In some of his last publications, R. G. Collingwood takes the position that problems in philosophy are not eternal. Such a denial, in the context of the controversies concerning the overall interpretation of Collingwood's work, is significant for at least two reasons: it seems to suggest an “atomistic” view of the history of philosophy on Collingwood's part, perhaps one that resembles that of the history of science as offered inThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Also, the denial seems to reverse Collingwood's (...) earlier views which insisted on aphilosophia perennis, and this would support those who maintain that at some point Collingwood's thought underwent a “radical conversion”. (shrink)

Husserl and others have spent a great deal of time writing introductions to phenomenology, and in trying to explain its nature. One thing that becomes clear from these efforts is that phenomenology claims to have a method for analyzing the essential structures of “mental events”. This raises the possibility of phenomenology turning back on itself, for surely the analysis itself must consist of “mental events”. Hence, at some point in its investigations, phenomenology itself could become what phenomenologists seek to analyze. (...) Husserl foresaw this when he suggested the possibility that:transcendental phenomenology itself then becomes a theme for constitutional and critical inquiry at a higher level, for the sake of conferring on it the highest dignity of genuineness: the ability to justify itself down to its roots.What becomes apparent here is that phenomenology's self-reflection is necessary, not merely possible: without self-reflection phenomenology would lack final “genuineness” or the “ability to justify itself down to its roots”. Unfortunately while Husserl, here and in other places, signals the necessity of this sort of reflection, he nowhere seems actually to carry it out at length. (shrink)

The chapter on time is one of the central investigations in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Throughout preceding chapters of that work one meets the claim that theoretical difficulties raised by the type of description of the perceiving subject that Merleau-Ponty offers are to be resolved in the investigation of time. For example, in describing perception, it begins to seem that the perceiving subject is neither a pure for-itself, nor an in-itself, but rather belongs to some category intermediate between these two. (...) How is such an ambiguity to be understood? Merleau-Ponty tells us that:On the level of being one will never understand that the subject must be at once naturans and naturatus, infinite and finite. But if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing and the other, we shall understand that there is nothing to understand beyond this. (shrink)

In the battle against the vampiric Ticks, humanity was slowly but certainly headed for extinction. For months, twin sisters Lily and Mel had been “quarantined” with thousands of other young people being harvested for their blood—food for the Ticks. Finally escaping with a few friends, the twins are separated—and must continue the fight on their own . . . After making it to a resistance base camp in Utah, Lily learned to survive at all costs. But when a Tick attack (...) decimates the fighters, Lily and her pregnant friend, McKenna, decide to make the hard trek north to Canada—and safety. Meanwhile, Mel is being taught how to survive by the very vampire that turned her. Living without her sister is hard, but dealing with the fact that her autism was cured by the vampire bite is an even bigger challenge. But when a monstrous betrayal places Lily in mortal danger, Mel must set out to find her, save her, and begin to unravel the empire of destruction that the Ticks have built. (shrink)

This landmark study brings together a comprehensive collection of readings on Educational Thought from Antiquity to the Present. It includes four volumes and over 100 different selections: Vol 1: Classic/Early Modern (to 1945) Vol 2: Modern (1945-1979) Vol 3/4: Postmodern (1979-present) From Montaigne to Chomsky, the editor has included articles from some of the Western world's most influential educational thinkers alongside authoritative voices from the field to show a full spectrum of ideas about Education, its purpose and objectives. The first (...) volume includes a lead essay by the editor on the nature of Educational Thought and the Social and Cultural Foundations of Education. Each volume also includes its own introduction. Taken together, the volumes provide an unparalleled resource featuring broad coverage of the subject with historical depth and contemporary relevance. (shrink)