The theory of action underlying Immanuel Kant's ethical theory is the subject of this book.

: A standard interpretation of Kantian "maxims" sees them as expressing reasons for action, implying that we cannot act without a maxim. But recent challenges to this interpretation claim that Kant viewed acting on maxims as optional. Kant's understanding of maxims derives from Christian Wolff, who regarded maxims as major premises of the practical syllogism. This supports the standard interpretation. Yet Kant also viewed commitments to maxims as essential for virtue and character development, which supports challenges to the standard interpretation, (...) and raises questions about the coherence of Kant's overall conception of the role of maxims in practical philosophy. (shrink)

In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant wrote that ‘freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except insofar as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim.’ This is an obscure statement, in both meaning and provenance. Yet almost all recent interpreters of Kant's practical philosophy find it crucial for understanding his theories of freedom and motivation, since it seems to indicate (...) what we are required to do in order to act by our own free choice. Here I refer to Kant's statement expressing the requirement that incentives be incorporated into maxims as his ‘incorporation requirement.’ How that requirement is best understood will be the leading question in what follows: a question I shall answer by showing why the incorporation requirement, and Kant's theories of freedom and motivation, should be understood differently from the way they are now usually understood. (shrink)

The categorical imperative can be construed as a universalization test for moral permissibility. False negatives of the categorical imperative would be maxims failing this test, despite the permissibility of their actions; maxims like: ‘I’ll withdraw all my savings on April 15th’. Examples of purported false negatives familiar from the literature can be grouped into three general categories, and dispatched by applying category-specific methods for proper formulation of their maxims, or for proper testing. Methods for reformulating failing maxims, such as the (...) addition of appropriate conditional clauses, do not generate false-positive counterexamples in other instances. (shrink)

On a standard interpretation, Hume argued that reason is not practical, because its operations are limited to “demonstration” and “probability.” But recent critics claim that by limiting reason’s operations to only these two, his argument begs the question. Despite this, a better argument for motivational skepticism can be found in Hume’s text, one that emphasizes reason’s inability to generate motive force against contrary desires or passions. Nothing can oppose an impulse but a contrary impulse, Hume believed, and reason cannot generate (...) an impulse. This better argument is here developed and defended. Two lines of objection to it can be anticipated: that reason actually can generate impulsive force, based on contents of its normative judgments and that reason neither can nor needs to generate an impulse, since the actions of rational agents are not determined by forceful impulses of desire, as Hume supposed. These objections are answered by pointing out their unsatisfying consequences. (shrink)

Few challenges facing Kantian ethics are more famous and formidable than the so-called "case of the inquiring murderer." It appears in some form today in most introductory ethics texts, but it is not a new objection. Even Kant himself was compelled to respond to it, though by most accounts his response was embarrassingly unpersuasive. A more satisfactory reply can be offered to this old objection, however. It will be shown here that Kantian ethics permits lying to inquirers asking wrong questions, (...) and that, therefore, it can be right to lie to a murderer inquiring whether his intended victim is hiding in your house. We begin by reviewing a now popular and plausible-sounding defense of the right to lie. Finding it unsuccessful, we turn next to scrutinize the type of question asked. The case of the inquiring murderer cannot be presented without supposing that the murderer's inquiry is unevadable. As we shall then see, in Kantian ethics it is usually wrong to ask such questions. (shrink)

The comparative seriousness of business law and business ethics gives some business people the impression that there is nothing important in business ethics. The costly penalties of illegal conduct compared to the uncertain consequences of unethical conduct support a common illusion that business ethics is much less important than law for business people. To dispel the illusion I distinguish two perspectives from which we can view the relation of business and normative systems: the internal and external perspectives. I show that (...) in one perspective, ethics is hardly less important than law, and in the other perspective it is more important, more fundamental than law. I conclude with a discussion of why business persons must place ethical and legal rules ahead of profits. (shrink)

Part of the Blackwell Readings in the History of Philosophy series, this survey of late modern philosophy focuses on the key texts and philosophers of the period whose beliefs changed the course of western thought.

