overdue special series in philosophy honoring Gilson's legendary scholarship. It presents wide-ranging expositions of Thomist realism in the tradition of Gilsonian humanism covering themes related to philosophy in general, historical method, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and politics.".