The "aesthetic attitude" is the primary concept in this aesthetic theory. I argue that it is capable of accounting for both the experiential and the axiological parts of the aesthetic. In the first Part of this dissertation I defend against past and recent criticism such concepts as "aesthetic disinterestedness" and "psychical distance." They are accurate but negative descriptions of the aesthetic attitude. I present as a positive formulation of the aesthetic attitude a theory of "aesthetic attention": a mode of attention (...) whose object is a phenomenal object grounded in the objective self. ;In Part II I explain the value in aesthetic experience as arising from the relation of a subject's immediate or intrinsic interest to an object of aesthetic attention. This theory of value is relational and therefore recognizes no absolute standard for aesthetic value judgments. Authoritative criticism is possible, however, insofar as the critic represents a tradition or community of interests. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Critics have charged that there are gaps in the logic of Kant’s derivation of the formula of universal law. Here I defend that derivation against these charges, partly by emphasizing a neglected teleological principle that Kant alluded to in his argument, and partly by clarifying what he meant by actions’ “conformity to universal law.” He meant that actions conform to universal law just when their maxims can belong to a unified system of principles. An analogy with objects’ conformity to (...) universal law in nature helps show how Kant was correct in deriving the formula of universal law from the premises of his argument. RÉSUMÉ: Certains ont critiqué la dérivation de la formule de la loi universelle de Kant parce que la logique en serait lacunaire. Je prends la défense de la dérivation, en mettant d’abord l’accent sur un principe téléologique auquel Kant fait allusion dans son argument et, ensuite, en clarifiant ce que celui-ci entend par la «conformité à la loi universelle» des actions. Kant maintenait que les actions étaient conformes à une loi universelle seulement lorsque leurs maximes appartiennent à un système unifié de principes. Une analogie avec la conformité à la loi universelle des objets dans la nature aide à montrer pourquoi Kant avait raison de dériver la formule de la loi universelle des prémisses de son argument. (shrink)

After distinguishing three criteria of adequacy for any acceptable moral theory's treatment of moral conflict, or conflicts of duties, I explain how Kant's ethics can satisfy all three. Although Kant denies the possibility of conflicting duties, he does allow conflicting "grounds of obligation." I develop a new interpretation of such conflicts, rejecting one proposed earlier by Onora O'Neill.

Kantian political philosophy is a rich mine, and one which is hardly played out after two centuries. This substantial collection of essays validates both of those claims. Although Kant's moral philosophy has understandably received the lion's share of attention from contemporary philosophers, Beiner and Booth, both political scientists, have gathered essays which nicely illuminate the historical and political facets of Kantian practical philosophy. Anyone interested in Kantian ethics would benefit from a look at most of the essays included.

Against the background of current reforms in higher education, we analyze the traditional education of Japanese doctoral students in philosophy of education from Western and Japanese perspectives by focusing on learning as self-education, on being and learning with others, on the socialization into the profession, and on the study of the foreign subject. Imai's explication of the Japanese construction of the adult self as instrumental is compared to Gadamer's ideas on self-education and education with others. A significant element of doctoral (...) education in Japan involves the learning of certain forms ( kata ) of professional conduct: belonging to a group, occupying a clear position in the social hierarchy, and developing a close mentoring relationship that fosters strong feelings of loyalty, harmony and respect. Furthermore, reciprocal dependence ( amae ) is analyzed and contrasted with the Western ideal of autonomy and maturity. Finally, the study of the foreign subject is considered in light of Gadamer's and Hegel's notion of making a home in the alien. Saito affirms a cross-cultural reading of foreign philosophical texts, claiming that they destabilize the native culture and turn a teacher in philosophy of education into a translator and prophet of her own as well as the foreign culture. (shrink)

Provides a guide for starting a "philosophy dinner club," a club that meets to discuss philosophy and cook food from each philosopher's home country.

We show that, if a suitable intuitionistic metatheory proves that consistency implies satisfiability for subfinite sets of propositional formulas relative either to standard structures or to Kripke models, then that metatheory also proves every negative instance of every classical propositional tautology. Since reasonable intuitionistic set theories such as HAS or IZF do not demonstrate all such negative instances, these theories cannot prove completeness for intuitionistic propositional logic in the present sense.

Teaching competency in bioethics has been a concern of the field since its start. In 1976, The Hastings Center published the first report on the teaching of contemporary bioethics. Graduate programs culminating in an MA or PhD were not needed at the time, concluded the report. “In the future, however,” the report speculated, “the development and/or changing social priorities may at some point allow, or even require, the creation of new academic structures for graduate education in bioethics.” Although that future (...) might be upon us, the creation of a terminal degree in bioethics has its detractors. Scholars have debated whether bioethics is a discipline with its own methods and theoretical grounding, a multidisciplinary field bringing various professional perspectives to bear on particular types of problems, a set of problem-solving skills to resolve moral disagreements, or something else entirely. Whether or not efforts to develop the methods and theory of bioethics have matured to the point that it is now a discipline in the strictest sense, new bioethics training programs have appeared at all postsecondary levels. In this essay, we examine the number and types of U.S. programs and degrees in this growing field. (shrink)

In 1957, Gödel proved that completeness for intuitionistic predicate logic HPL implies forms of Markov's Principle, MP. The result first appeared, with Kreisel's refinements and elaborations, in Kreisel. Featuring large in the Gödel-Kreisel proofs are applications of the axiom of dependent choice, DC. Also in play is a form of Herbrand's Theorem, one allowing a reduction of HPL derivations for negated prenex formulae to derivations of negations of conjunctions of suitable instances. First, we here show how to deduce Gödel's results (...) by alternative means, ones arguably more elementary than those of Kreisel. We avoid DC and Herbrand's Theorem by marshalling simple facts about negative translations and Markov's Rule. Second, the theorems of Gödel and Kreisel are commonly interpreted as demonstrating the unprovability of completeness for HPL, if means of proof are confined within strictly intuitionistic metamathematics. In the closing section, we assay some doubts about such interpretations. (shrink)

This classic, provocative introduction to classical metaphysical questions focuses on appreciating the problems, rather than attempting to proffer answers.

In this volume Rorty offers a Deweyan account of objectivity as intersubjectivity, one that drops claims about universal validity and instead focuses on utility for the purposes of a community. The sense in which the natural sciences are exemplary for inquiry is explicated in terms of the moral virtues of scientific communities rather than in terms of a special scientific method. The volume concludes with reflections on the relation of social democratic politics to philosophy.

The historical antecedents of Frege's treatment of binocular vision in "The thought" were the physiological writings of Johannes Mueller, Hermann von Helmholtz, and Emil du Bois-Reymond. In their research on human vision, logic was assigned an unexpected role: it was to be the means by which knowledge of a world extended in three dimensions arises from stimuli that are at best two-dimensional. An examination of this literature yields a richer understanding of Frege's insistence that a proper epistemology requires us to (...) recognize the existence and importance of nonsensible sources of knowledge. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne offers an original treatment of a question at the heart of epistemology: what makes a belief rational, or justified in holding? He maps the rival accounts of philosophers on epistemic justification ("internalist" and "externalist"), arguing that they are really accounts of different concepts. He distinguishes between synchronic justification (justification at a time) and diachronic justification (synchronic justification resulting from adequate investigation)--both internalist and externalist. He also argues that most kinds of justification are worth having because they are (...) indicative of truth; however, it is only justification of internalist kinds that can guide a believer's actions. Swinburne goes on to show the usefulness of the probability calculus in elucidating how empirical evidence makes beliefs probably true. (shrink)